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Abstract	
Aside	from	contemporaneous	material	by	activists,	scant	traces	of	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	appear	in	the	historiography	and	wider	literature	on	Ford	in	Britain.	Focusing	on	the	1970s,	this	study	reframes	the	firm’s	history	in	relation	to	these	politics.	Doing	so	highlights	the	role	of	workers’	struggle	at	Ford,	which	was	a	key	locus	for	more	widespread	unrest	at	a	time	of	crisis	and	transition.	As	a	work	of	twentieth-century	social	and	cultural	history,	it	draws	on	a	broad	range	of	sources,	including	newly	conducted	oral	history	interviews	and	material	from	private	papers	not	cited	previously.	In	the	USA,	France	and	Italy,	an	international	context	linked	the	automobile	sector	to	the	emergence	of	autonomist	politics,	which	were	articulated	in	Britain	from	1960	onwards	by	Solidarity,	a	group	with	links	to	Ford’s	workforce.	Later	that	decade	unrest	at	Ford	became	enmeshed	with	the	ill-fated	policies	of	a	Labour	government,	leading	up	to	the	launch	of	the	rank-and-file	newspaper	Big	Flame.	Influenced	by	Italian	workerism,	Big	Flame	became	a	national	political	organisation	that	intervened	at	Ford,	where	another	strike	confronted	the	subsequent	Conservative	administration’s	Industrial	Relations	Bill.	When	Labour	returned	to	power,	the	further	breakdown	of	trade-union	mediation	at	Ford	led	to	increased	conflict	and	saw	these	politics	develop	further	inside	and	outside	the	factory.	Elements	from	this	tendency	then	initiated	the	Ford	Workers	Group	(“The	Combine”),	which	took	a	lead	in	the	1978	Ford	pay	strike,	a	major	blow	against	the	government’s	Social	Contract.	Although	activity	continued	under	Margaret	Thatcher’s	premiership,	including	efforts	to	coordinate	Ford’s	European	workforce,	unrest	at	the	firm	never	again	had	the	same	impact.	This	account	reframes	our	understanding	of	this	history,	while	also	having	relevance	to	current	theoretical	debates,	for	instance	those	concerning	accelerationism,	and	recent	renewed	interest	in	the	practice	of	workers’	inquiry.	
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Introduction:	Debunking	the	Myth	of	Henry	Ford	
“You	all	remember,”	said	the	Controller,	in	his	strong	deep	voice,	“you	all	remember	I	suppose	that	beautiful	and	inspired	saying	of	Our	Ford’s:	History	is	bunk.	History,”	he	repeated	slowly,	“is	bunk.”1		 	 Aldous	Huxley,	Brave	New	World		Aldous	Huxley	clearly	indulged	in	a	rhetorical	flourish	when	he	deified	‘Our	Ford’	in	
Brave	New	World.	And	yet,	Henry	Ford	and	the	company	he	established	have,	in	truth,	transcended	this	individual’s	life	history	and	the	sphere	of	industrial	production	to	take	on	an	iconic	quality.	If	not	quite	a	god,	Ford	has	certainly	become	a	mythological	figure.	The	terms	Fordism	and	Fordist	represent	social,	economic,	political,	and	cultural	changes	at	the	heart	of	twentieth-century	history.	Over	the	same	period	the	Ford	Motor	Company	actually	became	a	titan	of	industry.	The	firm,	the	largest	in	the	world	for	a	time,	consistently	ranked	among	the	top	three	US	corporations	for	much	of	the	American	Century.2	A	workforce	based	in	Britain	made	a	significant	contribution	to	this	success,	following	the	opening	of	Ford’s	first	overseas	factory	on	a	Manchester	industrial	estate	in	1911.3	After	the	Second	World	War	British	output	overtook	that	of	an	older	Canadian	subsidiary,	coming	second	only	to	the	US	parent	company.4	This	position	was	only	ceded	to	Ford	Werke	AG,	a	German	subsidiary,	in	the	early	1970s.	Output	peaked	in	
																																								 																					1	Aldous	Huxley,	Brave	New	World	(London:	Chatto	&	Windus,	1932),	p.	38.	2	‘Fortune	500	Companies	—	A	Database	of	50	Years	of	Fortune’s	List	of	2	‘Fortune	500	Companies	—	A	Database	of	50	Years	of	Fortune’s	List	of	America’s	Largest	Corporations’	<http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full/1955/>	[accessed	20	April	2016].	3	‘Northern	Motor	Works’,	Manchester	Courier	and	Lancashire	General	
Advertiser,	18	October	1911,	p.	2.	4	Mira	Wilkins	and	Frank	Ernest	Hill,	American	Business	Abroad:	Ford	on	Six	
Continents	(Detroit,	MI:	Wayne	State	University	Press,	1964),	pp.	436–37.	
	 11	
1972,	before	going	into	steady	decline	thereafter.5	The	production	of	Ford	cars	in	Britain	finally	ceased	in	2002.6	The	subsidiary’s	economic	and	political	significance	for	Britain	followed	a	broadly	parallel	trajectory.	Having	taken	an	early	lead	in	the	automobile	sector,	the	firm	struggled	through	the	1920s	before	making	a	partial	and	gradual	recovery	in	the	1930s.	Despite	such	weak	performance,	an	employer’s	organisation	the	Economic	League	eulogised	‘Henry	Fordism’	as	‘a	new	gospel	for	industry’	in	the	aftermath	of	the	1926	general	strike.7	Ford’s	re-organisation	of	work	around	the	automated	assembly	line	appeared	to	offer	industrialists	a	solution	to	the	political	unrest	that	dominated	labour	relations	between	the	wars.	Wartime	production	revived	Ford’s	fortunes,	a	position	consolidated	afterwards.	With	the	automobile	central	to	government	strategy	for	managing	the	economy	and	in	particular	the	balance	of	payments,	this	US	subsidiary	manufactured	a	third	of	all	British	cars	exported	in	1949.	This	played	a	key	part	in	Britain	becoming	the	world’s	leading	car	exporter	the	following	year,	albeit	briefly.8	Ford	would	not	regain	its	former	position	as	the	largest	domestic	automobile	producer,	due	to	mergers	between	domestic	rivals.	Throughout	the	long	boom	the	
																																								 																					5	Steven	Tolliday,	‘Statistical	Appendix	to	Chapter	13	&	14’,	in	Ford,	1903-
2003:	The	European	History,	ed.	by	Hubert	Bonnin,	Yannick	Lung,	and	Steven	Tolliday,	2	vols	(Paris:	Éditions	PLAGE,	2003),	II,	118–47	(p.	119);	Paul	Thomes,	‘Searching	for	Identity:	Ford	Motor	Company	in	the	German	Market	(1903-2003)’,	in	Ford,	1903-2003:	The	European	History,	ed.	by	Hurbert	Bonin,	Yannick	Lung,	and	Steven	Tolliday,	2	vols	(Paris:	Éditions	PLAGE,	2003),	II,	150–95	(p.	173).	6	Steven	Tolliday,	‘The	Decline	of	Ford	in	Britain:	Marketing	and	Production	in	Retreat,	1980-2003’,	in	Ford,	1903-2003:	The	European	History,	2	vols	(Paris:	Éditions	PLAGE,	2003),	II,	73–117	(pp.	105–9).	Ford	continues	to	produce	components	including	engines	in	Britain,	and	produced	commercial	vehicles,	Jaguar	cars,	and	Land	Rovers	there	for	a	period	after	2002.	7	Henry	Fordism:	A	New	Gospel	for	Industry	(London:	The	Economic	League	(Central	Council),	1927).	8	Tolliday,	‘Statistical	Appendix’,	II,	p.	139;	D.	G.	Rhys,	The	Motor	Industry:	An	
Economic	Survey	(London:	Butterworths,	1972),	pp.	375	&	382;	Statistical	Office	of	the	United	Nations,	‘Table	119	Motor	Cars	Production’,	United	Nations	Statistical	
Yearbook,	2,	1949,	270.	
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firm	generally	outstripped	these	rivals	though	in	terms	of	exports,	profitability	and	investment.9	More	broadly	a	relationship	of	interdependence	developed	between	the	post-war	welfare	state	and	a	system	of	mass	production	epitomised	by	Ford.	Keynesian	macroeconomics	and	social	democratic	welfare	policies	created	the	social	stability	and	effective	demand	that	underpinned	this	golden	age	of	economic	growth.	Mass	production	generated	the	employment,	consumer	goods,	tax	receipts	and	exports	required	to	sustain	the	system.	Then	amid	the	political	upheaval	of	the	late	1960s,	world	economic	growth	began	to	falter.	As	a	result,	the	incomes	and	industrial	policies	of	successive	British	governments	became	increasingly	enmeshed	with	the	company’s	strategy	for	managing	labour	relations	and	negotiating	pay	contracts.	As	the	crisis	came	to	a	head,	a	series	of	disputes	at	the	company	took	on	national	political	significance.	Towards	the	end	of	the	next	decade	a	nine-week	national	Ford	strike	in	1978	marked	a	break	between	company	and	government	strategies,	foreshadowing	changes	in	government	policy	brought	in	after	Margaret	Thatcher’s	general	election	victory	six	months	later.	My	dissertation	takes	the	company	as	a	case	study	to	focus	on	the	conflict,	crisis,	and	restructuring	of	this	final	period.	This	covers	what	we	could	think	of	as	the	long	1970s:	from	around	the	time	of	the	corporation’s	transnational	integration	as	Ford	of	Europe	in	1967	until	1988,	the	year	that	an	unofficial	pay	strike—the	last	of	its	kind—ended	in	failure.	As	well	as	contextualising	the	long	1970s	in	relation	to	the	previous	history	of	Ford	in	Britain,	the	structure	of	my	dissertation	extends	this	period	somewhat	further	to	situate	developments	in	relation	to	the	electoral	cycle.	
																																								 																					9	Rhys,	p.	361.	
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The	thesis	of	my	dissertation	is	that	a	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	emerged	in	Britain	at	this	time,	which	has	been	largely	overlooked	in	the	relevant	historiography.	My	use	of	this	term	refers	to	a	loosely	defined	tendency	that	emerged	from	Marxist	politics,	more	broadly,	in	the	latter	half	of	the	twentieth	century.	While	this	perspective	was	most	clearly	articulated	in	Italy	both	politically	and	theoretically,	related	currents	also	emerged	in	the	USA,	France,	and	Britain.	The	relationship	between	these	politics	and	industrial	unrest	at	Ford	came	to	my	attention	through	my	father-in-law	Alan	Hayling	who	was	secretary	of	the	Ford	Workers	Combine	and	a	member	of	Big	Flame,	a	group	influenced	by	the	Italian	movement.	In	this	study	of	Ford,	I	aim	to	assess	how	these	perspectives	can	reframe	our	understanding	of	this	pivotal	period	of	social	unrest	and	structural	change.	In	the	process	I	also	aim	to	provide	an	evaluation	of	the	contemporary	relevance	of	these	politics	today,	both	in	terms	of	theory	and	practice.		
Methodology	
This	dissertation	is	a	work	of	twentieth-century	social	and	cultural	history,	broadly	conceived,	exploring	the	relationship	between	technological	development	and	social,	cultural	and	political	change.	It	draws	on	a	wide	range	of	sources	that	include	public	records,	newspapers,	memoirs,	archival	material,	the	private	papers	of	individuals,	and	theoretical	and	analytical	work	by	academics	and	political	activists.	Beyond	basic	standards	of	good	scholarship—accurate	citation	and	referencing	of	sources,	thorough	archive	searches,	attentiveness	to	chronology,	etc.—historical	method	might	be	best	understood	as	a	set	of	problems.	To	review	those	most	relevant	to	this	study,	let	us	begin	by	considering	Walter	Benjamin’s	
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adage	exhorting	the	historical	materialist	to	‘brush	history	against	the	grain’.10	By	this,	Benjamin	suggested	the	need	for	a	particularly	critical	reading	of	those	sources	that	represent	a	socially	dominant	perspective	to	avoid	misplaced	empathy	for	history’s	victors.	Sharing	Benjamin’s	cultural	attentiveness	and	scepticism	towards	grand	narrative,	E.	P.	Thompson	adopted	such	an	approach	in	The	Making	
of	the	English	Working	Class.11	This	text	‘opened	up	the	ambiguities	and	complexities	of	cultural	history’	according	to	Geoff	Eley,	a	historian	working	at	the	intersection	of	social	and	cultural	history	today.12	Thompson’s	depiction	of	working-class	subjectivity	then	came	under	critical	scrutiny	as	the	discipline’s	cultural	turn	progressed.13	This	saw	the	assumption	that	social	reality	was	itself	constructed	through	language	established	as	paradigmatic.	Gender	history,	a	key	constituent	of	the	new	cultural	history	associated	with	this	shift,	also	drew	attention	to	gendered	aspects	of	Thompson’s	viewpoint.14	While	such	studies	have	led	some	to	dismiss	the	continued	relevance	of	class	analysis,	Geoff	Eley	and	Keith	Nield	have	suggested	a	relationship	between	the	changing	disciplinary	conventions	of	historians	and	wider	structural	changes	in	society.	They	have	also	argued	that	‘the	political	formation	of	subjectivities	and	the	structured	consequences	of	capitalist	inequality	can	both	be	addressed	in	the	same	analysis’,	suggesting	that	insights	gained	from	cultural	history	might	inform	a	new	history	of	society.15	This	dissertation	sets	out	to	steer	a	course	along	such	a	route.																																									 																					10	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Theses	on	the	Philosophy	of	History’,	in	Illuminations,	trans.	by	Harry	Zohn	(London:	Jonathan	Cape,	1970),	p.	259.	11	E.	P.	Thompson,	The	Making	of	the	English	Working	Class	(London:	Victor	Gollancz,	1963).	12	Geoff	Eley,	A	Crooked	Line:	From	Cultural	History	to	the	History	of	Society	(Ann	Arbour,	MI:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	2005),	p.	56.	13	Gareth	Stedman	Jones,	Languages	of	Class:	Studies	of	English	Working	Class	
History,	1832-1982	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1983),	p.	17.	14	For	instance,	Carolyn	Steedman,	Labours	Lost:	Domestic	Service	and	the	
Making	of	Modern	England	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2009),	pp.	16–17.	 15	Geoff	Eley	and	Keith	Nield,	The	Future	of	Class	in	History:	What’s	Left	of	the	
Social?	(Ann	Arbour,	MI:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	2007),	p.	17;	See	also	Eley.	
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My	research	also	draws	upon	oral	sources:	both	newly	conducted	interviews	and	existing	recordings.	The	use	of	such	material	by	historians	is	intimately	linked	to	the	historiography	of	Ford,	with	the	company’s	official	historian	Allan	Nevins	widely	seen	as	‘the	father	of	modern	oral	history’.16	By	1938	Nevins	had	already	explored	the	use	of	interviews	by	historians	and	the	implications	of	the	emergence	of	sound	recording	technology	for	the	discipline.17	He	then	began	to	apply	these	insights	to	his	own	research	from	the	late	1940s	onwards.	Nevins	early	work	foreshadowed	subsequent	developments	by	reflecting	on	the	wide,	potential	applications	of	oral	sources	to	fields	such	as	Native	American	history.	His	later	studies,	however,	focused	more	narrowly	on	the	testimony	of	elite	leaders,	senior	Ford	executives	among	them.	Conducting	interviews	has	also	been	a	well-established	practice	for	labour	historians,	which	preceded	and	contributed	the	expansion	of	oral	history	from	the	late	1960s	onwards.18	More	recently	the	prominent	oral	historian	Paul	Thompson	identified	the	collection	of	‘basic	information	about	[...]	technology	and	work	organisation’	as	a	legitimate	and	valuable	application	for	such	sources.19	Indeed,	he	mentioned	this	specifically	with	reference	to	studies	of	the	relationship	between	social	forces,	culture	and	technological	change.	Such	issues	are	of	central	concerns	to	this	dissertation.	Yet,	any	current	work	that	sets	out	to	integrate	interviews	into	a	broader	study	cannot	overlook	how	oral	history	has	shifted	the	ontological	focus	historians	bring	to	such	sources.	The	subjective	qualities	of	interviewees’	testimony	and	the	construction	of	historic	memory,	both	of	which	began	as	problematic	issues	faced																																									 																					16	See	for	instance	‘Meeting	on	High:	The	First	National	Colloquium’,	Oral	
History	Association	Newsletter,	1.1	(1967),	1–2	(p.	2).	17	Allan	Nevins,	The	Gateway	to	History	(New	York,	NY:	1938,	Appleton	Century),	p.	55.	18	John	Saville,	‘Oral	History	and	the	Labour	Historian’,	Oral	History,	1.3	(1972),	60–62.	19	Paul	Thompson,	The	Voice	of	the	Past:	Oral	History,	3rd	edn	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2000),	p.	84.	
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when	applying	oral	sources	to	questions	of	historical	fact,	have	become	the	primary	objects	of	inquiry	for	many	historians	today.	For	some,	this	raises	questions	about	their	legitimate	application	to	‘the	concrete	situation	of	the	history	of	technology’.20	I	take	the	view	that,	while	making	full	use	of	such	sources	requires	attentiveness	to	subjective	factors,	it	remains	both	possible	and	necessary	to	glean	other	information	from	them	too.	Such	an	approach	is	consistent	with	the	epistemological	and	ontological	assumptions	associated	with	a	critical	realist	perspective.21	Aside	from	such	general	considerations,	the	interview	process	itself	raises	further	methodological	issues.	The	focus	of	this	research	made	it	appropriate	to	select	interviewees	based	on	their	ability	to	address	specific	questions.	This	is	a	well-established	practice	for	oral	historians,	initially	informed	by	the	grounded	theory	approach	to	qualitative	research.	For	my	purposes,	this	has	involved	starting	with	a	small	number	of	existing	contacts	and	seeking	to	‘snowball’	out	to	others	with	whom	they	worked	and/or	organised	politically	at	Ford.22	To	prepare	for	the	interviews,	I	drafted	a	list	of	non-leading,	open	questions	tailored	to	each	individual	(based	on	my	prior	understanding	of	their	relationship	to	the	subject	matter).	These	served	as	interview	guides	rather	than	questionnaires.	So	long	as	proceedings	didn’t	deviate	too	far	off	topic	and	the	relevant	points	were	covered,	I	aimed	to	practice	active	listening	rather	than	imposing	too	rigid	a	structure	on	the	interviews.23	
																																								 																					20	Chris	Niblett,	‘Oral	Testimony	and	the	Social	History	of	Technology’,	Oral	
History:	Journal	of	the	Oral	History	Society,	8.2	(1980),	53–57	(pp.	54–55).	21	Roy	Bhaskar,	A	Realist	Theory	of	Science	(Leeds:	Leeds	Books,	1975).	22	Paul	Thompson,	The	Voice	of	the	Past,	p.	151;	Barney	G.	Glaser	and	Anselm	L.	Strauss,	The	Discovery	of	Grounded	Theory:	Strategies	for	Qualitative	Research	(London:	Weidenfield	and	Nicholson,	1968),	pp.	62–65.	23	Along	with	my	own	previous	experience,	both	as	an	oral	history	interviewer	and	interviewee,	the	following	sources	helped	inform	my	approach:	Thompson,	pp.	222–45;	‘Getting	Started	|	Oral	History	Society’	<http://www.ohs.org.uk/advice/getting-started/>	[accessed	29	July	2016];	Pierre	
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Many	views	on	historical	method	that	have	entered	mainstream	academic	thought	share	a	genealogical	relationship	with	the	topic	of	this	dissertation.	Italian	workerism	(operaismo)	and	autonomist	Marxism	represented	open,	anti-determinist	political	tendencies,	which	developed	a	distinct	approach	to	questions	of	structure	and	agency.24	In	the	late	1960s	Marxist	humanism	came	under	criticism	for	focusing	too	heavily	on	questions	of	alienation	derived	from	Marx’s	early	work.25	Whatever	the	weaknesses	of	this	structuralist	argument,	it	contained	a	grain	of	truth,	reflecting	ideas	prevalent	in	the	new	left	at	the	time.	A	workerist	approach	instead	offered	a	reinterpretation	of	the	critique	of	political	economy	in	Marx’s	later	work,	which	placed	strategic	emphasise	on	how	workers’	subjectivity	could	be	read	back	into	this	analysis.26		
Literature	Review	
The	automobile	industry	in	general	and	the	Ford	Motor	Company	in	particular	played	a	prominent	part	in	twentieth-century	history.	A	vast	body	of	potentially	relevant	material	confronts	anyone	embarking	upon	research	into	a	particular	aspect	of	this	history.	To	tackle	this	challenge,	I	have	found	it	useful	to	group	material	into	two	main	categories:	general	texts	and	those	written	from	below.	From	the	latter	set,	I	have	then	separated	out	a	sub-category	of	sources	that	relate	conflict	in	the	automobile	sector	to	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy.	Doing	so	draws	attention	to	material	that,	in	my	view,	has	been	inadequately	addressed	by	the	wider	literature.																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 				Bourdieu,	‘Comprendre’,	in	La	misère	du	monde,	ed.	by	Pierre	Bourdieu,	Libre	Examen	(Paris:	Editions	du	Seuil,	1993),	pp.	903–39.	24	Mario	Tronti,	‘Lenin	in	Inghilterra’,	Classe	Operaia,	1,	1964,	1	&	18–20;	Mario	Tronti,	‘Lenin	in	England’,	in	Working	Class	Autonomy	and	the	Crisis:	Italian	
Marxist	Texts	of	the	Theory	and	Practice	of	a	Class	Movement,	ed.	by	Red	Notes,	trans.	by	Red	Notes	[Ed	Emery]	(London:	Red	Notes/CSE	Books),	pp.	1–6.	25	Louis	Althusser	and	others,	Lire	‘Le	Capital’	(Paris:	Maspero,	1967).	26	Harry	Cleaver,	Reading	‘Capital’	Politically	(Brighton:	Harvester	Press,	1979).	
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Any	such	categorisation	leaves	itself	open	to	question.	Some	texts	straddle	the	boundary	between	categories,	while	others	do	not	fit	neatly	into	any	such	schema.	The	present	case	is	no	exception.	Such	an	exercise	still	retains	a	heuristic	value	as	it	helps	clarify	my	thesis,	which	explores	how	material	from	the	final	sub-category	might	reframe	our	understanding	of	Ford’s	British	history.	The	literature	on	Ford	can	be	traced	back	to	works	written	for	Henry	Ford	by	Samuel	Crowther	in	the	1920s.27	While	these	provided	a	vivid	account	of	the	company’s	early	history,	John	Kenneth	Galbraith	counselled	caution	regarding	their	reliability.	‘Ford	was	the	product	of	a	pioneer	public	relations	ploy’,	he	warned,	‘the	first	of	the	industrial	fairy	tales’.28	Such	sources	serve	most	readily	to	remind	us	of	Ford’s	self-construction	as	a	mythological	figure.	A	more	rigorous	official	company	history	only	emerged	in	the	1950s,	following	the	death	of	Henry	Ford.	This	began	with	a	three-volume	study	funded	by	the	Ford	foundation	to	mark	the	firm’s	fiftieth	anniversary.29	Another	work	funded	by	the	company	followed	shortly	afterwards,	focusing	specifically	on	Ford’s	international	reach.30	More	recently	a	two-volume	official	history	of	the	corporation’s	European	operations	came	out	for	Ford’s	centenary.	This	brought	together	work	from	across	a	range	of	disciplines,	representing	a	breadth	of	critical	scholarship	to	provide	a	richly	multifaceted	account	of	the	company	from	a	range																																									 																					27	Henry	Ford	and	Samuel	Crowther,	My	Life	and	Work	(Garden	City,	NY:	Garden	City	Publishing,	1922);	Henry	Ford	and	Samuel	Crowther,	Today	and	
Tomorrow	(London:	William	Heinemann,	1926).	28	John	Kenneth	Galbraith,	‘Was	Ford	a	Fraud?’,	in	The	Liberal	Hour	(Boston,	MA:	Houghton	Mifflin	Company,	1960),	pp.	141–65	(p.	142).	Galbraith’s	perspective	illustrates	the	limits	of	my	categorisation:	as	a	Keynesian	economist	about	to	be	appointed	as	a	US	diplomat,	he	hardly	viewed	Ford	from	below,	but	nor	does	his	sharply	independent	scrutiny	of	the	firm	fit	readily	into	a	general	category	centred	around	management’s	perspective.	29	Allan	Nevins,	Ford:	The	Times,	the	Man	the	Company	(New	York,	NY:	Charles	Scribner’s	Sons,	1954);	Allan	Nevins	and	Frank	Ernest	Hill,	Ford:	Expansion	
and	Challenge	1915-1933	(New	York,	NY:	Charles	Scribner’s	Sons,	1957);	Allan	Nevins	and	Frank	Ernest	Hill,	Ford:	Decline	and	Rebirth,	1933-1962	(New	York,	NY:	Charles	Scribner’s	Sons,	1963).	30	Wilkins	and	Hill.	
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of	different	perspectives.31	Yet,	apart	from	one	brief	chapter,	suggesting	the	importance	of	‘the	transnational	dimension’	of	industrial	unrest	through	a	comparative	study	of	Britain	and	Germany,	this	aspect	of	the	firm’s	history	generally	received	only	marginal	attention.32	The	start	of	this	turn	towards	greater	independence	in	Ford’s	official	historiography	coincided	with	the	publication	of	memoirs	by	a	number	of	the	firm’s	former	managers.	These	included	Harry	Bennett’s	account	of	his	time	as	head	of	the	company’s	infamous	‘service	department’,	a	private	police	force	with	a	well-deserved	reputation	for	violence.	Bennett	claimed	that	the	department’s	activity	represented	‘an	organization	policy,	and	was	carried	out	by	the	
organization',33	emphasising	Henry	Ford’s	share	of	responsibility	for	its	actions.	The	hardboiled	style	of	this	ghostwritten	memoir,	which	reads	like	a	detective	novel,	was	reflected	in	its	publication	under	an	imprint	specialising	in	ufology.	A	few	years	later	Charles	E.	Sorensen,	a	former	Ford	executive,	offered	a	more	sober	personal	account,	which	highlighted	the	contribution	he	and	other	senior	Ford	executives	had	made	to	the	company.34	Taken	together	both	books	began	to	undermine	a	well-crafted	image	of	Henry	Ford	as	a	socially	benign	and	technically	creative	genius.	Such	works	can	be	situated	within	a	broader	interdisciplinary	context	that	extends	beyond	personal	memoir	and	business	history	into	management	studies,	
																																								 																					31	Ford,	1903-2003:	The	European	History,	ed.	by	Hubert	Bonnin,	Yannick	Lung,	and	Steven	Tolliday,	2	vols	(Paris:	Éditions	PLAGE,	2003).	32	Thomas	Fetzer,	‘Walking	out	of	the	National	Workplace:	Industrial	Disputes	and	Trade	Union	Politics	at	Ford	in	Britain	and	Germany	in	the	1970s	and	1980s’,	in	Ford,	1903-2003:	The	European	History,	ed.	by	Hubert	Bonin,	Yannick	Lung,	and	Steven	Tolliday,	2	vols	(Paris:	Éditions	PLAGE,	2003),	I,	393–416	(p.	393).	 33	Harry	Bennett	and	Paul	Marcus,	We	Never	Called	Him	Henry,	Gold	Medal	Books	(New	York,	NY:	Fawcett	Publishing,	1951),	p.	34	(emphasis	in	the	original).	34	Charles	E.	Sorensen	and	David	L.	Lewis,	My	Forty	Years	with	Ford	(New	York,	NY:	Norton,	1956;	repr.	Detroit,	MI:	Wayne	State	University	Press,	2006).	
	 20	
human	relations,	and	industrial	relations.35	Urwick	Orr	and	Partners’	activities	as	management	consultants	in	a	late-1960s	job	evaluation	programme	at	the	company’s	British	subsidiary	suggest	the	relevance	of	Lyndall	Urwick’s	contribution	to	management	theory.36	Other	particularly	relevant	work	from	the	field	of	industrial	relations	includes	an	account	of	unrest	in	the	British	automobile	industry	and	another	study	co-written	by	an	ex-shop	steward	and	a	former	labour	relations	manager,	who	both	participated	in	negotiations	during	the	1968	sewing	machinists’	strike	at	Ford	Dagenham.37	Steven	Tolliday’s	role	as	joint	editor	of	the	company’s	most	recent	official	history	draws	attention	to	his	previous	research,	including	collaborative	work	with	Jonathan	Zeitlin.	Originally	working	in	the	field	of	economic	and	social	history,38	Tolliday	and	Zeitlan	began	to	frame	the	dynamics	of	the	late	twentieth	century	in	terms	of	a	transition	between	Fordism	and	flexible	specialisations.39	While	recognising	the	importance	of	a	variety	of	structural	and	institutional	factors,	this	approach	generally	focused	on	strategic	choices	made	by	management.	Over	the	trajectory	of	Tolliday’s	writing,	an	account	emerged	of	developments	at	Ford	and	across	the	automobile	industry	in	general	that	emphasised	causal	complexity,	while	ascribing	little	importance	if	any	to	the	action	of	workers.																																										 																					35	Seminal	texts	in	these	three	related	disciplines	include	Frederick	W.	Taylor,	The	Principles	of	Scientific	Management	(New	York,	NY:	Harper	&	Brothers,	1913);	Elton	Mayo,	The	Social	Problems	of	an	Industrial	Civilisation	(Boston,	MA:	Harvard	University,	1945);	John	T.	Dunlop,	Industrial	Relations	Systems	(New	York,	NY:	Henry	Holt,	1958).	A	Ford	Foundation	Grant	supported	Dunlop’s	work	with	the	Inter-University	Study	of	Labour	Problems	in	Economic	Development.	36	Lyndall	Urwick	and	Edward	Franz	Leopold	Brech,	The	Making	of	Scientific	
Management,	3	vols	(London:	Management	Publications	Trust,	1945).	37	H.	A.	Turner,	Garfield	Clack,	and	Geoffrey	Roberts,	Labour	Relations	in	the	
Motor	Industry:	A	Study	of	Industrial	Unrest	and	an	International	Comparison	(London:	George	Allen	&	Unwin,	1967);	Henry	Friedman	and	Sanders	Meredeen,	
The	Dynamics	of	Industrial	Conflict:	Lessons	from	Ford	(London:	Croom	Helm,	1980).	38	Shop	Floor	Bargaining	and	the	State:	Historical	and	Comparative	
Perspectives,	ed.	by	Steven	Tolliday	and	Jonathan	Zeitlin	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1985).	39	Between	Fordism	and	Flexibility:	The	Automobile	Industry	and	Its	Workers,	ed.	by	Steven	Tolliday	and	Jonathan	Zeitlin	(Oxford:	Berg,	1992).	
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A	historiography	of	Ford	from	below	can	be	traced	back	to	Upton	Sinclair’s	semi-fictional	didactic	novel	The	Flivver	King.	This	was	written	in	support	of	the	United	Automobile	Worker’s	(UAW)	campaign	to	unionise	the	company’s	workforce.	From	its	opening	passage,	Sinclair	almost	suggested	that	Ford	invented	the	car:	'“Mom,”	said	little	Abner,	“there's	a	feller	down	the	street	says	he's	goin'	to	make	a	wagon	that'll	run	without	a	hoss.”'40	A	tension	runs	throughout	the	text	between	similar	sections	enthralled	to	the	carmaker’s	achievements	and	others	depicting	management’s	brutal	enforcement	of	labour	discipline.	In	an	earlier	novel	
The	Jungle,	Sinclair	described	processes	in	the	Chicago	meatpacking	industry	that	paved	the	way	for	the	introduction	of	the	automated	assembly	line	to	the	automobile	sector.	While	this	brought	to	public	attention	an	automated	system	of	workflow	years	before	Ford’s	single	greatest	innovation,	Sinclair’s	own	role	in	disseminating	this	technology	appears	ironically	to	have	been	lost	on	the	author.	41	While	Henry	Ford	had	already	attracted	adverse	attention,	notably	for	his	publication	of	anti-Semitic	propaganda	on	an	industrial	scale,42	his	commercial	activity	would	only	undergo	thorough	critical	examination	after	the	Second	World	War.	Keith	Sward,	who	initiated	this	process,	shared	Sinclair’s	links	to	the	UAW,	having	worked	for	the	Congress	of	Industrial	Organizations	(CIO)	the	union	federation	to	which	the	UAW	was	affiliated.	Years	before	a	credible	official	version	of	the	company’s	history	saw	publication,	Sward	began	to	subject	the	Ford	myth	to	scrutiny.43	
																																								 																					40	Upton	Sinclair,	The	Flivver	King:	A	Story	of	Ford-America.	(Pasadena,	CA:	the	author,	1937).	41	Upton	Sinclair,	The	Jungle	(New	York,	NY:	Jungle	Publishing	Co,	1906).	42	See	for	instance	Edwin	Pipp,	The	Real	Henry	Ford	(Detroit,	MI:	Pipp’s	Weekly,	1922).	43	Keith	T.	Sward,	The	Legend	of	Henry	Ford	(Toronto:	Rinehart	&	Co,	1948).	
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The	Communist	Party	also	figured	prominently	in	the	activities	of	the	UAW-CIO	until	a	purge	at	the	beginning	of	the	Cold	War.44	The	party	played	a	comparable	role	organising	Ford’s	workforce	in	Britain	at	least	until	the	early	1960s.	This	gives	particular	relevance	to	material	issued	by	the	party	as	well	as	by	shop	stewards,	many	of	whom	were	party	members.45	Then	an	upsurge	in	industrial	militancy	at	Ford	at	the	end	of	the	1960s	stimulated	wider	interest	in	the	firm’s	workforce.46	Huw	Beynon	explicitly	adopted	a	perspective	‘from	below’	for	his	sociological	account	of	shop	stewards	at	Ford’s	Halewood	plant	on	Merseyside.	Beynon	focused	on	the	subject	position	of	the	shop	steward	as	a	militant	representative	of	their	workmates.47	When	a	second	edition	came	out	in	1984,	Beynon	eschewed	the	opportunity	to	bring	the	story	up	to	date,	simply	including	two	new	chapters,	providing	a	brief	overview	of	strategic	developments	from	the	perspective	of	management	and	labour.	The	new	version	ended,	however,	with	‘A	Bibliographical	Note’,	listing	‘a	number	of	important	publications’	produced	in	the	meantime.48	This	included	material	by	Red	Notes,	Big	Flame,	and	the	Ford	Workers	Group.	This	dissertation	takes	up	this	thread,	while	examining	how	such	sources	might	offer	an	alternative	perspective	from	Beynon’s	initial	thesis	on	the	relationship	between	rank-and-file	trade	unionism	and	shop-floor	workers.																																									 																					44	There	is	even	a	credible	case	that	UAW	leader	Walter	Reuthers,	who	led	this	purge	was	a	member	for	much	of	the	1930s.	Victor	G.	Devinatz,	‘Reassessing	the	Historical	UAW:	Walter	Reuther’s	Affiliation	with	the	Communist	Party	and	Some	of	Its	Meaning—A	Document	of	Party	Involvement,	1939’,	Labour/Le	Travail,	49	(2002),	223–45.	45	See	for	instance	The	Communist	Party	Midlands	District,	Men	and	Motors	
Today...	A	Policy	for	the	Industry	(Birmingham:	The	Communist	Party	Midlands	District	Committee,	1954);	Joint	Ford	Shop	Stewards	Committee,	What’s	Wrong	at	
Fords	(London:	Joint	Ford	Shop	Stewards	Committee,	1962);	Kevin	Halpin,	Memoirs	
of	a	Militant:	Sharply	and	to	the	Point	(Glasgow:	Praxis	Press,	2012).	46	For	an	early	such	example	see	John	Mathews,	Ford	Strike:	The	Workers’	
Story	(London:	Panther,	1972).	47	Huw	Beynon,	Working	for	Ford,	1st	edn	(Harmondsworth:	Penguin,	1973);	Beynon,	Working	for	Ford.	48	Huw	Beynon,	Working	for	Ford,	2nd	edn	(Harmondsworth:	Penguin,	1984),	p.	397.	
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Ralph	Darlington	took	a	broadly	similar	approach	in	his	own	study	into	the	dilemmas	stewards	subsequently	faced	at	the	same	plant.49	Sheila	Cohen’s	recent	history	of	a	union	branch	at	Ford	Dagenham	was	also	written	in	a	similar	vein.	Cohen’s	conclusion	highlighted	the	shifting	balance	of	forces	within	the	unions:	‘The	pivot	of	union-as-institution	overpowering,	for	now,	union-as-movement’.	In	doing	so,	she	framed	the	power	relationship	between	unofficial	rank-and-file	union	activists	and	full-time	officials	as	a	key	dynamic.50	This	suggests	a	high	degree	of	continuity	in	terms	of	the	theory	and	practice	of	labour	unrest	going	back	to	the	shop	stewards	movement	of	the	First	World	War.	Such	work	can	all	be	situated	within	a	wider	body	of	historical	and	sociological	material	by	authors	sympathetic	to	the	labour	movement	in	Britain	since	Sydney	and	Beatrice	Webb.51	Carter	Goodrich’s	study	of	the	conflict	between	craftsmen	and	management	for	control	of	Britain’s	engineering	workshops	in	the	1920s	is	of	particular	relevance.	Specifically,	subsequent	writers	have	adopted	Goodrich’s	term	the	frontier	of	control	to	describe	the	shifting	balance	of	forces	at	work.52	Studies	‘from	below’	tend	to	adopt	a	Marxist	perspective,	of	one	form	or	another,	providing	another	context	within	which	they	need	to	be	situated,	beginning	with	Marx’s	own	writing	on	work.53	The	outcome	of	the	October	Revolution	quickly	confronted	the	Bolsheviks	with	the	need	to	respond	practically																																									 																					49	Ralph	Darlington,	The	Dynamics	of	Workplace	Unionism:	Shop	Stewards	
Organization	in	Three	Merseyside	Plants	(London:	Mansell,	1994).	50	Sheila	Cohen,	Notoriously	Militant:	The	Story	of	a	Union	Branch	(London:	Merlin	Press,	2013),	p.	194.	51	Sidney	Webb	and	Beatrice	Webb,	The	History	of	Trade	Unionism	(London:	Longmans,	Green,	1894);	Sidney	Webb	and	Beatrice	Webb,	Industrial	Democracy	(London:	the	authors,	1898).	52	Carter	Goodrich,	The	Frontier	of	Control.	A	Study	in	British	Workshop	
Politics	(London:	G	Bell	&	Sons,	1920),	pp.	56–62;	Darlington,	pp.	19–25.	53	The	following	are	of	particular	relevance:	Karl	Marx,	Grundrisse:	
Foundations	of	the	Critique	of	Political	Economy	(Rough	Draft),	trans.	by	Martin	Nicolaus	(Harmondsworth:	Penguin/New	Left	Review,	1973);	Karl	Marx,	Capital:	A	
Critique	of	Political	Economy,	trans.	by	Ben	Fowkes	and	David	Fernbach,	3	vols	(Harmondsworth:	Penguin/New	Left	Review,	1973).	
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to	questions	of	how	to	organise	production,	giving	particular	relevance	to	Lenin	and	Trotsky’s	writing	on	industrial	management.54	This	coincided	with	a	struggle	for	control	of	the	workplace	in	developed	Western	countries.	Alexandra	Kollontai’s	critique	of	the	Bolshevik	leadership’s	industrial	policies	was	also	framed	in	terms	of	workers’	control,	highlighting	parallels	between	the	situations	faced	by	workers	under	both	systems.55	An	edition	of	Kollontai’s	text	republished	by	Solidarity,	a	group	we	will	come	back	to,	was	accompanied	by	detailed	footnotes.	Despite	their	polemic	tone,	these	forensically	dissected	how	the	Bolshevik	leadership	became	enthralled	with	Fordism	after	the	October	Revolution,	suppressing	Soviet	industrial	democracy	within	a	political	dictatorship.56	Tangentially	to	this,	the	imprisoned	Italian	Communist	leader	Antonio	Gramsci	reflected	broadly	on	the	implications	of	new	production	methods	developed	by	American	industry	in	general	and	Ford	in	particular.57	‘Workers’	autonomy’	provides	a	unifying	theme	for	a	final	sub-category	of	texts	written	‘from	below’,	which	can	be	traced	back	to	dissident	Trotskyists	in	the	USA	and	France	after	the	Second	World	War.	Disillusioned	with	the	orthodox	Trotskyist	misassessment	of	the	stability	of	the	capitalist	system	and	equally	dissatisfied	with	its	account	of	Soviet	Russia,	a	group	of	left-wing	intellectuals	and	militant	workers	began	to	examine	the	automobile	sector	collectively.	Phil	Singer,	a	
																																								 																					54	This	includes	material	such	as	Lenin,	V.	I.,	‘The	Taylor	System—Man’s	Enslavement	by	the	Machine’,	in	Collected	Works	(Moscow:	Progress	Publishers,	1964),	XX,	152–54;	Leon	Trotsky,	Terrorism	and	Communism:	A	Reply	to	Karl	
Kautsky	(Ann	Arbour,	MI:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	1961).	55	Alexandra	Kollontay,	‘The	Workers’	Opposition’,	Workers’	Dreadnought,	3	September	1921,	p.	5;	Alexandra	Kollontai,	The	Workers	Opposition,	Solidarity	Pamphlet,	7	(Reading:	E.	Morse,	1962).	56	Alexandra	Kollontai,	The	Workers	Opposition,	3rd	Solidarity	(London:	Solidarity,	1979),	pp.	25–34.	57	Antonio	Gramsci,	‘Americanismo	e	fordismo’,	in	Quaderni	del	carcere:	
Edizione	critica	dell’Instituto	Gramsci,	4	vols	(Torino:	Einaudi,	1975),	III,	2137–81;	Antonio	Gramsci,	‘Americanism	and	Fordism’,	in	Selections	from	Prison	Notebooks,	trans.	by	Quintin	Hoare	and	Geoffrey	Nowell	Smith	(London:	Lawrence	and	Wishart,	1971),	pp.	277–318.	
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Black	car	worker,	made	an	early	contribution	with	the	Marxist	theorist	Grace	Lee	Boggs	in	The	American	Worker.58	Singer	and	Lee	Boggs	were	both	members	of	the	Johnson-Forest	Tendency,	initially	a	faction	of	the	Socialist	Workers	Party.	This	group	took	its	name	from	the	pseudonyms	of	its	two	leading	members:	the	Trinidadian	historian	and	political	theorist	C.	L.	R.	James	and	Trotsky’s	former	secretary	Raya	Dunayevskaya.	Together	they	developed	an	analysis	of	the	Soviet	Union	as	state	capitalist,	not	only	in	terms	of	its	integration	into	the	world	market	but	also	based	on	the	social	relations	in	production	within	this	society.	In	doing	so,	they	also	emphasised	how	the	situation	there	mirrored	increased	state	intervention	to	manage	industry	in	the	West,	highlighting	parallels	between	workers’	experiences	across	both	sides	of	the	Iron	Curtain.59	Following	a	break	with	Trotskyism,	the	Correspondence	Publishing	Committee	and	Facing	Reality,	both	of	which	emerged	from	the	Johnson-Forest	Tendency,	issued	further	studies	of	the	automobile	sector	written	by	members	of	its	workforce.60	Within	two	years	of	its	publication,	a	French	translation	of	The	American	
Worker	was	serialised	in	Socialisme	ou	Barbarie.61	This	was	the	eponymous	journal	of	a	group	that	developed	a	libertarian	socialist	perspective,	emphasising	the	increasingly	bureaucratic	form	of	contemporary	capitalism	and	its	apparent	stability	since	the	Second	World	War.	Cornelius	Castoriadis,	Socialisme	ou	Barbarie’s	most	prominent	theorist,	emphasised	the	growing	importance	of	the	relationship	between	‘dirigeants’	(managers)	and	‘exécutants’	(managed)	in																																									 																					58	Paul	Romano	and	Ria	Stone,	The	American	Worker	(Detroit,	MI:	Bewick	Editions,	1972).	59	J.	R.	Johnson,	F.	Forest,	and	Ria	Stone,	The	Invading	Socialist	Society	([New	York,	NY]:	Johnson-Forest	Tendency,	1947),	p.	1.	60	James	Boggs,	‘The	American	Revolution:	Pages	from	a	Negro	Workers	Notebook’,	Monthly	Review,	15.3–4	(1963),	13–93;	Charles	Denby,	Indignant	Heart:	
A	Black	Worker’s	Journal	(Boston,	MA:	South	End	Press,	1978).	An	earlier	version	of	Denby’s	work	was	originally	published	under	the	pen	name	Charles	Ward	in	1952.	61	This	begins	with	Paul	Romano,	‘L’ouvrier	américain	(I)	(traduit	de	l’américain)’,	Socialisme	ou	Barbarie,	1,	1949,	78–89.	
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modern	society,	leading	to	a	break	with	Marxist	class	analysis	and	theory	of	capitalist	crisis.62	Based	on	a	historical	critique	of	the	politics	of	workers’	control,	Socialisme	ou	Barbarie	also	formulated	the	demand	for	autogestion	(self-management),	a	slogan	that	was	raised	more	widely	during	the	French	factory	occupations	of	1968.	In	1960	a	minority	faction	of	the	Socialist	Labour	League,	then	the	largest	Trotskyist	organisation	in	Britain,	split	away	to	form	the	group	Solidarity,	adopting	a	perspective	close	to	that	of	Socialisme	ou	Barbarie.	One	of	the	leading	figures	among	these	dissidents	was	Ken	Weller,	a	shop	steward	at	Ford	Dagenham.	The	firm	also	provided	the	subject	of	analysis	for	frequent	articles	in	the	journal	
Solidarity.63	By	this	point	C.	L.	R.	James	lived	in	London	with	his	then	wife	Selma	James.	Among	other	things	Selma	James	edited	the	newsletter	of	the	Black	Regional	Action	Movement,	Black	RAM,	which	published	articles	on	the	situation	encountered	by	Black	workers	at	the	Ford	Langley	truck	assembly	plant	west	of	London.64	Selma	James	went	on	to	co-author	a	seminal	pamphlet	on	women	and	housework	with	the	Italian	feminist	Mariarosa	Dalla	Costa.65	This	opened	a	critical	dialogue	with	Italian	workerism	(operaismo):	a	related	political	tendency	articulated	by	figures	such	as	Mario	Tronti	and	Romano	Alquati	from	the	early	1960s.66	While	Tronti’s	theoretical	
																																								 																					62	Cornelius	Castoriadis,	Capitalisme	moderne	et	révolution:	le	mouvement	
révolutionnaire	sous	le	capitalisme	moderne	(Paris:	Union	Générale	D’Éditions,	1979),	II,	p.	52.	63	See	for	instance	‘Fords’,	Solidarity:	For	Workers’	Power,	2.7	(1962),	3–4;	Ken	Weller	and	Ernie	Stanton,	What	Happened	at	Ford,	Solidarity	Pamphlet,	26	(Bromley,	Kent:	Solidarity,	1967).	The	back	cover	of	the	later	work	features	a	list	of	articles	on	to	the	automobile	industry	from	the	journal.	64	‘D.R.U.M.’,	The	Black	Ram,	1.4	(1969),	9–12.	65	Mariarosa	Dalla	Costa	and	Selma	James,	The	Power	of	Women	and	the	
Subversion	of	Community,	3rd	edn	(Bristol:	Falling	Wall	Press,	1975).	66	Mario	Tronti,	Operai	e	capitale	(Torino:	Einaudi,	1966);	Romano	Alquati,	
Sulla	FIAT,	e	altri	scritti,	Materiali	Marxisti	(Milano:	Feltrinelli,	1975).	Both	of	these	anthologies	include	material	first	published	in	the	early	1960s.	
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work	has	led	to	him	being	dubbed	‘the	“father	of	European	Workerism”’,67	Alquati	developed	and	applied	a	politically	engaged	research	method	to	the	Italian	carmaker	Fiat,	derived	in	part	from	Marx’s	enquête	ouvrière	(workers’	inquiry)	a	term	derived	from	a	survey	Marx	designed	for	a	French	socialist	journal.68	Another	particularly	relevant	Italian	source	for	our	purposes	is	Operai	e	
stato.69	The	first	part	of	this	edited	volume	emerged	from	a	discussion	in	1967,	attended	by	figures	who	would	gain	prominence	through	Italy’s	Hot	Autumn	(l’autunno	caldo)	of	industrial	unrest	two	years	later.	These	essays	attempted	to	synthesise	a	historic	overview	of	recent	developments	in	political	economy,	situating	these	in	relation	to	the	social	upheaval	of	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century.	At	the	time	of	publication,	in	1973,	two	further	essays	were	included,	one	of	which	provided	an	account	of	Ford	in	Britain	by	Ferruccio	Gambino.	This	choice	of	subject	matter	was	no	coincidence	according	to	the	introduction	to	an	abridged	English	translation	that	came	out	the	same	year:	‘A	section	of	the	Italian	left	has	[...]	for	several	years	looked	to	the	UK	as	having	one	of	the	strongest	working	classes	in	production	[...]	being	one	of	the	weakest	links	in	the	capitalist	chain,	together	with	Italy.70’	This	text	appeared	in	Big	Flame	Fact	
Folder	No.	3,	a	dossier	of	material	focused	on	current	workplace	struggles	in	Britain.71	Ed	Emery,	the	translator,	also	organised	at	Ford	Dagenham	with	East	London	Big	Flame	and	subsequently	supported	the	Ford	Workers	Group	and	the	Ford	Workers	Combine.																																									 																					67	Mario	Tronti,	‘Tronti	on	Negri’,	in	Working	Class	Autonomy	and	the	Crisis:	
Italian	Marxist	Texts	of	the	Theory	and	Practice	of	a	Class	Movement,	ed.	by	Red	Notes,	trans.	by	Red	Notes	[Ed	Emery]	(London:	Red	Notes/CSE	Books,	1979),	pp.	21–22	(p.	21).	68	For	a	recent	history	of	workers	inquiry,	see	Asad	Haider	and	Salar	Mohandesi,	‘Workers’	Inquiry:	A	Genealogy’,	Viewpoint	Magazine,	3,	2013,	1–29.	69	Sergio	Bologna	and	others,	Operai	e	stato:	Lotte	operaie	e	riforma	dello	
stato	capitalistico	tra	rivoluzione	d’Ottobre	e	New	Deal,	Materiali	Marxisti,	2nd	edn	(Milano:	Feltrinelli,	1973).	70	Ferruccio	Gambino,	‘Workers’	Struggle	and	the	Development	of	Ford	in	Britain’,	in	Fact	Folder,	Issue	No.	3	(London:	Big	Flame,	1973),	p.	[i].	71	Gambino,	‘Workers’	Struggle	and	the	Development	of	Ford	in	Britain’.	
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Big	Flame	went	on	to	publish	other	material	on	Ford	and	the	Italian	movement.72	Three	years	later	Emery	translated	the	full	text	of	Gambino’s	essay,	assembled	with	other	related	material	under	the	Red	Notes	imprint,	which	was	also	published	by	him.73	Red	Notes	also	released	a	documentary	account	of	shop-floor	conflict	at	Ford	in	Britain	during	the	mid-1970s,	which	came	out	just	before	a	nine-week	national	strike	at	the	firm:	a	pivotal	moment	in	this	history.74	Emery	translated	further	material	from	the	Italian	movement,	including	extracts	from	many	of	the	sources	mentioned	above.75	Between	the	publication	dates	of	these	texts,	Harry	Braverman’s	study	of	the	labour	process	came	out	provoking	widespread	discussion.76	In	preparation	for	a	series	of	workshops	and	a	conference	on	this	topic,	the	Conference	of	Socialist	Economists	(CSE)	issued	a	pamphlet	including	material	by	Raniero	Panzieri,	Sergio	Bologna,	and	Mario	Tronti,	alongside	Gambino’s	essay.77	This	initiated	what	has	become	known	as	the	labour	process	debate,	which	focused	on	the	relationship	between	working-class	subjectivity	and	the	development	of	work	as	a	qualitative	process	under	capitalist	social	relations.	
																																								 																					72	See	for	instance	Big	Flame	Ford	Group,	Five	Months	of	Struggle	at	Ford	(Liverpool:	Big	Flame,	1973);	Big	Flame,	‘Shop	Stewards	at	Ford’,	Radical	America,	8.5	(1974),	119–39.	73	Ferruccio	Gambino,	Workers’	Struggles	and	the	Development	of	Ford	in	
Britain	(London:	Red	Notes,	1976).	74	The	Little	Red	Blue	Book:	Fighting	the	Layoffs	at	Fords.,	ed.	by	Red	Notes	(London:	Red	Notes,	1978).	75	See	for	instance	Italy,	1977-8:	Living	with	an	Earthquake,	ed.	by	Red	Notes	(London:	Red	Notes,	1978);	Antonio	Negri,	‘Reformism	and	Restructuration’,	in	
Working	Class	Autonomy	and	the	Crisis:	Italian	Marxist	Texts	of	the	Theory	and	
Practice	of	a	Class	Movement,	ed.	by	Red	Notes,	trans.	by	Red	Notes	[Ed	Emery]	(London:	Red	Notes/CSE	Books,	1979),	pp.	33–38.	76	Harry	Braverman,	Labor	and	Monopoly	Capital:	The	Degradation	of	Work	in	
the	Twentieth	Century.	(New	York,	NY:	Monthly	Review	Press,	1974).	77	Ferruccio	Gambino,	‘Workers’	Struggles	and	the	Development	of	Ford	in	Britain	(Operai	E	Stato	1972)’,	trans.	by	‘Big	Flame’,	Bulletin	of	the	Conference	of	
Socialist	Economists,	6.13	(March	76),	pp.	Ford.1	–	Ford.18;	The	Labour	Process	&	
Class	Strategies,	CSE	Pamphlet,	1	(London:	Stage	1,	1976).	
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At	the	time	this	opened	out	into	a	wider	debate	about	structural	changes	then	taking	place.78	From	the	mid-1970s	a	circle	of	French	Marxian	political	economists	the	Regulation	School	(l'école	de	la	régulation),	began	to	theorise	a	transition	from	a	Fordist	to	a	post/neo-Fordist	‘regime	of	accumulation’,	based	on	an	analysis	of	the	state	and	civil	society	as	a	‘mode	of	regulation’	for	capitalist	development.79	Post-Fordism	soon	became	subject	to	a	wide-ranging	debate,	both	in	relation	to	the	labour	process	and	at	the	broader	level	of	political	economy.80	This	brings	us	full	circle	to	the	most	recent	accounts	of	Ford	‘from	above’.	In	the	mid-1980s	Piore	and	Sabel	provided	an	assessment	of	this	technological	and	organisational	change,	framed	in	terms	of	‘Fordism’	and	‘flexible	specialisation’	as	competing	management	strategies.81	Zietlin	developed	this	approach	further	in	collaboration	with	Sabel,	supported	by	historical	research	on	Ford	conducted	with	Tolliday.82	The	main	distinction	between	these	competing	accounts	of	the	rise	and	fall	of	Fordism	can	be	framed	in	terms	of	structure	and	agency.	
																																								 																					78	Post-Fordism	and	Social	Form:	A	Marxist	Debate	on	the	Post-Fordist	State,	ed.	by	Werner	Bonefeld	and	John	Holloway,	Capital	and	Class	(London:	Macmillan,	1991);	Ferruccio	Gambino,	‘A	Critique	of	the	Fordism	of	the	Regulation	School’,	trans.	by	Ed	Emery,	Common	Sense:	Journal	of	the	Edinburgh	Conference	of	Socialist	
Economists,	19	(1996),	42–64.	79	A	seminal	text	in	this	field	is	Michel	Aglietta,	Régulation	et	crises	du	
capitalisme:	L’expérience	des	États-Unis,	Perspectives	de	l’économique,	2nd	edn	(Paris:	Calmann-Lévy,	1976).	80	For	an	overview	see	Patterns	of	Work	in	the	Post-Fordist	Era:	Fordism	and	
Post-Fordism,	ed.	by	Huw	Beynon	and	Theo	Nichols,	2	vols	(Cheltenham:	Elgar,	2006);	The	Fordism	of	Ford	and	Modern	Management:	Fordism	and	Post-Fordism,	ed.	by	Huw	Beynon	and	Theo	Nichols,	2	vols	(Cheltenham:	Elgar,	2006);	Regulation	
Theory	and	the	Crisis	of	Capitalism:	Regulationist	Perspectives	on	Fordism	and	Post-
Fordism,	ed.	by	Bob	Jessop,	5	vols	(Cheltenham:	Elgar,	2001),	III.	81	Michael	J.	Piore	and	Charles	F.	Sabel,	The	Second	Industrial	Divide:	
Possibilities	for	Prosperity	(New	York,	NY:	Basic	Books,	1984).	82	World	of	Possibilities:	Flexibility	and	Mass	Production	in	Western	
Industrialization,	ed.	by	Charles	F.	Sabel	and	Jonathan	Zeitlin,	Studies	in	Modern	Capitalism/Etudes	Sur	Le	Capitalisme	Moderne	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1997);	Tolliday	and	Zeitlin,	Between	Fordism	and	Flexibility:	The	Automobile	
Industry	and	Its	Workers.	
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‘Capitalist	power’,	Mario	Tronti	claimed,	‘seeks	to	use	the	workers’	antagonistic	will-to-struggle	as	a	motor	of	its	own	development’.83	Working-class	agency	is	key	for	those	who	developed	his	analysis	of	class	composition.	While	the	breadth	of	material	to	emerge	from	the	regulation	school	makes	any	generalisation	challenging,	this	approach	emerged	from	a	Marxist	intellectual	tradition	to	focus	on	the	institutional	role	of	the	state	and	civil	society	in	reproducing	social	relations.84	Doing	so	has	drawn	criticism	from	Gambino	that	such	work	‘tends	to	overlook	human	subjects’	to	instead	emphasise	structural	factors	and	the	institutional	role	of	the	state.85	The	final	approach	involved	the	adoption	of	Weberian	ideal	types	of	Fordism,	or	mass	production,	and	flexible	specialisation	to	account	for	alternative	management	strategies.86	The	agency	of	workers,	institutional	structures,	and	management	strategy	take	centre	stage,	respectively.	This	broadly	corresponds	with	my	initial	categorisation:	material	either	favouring	a	perspective	‘from	below’	or	‘above’,	with	the	former	category	further	split	based	on	whether	emphasis	is	placed	on	structure	or	agency.		A	further	distinction	can	be	drawn	between	these	approaches	based	on	the	different	interpretations	they	provide	of	Fordism.	From	a	workerist	perspective	its	emergence	has	been	linked	to	political	struggles	led	by	craft	workers	earlier	in	the	twentieth	century.	The	reorganisation	of	production	around	the	continuous	flow	of	the	assembly	line	was	seen,	in	the	first	instance,	as	a	response	to	the	threat	this	movement	posed	and	a	means	of	its	defeat.	This,	in	turn,	brought	the	deskilled																																									 																					83	Mario	Tronti,	‘The	Strategy	of	Refusal’,	in	Working	Class	Autonomy	and	the	
Crisis:	Italian	Marxist	Texts	of	the	Theory	and	Practice	of	a	Class	Movement,	ed.	by	Red	Notes,	trans.	by	Red	Notes	[Ed	Emery]	(London:	Red	Notes/CSE	Books),	pp.	7–32	(p.	8);	The	original	reads:	‘Il	potere	del	capitale	cerca	di	usare	la	volontà	antagonista	degli	operai	come	motore	del	suo	proprio	sviluppo.’	Tronti,	Operai	e	
capitale,	p.	235.	84	Jessop,	III,	pp.	ix–xi.	85	Gambino,	‘A	Critique	of	the	Fordism	of	the	Regulation	School’,	p.	44.	Original	text	in	italics.	86	Paul	Hirst	and	Jonathan	Zeitlan,	‘Flexible	Specialization	versus	Post-Fordism:	Theory,	Evidence	and	Policy	Implications’,	Economy	and	Society,	20.1,	5–9	(p.	2).	
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‘mass	worker’	to	the	fore	both	economically	and	as	a	political	subject.87	In	what	became	a	foundational	text	for	the	regulation	school,	Michel	Aglietta	drew	on	such	analysis	to	then	identify	Fordism	with	the	mechanisms	by	which	industrial	conflict	became	institutionalised	after	the	Second	World	War.88	Gambino	suggested	the	need	to	differentiate	between	‘“regulationist	Fordism”	and	[...]	“pre-trade	union	Fordism”’	to	acknowledge	a	temporal	gap	between	an	earlier	period	of	innovations	in	work	organisation	and	the	subsequent	institutional	mediation	to	stabilise	this	system.89	The	ideal	type	of	Fordism,	which	is	counterposed	to	flexible	specialisation,	focuses	more	narrowly	on	mass	production	as	a	management	strategy	characterised	by	rigidity,	compared	to	both	earlier	craft	production	and	the	more	flexible	Japanese	management	strategies	that	came	to	global	prominence	in	the	1980s.90		These	alternative	accounts	of	Fordism	also	gave	different	views	of	structural	changes	in	the	latter	decades	of	the	twentieth	century.	Highlighting	the	role	of	workers’	struggle	in	the	crisis	of	the	1960s,	Tronti	emphasised	the	political	content	of	industrial	action	as	a	‘strategy	of	refusal’.	More	generally,	his	use	of	the	term	‘social	factory’	suggested	a	connection	between	growing	social	conflict	outside	of	industry	in	wider	society	and	the	increased	need	for	political	intervention	by	the	state,	in	order	to	maintain	the	flow	of	capital.91	Since	the	1970s	(post-)	workerist/autonomist	thought	has	debated	how	work	has	changed	through	this	process	of	restructuring.	Some,	such	as	Antonio	Negri,	have	suggested	that	reproductive	labour	and	the	cognitive	work	associated	with	information	technology	and	the	creative	economy	constitute	a	new	immaterial	form	of	labour,																																									 																					87	See	for	instance	the	Red	Notes	appendices	to	Gambino,	Workers’	Struggle,	pp.	1(b)	&	2(a-b).	88	Aglietta,	p.	96.	89	Gambino,	‘A	Critique	of	the	Fordism	of	the	Regulation	School’,	p.	42.	90	Tolliday	and	Zeitlin,	Between	Fordism	and	Flexibility:	The	Automobile	
Industry	and	Its	Workers,	pp.	3–5.	91	Tronti,	Operai	e	capitale,	pp.	39–59	&	234–52;	Tronti,	‘Lenin	in	England’;	Tronti,	‘The	Strategy	of	Refusal’.	
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which	has	now	become	hegemonic.	George	Caffentzis,	among	others,	has	denied	such	claims	by	suggesting	these	forms	of	work	can	be	conceived	in	materialist	terms.92	Generally	speaking	the	regulation	approach	has	shared	with	Italian	workerism	Marx’s	assumption	that	capitalism	has	an	immanent	tendency	towards	crisis.	The	main	difference,	as	already	suggested,	is	one	of	emphasis,	with	greater	focus	on	the	structural	role	of	institutions	in	reproducing	social	relations.93	On	the	other	hand,	proponents	of	flexible	specialisation	reject	Marxist	class	analysis,	instead	placing	much	greater	emphasis	on	complexity	and	contingency.94	When	we	turn	attention	to	the	historical	context	leading	up	to	the	main	period	covered	by	this	study,	it	will	be	useful	to	keep	in	mind	the	different	factors	these	approaches	emphasise:	workers’	struggle	and	class	composition	for	autonomist	Marxists;	institutional	structures	and	the	state	from	a	regulationist	perspective;	and	competing	management	strategies	for	proponents	of	‘flexible	specialisation’.	Assessing	the	relevance	of	these	categories	to	an	account	of	this	period	of	the	firm’s	history	should	help	us	evaluate	how	these	approaches	might	best	inform	our	understanding	of	the	rise	and	fall	of	Fordism,	both	in	Britain	and	more	generally.	In	general,	British	industrial	politics	of	the	1970s	has	formed	the	subject	of	a	growing	body	of	recent	work,	extending	out	from	sociology	and	labour	history	into	a	wider	scholarly	and	popular	literature	on	social	and	cultural	history.95	Of	
																																								 																					92	For	contrasting	perspectives	on	this	debate	see	Michael	Hardt	and	Antonio	Negri,	Empire	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press),	pp.	291–93;	George	Caffentzis,	‘Crystals	and	Analytic	Engines:	Historical	and	Conceptual	Preliminaries	to	a	New	Theory	of	Machines’,	Ephemera:	Theory	&	Politics	in	Organization,	7.1	(2007),	24–45.	93	Jessop,	III,	pp.	ix–xii.	94	Hirst	and	Zeitlan,	pp.	8–32.	95	Andy	Beckett,	When	the	Lights	Went	out:	Britain	in	the	Seventies	(London:	Faber,	2009);	Dominic	Sandbrook,	State	of	Emergency:	The	Way	We	Were,	Britain,	
1970-1974	(London:	Allen	Lane,	2010);	Dominic	Sandbrook,	Seasons	in	the	Sun:	The	
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particular	relevance	to	this	dissertation,	Mike	Savage’s	work	has	developed	the	thesis	that	a	non-traditional	working-class	culture	of	‘rugged	individualism’	emerged	among	male	manual	workers	in	the	1970s.	In	doing	so,	Savage	drew	on	Beynon’s	account	of	shop	stewards	at	Ford	Halewood.	As	automation	and	deskilling	increasingly	marginalised	the	skilled	craftsman	as	an	individual	subject	with	a	high	degree	of	‘autonomy’,	the	militancy	of	shop	stewards	remained	an	outlet	for	such	subjective	self-expression.96	His	use	of	this	term	aimed	to	challenge	what	he	perceived	to	be	a	false	binary	between	individual	and	collective	class	identities.	In	doing	so,	he	called	into	question	more	pessimistic	assessments	of	working-class	self-awareness	in	this	period.	He	also	aimed	to	suggest	a	more	nuanced	take	on	the	context	of	the	rise	of	Thatcherism	than	a	straightforward	narrative	of	right-wing	individualism	coming	into	conflict	with	and	then	defeating	left-wing	collectivism.	Savage’s	conceptualisation	of	rugged	individualism	has	influenced	more	recent	work	by	Jack	Saunders,	who	adopted	the	term	to	emphasise	the	agency	of	non-traditional	worker-activists	in	the	post-war	automobile	sector.	Saunders	rightly	emphasised	the	inadequacy	of	viewing	this	period	of	labour	history	exclusively	in	terms	of	external	structural	factors	or	practices	established	earlier	by	different	groups	of	workers	in	other	sectors.	His	work	also	drew	on	a	range	of	sources,	including	reports	in	the	‘small	iconoclastic	libertarian	socialist	journal’	
Solidarity,	although	the	politics	of	this	periodical’s	publisher	received	less	attention.	While	representing	his	subjects	as	‘engaging	in	a	process	of	their	own	creation’,	a	clear	allusion	to	E.	P.	Thompson’s	approach	to	history	from	below,	Saunders	focused	on	the	shops	stewards’	organisations	in	which	the	Communist	Party	often																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 				
Battle	for	Britain,	1974-1979	(London:	Allen	Lane,	2012);	Alwyn	W.	Turner,	Crisis?	
What	Crisis?:	Britain	in	the	1970s	(London:	Aurum,	2008).	96	Mike	Savage,	‘“Sociology,	Class	and	Male	Manual	Work	Cultures”’,	in	British	
Trade	Unions	and	Industrial	Politics:	The	High	Tide	of	Trade	Unionism	1964-1979,	ed.	by	John	McIlroy,	Nina	Fishman,	and	Alan	Campbell,	Studies	in	Labour	History	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	1999),	II,	23–42	(pp.	32–33	&	37).	
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exercised	hegemony.97	While	clearly	playing	a	key	role	in	labour	relations	across	much	of	the	car	industry,	these	senior	lay	trade-union	representatives,	including	those	close	to	the	CPGB,	had	a	complicated	and	at	times	antagonistic	relationship	with	militant	shop-floor	workers.	Indeed,	Solidarity	provided	a	detailed,	historically	informed	and	theoretically	sophisticated	account	of	this	situation—the	significance	of	which	was	not	lost	on	Thompson	at	the	time	either.98	
Saunders	most	recent	work,	a	monograph	on	the	cultural	politics	of	work	in	the	car	industry,	came	out	after	the	submission	of	this	dissertation	for	examination.	It	explored	how	‘car-factory	activists	reinvented	workplace	trade	unionism	multiple	times’	between	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War	and	the	early	1980s.	Of	particular	relevance	to	this	study,	Saunders	identified	Big	Flame	as	one	of	the	far-left	groups	that	‘drew	in	the	values	of	the	shop	floor,	which	they	then	fed	back	to	fellow	workers	in	slightly	[sic]	more	politicised	ways’.	In	doing	so,	he	struggled	to	strike	a	balance	between	recognising	the	marginality	of	such	groups	and	appreciating	the	wider	relevance	of	their	perspective—a	dilemma	that	confronts	anyone	examining	this	subject	matter.	He	also	recognised	the	role	of	the	Ford	Workers	Group	in	organising	the	1978	national	Ford	Pay	Strike,	but	failed	to	recognise	the	role	of	Big	Flame	and	other	autonomist	Marxists	in	initiating	this	group.99	Hinging	on	the	dispute,	my	dissertation	sets	out	to	explore	how	further	engagement	with	these	politics	might	contribute	to	our	understanding	of	this	history.	
																																								 																					97	Jack	Saunders,	‘The	Untraditional	Worker:	Class	Re-Formation	in	Britain	1945-65’,	Twentieth	Century	British	History,	26.2,	225–48.	98	For	instance,	see	Ken	Weller	and	Ernie	Stanton,	What	Happened	at	Ford,	Solidarity	Pamphlet,	26	(Bromley,	Kent:	Solidarity,	1967),	p.	15;	E.	P.	Thompson,	
The	Poverty	of	Theory	&	Other	Essays	(London:	Merlin,	1978),	p.	133.	99	Jack	Saunders,	Assembling	Cultures:	Workplace	Activism,	Labour	Militancy	
and	Cultural	Change	in	Britain’s	Car	Factories,	1945-82	(Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	2019),	pp.	191–92	&	258.	
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Savage’s	conceptualisation	of	rugged	individualism	has	also	informed	a	broader	reassessment	of	the	social	and	cultural	history	of	post-war	Britain.	This	has	included	a	proposal	to	reframe	how	‘individuals	navigated	the	terrain	of	class,	gender	and	racial	identities’	as	manifestations	of	‘popular	individualism’,	a	term	coined	by	Florence	Sutcliffe-Braithwaite.100	Doing	so	aimed	to	address	key	dynamics	of	this	period	in	terms	of	the	shifting	saliency	of	the	subjective	aspect	of	class	in	relation	to	other	categories	of	social	identity.	My	own	work	focuses	on	how	actors	struggled	at	the	time	to	maintain	an	adequate	class	analysis	capable	of	accounting	for	phenomena	addressed	by	these	concepts,	such	as	the	demand	for	autonomy	by	women	and	Black	people	as	well	as	workers.	Given	the	prominent	place	of	the	1978	Ford	strike	in	the	Winter	of	Discontents	and	this	dispute’s	pivotal	role	in	my	dissertation,	Colin	Hay’s	work	on	the	mythology	surrounding	these	events	has	particular	relevance	too.101	Hay	persuasively	demonstrated	how	a	highly	partial	representation	of	this	history	played	a	constitutive	role	for	Thatcherite	politics.	However	convincing	his	central	thesis,	Hay’s	analysis	of	the	structural	issues	that	confronted	British	Keynesianism	only	traced	these	back	to	the	1973	oil	crisis.	This	implied	an	exogenous	shock	occurred	to	an	otherwise	healthy	system.	While	recognising	the	political	and	economic	dynamics	of	this	crisis	as	intrinsically	intermeshed,	an	autonomous	Marxist	reading	of	the	situation	by	the	Midnight	Notes	Collective	suggested	that	such	structural	issues	went	deeper.102	
																																								 																					100	Emily	Robinson	and	others,	‘Telling	Stories	about	Post-War	Britain:	Popular	Individualism	and	the	“Crisis”	of	the	1970s’,	20th	Century	British	History,	28.2	(2017),	268–304	(pp.	268	&	302).	101	Colin	Hay,	‘Narrating	Crisis:	The	Discursive	Construction	of	the	“Winter	of	Discontent”’,	Sociology,	30.2	(1996),	253–77;	Colin	Hay,	‘Chronicles	of	a	Death	Foretold:	The	Winter	of	Discontent	and	Construction	of	the	Crisis	of	British	Keynesianism’,	Parliamentary	Affairs,	63.3	(2010),	446–70.	102	Midnight	Notes	Collective,	‘“Chapter	1.	Oil,	Guns	and	Money”’,	in	Midnight	
Oil:	Work,	Energy,	War	1973-1992	(Brooklyn,	NY:	Autonomedia,	1992).	
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Also	of	relevance	both	in	itself	and	in	terms	of	its	influence	on	recent	work,	sociologist	John	Goldthorpe’s	contemporaneous	analysis	examined	the	dynamics	of	a	situation	he	saw	as	driven	by	market	inequalities.103	Goldthorpe’s	credible	assessment	of	the	reformist	character	of	working-class	politics	also	posed	serious	issues	from	a	Marxist	perspective.	For	him,	these	went	beyond	a	political	challenge	to	justify	a	complete	rejection	of	Marxist	analysis	of	the	immanent	dynamics	of	capitalist	society.104	Despite	Goldthorpe’s	nuanced	reading	of	the	situation	and	empathy	towards	the	working	class,	clearly	informed	by	his	colliery-town	background,	this	left	no	alternative	to	incomes	policy	and	continuity	with	a	Social	Contract	discredited	by	Labour’s	turn	to	monetarism.	As	a	final	point,	this	work	examines	issues	at	the	intersection	of	far-left	politics	and	labour	history.	A	recent	multi-volume	work	edited	by	Evan	Smith	and	Matthew	Worley	aimed	to	start	‘a	conversation	among	scholars	and	activists	about	the	history	of	the	British	far	left’.	In	doing	so,	Smith	and	Worley	set	out	to	redress	the	balance	of	a	historiography	excessively	focused	on	the	CPGB	and	SWP.105	My	dissertation	takes	up	this	invitation.		 	
																																								 																					103	John	H.	Goldthorpe,	‘The	Current	Inflation:	Towards	a	Sociological	Account’,	in	The	Political	Economy	of	Inflation,	ed.	by	Fred	Hirsch	and	John	H.	Goldthorpe	(London:	Martin	Robertson,	1978),	pp.	186–214.	104	John	H.	Goldthorpe,	David	Lockwood,	and	Frank	Bechhofer,	The	Affluent	
Worker	in	the	Class	Structure,	Cambridge	Studies	in	Sociology,	3,	3	vols	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1969),	III,	p.	2.	105	Against	the	Grain:	The	British	Far	Left	from	1956,	ed.	by	Evan	Smith	and	Matthew	Worley	(Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	2014);	Evan	Smith	and	Matthew	Worley,	‘Introduction:	The	Continuing	Importance	of	the	History	of	the	British	Far	Left’,	in	Waiting	for	the	Revolution:	The	British	Far	Left	from	1956,	ed.	by	Evan	Smith	and	Matthew	Worley	(Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	2017),	pp.	1–10	(pp.	3–4).	
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1.	Workers’	Struggle	and	the	Development	of	Ford,	1911	to	1964	
The	country	is	in	a	state	of	chaos.	The	transport	systems	have	completely	broken	down	as	a	result	of	the	Railway	Strike.	Lawlessness	and	riot	are	reported	from	almost	every	big	centre	of	population,	and	so	far	there	is	no	prospect	of	a	settlement.106		 	 Reynolds’s	Newspaper,	20	August	1911		
HMS	Antrim	patrolled	the	Mersey	Estuary	in	August	1911	during	the	Liverpool	General	Transport	Strike.	In	one	of	four	related	Royal	Navy	deployments	along	the	British	coast	that	summer,	the	destroyer	had	its	guns	trained	on	the	docks	in	an	assertion	of	the	state’s	authority	over	striking	workers	on	Merseyside.	This	marked	a	high	point	in	a	wave	of	social	upheaval	leading	up	to	the	First	World	War	known	as	the	Great	Unrest.	As	industrial	action	erupted	into	a	general	strike,	street	fighting	broke	out	when	troops	violently	dispersed	a	peaceful	mass	demonstration	in	the	city	on	13	August.	While	this	incident	added	another	‘Bloody	Sunday’	to	the	annals	of	British	labour	history,	the	disturbances	only	culminated	two	days	later.	In	further	clashes	with	residents	of	a	predominantly	Irish	neighbourhood,	soldiers	escorting	a	vanload	of	prisoners	to	Walton	Gaol	hospitalised	fifteen	civilian:	five	of	them	with	gunshot	injuries;	two	of	which	proved	fatal.107	As	unrest	spread	across	the	country,	the	authorities	initially	showed	reluctance	to	even	station	troops	nearby	in	Manchester,	concerned	to	avoid	any	unnecessary	provocation	to	the	city’s	striking	workers.	Following	‘great	trouble	among	the	goods	porters	and	carters’,	however,	soldiers	were	eventually	deployed																																									 																					106	‘Serious	Conflict	Yesterday	Between	Troops	and	Strikers’,	Reynold’s	
Newspaper,	20	August	1911,	p.	1.	107	Sam	Davies	and	Ron	Noon,	‘The	Rank-and-File	in	the	1911	Liverpool	General	Transport	Strike’,	Labour	History	Review,	79.1	(2014),	55–81	(pp.	57–67)	<https://doi.org/10.3828/lhr.2014.4>.	For	an	overview	of	Syndicalism	in	Britain	and	the	Great	Unrest,	see	other	articles	in	the	same	issue,	as	well	as	Bob	Holton,	
British	Syndicalism	1900-1914:	Myths	and	Realities	(London:	Pluto	Press,	1976).	
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to	two	Manchester	train	stations	and	a	goods	yard	in	neighbouring	Salford.108	The	city	had	played	a	more	prominent	role	in	the	build	up	to	these	events	the	previous	autumn,	when	Manchester	hosted	the	First	Conference	on	Industrial	Syndicalism.	This	event	was	called	by	Tom	Mann,	a	key	labour	organiser	since	the	New	Unionism	of	the	1880s	and	the	most	prominent	British	advocate	of	a	more	militant	industrial	politics.	Delegates	at	the	conference	passed	a	motion	declaring	that	‘the	time	is	now	ripe	for	the	industrial	organisation	of	all	workers	on	the	basis	of	class—not	trade	or	craft’109—and	Mann	went	on	to	play	a	leading	role	in	the	strike	in	Liverpool.	For	a	time,	the	campaign	for	parliamentary	representation	gave	way	to	industrial	direct	action.	This	wave	of	syndicalism	provided	the	immediate	context	in	which	Ford	operations	began	in	Britain.	Such	disturbances	also	marked	a	transition	towards	a	more	militant	industrial	politics	internationally,	coinciding	with	the	heyday	of	the	Industrial	Workers	of	the	World	(IWW)	in	America	for	instance.	A	number	of	those	I	interviewed	cited	syndicalism	as	a	precursor	for	the	industrial	action	in	which	they	participated	half	a	century	later,	one	of	them	referring	to	the	involvement	of	his	family	at	the	time.110	Yet,	the	historiography	of	Ford	in	Britain	makes	no	mention	of	the	Great	Unrest.	This	might	seem	all	the	more	remarkable	since	the	Fordist	assembly	line	can	be	seen	as	a	technological	response	to	precisely	this	sort	of	industrial	conflict,	as	discussed	further	below.	This	chapter	charts	the	first	half-century	of	the	firm’s	British	history,	focusing	on	class	dynamics	such	as	these.	Doing	so	provides	context	for	the	account	of	unrest	at	Ford	and	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	during	the	long	1970s	to	follow.																																									 																					108	London,	National	Archives,	HO	45/10656/212470	‘321:	Report	of	Reasons	for	Sending	Troops	into	Manchester	and	Blackburn	during	the	Period	of	Strikes,	August	1911’.	109	‘A	Manchester	Message	to	the	Workers	of	Britain’,	The	Industrial	
Syndicalist,	December	1910,	pp.	1–47	(p.	18).	110	Brian	Ashton,	Interview,	2015.	
	 39	
A	New	Gospel	for	Industry,	1911	to	1931	
While	Ford	already	traded	in	Britain	before	1911,	two	events	that	year	transformed	the	country	from	yet	another	marketplace	into	a	key	location	for	the	firm.	The	Ford	Motor	Company	(England)	Limited	was	registered	that	March,	with	a	thousand	pounds	of	share	capital.111	Then	in	October	the	Ford	Manchester	Works	opened,	overseen	by	an	English	managing	director	Percival	Perry.	The	company’s	first	plant	outside	North	America	became	operational.112	A	former	coach	works	on	the	American-inspired	Trafford	Park	industrial	estate,	gave	the	firm	access	to	Manchester’s	established	workforce	and	well-integrated	transport	infrastructure.113	It’s	location	lay	directly	opposite	the	Salford	goods	yard,	where	troops	had	been	mobilised	two	months	earlier,	on	the	opposite	bank	of	the	Manchester	Ship	Canal.	Thirty	miles	downstream	this	waterway	fed	into	the	River	Mersey	at	the	epicentre	of	that	summer’s	disturbances.	While	Ford	already	led	the	highly	competitive	US	car	industry,	this	move	preceded	two	measures	that	saw	the	firm	transformed	into	the	largest	company	in	the	world.	These	were	a	policy	of	paying	relatively	high	wages	and	the	technological	innovation	of	introducing	the	automated	assembly	line.	When	Henry	Ford	visited	Britain	the	following	year,	‘Perry	explained	[...]	his	plan	of	“high	wages	and	straight	wages”’	to	the	US	industrialist	according	to	an	official	company	history.114	To	be	clear,	the	subsidiary’s	pay	policy	helped	inspire	the	Five	Dollar	Day,	the	corporation’s	US	profit	sharing	scheme,	which	aimed	to	reduce	labour	turnover.	In	the	absence	of	the	state	intervention	associated	with	Fordism	after	the	
																																								 																					111	London,	National	Archives,	BT	31/19905/114576	Company	No:	114576	Ford	Motor	Company	(England)	Ltd.,	Henry	Ford	et	al.,	‘Memorandum	and	Articles	of	Association	of	the	Ford	Motor	Company	(England)	Limited,	8	March	1911.	112	‘Northern	Motor	Works’.	113	Ian	McIntosh,	Ford	at	Trafford	Park:	"An	Americanised	Corner	of	Old	Jog-
Trot	England,	Manchester	Sociology	Occasional	Papers,	30	(Manchester:	Department	of	Sociology,	University	of	Manchester,	1991),	pp.	2–12.	114	Nevins,	Ford:	The	Times,	p.	540.	
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Second	World	War,	such	corporate	largesse	proved	short	lived	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic.	All	the	same,	labour	relations	at	the	Manchester	works	helped	drive	a	policy	of	paying	adequate	wages	to	sustain	economic	demand,	a	recurrent	objective	of	the	Fordist	model.	The	autumn	before	the	introduction	of	the	Five	Dollar	Day,	a	strike	broke	out	at	the	Manchester	Works	that	corroborates	this	sequence	of	events.	Craftsmen	downed	tools	over	the	allocation	of	work	between	themselves	and	unskilled	workers.	To	justify	this	action,	the	representatives	of	these	skilled	workers	reportedly	asked	‘why	the	firm	are	ready	to	pay	10d.	an	hour	to	the	labourers	if	the	work	they	do	is	not	of	a	skilled	character’.115	While	the	strikers	were	ultimately	defeated,	a	picket	remained	outside	the	factory	when	a	local	profit	sharing	scheme	was	announced	the	following	January	in	the	wake	of	parent	company’s	announcement	of	the	Five	Dollar	Day.116		This	incident	might	seem	like	little	more	than	an	attempt	by	members	of	a	relatively	privileged	section	of	the	workforce,	a	labour	aristocracy	if	you	will,	to	defend	their	own	interests	against	other	workers.	The	craftsmen’s	objection	to	the	high	pay	of	the	labourers	they	worked	alongside	certainly	supports	such	a	view.	Yet,	this	strike	also	called	attention	to	the	shifting	balance	of	forces	in	the	workplace	at	the	time.	Ford	initially	operated	in	Manchester,	as	in	Michigan,	within	a	paradigm	most	clearly	articulated	by	Frederick	Taylor.	Taylor’s	theory	of	scientific	management	outlined	the	main	challenge	facing	management:	‘the	shop	was	really	run	by	the	workmen,	and	not	the	bosses’.	To	address	this,	he	proposed	appropriating	a	‘mass	of	traditional	knowledge	[...]	not	in	possession	of	the	management’	to	gain	control	
																																								 																					115	‘Manchester	Motorworks	Dispute:	A	Sympathetic	Strike’,	Manchester	
Guardian,	13	September	1913,	p.	10.	116	‘Engineering:	A	Reactionary	Attitude’,	Manchester	Guardian,	27	January	1914,	p.	14.	
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over	production.117	The	strike	in	Manchester	demonstrated	how	Taylorism	accentuated	divisions	between	different	groups	of	workers.	The	resistance	of	craftsmen	to	encroachment	by	management	upon	their	control	of	production	underscored	differences	between	their	interests	and	those	of	a	growing	body	of	semi-skilled	workers.	As	well	as	influencing	the	wage	rate	for	a	given	task,	control	over	the	allocation	of	work	determined	who	was	paid	to	carry	it	out.	While	the	First	World	War	led	to	a	general	suppression	of	industrial	unrest,	another	wave	of	militancy	broke	out	among	skilled	engineering	workers	in	the	munitions	sector	who	faced	less	likelihood	of	military	conscription.	With	wartime	labour	shortages	increasingly	met	by	employing	semi-skilled	workers,	many	among	them	women,	in	a	process	known	as	dilution,	which	became	a	major	point	of	contention.	In	1915	trade	union	officials	entered	an	agreement	with	the	government	that	set	terms	for	this	practice	for	the	duration	of	hostilities,	bringing	official	industrial	action	to	a	pause.118	This	left	a	skilled	and	well-organised	workforce	effectively	unrepresented	as	industrial	practices	underwent	profound	change.	At	the	same	time	high	demand	for	skilled	labour	increased	the	potential	leverage	in	the	hands	of	these	craftsmen.	The	first	shop	stewards	movement	emerged	to	represent	the	interests	of	these	skilled	workers	during	the	disputes	that	inevitably	ensued.	From	1915	onwards	this	unofficial	movement	organised	a	series	of	illegal	strikes.119	The	Clyde	Workers’	Committee,	one	of	its	earliest	manifestations,	initially	opposed	dilution.	Harry	McShane,	an	engineer	from	Glasgow,	later	recalled	this	as	‘a	very	difficult	fight	for	socialists	who	had	always	been	opposed	to	the	craft	trade	unions	and	
																																								 																					117	Frederick	W.	Taylor,	The	Principles	of	Scientific	Management	(New	York,	NY:	Harper	&	Brothers,	1913),	p.	32	&	48-49.	118	Branko	Pribićević,	The	Shop	Stewards’	Movement	and	Workers’	Control	
1910-1922	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	1959),	pp.	32–37.	119	Pribićević,	pp.	83–84.	
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advocated	industrial	unions’.120	Over	time	the	committee	instead	tried	to	control	the	process	of	dilution,	defending	the	rights	of	shop	stewards	to	organise	their	new	workmates.	Yet,	divisions	between	workers	remained,	both	based	on	skill	and	through	the	sexual	division	of	labour.	While	the	immediate	post-war	period	saw	a	surge	in	working-class	militancy,	including	strikes	by	the	police	and	mutinies	among	the	armed	forces,	the	issue	of	dilution	remained	unresolved.	Writing	for	the	Sheffield	Workers’	Committee,	J.	T.	Murphy	summed	up	the	situation:	‘The	skilled	men	resent	the	encroachments	of	the	unskilled,	the	unskilled	often	resent	what	appears	to	them	the	domineering	tactics	of	the	skilled,	and	both	resent	the	encroachments	of	the	women	workers.’121	While	the	struggle	to	control	the	engineering	workshops	remained	a	point	of	contention	throughout	the	1920s,	demobilisation	and	a	slump	in	demand	resulted	in	unemployment	for	many,	particularly	militant	stewards	and	women.122	Throughout	this	period	of	social	turmoil,	Ford	management	maintained	firm	control	over	production	at	Trafford	Park.	Indeed,	there	are	no	further	reports	of	any	strikes	there.	To	some	extent	this	reflected	a	wider	resistance	to	organised	labour	in	the	automobile	sector.	The	owner	of	the	largest	British	car	firm	Lord	Nuffield	also	refused	to	recognise	trade	unions	before	the	Second	World	War.	What	set	Ford	apart	from	its	British	competitors	was	how	management	maintained	control	through	a	dual	strategy.	This	involved	the	profit	sharing	scheme	mentioned	already	and	the	automated	final	assembly	line.	The	firm	first	produced	a	single	component	by	such	means	in	spring	1913.	The	final	assembly	of	cars	on	a	production	line	began	in	Michigan	the	following	
																																								 																					120	Harry	McShane	and	Joan	Smith,	Harry	McShane:	No	Mean	Fighter	(London:	Pluto	Press,	1978),	p.	76.	121	J.	T.	Murphy,	The	Workers’	Committee:	An	Outline	of	Its	Principles	and	
Structures	(Sheffield:	Sheffield	Workers’	Committee,	1917),	p.	6.	122	Carter	Goodrich,	The	Frontier	of	Control:	A	Study	of	British	Workshop	
Politics	(New	York,	NY:	Harcourt	Brace,	1920).	
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January.123	Vehicles	then	began	to	roll	off	the	line	at	the	Manchester	Works	later	that	year.124	While	Taylor’s	approach	aimed	to	maximise	output	by	identifying	and	imposing	the	most	efficient	working	methods	then	available,	the	assembly	line	set	the	pace	of	work	automatically.	Increasingly	advanced	machine	tools,	production	organised	as	a	process	of	workflow	and	the	use	of	conveyor	belts	represented	the	existing	state	of	the	art.	Ford’s	achievement	was	to	bring	all	these	elements	together	to	automatically	set	the	rate	of	production	for	the	motorcar,	a	particularly	large	and	complex	commodity.125	The	company’s	pay	policy	also	broke	with	Taylorism.	Whereas	Taylor	advocated	incentive	pay	to	motivate	individual	workers,	the	Ford	wage	was	made	available	universally.	At	least	this	was	the	case	for	adult	male	employees	following	a	probationary	period.	This	transformed	the	promise	of	higher	pay	from	a	means	of	incentivising	individual	workers	into	a	standard	rate,	in	the	process	turning	its	withdrawal	into	a	possible	sanction.126	Though	Ford’s	high	wages	would	not	last	long,	payment	for	measured	day	work	instead	of	piecework	set	the	company	apart	from	British	competitors	for	decades	to	come.		These	innovations	were	introduced	amid	ongoing	social	conflict.	Outside	the	factory	the	Russian	Revolution	made	its	impact	felt	internationally.	As	well	as	raising	alarm	among	the	ruling	class	worldwide,	the	Bolshevik	seizure	of	power	led	many	working-class	militants	to	view	the	syndicalist	focus	on	industry	as	politically																																									 																					123	This	is	according	to	Henry	Ford	himself.	See	Ford	and	Crowther,	My	Life	
and	Work,	pp.	81–82.	Ex-Ford	managers,	notably	Charles	E.	Sorensen,	have	disputed	aspects	of	this	account,	raising	some	confusion	about	the	precise	chronology.	Yet,	Sorensen	confirmed	the	significance	of	events	this	winter,	which	marked	the	beginning	of	‘a	new	era	in	industrial	history’	for	him.	Charles	E.	Sorensen	and	David	L.	Lewis,	My	Forty	Years	with	Ford	(New	York,	NY:	Norton,	1956;	repr.	Detroit,	MI:	Wayne	State	University	Press,	2006),	p.	131.	124	A	number	of	Ian	McIntosh,	‘“It	Was	Worse	than	Alcatraz”	Working	for	Ford	at	Trafford	Park"’,	Manchester	Regional	History	Review,	9	(1995),	66–76	(p.	67).		 125	Galbraith,	‘Was	Ford	a	Fraud?’,	pp.	152–53.	126	Ferruccio	Gambino,	‘Ford	britannica.	Formazione	di	una	classe	operaia’,	in	
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limited.	Though	not	directly	involving	Ford,	an	incident	known	as	the	Slough	Soviet	brought	together	key	individuals	who	would	later	confront	each	other	in	the	struggle	for	trade	union	recognition	at	the	firm.	In	1919	Bob	Lovell	invited	fellow	toolmaker	and	militant	Wal	Hannington	to	join	him	at	a	government	transport	depot	in	Slough.	Under	their	leadership	the	Shop	Stewards	Committee	at	the	facility	organised	two	successful	‘stay-in’	strikes	that	year.127	Eventually,	the	government	sold	the	site	to	the	Slough	Trading	Company,	a	business	directed	by	the	recently	knighted	Sir	Percival	Perry	during	a	hiatus	in	his	career	with	Ford.128	Hannington	and	Lovell	went	on	to	join	the	newly	founded	Communist	Party	of	Greater	Britain	(CPGB)	in	1920.	Lovell	would	subsequently	play	a	prominent	part	in	the	campaign	to	unionise	Ford,	eventually	as	a	district	officer	of	the	Amalgamated	Engineering	Union	(AEU),	while	Hannington	led	the	National	Unemployed	Workers’	Movement	(NUWM).	The	CPGB	also	mobilised	trade	union	militants	between	the	wars,	albeit	with	limited	success,	through	another	front	organisation	the	National	Minority	Movement.	As	the	name	suggests,	the	party	occupied	a	relatively	marginal	position	in	British	politics,	even	within	its	trade-union	stronghold.	Internal	divisions	beset	the	CPGB	from	the	outset.	Sylvia	Pankhurst	was	expelled	within	a	year	of	its	foundation	for	refusing	to	cede	control	of	the	newspaper	Worker’s	Dreadnought.	This	followed	the	paper’s	publication	of	material	by	Alexandra	Kollontai,	a	leader	of	the	recently	dissolved	Worker’s	
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Opposition	faction	of	the	All	Russian	Communist	Party.129	According	to	Kollontai,	the	party’s	industrial	policy	took	a	‘jump	off	the	rails	of	scientific	Marxian	thought’	by	rejecting	collective	management	of	workers	through	the	trade	unions	in	favour	of	individual	management	by	technicians.130	For	her,	this	represented	a	crucial	setback	in	the	struggle	against	capitalist	exploitation.	Such	disagreement	over	industrial	strategy	was	linked	to	wider	strategic	divisions	between	revolutionaries	in	Britain	about	whether	or	not	to	engage	in	electoral	politics	and	attempt	to	affiliate	to	the	Labour	Party.131	Kollontai’s	work	would	resurface	again	decades	later	in	the	late	1960s,	thanks	to	the	libertarian	socialist	organisation	Solidarity.	As	we	shall	see	in	the	next	chapter,	this	group	also	shared	close	connections	to	Ford’s	workforce.	Ultimately,	Solidarity	members	came	to	adopt	a	perspective	that	was	critical	of	Marxism	in	general,	informed	in	part	by	their	forensically	detailed	if	polemical	reading	of	this	period	of	Russian	history.	Meanwhile	in	post-revolutionary	Russia,	the	question	of	how	to	manage	industry	continued	to	underscore	political	divisions	between	those	who	were	required	to	work	and	a	new	elite	enthralled	by	scientific	management.	Russian	publishers	translated	works	attributed	to	Henry	Ford	throughout	the	1920s.	No	doubt,	faced	with	immense	challenges,	but	also	in	a	mood	of	technological	euphoria,	the	country’s	political,	technical,	and	cultural	elites	became	increasingly	enthusiastic	about	the	possibilities	that	Fordism	and	Taylorism	appeared	to	offer.132	Significantly,	Bolshevik	leaders	came	to	view	such	technology	as	socially																																									 																					129	Sylvia	Pankhurst,	‘Freedom	of	Discussion’,	Workers’	Dreadnought,	17	September	1917,	pp.	1	&	5.	130	Alexandra	Kollontay,	‘Russian	Workers	v	Soviet	Government	(Continued	from	Our	Last	Issue)’,	Workers’	Dreadnought,	6	May	1922,	p.	5.	131	Matthew	Worley,	Class	against	Class:	The	Communist	Party	in	Britain	
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neutral.	This	suggested	the	assembly	line	could	serve	working-class	interests	in	a	socialist	society	as	effectively	as	it	demonstrably	functioned	under	capitalism.	Back	in	Britain	the	failure	of	the	Labour	Party	and	Trades	Union	Congress	(TUC)	to	provide	adequate	political	leadership	left	opportunities	for	the	CPGB	to	take	the	initiative	from	the	margins.	The	TUC	General	Council	clearly	showed	such	a	lack	of	leadership	in	calling	off	the	1926	General	Strike	without	securing	any	concessions	from	employers	or	the	state.133	In	the	aftermath	of	this	fiasco	and	amid	rising	unemployment,	TUC	General	Secretary	Ben	Turner	then	formally	adopted	a	conciliatory	approach	to	industrial	relations	two	years	later	at	the	Mond	Turner	talks.	While	such	a	stance	aimed	to	bring	about	‘a	revival	in	the	public	standing	of	the	TUC’,	it	took	place	just	before	the	Great	Depression	saw	the	living	standards	of	many	workers	collapse.134	Meanwhile,	the	1929	Labour	minority	government	failed	to	provide	any	alternative	to	laissez-faire	economic	orthodoxy,	which	proved	so	counterproductive.	As	this	administration	collapsed	over	how	far	to	pursue	austerity	policies,	Ramsay	MacDonald	agreed	to	head	a	national	government	willing	to	implement	the	cuts	needed	to	secure	$200,000,000	of	credit	from	J.	P.	Morgan.	Aside	from	the	effect	of	this	debacle	on	the	Labour	Party’s	political	credibility,	the	strategy	resulted	in	the	withdrawal	of	sterling	from	the	gold	standard.	While	such	an	outcome	was	potentially	favourable	for	British	exports,	in	practice,	it	failed	to	achieve	a	recovery	amid	ongoing	domestic	austerity	and	a	spiralling	international	crisis.135	
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Between	the	wars	the	Irish	War	of	Independence	also	had	a	profound	impact	in	Britain	and	specifically	at	Ford.	The	participation	of	members	of	the	Irish	Citizens’	Army	in	the	Easter	Rising	demonstrated	how	the	politics	of	nation	and	class	had	become	entangled	within	the	British	Empire.	This	force	emerged	from	the	Irish	Transport	and	General	Workers’	Union	during	the	1913	Dublin	Lockout,	initially	under	the	leadership	of	James	Larkin,	a	former	delegate	at	the	syndicalist	conference	in	Manchester.	While	Irish	socialist	republicanism	proved	inspirational	to	few	workers	in	Britain,	this	minority	included	figures	such	as	Bob	Lovell	who	was	politicised	by	the	Rising	according	to	his	biographers.136	From	1922	onwards,	Irish	independence	also	had	a	more	direct	and	material	effect	on	the	company.	The	Manchester	Works	had	by	then	already	grown	from	an	assembly	plant	into	a	fully	functioning	car	factory,	with	one	important	exception.	It	lacked	a	foundry	where	components	such	as	engine	blocks	and	wheel	axles	could	be	cast.	The	company	sourced	these	from	the	Fordson	tractor	plant	in	Cork,	Ireland.	The	creation	of	the	Irish	Free	State	made	these	components	subject	to	McKenna	Duties,	a	tariff	on	cars	and	other	imported	luxury	goods.137	The	effect	this	had	on	cost	initially	drove	the	company’s	plans	to	construct	a	new	plant	in	Britain	with	a	foundry	of	its	own.138	In	July	1924	the	firm	acquired	land	for	this	purpose	along	the	eastern	periphery	of	London	on	the	northern	bank	of	the	Thames	in	Dagenham,	Essex.139	Around	the	same	period	the	company	began	to	describe	its	cars	as	British.	This	started	in	an	advertisement	encouraging	readers	to	make	a	purchase	before	the	anticipated	withdrawal	of	McKenna	Duties.	At	first	emphasising	the	British																																									 																					136	Edmund	Frow	and	Ruth	Frow,	Bob	and	Sarah	Lovell:	Crusaders	for	a	Better	
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1933	(New	York,	NY:	Charles	Scribner’s	Sons,	1957),	pp.	369–70.	138	Nevins	and	Hill,	Ford:	Expansion	and	Challenge.	139	‘Ford	Thames-Side	Factory:	Big	Dagenham	Scheme’,	The	Times	(London,	11	July	1924),	p.	11.	This	plan	went	ahead	although	McKenna	duties	were	briefly	lifted	around	this	time.	
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labour	and	materials	embodied	in	a	Ford	vehicle	served	to	demonstrate	the	marginal	effect	a	change	in	this	policy	would	have	on	cost.	To	reinforce	the	point,	the	company	offered	to	refund	any	price	difference	for	purchases	made	in	the	meantime.140	The	firm’s	marketing	soon	took	on	a	more	patriotic	tone	though.	The	following	year	a	fully	operational	Ford	assembly	line	represented	Manchester	in	the	Mother	Country	Pavilion	at	the	British	Empire	Exhibition.	A	Union	Jack	also	flew	from	a	Ford	car	as	it	rolled	off	the	Manchester	assembly	line	to	celebrate	production	of	a	quarter	of	a	million	automobiles	for	the	British	market.141	The	company	marked	the	occasion	with	a	brochure,	which	boasted	that	British	employees	made	up	over	ninety-nine	per	cent	of	its	Manchester	workforce.142	Despite	plans	to	move	operations	south,	production	continued	there	throughout	the	1920s	and	into	the	1930s.	Afterwards,	former	workers	would	describe	conditions	resembling	those	at	Ford’s	US	facilities:	company	police	maintained	rigid	discipline;	talking	was	banned;	workers	were	refused	toilet	breaks;	and	managers	dismissed	individuals	arbitrarily,	unchecked	by	an	intimidated	workforce.	One	ex-employee	later	compared	it	to	the	notorious	Alcatraz	Prison,143	while	another	recalled	how	the	firm’s	welfare	department	extended	surveillance	into	employees’	lives	outside	work:	‘to	see	that	you	had	a	good	home,	to	check	that	you	were	teetotal,	to	see	if	you	gave	your	wife	or	your	
																																								 																					140	See	for	instance	‘Ford:	Policy	on	McKenna	Duties’,	Western	Morning	News,	30	May	1924,	p.	6.	141	‘Housing	and	Transport’,	The	Times	(London,	23	May	1925),	section	Empire	Day	and	British	Empire	Exhibition	Supplement,	p.	viii.		142	The	British	Ford:	Facts	from	the	Factory	(Manchester:	Ford	Motor	Company	(England)	Ltd,	1925),	p.	33.		143	Keith	Ward,	‘Ford	of	Manchester:	A	Cut	Throat	Fight	to	Get	the	Jobs’,	
Manchester	Evening	News,	22	June	1978,	p.	9.	
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mother	your	wages’.144	Such	practices	mirrored	the	policies	of	the	so-called	‘sociological	department’	at	the	parent	company	in	Michigan.		Under	these	conditions	the	Manchester	Works	remained	operational	throughout	the	1922	Engineering	Lockout.	Even	a	power	cut	four	years	later	during	the	General	Strike	failed	to	disrupt	the	flow	of	work.	With	a	Model	T	improvised	into	a	source	of	electricity	the	line	kept	flowing	throughout	this	major	industrial	dispute.145	Ford	appeared	to	have	overcome	the	working-class	antagonism	faced	by	the	rest	of	industry.	Management	seemed	to	have	achieved	absolute	control	of	the	shop	floor.	The	image	of	success	that	Ford	projected	and	the	firm’s	undoubted	effectiveness	at	imposing	labour	discipline	belied	the	reality	of	the	situation	though.	Despite	the	continuous	expansion	of	the	British	car	market	during	the	1920s,	Ford’s	production	peaked	at	the	beginning	of	the	decade.	Output	reached	just	over	45,000	vehicles	in	a	fifteen-month	period	before	going	into	a	steady	decline.146	Within	four	years	the	company	went	from	controlling	two	thirds	of	the	British	market	to	loosing	its	leading	position	to	Morris	Motors.	By	the	end	of	the	decade,	it	would	fall	even	further	down	the	ranks	of	British	motor	manufacturers.147	No	doubt,	specific	local	factors	contributed	to	this	change	in	fortune.	The	US	managers	who	replaced	Perry	displayed	incompetence,	and	government	fiscal	policy	penalised	Ford’s	choice	of	a	twelve-horsepower	engine.	Meanwhile,	British	firms	Morris	and	Austin	adopted	aspects	of	mass	production,	while	producing	cars	
																																								 																					144	Keith	Ward,	‘Ford	of	Manchester	Part	Two:	Working	at	Ford’s	“Drove	Some	to	Suicide”’,	Manchester	Evening	News	(Manchester,	20	June	1978),	p.	8.	145	Keith	Ward,	‘Ford	of	Manchester:	Tin	Lizzie	Put	the	World	on	Wheels’,	
Manchester	Evening	News,	21	June	1978,	p.	8.	146	An	annual	figure	is	not	available	for	1920	due	to	a	change	in	the	company’s	financial	year.	Tolliday,	‘Statistical	Appendix’,	II,	pp.	118–20.	147	Peter	King,	The	Motor	Men:	Pioneers	of	the	British	Car	Industry	(London:	Quiller	Press,	1989),	pp.	7–8,	70.	
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more	tailored	to	the	local	market.148	Yet,	these	problems	also	reflected	the	commercial	fortunes	and	erratic	management	style	of	the	US	parent	company.	The	1920s	saw	Ford	replaced	as	the	American	market	leader	too,	with	US	consumers	favouring	the	General	Motors	range	over	the	out-of-date	and	uniform	Model	T.149	While	Henry	Ford	continued	to	preach	its	virtues,	a	particularly	inflexible	version	of	Fordism	already	began	to	go	into	decline.	At	one	stage	this	uncompromising	approach	to	mass	production,	which	famously	offered	the	customer	‘any	colour	that	he	wants	so	long	as	it	is	black’,	even	attempted	to	impose	left-hand	drive	vehicles	on	British	motorists.150		None	of	this	prevented	the	Economic	League	from	eulogising	‘Henry	Fordism’	as	‘a	new	gospel	for	industry’	in	the	aftermath	of	the	General	Strike.151	In	the	circumstances,	such	praise	had	a	distinctly	political	ring	to	it.	Originally	named	‘National	Propaganda’,	the	Economic	League	had	been	established	by	the	outgoing	Director	of	British	Naval	Intelligence	towards	the	end	of	the	First	World	War.	The	organisation	had	the	explicit	aim	of	countering	communist	subversion.	Activities	included	producing	and	disseminating	propaganda,	disrupting	strikes,	and	maintaining	a	blacklist	of	workers.152	The	Economic	League’s	main	constituency	originally	consisted	of	engineering	employers	in	Manchester,	where	Ford’s	British	operations	were	based.	By	this	stage	the	parent	company	already	affiliated	to	the	Employers’	Association	of	
																																								 																					148	Steven	Tolliday,	‘The	Rise	of	Ford	in	Britain:	From	Sales	Agency	to	Market	Leader,	1904-1980’,	in	Ford,	1903-2003:	The	European	History,	2	vols	(Paris:	Éditions	PLAGE,	2003),	II,	7–72	(pp.	13–18).	149	Sward,	pp.	194–99.	150	Ford	and	Crowther,	My	Life	and	Work,	p.	72.	151	Henry	Fordism:	A	New	Gospel	for	Industry.	152	Arthur	McIvor,	‘“A	Crusade	for	Capitalism”:	The	Economic	League,	1919-39’,	Journal	of	Contemporary	History,	23.4	(1988),	631–55;	Labour	Research	Department,	Facts	About	the	Economic	League	(London:	Labour	Research	Department,	[n.d.]);	Mark	Hollingsworth	and	Richard	Norton-Taylor,	Blacklist:	The	
Inside	Story	of	Political	Vetting	(London:	Hogarth	Press,	1988),	pp.	147–48.	
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Detroit,	an	organisation	sharing	a	similar	modus	operandi.	Despite	all	this,	available	sources	suggest	the	company	had	yet	to	join	the	Economic	League.	
	
The	Dagenham	New	Deal,	1931	to	1946	
Machinery	and	workers	began	their	journey	from	Manchester	to	Dagenham	aboard	ten	special	trains	in	September	1931.	Beforehand	preparations	for	this	move	brought	changes	to	both	the	company	structure	and	its	strategy	for	ensuring	an	adequate	supply	of	labour.153	In	1928	the	Ford	Motor	Company	Limited	was	registered	with	a	public	share	issue	and	steps	began	to	wind	up	the	old	subsidiary.	Perry	also	returned	as	chairman	of	what	was	intended	as	the	firm’s	European	headquarters.154	Alongside	private	investors,	the	state	supported	the	company’s	relocation	and	expansion	with	unprecedented	public	investment.	Local	and	national	government	helped	realise	Ford’s	plans	by	constructing	the	urban	environment	required	to	support	the	firm’s	workforce.	The	urbanisation	of	Dagenham	actually	started	before	Ford’s	decision	to	relocate	there,	beginning	in	1921	with	London	County	Council’s	(LCC)	acquisition	of	land	for	social	housing	along	the	city’s	eastern	edge.	However,	this	programme	quickly	faltered	during	a	post-war	economic	slump,	when	the	Conservative	government	abandoned	the	commitment	of	Lloyd	George’s	coalition	to	build	homes	fit	for	heroes.	Subsequently,	the	local	authorities	only	called	a	conference	to	relaunch	their	housing	strategy	after	the	firm	announced	plans	to	move	there.	A	report	of	this	meeting	in	The	Times	described	how	‘the	urgency	of	the	problem	had	been	increased	by	the	decision	of	the	Ford	Motor	Company	to	build	works	that	would	
																																								 																					153	‘Plant	for	Ford	Factory’,	Essex	Newsman,	19	September	1931,	p.	3.	154	‘Seven	Million	Capital:	New	British	Ford	Motor	Company’,	Financial	Times	(London,	14	November	1928),	p.	7.	
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employ	10,000	men’.155	The	pace	of	development,	which	had	dropped	off	the	previous	year,	then	regained	momentum.	Between	1924	and	the	end	of	the	decade	more	than	14,000	homes	were	built	on	the	Becontree	Housing	Estate,	financed	under	the	first	Labour	government’s	Wheatley	Housing	Act.	Within	a	year	of	the	car	plant	opening,	more	than	22,000	council	properties	in	Dagenham	housed	over	100,000	residents.156	As	well	as	constructing	housing	on	what	an	official	history	of	LCC	hailed	as	‘the	largest	municipal	estate	in	the	world’,157	government	expenditure	financed	road	building,	utilities,	and	schools.	The	Italian	Marxist	Ferruccio	Gambino	later	described	how	the	‘Dagenham	“New	Deal”	begins	at	the	moment	of	the	deepest	crisis	for	British	capital,	which	coincides	with	the	first	signs	of	its	political	recovery’.158	While	too	limited	in	scope	to	constitute	a	shift	in	macroeconomic	policy,	this	public	investment	programme	foreshadowed	Roosevelt’s	policies	in	the	US,	which	were	adopted	more	widely	after	the	Second	World	War.	Gambino’s	analysis	emphasised	the	political	aspect	of	both	the	interwar	crisis	and	such	a	proto-Keynesian	response.	At	this	precise	moment	with	the	international	market	disintegrating	and	mass	unemployment	curtailing	the	labour	shortages	that	a	policy	of	paying	high	wages	addressed,	the	company	abandoned	such	a	strategy.	Within	months	of	Dagenham	opening,	the	firm	cut	pay	by	ten	per	cent.	That	year	also	saw	NUWM	hunger	marches,	led	by	Wal	Hannington,	against	the	government’s	means	test	for	outdoor	relief.	This	policy	threatened	to	throw	the	unemployed	deeper	into																																									 																					155	‘London	Beyond-the-Border:	Thames-Side	Housing	Problem’,	The	Times	(London,	30	September	1924),	p.	7.	156	Terence	Young,	Becontree	and	Dagenham:	A	Report	Made	for	the	Pilgrim	
Trust	(London:	Becontree	Social	Survey	Committee,	1934),	pp.	301–2.	157	Sir	Gwilym	Gibbon	and	Reginald	W.	Bell,	History	of	the	London	County	
Council	1889-1939	(London:	Macmillan,	1939),	p.	390.	158	Gambino,	‘Ford	britannica’,	pp.	168–69.	Original	reads:	‘Il	New	Deal	di	Dagenham	ha	inizio	nel	momento	della	più	profonda	crisi	economica	del	capitale	britannico,	che	coincide	con	i	primi	segni	della	sua	ripresa	politica’.	
	 53	
poverty,	increasing	competition	for	scarce	jobs	and	driving	wages	further	downwards	in	the	process.	As	the	NUWM	campaign	gathered	momentum,	violence	erupted	between	police	and	demonstrators,	with	three	days	of	street	fighting	in	Birkenhead	and	clashes	in	Belfast,	where	police	shot	two	people	dead	and	wounded	fifty	others.159	The	following	year	Ford	announced	plans	to	cut	wages	by	a	further	ten	per	cent,	but	this	time	they	met	with	resistance.	Following	a	meeting	of	craftsmen	in	the	toolroom,	7000	workers	of	all	grades	went	on	strike.	A	rank-and-file	strike	committee	then	organised	mass	pickets,	bringing	gridlock	to	nearby	streets.	In	response	the	company	barricaded	access	to	the	factory,	and	mounted	police	attempted	to	break	the	pickets,	all	to	no	avail.160	Throughout	this	dispute	managers	refused	to	deal	with	union	officials.	At	one	point	they	even	attempted	to	obstruct	negotiations	by	denying	that	representatives	of	the	strike	committee	worked	for	the	company.161	Nonetheless,	after	four	days	of	disruption	an	agreement	was	reached	and	work	resumed.	Under	the	terms	of	this	deal,	the	pay	cut	was	revoked	and	strikers	were	guaranteed	against	victimisation.	While	the	company	still	refused	to	recognise	trade	unions,	skilled	and	semi-skilled	workers	managed	to	secure	a	pay	increase.162	Rank-and-file	action,	initiated	by	craftsmen	and	taken	up	by	all	grades	of	the	workforce,	led	to	this	first	victory—one	in	which	Communists	played	no	small	role.	Such	involvement	reflected	how	the	CPGB’s	implementation	of	the	Third	International’s	‘class	against	class’	policy	
																																								 																					159	Wal	Hannington,	Ten	Lean	Years:	An	Examination	of	the	National	
Government	in	the	Field	of	Unemployment	(London:	Victor	Gollancz,	1940),	pp.	50–69.	 160	‘8,000	Ford	Workers	Strike	Against	Cuts’,	Daily	Worker,	28	March	1933,	p.	1.	 161	‘Dockers	Won’t	Handle	Ford	Goods’,	Daily	Worker,	29	March	1933,	p.	1.	162	‘Ford	Strikers	Win	Concessions’,	Daily	Worker,	30	March	1933,	p.	1.	
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became	increasingly	accommodating	towards	trade	unionism	towards	the	end	of	the	Third	Period.163	The	following	year	a	dispute	occurred	at	another	American	subsidiary	in	the	car	industry	Pressed	Steel,	which	operated	a	body	plant	servicing	Morris	Motors	in	Oxford.	This	marked	an	important	shift	in	the	balance	of	power	between	different	sections	of	the	workforce	in	the	automobile	sector.	For	the	first	time	semi-skilled	workers,	women	among	them,	went	on	strike	without	taking	a	lead	from	skilled	men	to	demand	increased	pay	and	recognition	for	their	own	shop	stewards.	Indeed,	they	did	so	despite	their	strike	being	declared	unconstitutional	by	the	AEU	and	NUVB	unions,	which	represented	the	craftsmen.	On	the	other	hand,	the	TGWU’s	role	in	organising	the	strike	consolidated	its	position	in	the	car	industry.	Ford	workers	pledged	support	for	the	strike	at	mass	meetings	in	Dagenham.	Such	solidarity	indicated	that	union	activity	continued	at	the	car	firm	despite	the	failure	to	win	recognition	in	the	previous	year’s	otherwise	successful	strike.164	By	this	point	Lovell	had	already	moved	to	Essex,	where	he	worked	and	became	a	shop	steward	at	Briggs	Bodies.	This	firm	played	an	equivalent	role	to	Pressed	Steel	for	Ford,	operating	a	body	works	on	the	Dagenham	industrial	estate.	Lovell	also	helped	organise	union	members	at	the	car	firm	through	his	AEU	activity.	He	later	described	how	union	activists	mounted	their	campaign	in	1933	despite	high	unemployment	and	a	mood	of	defeat	following	the	General	Strike:	‘Underground	activity	was,	however,	taking	place	particularly	among	the	skilled	engineers	in	the	Toolroom	and	Machine	Shop,	led	by	Ernie	Athorne	and	Jack	Longworth	both	AEU	toolmakers’.	They	published	a	newspaper,	smuggling	it	into	the	factory,	while	their	wives	distributed	leaflets	at	the	gates.	Lovell	also	recalled	the	opposition	they	encountered:	‘Fascist	elements	inside	and	outside	the																																									 																					163	Worley,	pp.	287–97.	164	Richard	Croucher,	Engineers	at	War	(London:	Merlin	Press,	1982),	pp.	28–29.	
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Dagenham	factories	were	showing	their	ugly	heads,	and	the	Economic	League	was	distributing	anti-Communist	leaflets	weekly	and	holding	factory	gate	meetings’.165		By	then	the	League	was	led	by	John	Baker	White,	a	military	intelligence	officer	in	both	World	Wars	and	future	Conservative	MP.	Baker	White	had	close	personal	ties	to	senior	figures	in	the	Metropolitan	Police	Special	Branch	and	held	outspoken	fascist	sympathies,	publishing	a	glowing	report	from	the	1937	Nuremberg	Rally.	Henry	Ford	infamously	shared	the	same	allegiances,	accepting	the	Grand	Cross	of	the	German	Eagle,	the	highest	Nazi	honour	awarded	to	foreign	nationals,	the	following	year.	As	mentioned	already,	the	parent	company	was	also	affiliated	to	the	Employers’	Association	of	Detroit,	an	organisation	serving	the	same	function	as	the	Economic	League	in	Michigan.	In	addition,	the	engineering	sector	in	Manchester,	where	the	subsidiary	first	opened,	provided	the	Economic	League’s	original	industrial	base.	Firm	proof	of	any	direct	relationship	between	Ford	and	the	Economic	League	at	this	stage	still	remains	allusive	despite	such	circumstantial	evidence.166	Conversely,	Ford	shared	well-documented	links	with	Soviet	Russia.	Indeed,	the	company	had	traded	there	since	1909	with	remarkably	little	interruption	despite	the	chaos	and	upheaval	that	engulfed	the	region.	Ford	actually	advanced	from	the	fringe	of	the	Imperial	Russian	automobile	industry	to	play	a	central	part	in	the	sectors	development	by	the	1920s.	In	summer	1929	Perry	accompanied	the	senior	US	executive	Charles	E.	Sorensen	on	a	trip	to	the	Soviet	Union	arranged	as	part	of	a	trade	agreement	between	the	US	corporation	and	the	Bolshevik																																									 																					165	Bob	Lovell,	‘What	a	Bloody	Nerve	the	Ford	Management	Has!’,	Morning	
Star	(London,	15	November	1968),	p.	2.	166	John	Baker	White,	Dover-Nüremberg	Return	(London:	Burrup,	Mathieson	&	Company,	1937);	Baker	White,	John,	True	Blue:	An	Autobiography	1902-1939	(London:	Frederick	Muller,	1970)	In	this	latter	work,	Baker	White	wrote	candidly	about	his	previous	Fascist	sympathies	and	continued	to	defend	Franco,	though	he	claimed	that	his	earlier	articles	about	Hitler	had	provided	cover	for	espionage	at	the	Nuremberg	Rally.	None	of	this	explains	the	content	of	Dover-Nüremberg	Return,	which	was	published	on	his	return	to	England,	a	point	elided	in	his	memoirs.	
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government.167	Under	this	arrangement,	Russian	technicians	received	training	in	Michigan	and	technical	assistance	was	provided	to	build	a	factory	in	Nizhny	Novgorod.	Ford	helped	establish	Europe’s	largest	automobile	plant	there,	a	cornerstone	for	Russian	industrialisation.	Paradoxically	perhaps,	this	high	point	in	relations	between	the	company	and	Soviet	Russia	coincided	with	Communist-led	campaigns	for	union	recognition	in	the	USA	and	Britain,	which	management	met	with	intransigence.	In	1932	party	members	led	a	hunger	march	from	Detroit	to	Dearborn,	a	nearby	town	dominated	by	the	firm’s	River	Rouge	headquarters.	This	ended	violently	with	five	demonstrators	shot	dead	outside	Ford’s	main	plant.	Harry	Bennett,	the	head	of	the	company’s	private	police	force	known	as	the	‘Service	Department’,	ruminated	sardonically	on	this	incident	in	his	memoirs:	‘Russians	were	actually	watching	everything	out	the	windows.	Rocks	flung	by	the	mob	were	striking	there	and	I	cracked,	“You’re	stoning	your	own	fellows	up	there!”’168	Clearly,	the	irony	of	the	situation	was	not	lost	on	him.	Five	years	later	a	campaign	by	the	United	Automobile	Workers	(UAW)	union	began	to	gain	traction	in	the	USA	with	sit-down	strikes	winning	recognition	at	General	Motors	(GM)	and	Chrysler.	Efforts	to	organise	at	Ford,	however,	only	ended	in	another	bloody	encounter	with	the	Service	Department	in	the	battle	of	the	overpass.	The	same	year	also	saw	Briggs	workers	in	Dagenham	appeal	to	Ernest	Bevin,	General	Secretary	of	the	Transport	and	General	Workers	Union	(TGWU),	for	his	support	following	a	number	of	fatal	accidents	at	the	firm.169	This	marked	the	beginning	of	another	attempt	to	unionise	Dagenham.	Shortly	later	Walter	Citrine,	General	Secretary	of	the	Trades	Union	Congress,	gave	official	backing	to	a	recruitment	campaign	at	Ford,	Briggs	Bodies,	and	Kelsey	Hayes	(another	of	the																																									 																					167	Sorensen	and	Lewis,	pp.	193–204.	168	Bennett	and	Marcus,	p.	93.	169	Cohen,	Notoriously	Militant:	The	Story	of	a	Union	Branch,	p.	31.	
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company’s	suppliers,	which	produced	wheels	on	the	estate).	While	local	officials	including	Lovell	ran	the	campaign	on	the	ground	with	shop	stewards,	it	was	coordinated	for	the	TUC	Organising	Department	by	a	recently	appointed	administrator	Victor	Feather.	Over	ninety	thousand	leaflets	and	a	broadsheet	were	printed	for	a	two-week	recruitment	drive.	Demonstrations	took	place	in	local	parks,	factory-gate	meetings	were	held,	and	a	march	took	place	in	Romford.170	This	campaign	brought	together	militant	shop	stewards	and	Communist	local	officials	with	‘moderates’	from	the	national	leadership	of	the	trade	union	movement.	While	the	Communist	policy	shift	from	class	against	class	to	the	popular	front	had	limited	success	in	overcoming	hostility	from	the	right	of	the	Labour	Party,	it	helped	make	such	an	incongruous	coalition	possible.	Though	union	membership	continued	to	grow,	the	campaign	was	not	so	easily	won.	Such	progress	would	only	come	after	the	outbreak	of	the	Second	World	War.	Skilled	workers	at	Briggs	were	the	first	to	gain	union	recognition.	This	followed	the	dismissal	of	Mr	McDougall,	a	shop	steward	in	the	body	plant,	for	using	‘hasty	words’	with	a	foreman.	To	forestall	industrial	action	from	disrupting	war	work,	Bevin,	by	then	Minister	of	Labour	and	National	Service,	called	a	Court	of	Inquiry	chaired	by	Sir	Charles	Doughty	KC.	The	Doughty	Report	concluded	‘that	this	Company	should	adopt	the	normal	procedure	for	discussing	and	settling	disputes’	and	recommended	that	craftsmen	should	‘elect	from	their	numbers	their	own	representatives’.171	This	outcome	made	Ford’s	refusal	to	recognise	trade	unions	increasingly	untenable.	
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The	following	year	Perry—now	Barron	Perry	of	Stock	Harvard—founded	a	lobbying	organisation	Aims	of	Industry	to	promote	free	enterprise.172	One	of	its	earliest	publications	recorded	a	speech	of	his	denouncing	the	Beveridge	Report’s	proposals	for	the	welfare	state.173	Other	pieces	published	included	one	in	which	he	dismissed	the	Bretton	Woods	architecture	for	the	international	monetary	system	and	a	favourable	review	of	Friedrich	Hayek’s	polemic	against	state	planning	The	
Road	to	Serfdom.174	As	government	contracts	in	a	planned	wartime	economy	created	the	demand	that	finally	brought	operations	at	Ford	Dagenham	up	to	full	capacity,	the	subsidiary’s	chairman	became	an	outspoken	opponent	of	proposals	for	the	post-war	settlement.	Ironically	enough,	at	the	outset	senior	management	bitterly	opposed	the	development	of	a	system	that	would	become	eponymous	with	Ford	and	allow	the	firm	an	unprecedented	opportunity	for	peacetime	growth.	In	another	Aims	of	Industry	pamphlet,	Perry	also	warned	that	‘the	effects	of	“equal	pay”	would	be	such	that	grave	harm	might	be	done	to	both	male	and	female	workers’.175	He	framed	this	argument	broadly	in	terms	of	‘justice’,	denouncing	the	‘unfavourable’	treatment	of	men	before	the	criminal,	civil,	and	divorce	courts.	Yet,	the	women	who	joined	Ford’s	workforce	during	the	war	undoubtedly	contributed	to	his	concerns.	References	Perry	made	to	a	speech	by	Bevin	at	a	TGWU	women’s	conference,	in	which	he	also	opposed	equal	pay,	indicated	the	common	ground	shared	between	the	industrialist	and	right-wing	union	leaders	on	the	issue.		Meanwhile,	further	pressure	began	to	build	for	the	firm	to	recognise	trade	unions.	This	began	with	shop	stewards	calling	a	series	of	local	meetings	in	April																																									 																					172	30	Years	of	Aims	of	Industry	(London:	Aims	of	Industry,	1972).	173	Lord	[Percival]	Perry,	Industry	in	Reconstruction:	A	Speech	Contributed	to	a	
Series	on	“Planning	for	Peace”	and	Delivered	in	Slough	in	February,	1943	(London:	Aims	of	Industry,	1944).	174	Lord	[Percival]	Perry,	The	Golden	Calf	(Aims	of	Industry,	1944);	Hargreaves	Parkinson,	‘“Planning”	under	Fire’,	Aims	of	Industry:	Notes	on	Industrial,	
Commercial,	Economic	and	Financial	Trends	(London,	December	1944),	pp.	4–7.	175	‘Equal	Pay’:	What	It	Is	and	What	It	Means	([London]:	Aims	of	Industry,	1944),	pp.	2	&	24.	
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1943.176	The	following	month	the	TUC	hosted	a	conference	on	Ford,	Briggs,	and	Kelsey	Hayes	at	London’s	Transport	House.	A	Ministry	of	Labour	report	noted	that	the	conference	‘pledged	its	full	support	to	the	Shop	Stewards	and	members	in	their	efforts’,	describing	management’s	attitude	at	the	latter	two	companies	as	‘a	disgrace’.177	Later	that	year	a	brief	interview	with	an	unofficial	shop	steward	at	Ford	Mr	J.	O’Connell	appeared	in	The	Irish	in	Britain,	a	pamphlet	published	by	the	Connolly	Association,	an	Irish	republican	socialist	organisation	established	in	London.	The	piece	identified	O’Connell	as	one	of	twelve	stewards	to	stage	a	sit-down	protest	at	the	Ministry	of	Labour	to	enforce	an	agreement	allowing	workers	from	the	Irish	republic	to	travel	home	twice	a	year.	He	then	explained	how	this	related	to	the	wider	situation	at	Ford:	‘We	have	taken	up	the	problem	in	Dagenham	of	the	transferred	workers,	and	have	a	movement	in	the	factories	for	trade	union	recognition	and	we	were	asked	to	organise	the	Irish	workers,	because	if	all	the	Irish	were	in	the	union	it	would	be	recognised.’178	The	following	February	Catholic	
Worker	revealed	another	incident	in	which	Ford	docked	pay	from	twelve	stewards	for	having	spent	six	hours	in	a	confrontation	with	management	instead	of	at	work.	Their	demands	included	recognition	for	shop	stewards,	progress	in	ongoing	discussions	between	Perry	and	Citrine,	reinstatement	of	a	recently	dismissed	convenor,	and	a	higher	rate	of	overtime	pay.179	Such	reports	reflected	the	emergence	of	an	ethnic	division	within	the	British	subsidiary’s	workforce,	which	dated	back	at	least	to	the	opening	of	Ford	Dagenham.	This	move	coincided	with	the	closure	of	the	Cork	foundry	and	the	redeployment	of																																									 																					176	‘No	Trade	Union	Recognition	at	Fords’,	Dagenham	Post,	25	March	1943,	p.	1;	‘Trade	Union	Recognition	in	Ford	Group’,	Dagenham	Post,	29	April	1943,	p.	1.	177	London,	National	Archives,	LAB	10/274,	Report	of	the	London	RIRO	‘I.R.	(Lo)	15	b’	24	May	1943;	‘Trade	Union	Recognition’,	Dagenham	Post,	20	May	1943,	p.	1.	 178	Pat	Dooley,	The	Irish	in	Britain	(London:	The	Connolly	Association,	1943),	p.	8.	 179	‘Trade	Unions	and	Fords’,	Catholic	Worker,	February	1944,	p.	1.	
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some	the	existing	workforce	to	the	new	facilities	in	England.	It	resulted	in	predominantly	Irish	migrant	labour	being	allocated	work	in	the	new	British	foundry,	a	particularly	hazardous	and	unpleasant	role	as	it	involved	handling	molten	metal.	Other	publications	showed	some	reticence	in	covering	shop-floor	disturbances	at	Ford	during	the	war.	Even	the	Daily	Worker	remained	taciturn	on	the	subject.	This	reflected	a	combination	of	Communist	Party	support	for	the	war	effort	after	the	German	invasion	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	a	cautious	approach	to	Government	censorship	following	the	paper’s	suppression	between	January	1941	and	September	1942.180	Reports	of	the	London	Regional	Industrial	Relations	Officer	to	the	Ministry	of	Labour	provide	another	source	of	scarce	contemporary	records	of	such	incidents.	A	report	for	4	February	1944	recorded	that	‘Management	are	continuing	to	experience	difficulty	in	handling	some	of	the	Shop	Stewards	who	are	impatient	at	the	delay	in	receiving	full	recognition	and	seize	on	any	pretext	for	staging	a	demonstration’.181	Within	two	months	Ford	entered	an	agreement	with	eleven	unions.	This	created	the	Ford	National	Joint	Negotiating	Committee	(FNJNC)	made	up	of	officials	and	managers.	It	also	established	procedures	for	workers	to	raise	grievances	with	an	‘appropriate	full-time	official’	after	the	exhaustion	of	company	procedures.	A	joint	press	statement	stressed	that	‘the	agreement	signed	today	was	not	negotiated	in	consequence	of	any	discontent	with	Ford	working	conditions’.	On	the	contrary,	union	officials	stated	that	‘the	company	has,	by	its	example,	played	a	leading	part	in	advancing	the	standard	of	life	of	workers	generally’.182	The	Daily	Worker	offered	a	cooler	assessment	of	the	company’s	refusal	to	recognise	shop	stewards,	calling	it	‘an	undoubted	blemish	on	the	agreement’.	The																																									 																					180	Croucher,	pp.	114–15	&	183.	181	London,	National	Archives,	LAB	10/443,	Weekly	Report	4	February	1944.	182	London,	National	Archives,	LAB	83/957,	‘Joint	Press	Statement’.	
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paper	also	made	a	veiled	reference	to	how	‘pressure	from	below	must	have	made	itself	felt	on	the	directors	of	the	company’.183	The	only	evidence	provided	to	support	this	claim	though	was	the	fact	that	union	membership	continued	to	grow.	A	piece	in	Catholic	Worker	went	further	to	question	union	negotiators’	motives.	‘Did	they	deliberately	throw	the	shop	steward	movement	overboard	in	order	to	consolidate	the	trade	union	bureaucracy?’184	Another	issue	of	the	same	paper	printed	a	shop	steward’s	appeal:	‘let	Catholics,	Communists,	and	all	workers	unite	to	fight	the	Ford	management	to	get	full	recognition’.185	Almost	two	decades	later	the	Joint	Ford	Shop	Stewards	Committee	claimed	that	‘in	1944	the	shop	stewards	staged	a	sitdown	in	the	main	plant’.186	Though	fragmented	and	perhaps	not	entirely	consistent,	such	accounts	cast	Ford	in	a	very	different	light	from	the	depiction	of	the	company	as	a	model	employer	by	management	and	union	leaders.	Given	such	contrasting	views,	the	assessment	of	an	observer	at	the	Ministry	of	Labour	is	telling:	The	instrument	very	carefully	excludes	Shop	Stewards	&	Works	Committees	[...]	Here	is	where	future	trouble	will	arise.	Indeed	I	am	informed	that	this	has	already	taken	place	[...]	I	anticipate	considerable	trouble	arising	between	S[hop]	Stewards	&	the	Unions	[...];	&	also	between	Shop	Stewards,	Works	Committees	&	the	Management.187	
																																								 																					183	Sinfield,	George,	‘Fords	Recognise	Trade	Unions,	but	Not	Shop	Stewards’,	
Daily	Worker,	18	April	1944,	p.	3.	184	Jack	Trueman,	‘Attack	on	Shop	Stewards	Ford—T.U.C.	Agreement’,	
Catholic	Worker,	July	1944,	p.	1.	185	R	Blackburn,	‘Shop	Steward	Position:	Ford-T.U.	Agreement’,	Catholic	
Worker,	October	1944,	p.	1.	186	Joint	Ford	Shop	Stewards	Committee,	pp.	3–4.	According	to	Croucher,	pp.	316	&	357,	‘the	Lovell	Papers,	Marx	Memorial	Library’	also	contain	relevant	sources.	However,	I	have	been	unable	to	trace	this	material	despite	the	patient	efforts	of	Meirian	Jump,	Archive	Manager.	187	London,	National	Archives,	LAB	10/274,	handwritten	note	dated	26	April	1944.	
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Lovell	later	acknowledged	that	local	organisers	had	helped	contain	‘any	action	that	would	weaken	the	fight	against	fascist	Germany’,188	reigning	in	trouble	until	the	contract	was	about	to	expire	in	March	1946,	well	after	end	of	the	war.	This	began	with	skilled	workers	walking	out	of	the	machine	shop.189	Yet	again,	craftsmen	initiated	industrial	action	at	Ford.	Their	demands	included	recognition	of	shop	stewards	and	an	increased,	standardised	rate	of	pay	for	skilled	work.	Eleven	thousand	members	of	the	company’s	workforce	then	joined	them	on	strike,	widening	the	demands	to	include	an	improved	‘minimum	starting	rate’	for	all	employees	and	‘equal	pay	for	women’.190	A	committee	of	about	two	hundred	members,	including	ninety	shop	stewards,	organised	the	strike.	When	management	threatened	to	lock	them	out	of	the	factory,	the	strikers	occupied	the	canteen.191	This	dispute	dragged	out	for	over	a	month	before	an	agreement	was	reached	between	union	leaders	and	management	at	a	meeting	in	the	Ministry	of	Labour.	The	company	agreed	to	recognise	seventy-five	‘shop	representatives’,	while	union	officials	conceded	that	‘the	introduction	of	labour-saving	machines’	was	necessary	to	‘achieve	efficient	production’.192	Seven	stewards	were	also	appointed	to	a	newly	formed	Joint	Works	Committee	(JWC),	but	union	officials	and	managers	retained	control	over	pay	contract	negotiations	on	the	FNJNC.	The	following	day	Arthur	Deakin,	TGWU	General	Secretary	and	chairman	of	the	union	side	of	the	FNJNC,	posted	a	notice	about	the	agreement	at	the	factory.	This	advised	the	workforce	of	
																																								 																					188	Lovell,	‘What	a	Bloody	Nerve	the	Ford	Management	Has!’	189	Cohen,	Notoriously	Militant:	The	Story	of	a	Union	Branch,	p.	41.	190	Jack	Owen,	‘Ford	Workers	May	Ask	Govt.	to	Take	Over’,	Daily	Worker,	13	March	1946,	pp.	1	&	4.	191	Bob	Lovell,	‘Fords—the	Victory	for	Union	Recognition’,	Morning	Star	(London,	16	November	1968),	p.	2.	192	London,	National	Archives,	LAB	83/957,	‘Procedure	for	the	Regulation	of	the	Relationship	Between	Ford	Motor	Company	Ltd.	Dagenham	and	Certain	Trade	Unions’.	
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the	need	for	‘increased	output	per	man	per	hour’.	Such	‘a	wholehearted	approach’	was	‘in	the	national,	as	well	as	your	own	personal,	interest’,	he	instructed	them.193	The	rapid	development	of	automated	machine	tools	after	the	war	gave	this	concession	by	union	leaders	greater	significance.	Not	only	did	automation	threaten	to	make	workers	redundant,	it	also	set	a	new	rhythm	to	work.	For	the	company	to	realise	the	benefits	of	investment	in	such	equipment,	the	pace	of	labour	had	to	be	intensified	for	those	processes	that	remained	manual	to	keep	up.	This	accentuated	the	gap	between	official	trade	union	negotiations	and	the	daily	experiences	of	workers	on	the	shop	floor	at	Ford.		
Not	a	Single	Official	Dispute	since	the	War,	1947	to	1964	
The	death	of	Henry	Ford	in	1947	and	Percival	Perry’s	retirement	the	following	year	marked	another	transition,	both	for	the	company	and	for	the	meaning	of	the	term	
Fordism.	As	we	have	seen,	Henry	Ford	and	Lord	Perry	shared	a	deep	antipathy	towards	both	the	new	deal	and	organised	labour.	Yet,	the	company’s	peacetime	fortunes	only	recovered	within	a	framework	of	broadly	Keynesian	macroeconomic	policies	and	industrial	relations	mediated	by	trade	unions.	Not	since	the	early	1920s	had	the	company	thrived	outside	of	a	wartime	command	economy.	Whatever	the	apparent	antinomies,	state	planning	was	required	to	maintain	the	growing	consumer	demand	that	sustained	mass	production.	Ford’s	promise	of	the	Five	Dollar	Day	prefigured	just	such	a	positive	feedback	system.	Making	it	work	in	practice,	however,	required	political	involvement	at	the	level	of	the	state.	In	Britain	such	intervention	took	a	social	democratic	form,	and	Ford	became	a	key	player	in	sustaining	and	reaping	the	benefits	of	a	new	regulatory	system.	
																																								 																					193	London,	National	Archives,	LAB	83/957,	‘Notice:	To	Trade	Union	Members	Employed	by	Ford	Motor	Company	Limited,	Dagenham’.	
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Before	the	next	wave	of	major	unrest	at	Dagenham,	the	post-war	Labour	government	introduced	an	austerity	budget,	British	troops	engaged	Communist	forces	in	Malaya	and	Korea,	and	the	Conservatives	regained	power.	Then	during	protracted	pay	negotiations	in	spring	1952,	industrial	action	began	with	a	series	of	stoppages	at	Briggs.	At	one	point	a	group	of	workers	marched	from	the	supplier’s	plant	to	the	nearby	Ford	factory	to	call	on	their	workmates	at	the	‘parent	company’	to	join	them	in	demanding	higher	wages.	One	hundred	women	marched	at	the	head	of	this	demonstration,	reflecting	the	changing	composition	of	the	workforce.	Disruption	to	the	sexual	division	of	labour,	a	legacy	of	the	wartime	recruitment	of	women,	saw	such	workers	play	a	more	prominent	part	than	craftsmen	in	industrial	action.194	Women	would	not	have	such	a	visible	role	in	unrest	effecting	Ford	again	for	over	a	decade.	All	the	same,	this	still	signalled	the	start	of	a	trend	that	would	see	exclusively	male	skilled	labour	increasingly	displaced	from	its	former	position	as	the	leadership	of	industrial	militancy.	Then	Briggs’s	workforce	walked	out	indefinitely	on	24	June.195	Pre-empting	a	mass	meeting	scheduled	for	the	following	day,	Ford	management	then	laid	off	hundreds	of	workers	without	pay.	In	response,	15,000	of	their	workmates	came	out	on	strike.196	To	legitimise	their	action,	a	strike	committee	at	Ford	prioritised	demands	arising	from	the	lay-offs.	On	the	other	hand,	the	issue	of	pay	was	only	raised	obliquely	at	times	with	references	to	‘other	outstanding	matters’	in	the	Daily	
Worker.197	Yet,	national	union	leaders	refused	to	make	either	strike	official.	Kevin	Halpern,	a	senior	shop	steward	at	Briggs,	later	recalled	how	candidly	Claude	Berridge,	a	fellow	Communist	and	local	AEU	official,	addressed	their	meeting.	‘I																																									 																					194	Leon	Griffiths,	‘1,500	March	to	Ford	for	9d	Hour	Rise’,	Daily	Worker,	14	June	1952,	p.	3.	195	Leon	Griffiths,	‘9,000	Go	on	Strike	at	Briggs	Bodies:	Ford	Workers	May	Follow’,	Daily	Worker,	25	June	1952,	p.	3.	196	‘15,000	out	on	Strike	at	Ford’s’,	Daily	Worker,	26	June	1952,	p.	1.	197	Peter	Fryer,	‘Three	Points	by	15,000:	Ford	Striker’s	Terms’,	Daily	Worker,	2	July	1952,	p.	1.	
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know	you	are	correct.	I	know	they	can	pay	you	9	pence	an	hour,	but	it’s	my	job	to	get	you	back	to	work.’198	Unsurprisingly,	workers	then	voted	to	remain	out	on	strike.	These	disputes	coincided	with	the	Conservative	government’s	decision	to	adopt	a	policy	to	wage	restraint.	The	Daily	Worker	argued	that	this	position	was	effectively	‘endorsed	by	the	refusal	of	the	fabulously	rich	Ford	concern	to	grant	demands	for	a	wage	increase’.199	Union	leaders	still	continued	to	oppose	industrial	action.	Deakin,	now	TUC	chairman	as	well	as	TGWU	leader,	warned	that	malign	forces	lay	behind	the	strike.	‘If	the	workers	gave	way	to	such	influence’,	he	cautioned,	‘it	would	be	the	first	nail	in	the	coffin	of	the	trade	union	movement’.200	Union	democracy,	he	implied,	placed	a	duty	on	members	to	refrain	from	industrial	action	throughout	the	entire	term	of	a	contract.	The	same	issue	of	The	Times	that	reported	this	speech	of	Deakin’s	also	printed	a	letter	signed	by	him,	along	with	others,	to	promote	the	Friends	of	Atlantic	Union,	a	pro-NATO	pressure	group.	This	warned	of	a	threat	to	‘the	prosperity	and	liberty	of	free	people	of	the	world’	that	Communism	posed.201	For	the	TUC	General	Secretary,	concerns	about	cold	war	foreign	policy	trumped	the	day-to-day	interests	of	union	members.	After	two	weeks	on	strike	Ford	workers	accepted	the	recommendation	of	officials	on	the	FNJNC	and	voted	to	resume	work,	against	the	advice	of	shop	stewards.	Immediately	afterwards	management	clamped	down	by	withdrawing	facilities	from	the	stewards,	even	putting	plant	convenor	Con	O’Keefe	back	on	
																																								 																					198	Halpin,	pp.	27–28.	199	George	Sinfield,	‘Butler’s	“Get	Tough”	Provokes	Huge	Battles’,	Daily	
Worker,	28	June	1952,	p.	1.	200	‘TUC	and	Wages:	Mr	Deakin’s	View	on	Policy’,	The	Times	(London,	9	July	1952),	p.	3.	201	‘Letters	to	the	Editor:	Atlantic	Union	a	Plan	for	Economic	Cooperation’,	
The	Times	(London,	9	July	1952),	p.	7.	
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full-time	production	work.	Meanwhile,	Briggs	workers	held	out	for	another	week	to	win	a	pay	increase,	if	not	their	full	claim.		Concerns	raised	by	another	TUC	official	afterwards	made	clear	that	the	priorities	of	‘moderate’	trade	union	leaders	remained	unchanged.	The	dispute	at	Ford	provided	the	main	case	study	for	How	do	the	Communists	Work?,	a	1953	pamphlet	by	Vic	Feather	published	in	the	Background	Books	series.	This	imprint	was	the	work	of	a	covert,	anti-Communist	propaganda	programme	run	by	the	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office’s	Information	and	Research	Department	(IRD).202	According	to	Feather,	by	then	the	third	most	senior	official	at	the	TUC,	‘the	Communist	Party’s	scheme	for	industrial	and	economic	disruption’	caused	the	1952	strikes.	To	support	this	claim	he	described	O’Keefe	as	‘a	typical	workman	of	average	ability,	but	with	no	great	competence	as	a	strike	organiser’.	By	implication,	the	real	leadership	must	actually	have	come	from	Communist	Party’s	King	Street	headquarters	in	Covent	Garden.	This	allegation	stood	in	stark	contrast	with	his	depiction	of	the	firm,	which	was	‘heavily	engaged	in	the	export	trade	and	a	blow	at	Ford’s,	therefore,	would	be	a	blow	against	Britain’s	[...]	exports’	according	to	him.203	Again,	‘moderate’	opinion	among	the	TUC	leadership	aligned	with	the	interests	of	Ford	and	the	Conservative	government,	rather	than	workers	at	the	US	subsidiary	and	their	elected	representatives.		That	year	also	saw	publication	of	a	Labour	Research	Department	(LRD)	pamphlet	Who	is	Behind	Them?.	In	it	the	LRD	published	a	leaked	copy	of	a	letter	from	the	Federation	of	British	Industry	to	its	members,	requesting	that	‘funds	be	found	to	finance	the	Economic	League	and	Aims	of	Industry’.204	This	indicated	a	close	relationship	between	the	three	organisations.	Subsequently,	Ford																																									 																					202	John	Jenks,	British	Propaganda	and	News	Media	in	the	Cold	War	(Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	University	Press,	2006),	pp.	63–65,	70,	107–8.	203	Victor	Feather,	How	Do	the	Communists	Work?,	Background	Books	(London:	Batchworth,	1953),	pp.	29–30.	204	Who	Is	Behind	Them?	(London:	Labour	Research	Department,	1953).	(At	the	time	the	Labour	party	proscribed	the	LRD	for	its	links	to	the	Communist	Party.).	
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management	revealed	to	a	House	of	Commons	Select	Committee	that	the	company	subscribed	to	the	Economic	League,	which	secretly	vetted	all	recruits	to	the	firm	for	more	than	three	decades	from	the	1950s	onwards.205	In	March	1953	one	year	after	the	two	strikes,	the	car	firm	took	over	the	body	works.	The	motivation	for	this	decision	has	since	been	a	subject	of	debate.	Some	observers	have	claimed	that	industrial	militancy	at	Briggs	drove	vertical	integration,	with	management	aiming	to	gain	control	over	the	supplier’s	workforce.206	Other	sources	closer	to	the	company	have	stressed	the	importance	of	competition	between	car	firms.	This	highlighted	concerns	that	Chrysler	could	acquire	the	body	works,	as	indeed	happened	with	Briggs’s	American	parent	company	afterwards.207	Either	way,	this	takeover	brought	a	workforce	into	Ford	that	was	accustomed	to	shop	stewards	having	a	recognised	role	in	pay	negotiations.	In	order	to	standardise	terms	and	conditions	across	the	two	companies,	management	reached	another	national	agreement	with	trade	union	officials	in	August	1955.	Under	this	deal	both	parties	agreed	to	the	continued	exclusion	of	shop	stewards	from	the	FNJNC.	This	erosion	of	shop-floor	representation	at	Briggs	led	to	234	unofficial	stoppages	over	the	following	eighteen	months,	before	the	Suez	Crisis	brought	matters	to	a	head.	With	conflict	in	the	Middle	East	disrupting	the	flow	of	oil	to	Britain,	limited	petrol	supplies	reduced	demand	for	cars.	In	response	Ford	dismissed	1729	workers,	convincing	shop	stewards	of	the	need	to	resist	any	further	dismissals.	Then	management	suspended	a	convenor	and	another	steward	for	attending	an	FNJNC	meeting,	even	though	they	did	so	at	the	invitation	of	a	union	official.	On	his	return	from	the	meeting,	John	McLoughlin,	a	Briggs	steward	who																																									 																					205	Parliamentary	Papers.	House	of	Commons,	HC	176	Employment	
Committee.	Second	Report.	Recruitment	Practices.	Minutes	and	Evidence	Appendices	
and	Index,	1991,	II,	pp.	146–47.	206	Mathews,	p.	44.	207	Nevins	and	Hill,	Ford:	Decline	and	Rebirth,	1933-1962,	p.	399.	
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avoided	suspension	despite	also	being	present,	called	a	shop-floor	meeting	by	ringing	a	hand	bell.	This	led	to	another	walk	out,	and	the	ensuing	dispute	became	known	as	‘the	bell	ringer	strike’.208	When	the	company	dismissed	McLoughlin,	workers	voted	at	a	mass	meeting	to	take	strike	action,	but	union	officials	quickly	persuaded	them	back	to	work	with	reassurances	that	management	would	review	McLoughlin’s	case.	After	his	dismissal	was	upheld,	another	vote	threatened	to	make	industrial	action	official.	To	avert	a	strike	the	Ministry	of	Labour	then	launched	a	Court	of	Inquiry,	chaired	by	Lord	Cameron.	The	Cameron	Report	met	a	need	to	appear	balanced,	finding	fault	on	both	sides.	For	instance,	it	documented	management’s	reluctance	to	follow	company	procedures.	All	the	same,	the	authors	concluded	that	‘the	greater	measure	of	responsibility	for	the	continuance	of	these	relations	rests	upon	the	side	of	the	workpeople’,	coming	down	firmly	in	favour	of	the	company.	They	also	warned	that	‘Communist	influence’	over	the	Briggs	stewards	was	‘to	the	further	detriment	of	good	industrial	relations’	and	upheld	the	decision	to	dismiss	McLoughlin.	The	party,	however,	was	not	found	to	be	‘the	prime	cause	of	trouble	on	the	workers	side’.	Such	criticism	was	reserved	for	the	Shop	Stewards	Committee,	the	‘continued	existence	of	such	an	uncontrolled	organisation	at	Briggs’	being	deemed	‘undesirable’.209	The	party’s	role	in	Dagenham	was	cast	in	a	different	light	by	Kevin	Halpin,	when	he	reflected	back	over	the	influence	that	CPGB	leader	Harry	Pollitt	exercised	over	Communist	shop	stewards	in	the	1950s.	‘It	convinced	us’	he	wrote	‘to	change	the	branch’s	strategy	to	The	British	Road	to	Socialism	rather	than	violent																																									 																					208	Parliamentary	Papers.	House	of	Commons,	Industrial	Court	Act	1919.	
Report	of	a	Court	of	Inquiry	into	the	Causes	and	Circumstances	of	a	Dispute	at	Briggs	
Motor	Bodies	Limited,	Dagenham,	Existing	between	the	Ford	Motor	Company	Limited	
and	Members	of	the	Trade	Unions	Represented	on	the	Trade	Union	Side	of	the	Ford	
National	Joint	Negotiating	Committee,	Cmnd.	131	(London:	HMSO,	1957),	pp.	9–13.	209	Parliamentary	Papers.	House	of	Commons,	Cmnd.	131,	p.	31.	
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revolution’.210	The	Party	first	published	this	programme	in	1951,	at	the	outset	of	the	cold	war.	Dismissing	claims	that	they	intended	‘to	introduce	Soviet	Power	in	Britain	and	abolish	Parliament’,	the	authors	instead	presented	‘the	peaceful	co-existence	of	socialism	and	capitalism’	as	a	realistic	possibility.211	Could	Communist	leadership	have	had	a	moderating,	rather	than	subversive,	influence	on	militant	Ford	workers?	Some	critics	on	the	left	certainly	suggested	as	much	following	1956,	when	Communist	orthodoxy	increasingly	came	under	critical	scrutiny.	While	the	Suez	Crisis	made	its	impact	felt	directly	at	Ford,	two	other	events	that	year	profoundly	shaped	working-class	politics	across	the	world:	Khrushchev’s	secret	speech	condemning	Stalin	and	the	Hungarian	Uprising.	After	news	of	the	Russian	leader’s	speech	reached	Britain,	Halpin	chaired	a	‘rowdy’	public	meeting	addressed	by	Pollitt	at	Barking	Town	Hall.	He	also	sat	on	an	Inner	Party	Democracy	Commission	set	up	at	that	year’s	Party	Congress.	By	his	own	account,	he	found	himself	increasingly	isolated	on	this	body,	both	from	a	majority	that	continued	to	uphold	democratic	centralism	and	from	a	libertarian	minority	that	included	the	historian	Christopher	Hill.212	As	a	major	international	split	occurred	within	the	Communist	movement,	Halpin	remained	faithful	to	the	party.	Others	involved	in	organising	at	Dagenham	did	not,	with	Johnny	McLoughlin	‘calling	for	an	“organized	movement	of	the	Marxist	anti-Stalinist	left”’,	as	E.	P.	Thompson	recalled	afterwards.213	Thompson	cited	McLoughlin,	among	others,	to	dismiss	the	characterisation	of	the	Marxist	humanist	critique	of	Stalinism	as	a	middle-class	parlour	game.	Such	divisions	left																																									 																					210	Halpin,	p.	39.	211	Executive	Committee	of	the	CPGB,	The	British	Road	to	Socialism:	
Programme	Adopted	by	the	Executive	Committee	of	the	Communist	Party	(London:	The	Communist	Party,	1951),	pp.	8	&	14.	212	Halpin,	pp.	50–54.	Most	of	the	latter	group	soon	left	the	Party	to	enter	the	emerging	New	Left.	213	E.	P.	Thompson,	The	Poverty	of	Theory	&	Other	Essays	(London:	Merlin,	1978),	p.	133.	
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the	authority	of	the	shop	stewards’	leadership	in	Dagenham,	which	remained	close	to	the	party,	increasingly	weakened.	While	this	rupture	within	the	Communist	movement	proved	disorientating	and	divisive	for	some,	others	took	it	as	a	moment	of	opportunity.	Ken	Weller,	also	a	Ford	steward,	helped	to	found	the	libertarian	socialist	group	Solidarity	in	1960.	While	this	organisation	remained	small	and	marginal,	even	by	the	standards	of	the	far	left	in	Britain,	it	opened	up	a	dialogue	with	related	political	currents	in	France	and	the	USA.	Solidarity	was	closely	aligned	to	Socialisme	ou	Barbarie,	a	French	group	that	emphasised	the	expansion	of	bureaucratic	power	in	contemporary	society	across	both	sides	of	the	iron	curtain.	The	first	issue	of	the	journal	Socialisme	ou	Barbarie	featured	an	extract	from	The	American	Worker,	an	account	of	work	in	the	Detroit	car	industry	written	by	members	of	the	Johnston-Forrest	Tendency.214	This	faction,	then	on	the	verge	of	splitting	from	the	Socialist	Workers	Party,	developed	a	theory	of	state	capitalism,	which	emphasised	the	parallels	between	social	relations	in	production	within	capitalist	society	and	purportedly	socialist	countries.	All	three	organisations	focused	on	the	experiences	of	working	in	the	automobile	sector,	publishing	studies	by	and	about	car	workers.	Their	political	ideas	would	have	an	influence	upon	the	movements	that	emerged	from	the	Detroit	riots	in	1967	and	the	famous	événements	in	France	the	following	May.		As	well	as	publishing	material	on	a	range	of	themes	from	the	Hungarian	Uprising	to	the	Committee	of	100,	including	the	first	reissue	since	the	1920s	of	Kollontai’s	The	Workers’	Opposition,	the	journal	Solidarity	regularly	reported	on	Ford.	An	early	piece	described	the	aftermath	of	the	agreement	reached	in	October	1961.	This	granted	workers	a	forty-hour	week	and	a	modest	pay	rise,	but	also	imposed	new	conditions	on	them.	These	included	a	reduction	in	the	length	of	their																																									 																					214	Romano.	
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tea	break.	The	refusal	of	the	workforce	to	cooperate	with	this	measure	forced	management	to	withdraw	the	policy	the	following	spring.	Solidarity’s	assessment	of	the	incident	was	equivocal.	A	somewhat	grandiose	claim	that	this	represented	‘a	victory	for	all	workers	employed	by	the	Company’	was	followed	by	a	more	realistic	assessment	of	it	as	a	‘red	herring’	that	diverted	attention	from	more	important	issues.215	These	included	the	gap	between	wages	at	Ford	and	the	average	for	the	sector,	the	lack	of	guaranteed	lay-off	pay,	and	the	situation	at	Halewood.	Meanwhile,	Ford	attracted	‘substantial’	government	aid	for	plans	to	invest	£25,000,000	in	a	new	plant	at	Halewood,	in	Liverpool	(an	area	of	high	unemployment),	in	1960.216	Later	that	year	a	controversy	arose	between	the	unions,	following	the	leak	of	an	agreement	between	the	company,	the	AEU,	and	the	National	Union	of	General	and	Municipal	Workers	(NUGMW).	This	revealed	that	the	two	unions	had	agreed	to	employment	terms	in	Merseyside	that	breached	the	national	agreement,	including	longer	working	hours	and	lower	wages,	in	return	for	exclusive	recognition	rights	at	Halewood.	While	this	attempt	to	exclude	other	unions	from	the	new	plant	quickly	derailed,	it	took	unofficial	overtime	bans	initiated	by	craftsmen	at	the	plant	for	workers	there	to	gain	parity	with	the	rest	of	Ford’s	workforce.217	Later	that	year	Henry	Ford	II	also	announced	a	planned	buy	out	of	other	shareholders	in	the	British	subsidiary	by	the	Ford	Motor	Company.	He	added	that	the	parent	company’s	stake	‘would	far	exceed	its	interests	in	all	other	operations	outside	the	United	States	combined’	and	that	the	purchase	would	‘permit	full	coordination	of	the	operations’	between	the	two	countries.218	This	£128,000,000																																									 																					215	‘News	from	Fords’,	Solidarity:	For	Workers’	Power,	2.3	(1962),	3–4.	216	‘Ford	Going	Ahead	at	Merseyside:	Substantial	Aid	from	Government’,	
Financial	Times	(London,	23	March	1960),	p.	1.	217	Ken	Weller,	‘The	Defeat	at	Fords:	Some	Lessons’,	Solidarity:	For	Workers’	
Power,	3.8	(1965),	22–26	(p.	23),	emphasis	in	the	original.	218	‘American	Assurances	on	Ford	Bid’,	The	Times	(London,	21	November	1960),	p.	10.	
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investment	was	linked	to	the	introduction	of	a	more	combative	‘Detroit’	style	of	management	at	the	firm.219	Managers	also	began	a	campaign	to	persuade	stewards	of	the	need	for	greater	competitiveness,	in	preparation	for	the	United	Kingdom’s	1961	application	for	membership	of	the	European	Economic	Community,	warning	them	that	European	economic	integration	would	lead	to	further	consolidation	in	the	automobile	sector.220	The	next	year	tensions	flared	up	again	in	Dagenham,	following	a	pay	agreement	in	which	union	officials	formally	acknowledged	management’s	right	to	clamp	down	on	unofficial	action.	Within	a	week	Bill	Francis,	a	Communist	shop	steward	in	the	assembly	plant,	called	a	meeting	with	a	group	of	workers	during	their	lunch	break.	This	was	to	discuss	management’s	latest	response	in	an	ongoing	dispute	over	manning	levels.	Managers	then	used	the	fact	that	this	meeting	took	place	on	company	premises	as	a	pretext	to	dismiss	Francis.	Predictably	enough,	this	led	to	an	immediate	walk	out	in	the	assembly	plant,	and	workers	voted	for	strike	action	in	a	series	of	mass	meetings.	Yet	again,	union	officials	persuaded	them	to	return	to	work,	claiming	that	Lesley	Blakeman,	Ford’s	Labour	Relations	Manager,	had	made	a	verbal	guarantee	against	further	dismissals.	Then	during	a	phased	resumption	of	work,	Management	made	‘redundancies’	targeted	at	those	workers	they	deemed	undesirable.221	After	a	protracted	series	of	negotiations	seventeen	workers	remained	suspended	and	pressure	grew	on	the	unions	to	back	industrial	action.	On	6	November	Minister	of	Labour	John	Hare	gave	Cabinet	colleagues	his	assessment	of	the	situation.	‘The	employer’s	object	had	been	to	remove	a	small	number	of	persistent	and	politically-minded	trouble	makers;	this	was	a	sensible	aim	which	the	unions	might	have	been	persuaded	to	support	had	the	employers	played	their	hand																																									 																					219	Mathews,	p.	45;	Gambino,	‘Ford	britannica’,	pp.	181–82.	220	Eddie	Stanton,	‘Inside	the	Fords	Defeat’,	Solidarity:	For	Workers’	Power,	3.11	(1965),	10–21	(p.	11).	221	Joint	Ford	Shop	Stewards	Committee,	pp.	8–10.	
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with	greater	tact’.222	Having	received	notice	of	official	action	from	the	unions,	he	set	out	plans	to	prevent	the	dispute	re-escalating.	This	took	the	form	of	another	Court	of	Inquiry,	chaired	this	time	by	D.	T.	Jack	Esquire.	This	led	union	officials	to	call	off	industrial	action.	The	Jack	Report	gave	an	accurate	account	for	how	the	rules	for	electing	stewards	at	Ford	had	weakened	ties	between	workers	and	trade	union	officials.	According	to	these	procedures,	individual	workers	generally	elected	representatives	based	on	their	location,	irrespective	of	their	specific	union	affiliation.	Workers	voted	for	stewards	and	stewards	represented	workers	from	across	different	unions.	The	report	still	went	on	to	place	‘responsibility	for	poor	industrial	relations	on	unions’,	singling	out	their	‘inability	[...]	to	exercise	effective	control	over	the	Shop	Stewards’.223	Yet	again,	the	stewards	took	the	blame	for	a	situation	that	arose,	as	the	report’s	authors	recognised,	because	of	the	terms	of	a	deal	management	had	struck	with	union	officials	without	consulting	any	of	the	lay	representatives.	Indeed,	such	arrangements	were	deliberately	designed	to	marginalise	shop	stewards	from	formal	negotiating	channels.	No	wonder	then	that	they	resorted	to	other	means.	Halpin,	one	of	the	seventeen	to	lose	their	jobs,	later	described	‘great	pressure	from	the	CPGB	to	get	all	the	shops	out	in	solidarity’	during	the	strike.	Afterwards	he	acknowledged	such	a	strategy	might	have	been	misguided.	After	all,	workers	in	the	assembly	plant	had	the	capacity	of	to	halt	Ford’s	production	without	such	support.224	
																																								 																					222	London,	National	Archives,	CAB	128/36/66,	‘Conclusions	of	a	Meeting	of	the	Cabinet	at	Admiralty	House,	S.W.1,	on	Thursday,	15th	November,	1962	at	10.30	a.m.’	pp.	477-78.	223	Parliamentary	Papers.	House	of	Commons,	Industrial	Courts	Act,	1919.	
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Former	Communist	Eddie	Stanton,	another	of	the	sacked	stewards,	made	more	blunt	criticisms.	He	claimed	that	‘party	stewards	and	members	were	in	total	confusion’	during	the	dispute.225	Meanwhile,	Weller	offered	a	rueful	assessment	of	the	predicament	faced	by	Ford	workers.	‘Not	a	single	dispute	at	Fords	since	the	war	has	been	“official”.	The	trade	union	officials	have	even	signed	a	long	series	of	agreements	which	have	had	the	effect	of	undermining	shop-floor	struggles.’226	This	was	a	turning	point,	he	suggested.	Workers	could	no	longer	take	the	claims	of	union	officials	to	act	on	their	behalf	credibly.	Doing	so	had	been	the	Shop	Stewards	Committee’s	gravest	error.	While	the	Jack	Court	of	Inquiry	continued	its	deliberations,	Halewood	came	fully	into	operation.	On	8	March	1963	journalists	and	cameramen	witnessed	the	assembly	of	the	first	Ford	Anglia	car	produced	at	the	plant,	accompanied	by	a	running	commentary	over	the	factory’s	loudspeakers.	As	this	spectacle	reached	its	climax,	‘the	Lord	mayor	of	Liverpool	took	the	wheel	and	drove	the	car	off	the	line	through	a	triumphal	arch’,	while	the	Ford	band	played	the	lively	overture	from	Franz	von	Suppé’s	comic	opera	Jolly	Robbers.227	The	mood	of	celebration	was	marred,	however,	by	an	ongoing	overtime	ban	by	workers	at	the	plant	in	opposition	to	pay	differentials	between	Halewood	and	the	firm’s	other	factories.	Attention	was	drawn	to	this	issue	by	the	transfer	of	toolmakers	from	Dagenham	to	Merseyside,	since	they	still	received	higher	pay	for	a	shorter	week	compared	to	locally	recruited	labour.	Ford’s	policy	at	Halewood	made	clear	management’s	lack	of	commitment	to	the	national	agreement,	a	point	conveniently	overlooked	in	the	Jack	Report.	
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Chapter	Conclusion	
In	the	early	twentieth	century	Ford	began	to	produce	cars	in	Britain,	soon	after	operations	began	in	America,	amid	an	international	revolt	of	labour.	This	move	came	before	two	of	the	main	innovations	associated	with	the	corporation,	the	automated	assembly	line	and	the	company’s	experiments	with	a	high-wage	policy.	In	1914	the	final	assembly	line	began	to	flow	in	Manchester,	the	same	year	as	in	Dearborn,	while	the	British	subsidiary	even	helped	inspire	pay	policy.		As	in	America,	such	measures	promised	a	solution	to	the	ongoing	crisis	British	capitalism	faced	between	the	wars.	This	served	though	as	political	ideology,	spiritual	doctrine	even,	rather	than	as	an	effective	economic	response	to	Britain’s	relative	industrial	decline	and	intensifying	international	class	conflict.	Public	investment	in	Ford’s	move	to	Dagenham	then	heralded	the	approach	of	a	Fordist	system	of	regulation.	Much	more	widespread	state	intervention	was	required,	however,	to	make	this	a	reality	after	the	Second	World	War.	A	golden	era	of	British	social	democracy	was	intrinsically	bound	up	with	mass	production	in	a	relationship	of	interdependence.	Ford	represented	the	form	of	work	this	system	was	based	upon,	both	symbolically	and	economically.	Meanwhile,	these	policies	created	the	social	peace	and	effective	demand	required	to	sustain	growth.	Indeed,	Ford	played	a	more	central	economic	role	in	Britain,	as	a	key	exporter	and	leading	investor,	than	in	the	USA,	where	the	corporation	faced	more	efficient	competition.	Seeking	to	give	voice	to	the	workers	who	built	this	system,	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	emerged	in	the	USA,	France	and	Italy.	This	tendency	grappled	with	the	parallels	between	contemporary	capitalism	and	actual	existing	socialism,	both	systems	requiring	rigid	labour	discipline	and	an	unprecedented	degree	of	state	planning.	Such	politics	were	first	articulated	in	Britain	from	1960	onwards	by	Solidarity,	a	group	with	close	links	to	Ford’s	workforce.		 	
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2.	Gathering	Storm	Clouds,	1964	to	1970	
The	storm	clouds	are	gathering	but	[...]	I	manage	to	keep	a	sense	of	proportion.	I	am	merely	fascinated	by	the	almost	impossibility	of	a	social	democratic	government	running	capitalism.228		 Barbara	Castle,	Diary,	31	May	1968		 I	was	wondering,	is	it	worth	considering	whether	you	could	include	in	your	legislation	provision	to	generalise	the	Ford-type	agreement,	providing	for	a	weekly	payment	into	a	holiday	fund	or	other	fund	designed	to	provide	a	collective	reward	for	the	workers,	again,	on	Ford	lines	dependent	each	week	on	good	behaviour?229		 	 Harold	Wilson,	Minute	to	Barbara	Castle,	3	April	1969		In	the	late	1960s	Ford	came	increasingly	to	serve	as	a	template	for	the	ill-fated	policies	of	Harold	Wilson’s	Labour	government.	At	one	point	the	Prime	Minister	even	suggested	to	Barbara	Castle,	Secretary	of	State	for	Employment	and	Productivity,	that	the	whole	of	British	industry	should	adopt	the	precise	terms	of	the	firm’s	employment	contract.	Government	proposals	for	industrial	relations	legislation	came	about	directly	in	response	to	the	1968	Ford	sewing	machinists’	strike.	The	following	year	ministers	attempted	to	implement	this	policy	in	the	aftermath	of	a	national	pay	strike	at	the	car	firm,	dividing	the	party	and	contributing	to	its	defeat	in	the	1970	general	election.	Events	surrounding	this	debacle	followed	their	own	particular	trajectory	within	a	specific	British	context.	Yet,	the	automobile	sector	also	became	an	international	hub	of	unrest,	amid	the	wider	social	upheaval	of	the	late	1960s.	A																																									 																					228	Barbara	Castle,	The	Castle	Diaries	1964-70	(London:	Weidenfield	and	Nicholson,	1984),	p.	454.	229	London,	National	Archives,	PREM	13/2725,	Harold	Wilson,	‘Prime	Minister’s	Personal	Minute	No.	25/69’,	3	April	1969.	
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series	of	volatile	disturbances	erupted	year	on	year:	the	1967	Detroit	Riots;	the	occupation	of	French	car	factories	in	May	and	June	1968;	and	unrest	at	Fiat	Mirafiori,	during	Italy’s	Hot	Autumn	(l’autunno	caldo)	in	1969.	This	chapter	focuses	on	unrest	at	the	Ford	Motor	Company	(Limited)	during	the	first	Wilson	government	from	1964	to	1970.	In	doing	so,	it	traces	how	the	international	social	upheaval	then	unfolding	began	to	influence	events	at	this	US	subsidiary’s	British	car	plants.	The	impact	of	these	was	then	felt	well	beyond	the	factory.	
	
Britain’s	Top	Exporting	Company,	1964	to	1967	
Two	points	were	key	to	how	the	fate	of	British	social	democracy	became	so	closely	enmeshed	with	the	fortunes	of	the	subsidiary	of	an	American	carmaker.	The	first	was	Ford’s	position	within	Britain’s	industrial	landscape;	and	the	other	was	the	set	of	structural	and	ideological	factors	driving	government	strategy.	The	firm’s	self-image	was	revealing	on	the	first	points.	Take,	for	instance,	a	statement	issued	in	January	1967	to	announce	publication	of	the	previous	year’s	annual	report:	The	company	said	that	the	tremendous	overseas	reception	of	the	new	Cortina	had	helped	to	lift	the	company’s	earnings	to	a	new	record,	consolidating	its	position	as	Britain’s	top	exporting	company	and	representing	the	most	important	single	contribution	to	the	balance	of	payments	by	any	single	company.	This	confident	assertion	of	financial	strength	and	importance	for	the	national	economy	was	followed	by	an	abrupt	shift	in	tone.	Assistant	Managing	Director	Leonard	Crossman	went	on	to	strike	a	note	of	caution:	‘We	are	in	a	capital	intensive	industry	demanding	high	and	intensive	investment’,	he	warned.	This	explained	
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how	such	record	earnings	and	exports	could	coincide	with	the	lowest	profits	recorded	since	the	1940s.230	By	the	standards	of	the	British	automobile	sector	at	least,	this	outlook	appears	to	have	been	unduly	pessimistic.	The	company’s	profits	averaged	over	£25,000,000	per	annum	over	the	course	of	the	1960s,	about	four	times	that	year’s	reported	figure.	Yet,	publication	of	such	low	profits	alongside	record	earnings	highlighted	what	it	was	that	set	the	firm	apart	from	its	competitors,	Ford’s	capital-intensive	corporate	strategy.	While	not	the	largest	car	manufacturer	in	Britain,	the	company	lead	the	British	sector	in	terms	of	profitability	by	reinvesting	in	fixed	capital	at	a	higher	rate	than	domestic	rivals.231	This	meant	that	the	amount	spent	on	plant	and	machinery	relative	to	wages	exceeded	that	of	the	rest	of	the	British	automobile	sector,	a	particularly	capital	intensive	branch	of	industry	in	general.	In	Marxist	terms,	this	ratio	of	constant	capital	to	variable	capital	is	referred	to	as	organic	composition.	Marx	associated	just	such	a	change	in	organic	composition	with	an	immanent	tendency	for	the	rate	of	profit	to	fall	within	capitalist	society.232	This	implied	that	the	ever-increasing	volume	of	investment	in	fixed	capital	at	the	expense	of	wages	constituted	a	key	source	of	crisis	for	capitalism.	The	prominence	of	industrial	action	by	autoworkers	within	an	international	context	of	major	social	unrest	strongly	suggested	the	salience	of	such	analysis	to	the	situation.	The	Italian	Marxist	Ferruccio	Gambino	developed	the	point,	arguing	that	the	relatively	high	level	of	organic	composition	at	Ford	gave	particular	political	significance	to	the	firm	and	its	workforce.	Both	played	a	leading	role	precisely	because	they	were	atypical	of	the	wider	British	automobile	sector.	Moreover,	for																																									 																					230	‘End	of	Year	Statement	Carries	News	of	Gloom	and	Boom:	Profits	Down!’,	
Ford	Bulletin:	For	Ford	Employees,	8.243	(1967),	1.	231	See	‘Figure	10.1’	Rhys,	pp.	361–70.	232	Karl	Marx,	Capital:	A	Critique	of	Political	Economy,	trans.	by	David	Fernbach	(Harmondsworth:	Penguin/New	Left	Review,	1981),	III,	p.	319.	
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Gambino,	it	was	workers’	struggle	that	drove	investment	and	not	vice	versa.233	Too	literal	a	reading	of	Gambino’s	identification	of	this	vanguard	subject,	along	with	his	focus	on	working-class	struggle	as	a	motor	for	history,	is	open	to	question.	While	social	reality	was	no	doubt	more	complex,	such	passages	need	to	be	interpreted	as	part	of	a	broader	critique	of	the	Leninist	vanguard	party,	determinist	tendencies	within	Marxism	and	a	turn	away	from	industrial	politics	by	some	on	the	new	left.	Crucially,	Gambino	offered	an	accurate	assessment	of	how	Ford	would	increasingly	become	a	strategic	point	for	political	intervention	by	those	who	recognised	the	agency	of	the	firm’s	workforce	as	the	crisis	intensified.	Signs	also	began	to	suggest	that	the	parent	company’s	investment	priorities	were	starting	to	shift	elsewhere.	In	1967	the	formation	of	Ford	of	Europe	marked	the	beginning	of	a	process	to	integrate	operations	transnationally,	signalling	the	importance	of	the	European	market	for	the	firm.	Two	years	later	output	in	Britain,	which	had	been	second	only	to	Detroit	since	the	1930s,	fell	below	that	of	Ford’s	German	subsidiary.234	German	membership	of	the	European	Economic	Community	(EEC)	clearly	favoured	the	expansion	of	production	at	Ford	Werke.	Nevertheless,	the	location	of	a	new	European	headquarters	in	Brentwood,	Essex,	demonstrated	the	corporation’s	ongoing	interest	in	maintaining	a	major	stake	in	British	industry.	Indeed,	the	firm’s	output	in	Britain	continued	to	rival	that	of	Germany	for	years	to	come.	In	such	circumstances,	management’s	vocal	and	influential	advocacy	of	Britain	joining	the	EEC	was	hardly	surprising.	This	objective	was	shared	by	the	Wilson	administration,	but	proved	divisive	with	trade	unionists	and	many	to	the	left	of	the	government.	
																																								 																					233	Gambino,	Workers’	Struggle,	pp.	1–2;	Gambino,	‘Ford	britannica’,	pp.	147–48.	 234	See	‘Table	10’	in	Tolliday,	‘Statistical	Appendix’,	II,	p.	144.	
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Other	aspects	of	Ford’s	business	model	also	took	on	greater	political	significance	as	a	result	of	a	series	of	speculative	attacks	by	currency	traders,	in	what	became	known	as	the	Sterling	Crisis.	Within	weeks	of	Wilson’s	election	the	pound	started	to	come	under	pressure,	culminating	with	the	devaluation	of	sterling	from	$2.80	to	$2.40	in	June	1967.235	This	increasingly	focused	government	attention	on	the	contribution	made	to	the	balance	of	payments	by	Britain’s	top	exporting	company,	both	through	international	trade	and	the	domestic	reinvestment	of	the	British	subsidiary’s	profits.	Increasingly,	the	aspirations	of	government	ministers	to	deliver	Labour’s	economic	plan	became	predicated	upon	Ford’s	commercial	performance.	The	pound’s	vulnerability	to	currency	speculators	reflected	structural	weaknesses	in	the	British	economy.	These	included	sterling’s	overvaluation	and	exposure	as	an	international	reserve	currency,	as	well	as	a	low	rate	of	industrial	investment.	It	took	overseas	military	expenditure,	though,	to	push	the	balance	of	payments	into	deficit—a	point	not	lost	on	critics	of	the	government	on	the	far	left	at	the	time.	For	instance,	Tony	Cliff	and	Colin	Barker	of	the	International	Socialists	attacked	the	Wilson	administration’s	management	of	the	economy.	Addressing	shop	stewards,	they	warned	that	‘an	Incomes	Policy	under	capitalism	must	necessarily	be	an	anti-working-class	measure’,	which	would	suppress	wages	that	already	lagged	behind	rates	of	pay	in	other	northern	European	countries.236	All	the	same,	attempting	to	control	inflation	by	imposing	deflationary	wage	settlements	became	central	to	government	policy.	
																																								 																					235	For	a	chronology	of	these	events,	see	Michael	D.	Bordo,	Ronald	MacDonald,	and	Michael	J.	Oliver,	‘Sterling	in	Crisis,	1964-1967’,	European	Review	
of	Economic	History,	13.3	(2009),	437–59	(pp.	439–44).	236	T.	Cliff	and	C.	Barker,	Incomes	Policy,	Legislation	and	Shop	Stewards	(Harrow	Weald:	London	Industrial	Shop	Stewards	Defence	Committee,	1966).	A	foreword	by	Reg	Birch,	a	Communist	AEU	official	who	negotiated	with	Ford,	highlights	the	direct	relevance	of	this	pamphlet	to	the	firm’s	history.	
	 81	
While	previous	administrations	had	intermittently	adopted	similar	measures	since	the	Second	World	War,	this	was	the	first	elected	with	a	commitment	to	do	so	in	its	manifesto.	‘Pay	norms’,	which	had	previously	only	set	voluntary	guidelines	for	the	private	sector,	became	legally	enforceable	limits	under	the	Prices	and	Incomes	Act	1966.	The	following	year	wage	increases	were	restricted	to	those	that	made	‘a	direct	contribution	to	increasing	productivity’,	making	productivity	bargaining	and	schemes	to	rationalise	pay	structures	the	order	of	the	day.237	Just	such	a	job	evaluation	programme	was	already	underway	at	Ford,	having	been	announced	to	the	workforce	the	previous	April.238	This	became	a	high-profile	test	case	for	a	central	component	of	government	policy.	Meanwhile,	industrial	unrest	erupted	at	Ford	with	increased	frequency	over	the	course	of	the	mid-1960s,	having	reached	a	low	ebb	after	the	defeat	of	the	shop	stewards	in	the	Bill	Francis	affair.	Time	lost	to	industrial	action	had	plummeted	from	around	750,000	man-hours	to	fewer	than	35,000	between	1962	and	1963.	It	then	increased	fivefold	over	the	next	two	years.239	Sir	Patrick	Hennessy,	the	firm’s	Chairman	and	President	of	the	Society	of	Motor	Manufactures	and	Traders,	described	the	situation	in	Britain’s	car	factories	as	a	‘national	stigma’.	His	outlook	for	the	sector’s	immediate	future,	however,	remained	remarkably	upbeat.	‘It	is	my	conviction	now’,	he	said,	‘following	the	latest	moves—the	co-operative	action	between	the	industry,	the	trade	unions	and	the	Government—that	it	may	not	be	long	before	we	can	see	the	beginning	of	action	to	prevent	unofficial	stoppages’.240	Hennessy	was	referring	to	talks	with	ministers	that	autumn,	which	lead	to	the	formation	of	the	Motor	Industry	Joint	Labour	Council	(MIJLC).	This	mediation	body	was	made	up	of	industry	representatives	and																																									 																					237	Prices	and	Incomes	Act	1966,	s	15	(i)	(i).	238	‘Wages	Survey	and	the	Questions	You	Raised’,	Ford	Bulletin:	For	Ford	
Employees,	19	April	1966,	p.	20.	239	‘A	Trial	of	Strength	at	Dagenham’,	Financial	Times	(London,	2	February	1966),	p.	6.	240	‘Britain’s	“Stigma”’,	Evening	Standard,	12	October	1965,	p.	16.	
	 82	
national	trade	union	officials.	As	a	consensus	emerged	between	Britain’s	Labour	government	and	industrial	leaders	on	the	need	to	tackle	shop-floor	militancy,	union	officials	came	under	conflicting	demands.	Should	they	collaborate	with	the	state	and	management	in	the	‘national	interest’,	or	defend	the	interests	of	their	members?	Ford	management	took	this	opportunity	to	make	a	‘test	case’	of	a	dispute	with	a	group	of	paint	sprayers	in	Dagenham.	Disagreement	initially	centred	on	two	issues.	These	were	the	rate	of	an	‘abnormal	conditions	allowance’	for	this	hazardous	work	and	the	length	of	‘relief	time’	between	periods	in	the	paint	booths.	While	the	question	of	pay	was	resolved	quickly,	official	negotiations	failed	to	reach	agreement	on	the	latter	point.	Nevertheless,	managers	attempted	to	impose	shorter	breaks	on	the	sprayers	in	January	1966.	Unsurprisingly,	this	led	all	151	of	them	to	walk	out.	The	company	then	laid	thousands	of	their	workmates	off	without	pay.241	Acting	with	‘unusual	speed’,	as	the	Financial	Times	reported,	the	Transport	and	General	Workers	Union	(TGWU)	responded	by	making	the	strike	official.242	The	matter	came	before	an	MIJLC	inquiry,	led	by	the	council’s	chairman	Mr	A.	J.	Scamp.	The	Ministry	of	Labour	defined	this	council’s	remit	over	‘disputes	leading	to	unofficial	strikes	[...]	in	breach	of	procedures’.243	Intervention	in	this	case	involved	a	broad	interpretation	of	these	terms	of	reference,	since	industrial	action	began	after	procedures	had	been	exhausted	and	quickly	became	official.	Management	and	the	unions	still	agreed	to	the	inquiry	and	accepted	the	recommendation	to	compromise	over	the	length	of	breaks.	Remarkably,	it	found	national	officials	and	managers	responsible	for	how	this	situation	unfolded,	rather	
																																								 																					241	‘Scamp	May	Act	in	Ford	Paint-Shop	Dispute’,	Financial	Times	(London,	27	January	1966),	p.	13.	242	‘A	Trial	of	Strength	at	Dagenham’.	243	Ministry	of	Labour	Motor	Industry	Joint	Labour	Council,	Report	by	Mr.	A.	J.	
Scamp	on	the	Activities	of	the	Council	(London:	HMSO,	1966),	p.	5.	
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than	following	the	by	now	familiar	script	of	laying	most	of	the	blame	with	the	shop	stewards.244	This	surprise	outcome	encouraged	other	Ford	workers,	foundrymen	and	toolmakers	among	them,	to	raise	fresh	demands	of	their	own.	A	former	personnel	manager	described	how	a	series	of	‘leapfrogging’	claims	threatened	to	challenge	management’s	prerogative	and	undermine	the	firm’s	pay	policies.245	It	also	clearly	posed	a	challenge	to	a	government	committed	to	pay	restraint.	In	order	to	reassert	management	authority,	Ford	unveiled	detailed	proposals	for	a	job-evaluation	scheme	that	April.	This	entailed	new	job	titles	for	the	entire	hourly-paid	workforce.	A	more	hierarchical	pay	structure	was	created.	This	replaced	three	existing	categories	of	male	manual	workers—skilled,	semi-skilled	and	unskilled—with	five	new	grades	(A-E).	In	addition,	women	workers,	who	had	been	previously	allocated	to	their	own	band	at	the	lowest	rates	of	pay,	were	integrated	into	this	system	at	eighty-five	per	cent	of	the	equivalent	male	rate.246	The	initial	response	of	the	workforce	was	hostile.	A	national	meeting	of	TGWU	shop	stewards	almost	decided	to	‘turn	down	the	scheme	and	put	in	a	new	claim’	for	a	straightforward	pay	increase.	247	Only	after	a	vote	on	this	proposal	came	to	a	dead-heat,	did	they	decide	by	a	narrow	majority	to	discuss	the	company’s	proposal	with	management.	A	month	into	negotiations	three	hundred	workers	at	the	Dagenham	assembly	plant	took	unofficial	strike	action	over	their	grade	allocation.	The	Times	described	this	as	‘the	tip	of	the	iceberg’,	warning	of	‘hundreds	
																																								 																					244	‘Scamp	Report	Praises	Ford	Shop	Stewards’,	Financial	Times	(London,	26	February	1966),	p.	5.	245	Friedman	and	Meredeen,	p.	43;	See	also,	Cohen,	Notoriously	Militant:	The	
Story	of	a	Union	Branch,	p.	84,	which	appears	to	cite	Stanley	Gillen,	describing	the	subsequent	sewing	machinists	strike	as	‘leapfrogging’.	246	‘New	Job	Titles	and	Grades’,	Ford	Bulletin:	For	Ford	Employees,	8.250	(1968),	1	&	8–9.	247	‘Talks	on	Ford’s	New	Pay	Plan’,	Financial	Times	(London,	18	April	1967),	p.	20.	
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of	objections	in	the	review	pipeline’.248	The	following	month	a	two-day	strike	by	paint	sprayers,	again	over	grading,	led	to	the	entire	workforce	being	laid	off	from	the	Halewood	Paint,	Trim	and	Assembly	(PTA)	Plant.	A	cascade	of	unofficial	action	by	shop-floor	workers	threatened	to	undermine	the	entire	settlement.	Meanwhile,	job	evaluation	gave	many	shop	stewards	their	first	formal	role	at	Ford.	The	company	had	granted	these	representatives	recognition	back	in	1946.	Aside	from	a	handful	of	Joint	Works	Committee	(JWC)	delegates,	however,	most	stewards	still	had	no	formal	way	of	raising	day-to-day	issues	about	working	conditions	with	management.	Moreover,	pay	contract	negotiations	remained	the	sole	prerogative	of	officials	on	the	Ford	National	Joint	Negotiating	Committee	(FNJNC).	For	many	of	those	shop	stewards	previously	left	with	no	actual	official	role,	the	programme	began	to	open	up	new	opportunities	to	participate	in	the	various	committees	that	conducted	and	reviewed	job	evaluations.	Henry	Friedman,	a	former-convener	at	the	Dagenham	River	Plant,	reflected	back	on	the	effect	of	this	newly	acquired	responsibility.	‘It	was’,	he	wrote,	‘a	classic	example	of	how	trade	union	representatives	can	become	fascinated	with	the	routines	of	management	and	absorbed	by	them’.249	This	built	upon	a	more	cooperative	relationship	that	a	new	generation	of	industrial	relations	managers	had	already	begun	to	establish	with	a	number	of	senior	stewards	and	convenors,	in	return	for	improved	facilities.250	However	gradually	and	unevenly,	a	process	of	integration	began	to	extend	down	from	union	officials	towards	the	shop	stewards	despite	Ford’s	longstanding	hostility	to	rank-and-file	trade	unionism.	After	five	months	of	negotiations	and	sporadic	industrial	action,	Ford	eventually	announced	a	new	agreement	on	21	September	1967.	By	then	local																																									 																					248	Alex	Hendry,	‘Grading	Trouble	for	Ford’,	The	Times	(London,	20	March	1967),	p.	26.	249	Friedman	and	Meredeen,	p.	67.	250	Bernie	Passingham,	another	former	convenor,	interviewed	by	Cohen,	
Notoriously	Militant:	The	Story	of	a	Union	Branch,	p.	82.	
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productivity	deals	covered	ninety-eight	per	cent	of	the	company’s	manual	workforce	with	an	average	increase	of	two	pounds	per	week	gained	under	the	new	contract.251	Managers	appeared	to	have	successfully	achieved	their	objectives.	These	comprised	of	a	two-year	package	deal,	based	on	the	job	evaluation	scheme,	with	productivity	deals	at	a	plant	level.	A	month	later	Harold	Wilson	opened	Ford’s	new	research	and	engineering	centre	at	Dunton	in	Essex.	In	a	speech,	which	was	widely	reported	at	the	time,	Wilson	warned	that	‘if	we	in	Britain	are	to	stay	in	the	forefront	of	modern	technological	industry	in	the	decades	ahead	it	is	vitally	important	that	we	should	invest	now’.	He	then	praised	the	firm	for	establishing	‘exactly	the	sort	of	facilities,	equipment	and	conditions	which	were	needed	much	more	widely	in	industry’.252	The	company’s	new	infrastructure	provided	a	physical	manifestation	of	Wilson’s	technocratic	vision	for	Britain’s	future,	as	famously	evoked	by	his	depiction	of	a	nation	‘forged	in	the	white	heat’	of	a	technological	revolution.253	The	firm’s	pay	policy	was	to	become	of	even	greater	political	importance.		
The	Gravest	Labour	Relations	Situation,	1968	
As	the	Prime	Minister	delivered	his	panegyric	on	Ford,	the	issue	of	grading	remained	an	ongoing	point	of	contention.	Among	those	to	still	contest	their	job	evaluation	were	a	group	of	sewing	machinists	who	assembled	car	upholstery.	This	almost	entirely	female	workforce	had	been	assigned	to	a	semi-skilled	grade	‘B’,	despite	a	recruitment	process	that	required	applicants	to	pass	an	entry	test.	Since	the	only	two	male	roles	to	share	such	a	requirement	received	a	higher	grade	‘C’,	the																																									 																					251	John	Elliott,	‘40,000	Ford	Workers	to	Receive	£2	a	Week	Rise’,	Financial	
Times	(London,	22	September	1967),	p.	1.	252	‘Mr	Wilson	Decries	“Wasteage”’,	The	Times	(London,	13	October	1967),	p.	2.	 253	Labour	Party,	Report	of	the	62nd	Annual	Labour	Party	Conference	Held	in	
the	Spa	Grand	Hotel,	Scarborough,	September	30	to	October	4,	1963	(London:	Labour	Party,	1963),	p.	140.	
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women	saw	this	as	a	clear	case	of	sex	discrimination.	This	view	was	confirmed	by	their	understanding	that	the	role	had	also	been	assigned	to	grade	‘C’	at	one	stage	in	the	job	evaluation	process,	before	then	being	downgraded.254		Management	and	shop	steward	accounts	of	the	circumstances	that	led	up	to	industrial	action	came	out	in	evidence	to	a	subsequent	Court	of	Inquiry.	Both	confirmed	that	the	National	Union	of	Vehicle	Builders	(NUVB)	first	contested	the	machinists’	grading	the	previous	summer.	The	company	case	then	represented	management	as	having	followed	procedures	to	a	‘T’,	while	claiming	that	union	representatives	had	generally	failed	to	do	so.	By	way	of	contrast,	shop	stewards	and	the	convenor	portrayed	the	relevant	committees	as	‘clogged	up	with	outstanding	cases’,	while	highlighting	the	inconsistency	of	management	in	resolving	other	claims	informally.	The	refusal	of	the	company	to	disclose	the	formula	used	to	weigh	job	evaluation	scores	into	different	grades	also	suggested	foul	play	to	union	representatives,	a	claim	denied	by	management.255		In	any	case,	the	sewing	machinists	understandably	felt	aggrieved.	A	few	days	after	declaring	an	overtime	ban,	they	held	a	one-day	strike	on	29	May	1968.	After	further	negotiations	failed	to	make	progress,	they	walked	out	again	on	Friday	8	June,	pre-empting	another	one-day	strike	planned	for	the	following	week.	Only	then,	was	the	issue	of	equal	pay	raised	by	‘the	leadership’,	in	other	words	not	by	the	women	themselves	but	by	the	River	Plant	Shop	Stewards	Committee.	This	change	in	strategy	aimed	to	secure	official	union	backing,	as	well	as	wider	support,	for	their	cause.	The	women’s	initial	response	was	sceptical:	‘But	we	have	never	even	asked	for	it.’	According	to	Friedman,	the	women	only	agreed	to	the	new	demand	afterwards	at	a	mass	meeting.	A	delegation	then	lobbied	the	Headquarters	of	the																																									 																					254	Parliamentary	Papers.	House	of	Commons,	Industrial	Courts	Act	1919.	
Report	of	a	Court	of	Inquiry	under	Sir	Jack	Scamp	into	a	Dispute	Concerning	Sewing	
Machinists	Employed	by	the	Ford	Motor	Company	Limited,	Cmnd.	3749	(London:	HMSO,	1968),	p.	26.	255	Parliamentary	Papers.	House	of	Commons,	Scamp	Report,	pp.	18–21.	
	 87	
AEF	(Amalgamated	Union	of	Engineering	and	Foundry	Workers),	a	union	representing	only	six	out	of	almost	two	hundred	Dagenham	sewing	machinists.	The	executive	agreed	to	make	the	strike	official,	but	‘purely	and	solely	in	support	of	the	principle	of	Equal	Pay’.256	One	of	those	on	strike	Violet	Dawson	later	explained	the	women’s	reticence	about	this	demand:	‘We	didn’t	want	equal	pay	because	if	we’d	got	that,	we	would	have	had	to	have	done	shift	work	and	we	didn’t	have	the	cover	for	the	kids.’257	Indeed,	management	had	previously	offered	to	reduce	differentials	between	male	and	female	wage	rates	‘subject	to	agreement	in	principle	on	shift	working	by	women	employees’.258	While	the	firm	was	open	to	negotiation	on	this	point,	the	sewing	machinists	had	to	take	into	consideration	their	availability	to	do	unpaid	housework	before	raising	a	demand	that	risked	extending	their	working	day	within	the	factory.	Paradoxically	perhaps,	the	dual	role	many	of	these	women	played	as	both	wage	labourers	and	unwaged	housewives	may	also	have	actually	made	it	easier	for	them	to	withdraw	their	labour	from	Ford.	The	sewing	machinists’	marginal	position	within	the	factory	meant	that	their	households	were	less	likely	to	depend	on	their	wages	to	meet	everyday	living	costs.	Another	remark	made	by	Violet	Dawson	certainly	suggested	as	much:	‘My	money	bought	us	all	the	extras.’259	In	so	far	as	their	income	supplemented	the	family	wage	of	a	male	‘breadwinner’,	the	archetypal	situation	of	the	Fordist	household,	the	company	had	relatively	weak	leverage	over	these	women.	One	week	into	the	strike	the	NUVB,	the	union	to	which	most	of	the	sewing	machinists	belonged,	joined	the	AEF	in	officially	backing	industrial	action.	With	car																																									 																					256	Friedman	and	Meredeen,	pp.	140–43.	257	Interviewed	by	Yvonne	Roberts,	Mad	about	Women:	Can	There	Ever	Be	
Fair	Play	between	the	Sexes	(London:	Virago,	1992),	p.	215.	258	Parliamentary	Papers.	House	of	Commons,	Scamp	Report,	p.	37.	259	Interviewed	by	Yvonne	Roberts,	p.	215.	
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production	‘drastically	curtailed’,	management	then	threatened	to	lay	off	thousands	of	their	male	colleagues.	All	this	came	at	‘a	crucial	time	in	Ford’s	major	campaign	[...]	to	boost	annual	exports	to	£225m’,	as	the	Financial	Times	reported,	prompting	government	intervention	to	resolve	the	dispute.260	Having	been	recently	appointed	to	a	newly	created	ministerial	post	overseeing	both	employment	and	incomes	policies,	Barbara	Castle	then	held	discussions	with	union	officials	in	her	office.	She	began	by	announcing	another	Court	of	Inquiry,	emphasised	the	impact	of	the	strike	in	terms	of	trade	and	asked	for	help	to	get	the	women	back	to	work.	Individual	union	officials	responded	differently.	Reg	Birch	of	the	AEF	backed	the	strike	over	equal	pay,	Alf	Roberts	of	the	NUVB	supported	the	original	claim	and	all	the	others	opposed	industrial	action.	Castle	interpreted	the	strike	crudely	as	a	‘political’	attempt	by	Communists	to	‘sabotage’	moderate	officials	in	their	efforts	to	resist	unconstitutional	rank-and-file	action.	She	drew	broader	conclusions	from	this,	with	much	wider	implications.	‘Certainly	this	particular	case’,	Castle	wrote	in	her	diary,	‘throws	doubt	on	the	efficacy	of	the	Donovan	remedies’.261	The	Ford	sewing	machinists	strike	suggested	to	her	the	need	to	go	beyond	the	Royal	Commission’s	recommendations	to	reform	industrial	relations,	but	still	leave	them	on	a	voluntary	basis.	Instead,	she	began	to	consider	the	use	of	legal	sanctions	against	workers	who	took	unofficial	action.	After	managers	and	sewing	machinists	attended	another	meeting	in	her	office,	Castle	noted	in	her	diary	the	‘imperative	to	get	work	resumed	before	export	orders	were	irreparably	lost’.	She	also	recorded	the	main	concern	of	Ford’s	Labour	Relations	Manager	Leslie	Blakeman.	‘If	the	girls	were	upgraded’,	he	warned	her,	‘nothing	could	prevent	the	thousands	of	men	workers	from	demanding	
																																								 																					260	John	Elliott,	‘Ministry	Acts	as	Ford	Strike	Hits	Export	Orders’,	Financial	
Times	(London,	15	June	1968).	261	Castle,	pp.	465–66.	
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reconsideration	of	their	grading	too’.262	To	prevent	another	such	cycle	of	leapfrogging	claims,	he	instead	offered	them	ninety-two	per	cent	of	the	male	rate	for	grade	‘B’.	Without	yielding	to	their	demand	for	recognition	of	their	skill,	this	resulted	in	a	higher	pay	increase	than	would	have	arisen	from	meeting	the	original	claim.	This	soon	brought	to	an	end	a	strike,	which	had	by	then	spread	to	Halewood,	shut	down	the	British	subsidiary’s	entire	car	output	and	resulted	in	thousands	of	lay	off.	Meanwhile,	the	Court	of	Inquiry	continued	with	its	work.	When	the	Scamp	Report	came	out	that	August,	it	gave	a	detailed	account	of	the	dispute,	documenting	the	views	of	management,	union	officials	and	shop	stewards.	Its	findings	were,	however,	less	balanced	and	essentially	favourable	to	the	company.	It	also	sidestepped	the	main	question	it	had	been	set	up	to	address,	with	a	recommendation	that	an	ad	hoc	committee	re-assess	the	sewing	machinists’	grade.263	Giving	evidence,	Blakeman	referred	to	the	strike	as	‘the	gravest	labour	relations	situation’	in	Ford’s	‘long	turbulent	history’,	in	which	‘the	whole	weakness	of	the	British	structure	of	industrial	relations’	could	be	seen.264	However	intrinsic	the	issue	of	sex	discrimination	was	to	this	dispute,	Sheila	Cohen	has	made	a	compelling	case	that	it	should	be	viewed	primarily	in	relation	to	the	demands	and	actions	of	other	Ford	workers.	Crucially,	such	an	approach	has	the	virtue	of	corresponding	with	many	of	the	women’s	own	memories.265	However,	a	letter	received	by	the	Prime	Minister	from	‘women	workers	of	Ford’	suggested	that	the	issue	of	equal	pay	also	became	entangled	with	the	shop-floor	tactic	of	submitting	‘leap	frogging’	wage	claims	in	this	case:																																									 																					262	Castle,	p.	474.	263	Parliamentary	Papers.	House	of	Commons,	Scamp	Report,	pp.	44–46.	264	‘Both	Sides	of	the	Story’,	Ford	Bulletin:	For	Ford	Employees	(Dagenham,	5	July	1968),	special	edition,	pp.	7–10	(p.	7).	265	Sheila	Cohen,	‘Equal	Pay	—	or	What?	Economics,	Politics	and	the	1968	Ford	Sewing	Machinists’	Strike’,	Labour	History,	53.1	(2012),	51–68.	
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[...]	we	will	not	go	back	to	work,	we	are	fighting	a	great	fight	equal	pay	for	women,	we	at	Fords	have	started	the	ball	rolling	our	unions	are	backing	us,	funds	are	coming	in	we’re	all	set	for	battle,	Fords	is	the	beginning,	soon	it	will	be	every	industry	in	Britain	out	because	of	us	women	of	Fords,	we	will	force	you	to	give	us	all	equal	pay,	or	strike	with	our	unions	blessing	[...]266	While	the	tone	of	this	tirade	was	more	blue-collar	than	bluestocking	and	its	origins	remain	unclear,	the	letter	gives	the	impression	that	the	possibility	of	raising	a	demand	for	equal	pay	did	not	entirely	pass	by	all	these	women	at	the	time.	More	significantly,	the	strike	directly	inspired	the	formation	of	the	National	Joint	Action	Campaign	Committee	for	Women’s	Equal	Rights	(NJACCWER),	the	unofficial	leadership	for	the	ensuing	campaign	for	equal	pay.267	Neither	government	nor	employer	met	this	demand	at	the	time.	Ford	merely	reduced	pay	differentials,	without	recognising	the	women’s	skill,	while	Barbara	Castle	refused	to	let	progress	towards	equal	pay	jeopardise	the	overall	pay	ceiling,	when	Parliament	passed	a	new	Prices	and	Incomes	Bill	that	June.268	NJACCWER	set	out	a	very	different	position	at	a	Trades	Union	Congress	(TUC)	‘discussion	conference’	(i.e.	one	without	authority	to	make	policy)	on	equal	pay	that	autumn.	A	delegate,	who	supported	the	campaign,	made	this	position	clear:	‘Many	men	in	manual	industries	are	on	very	low	basic	rates	and	they	need	higher	wages	just	as	much	as	women	need	equal	pay.’269	NJACCWER	supporters	shared	a	sense	of	class	solidarity	with	the	Ford	Sewing	Machinists.	This	included	a	keen	awareness	that	their	demands	
																																								 																					266	London,	National	Archives,	PREM	13/2412,	Letter	to	‘Dear	Mr	Wilson’	from	‘Women	Workers	of	Ford’,	June	1968.	267	Sarah	Boston,	Women	Workers	and	the	Trade	Unions	(London:	Davis	Poynter,	1980),	pp.	279–80.	268	Hansard	Parliamentary	Debates:	Commons,	Fifth	Series,	1967-68,	DCCLXVII,	cols	500-22.	269	Trades	Union	Congress,	Equal	Pay:	Report	of	a	Conference	at	Congress	
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risked	being	turned	against	themselves,	as	well	as	their	male	workmates	and	relatives.	While	the	working	women	who	raised	the	demand	for	equal	pay	sought	to	navigate	a	course	within	the	trade	union	movement,	the	Labour	government’s	position	converged	increasingly	with	that	of	Ford	management.	Over	lunch	with	other	senior	Ford	executives	that	December,	Blakeman	presented	his	plans	for	a	new	productivity	deal	to	Barbara	Castle.	This	included	a	‘novel’	financial	penalty	for	unofficial	action,	as	she	observed	in	her	diary.270	In	the	New	Year	she	published	her	own	industrial	relations	strategy,	which	mirrored	that	of	the	company,	in	the	white	paper	In	Place	of	Strife,	a	title	that	proved	ironic.	This	set	out	proposals	for	legislation	granting	ministerial	powers	to	call	off	industrial	action	that	was	‘unconstitutional	or	in	which	for	other	reasons	adequate	joint	discussions	have	not	taken	place’	and	to	impose	secret	ballots	before	strike	action.271	The	Donovan	Report,	which	came	out	just	after	the	strike	began,	identified	‘the	rapidly	growing	number	of	unofficial	and	unconstitutional	strikes	in	this	country’	as	a	major	cause	for	concern.272	However,	instead	of	simply	holding	workers	or	shop	stewards	responsible	for	the	situation,	its	authors	saw	the	lack	of	institutional	structures	at	a	plant	level	as	the	main	source	of	this	problem.	Without	entirely	ruling	out	legal	sanctions	for	unofficial	action,	their	report	explicitly	held	back	from	recommending	such	measures.	Instead,	it	proposed	to	integrate	shop	stewards	into	the	formal	collective	bargaining	system	to	encourage	workers’	participation,	while	maintaining	the	essentially	voluntary	status	of	employment	agreements	under	the	current	legal	framework.																																									 																					270	Castle,	p.	570.	271	Parliamentary	Papers.	House	of	Commons,	In	Place	of	Strife:	A	Policy	for	
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While	the	report	suggested	the	need	to	reform	industrial	relations,	Barbara	Castle	took	a	much	more	one-sided	approach	than	the	recommendations	of	its	authors.	Rather	than	just	another	symptom,	unofficial	action	became	for	her	the	cause	of	all	the	problems	with	British	industrial	relations.	This	might	seem	all	the	more	remarkable	at	a	time	when,	for	instance,	the	unions	that	represented	the	overwhelming	majority	of	Ford’s	workforce	could	still	be	outvoted	on	the	FNJNC	by	those	representing	craftsmen.273	Such	details	were	lost	on	Labour	ministers	who	had	recently	faced	a	series	of	disastrous	local	and	by-election	results,	as	the	sterling	crisis	undermined	government	attempts	at	economic	planning.	With	the	Conservatives	adopting	an	increasingly	aggressive	stance	towards	trade	unionism,	the	‘quasi-corporatist	vision’	set	out	in	the	white	paper	aimed	to	outflank	the	opposition	and	keep	a	lid	on	inflation.274	This	rightward	shift	on	the	part	of	the	government	coincided	a	move	to	the	left	in	trade-union	politics,	which	promised	greater	decentralisation,	shop-floor	representation	and	local	bargaining,	making	conflict	increasingly	likely.	As	state	intervention	to	set	wages	became	a	key	macroeconomic	lever,	industrial	relations	came	to	the	centre	of	the	policy	agenda.	In	April	1965	a	Royal	Commission,	chaired	by	Lord	Donovan,	had	been	appointed	‘to	consider	relations	between	management	and	employees	and	the	role	of	trade	unions	and	employers’	associations’.275	Ford	managers,	union	officials	and	shop	stewards	all	submitted	evidence	to	the	Donovan	Commission,	contributing	to	a	wider	public	debate	on	workers’	participation	and	industrial	democracy.	At	the	time	major	international																																									 																					273	‘Early	Ballot	Might	Have	Averted	the	Dagenham	Disaster’,	Sunday	Times	(London,	2	March	1969),	p.	4.	274	Andrew	Thorpe,	‘The	Labour	Party	and	the	Trade	Unions’,	in	British	Trade	
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labour	conferences	also	confronted	the	same	issues,	highlighting	that	developments	in	Britain	generally	and	Ford	specifically	need	to	be	viewed	within	an	international	context	of	escalating	industrial	and	social	unrest.276	While	Labour	government	policy	converged	with	the	agenda	of	industrial	leaders	upon	a	shared	agenda	of	workers’	participation,	the	position	of	the	trade	unions	remained	contested.	One	indication	of	this	came	from	the	growth	in	size	and	influence	of	a	series	of	conferences	on	the	theme	of	workers’	control.	These	set	out	to	formulate	a	‘democratic	reply	to	the	technocratic	pressures	for	an	incomes	policy’,	in	response	to	‘the	demand	that	the	unions	be	increasingly	integrated	into	the	State	machinery	for	control	of	industrial	relations’.	From	the	outset	Union	Voice,	a	rank-and-file	trade	union	newspaper,	helped	coordinate	these	events.	A	report	of	their	earliest	meeting	appeared	in	a	special	‘first	Factory	edition—for	the	workers	at	Fords’277—which	also	featured	a	section	edited	by	the	Shop	Stewards	Committee	in	Dagenham.	Over	the	years,	members	and	officials	from	a	growing	number	of	unions	joined	delegates	representing	an	increasingly	broad	spectrum	of	left-wing	political	opinion.	Representatives	of	a	plethora	of	revolutionary	socialist	groups	and	student	activists	took	part	in	discussions	with	Communist	Party	members	and	even	Labour	MPs.278	Established	at	the	1968	conference,	the	Institute	for	Workers	Control	(IWC)	gained	prominent	support	from	the	election	of	two	senior,	left-wing	union	officials	Hugh	Scanlon,	president	of	the	AEF,	and	Jack	Jones,	General	Secretary	of	the	
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TGWU.279	These	prominent	figures	on	the	left	of	the	Labour	Party	led	two	of	the	largest	unions	in	the	country,	representing	the	majority	of	Ford	workers.	Both	men	also	played	prominent,	if	not	entirely	consistent,	roles	in	disputes	at	the	firm,	as	we	shall	see.	The	IWC	drew	criticism	from	some	on	the	left	for	falling	too	far	under	the	influence	of	Jones	and	Scanlon.	Chris	Pallis,	a	leading	member	of	Solidarity,	went	further	to	subject	the	politics	of	workers’	control	to	a	more	general	critique.	Pallis	traced	the	history	of	this	term’s	use,	drawing	out	its	connections	to	the	Bolsheviks’	chequered	legacy	on	industrial	democracy.	In	doing	so,	he	highlighted	a	distinction	between	the	narrow	meaning	of	the	term	control	and	management,	which	encompassed	a	wider	range	of	activities.	Such	a	demand,	he	argued,	tacitly	left	these	unchallenged.280	Whatever	the	IWC’s	shortcomings,	it	demonstrated	that	the	state	integration	of	the	unions	was	perceived	as	a	threat	from	a	range	of	viewpoints	linked	to	Ford’s	workforce	from	leaders	of	the	two	main	unions	to	rank-and-file	militants	and	far-left	activists.	That	year	Solidarity	published	a	first-hand	account	of	the	events	of	May	and	June	1968	in	France.	This	recounted	how	stewards	from	the	Confédération	générale	du	travail	(CGT),	the	Communist	union	federation,	dispersed	crowds	after	a	one-day	general	strike	on	13	May.	This	aimed	to	prevent	members	from	fraternising	with	students	and	others	who	had	planned	an	open	public	discussion	that	day.	CGT	material	was	reproduced	that	depicted	the	rest	of	the	far	left	as	
																																								 																					279	The	first	pamphlet	issued	by	the	IWC	was	Hugh	Scanlon,	The	Way	Forward	
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‘pseudo-revolutionaries’	working	in	the	‘service	of	the	bourgeoisie’.281	This	implied	that	the	party	had	done	everything	possible	to	isolate	car	factory	occupations	from	wider	social	revolt,	while	redirecting	workers	towards	purely	economic	demands.	Despite	Solidarity’s	marginality,	the	group	developed	an	incisive	account	of	the	Communist	Party’s	current	activities,	as	well	as	a	more	general	historical	critique	of	Leninism,	which	was	disseminated	among	Ford	workers	alongside	factory	reports.		
	
Taking	a	Leaf	out	of	Ford’s	Book,	1969	to	1970	
Tensions	within	the	politics	of	workers’	control	came	out	at	Ford	the	following	year.	That	January	Socialist	Worker	published	critical	remarks	by	a	number	of	Ford	shop	stewards	about	how	their	workmates	pursued	grading	claims.	Instead,	they	argued	in	favour	of	demanding	workers’	control	of	job	evaluation:	‘Workers	will	accept	the	decisions	by	other	workers—their	own	elected	representatives.’282	This	highlighted	conceptual	ambiguities	elided	in	the	use	of	the	term	workers	control,	suggesting	to	some	its	political	irrelevance	in	this	context	‘Leapfrogging	claims’,	such	as	those	over	grading	at	Ford,	were	increasingly	ascribed	‘causal	primacy’	in	the	cost-push	theories	of	inflation	favoured	by	broadly	Keynesian	policy	makers	in	the	1970s.283	Yet,	such	tactics	represented	the	only	effective	shop-floor	strategy	available	to	maintain	wage	levels,	in	the	face	of	company	and	government	policies.	That	a	revolutionary	newspaper	gave	left-wing	stewards	a	platform	to	discourage	the	practice	was	remarkable	to	say	the	least.	Gambino	later	derided	this	position	as	the	result	of	a	misplaced	ideological	
																																								 																					281	Paris:	May	1968,	Solidarity	Pamphlet,	30	(Bromley,	Kent:	Solidarity,	1968),	p.	6.	 282	Jim	Lamborn,	‘Fords	Wait	for	Vital	Pay	Talks’,	Socialist	Worker	(London,	18	January	1969),	p.	4.	283	John	H.	Goldthorpe,	‘The	Current	Inflation:	Towards	a	Sociological	Account’,	in	The	Political	Economy	of	Inflation,	ed.	by	Fred	Hirsch	and	John	H.	Goldthorpe	(London:	Martin	Robertson,	1978),	pp.	186–214	(p.	189).	
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commitment	to	workers	control,	a	point	made	even	more	explicitly	in	the	translation	published	by	Red	Notes.284	In	fact,	the	shop-floor	strategy	proved	so	effective	that	the	company	agreed	to	fresh	pay	negotiations	within	one	year	of	signing	to	a	two-year	pay	deal.	On	11	February	the	FNJNC	met	to	discuss	the	company’s	proposals	for	a	new	package	deal,	which	included	penalty	clauses.	With	officials	representing	just	over	half	the	unions	in	attendance,	the	union	side	voted	to	accept	the	offer	by	just	two	votes.	Crucially,	however,	the	two	main	unions,	together	representing	more	than	seventy	per	cent	of	the	workforce,	did	not	back	the	deal.	Representatives	of	both	the	TGWU	and	AEF,	who	could	still	be	outvoted	by	officials	from	the	other	unions,	abstained.285	Nevertheless,	the	Labour	government	set	out	to	rationalise	industrial	relations	policies	modelled	on	this	system.	It	took	more	than	a	week	for	management	to	fully	inform	the	workforce	of	the	details	of	the	new	agreement,	issuing	an	‘Employee	Information	Sheet’	on	20	February.	The	new	terms	included	a	holiday	bonus	worth	twenty-five	pounds	and	guaranteed	lay-off	pay,	both	of	which	could	be	withdrawn	as	a	penalty	for	industrial	action.286	An	unofficial	strike	shut	down	the	Halewood	transmission	plant	the	next	day,	a	Friday,	pre-empting	shop	stewards’	plans	to	call	out	the	entire	Merseyside	workforce	the	following	week.	By	Monday	the	strike	had	closed	down	the	entire	Halewood	estate	and	two	smaller	plants	in	Basildon	and	Southampton,	where	tractors	and	vans	were	manufactured.	Less	widespread	action	only	caused	
																																								 																					284	Fn.	22	in	Gambino,	‘Ford	britannica’,	p.	159;	Fn.	23	in	Gambino,	Workers’	
Struggle,	p.	Notes	2.	285	Beynon,	Working	for	Ford.	286	Reproduced	in	the	second	edition	of	Beynon,	Working	for	Ford,	pp.	248–49.	
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partial	disruption	in	Dagenham,	initially,	before	the	AEF	and	then	the	TGWU	made	the	strike	official	later	that	week.287	In	response,	Ford’s	lawyers	successfully	applied	to	the	High	Court	for	an	interim	injunction,	restraining	the	two	unions	from	supporting	the	strike	until	a	hearing	scheduled	for	Monday	3	March.288	The	company	then	applied	for	five	further	injunctions	at	this	hearing.	These	included	one	‘to	restrict	these	Unions	from	attempting	to	vary	a	new	package	deal	agreement,	other	than	by	negotiations	through	the	National	Joint	Negotiating	Committee’.289	This	would	have	effectively	barred	organisations	that	represented	the	vast	majority	of	Ford’s	workforce	from	taking	action	without	the	support	of	unions	with	a	much	lower	mandate.	Since	the	new	pay	contract	still	remained	unsigned,	Ford’s	lawyers	had	to	argue	that	other	documents	constituted	a	binding	agreement.	These	included	a	notice	issued	by	the	union	side	of	the	FNJNC,	announcing	the	11	February	deal.	By	this	logic,	no	means	should	have	been	available	to	Ford	workers	to	lawfully	contest	the	decisions	of	this	unrepresentative	body.	Such	a	situation	would	have	effectively	bound	them	to	the	terms	of	a	new	agreement	they	had	not	yet	seen.	Before	the	close	of	the	case,	the	bench	expressed	the	view	that	employment	agreements	still	remained	unenforceable.	This	prompted	company’s	lawyers	to	withdraw	their	claim.290	Ultimately,	this	was	a	favourable	outcome	for	trade	unions	and	their	members.	That	the	government’s	model	employer	took	such	legal	action,	however,	
																																								 																					287	John	Elliott,	‘Ford’s	Pay	Deal	Hit	by	Official	AEF	Strike’,	Financial	Times	(London,	26	February	1969),	p.	1;	John	Elliott,	‘Union’s	Call	out	Over	50%	of	Ford	Motor	Manual	Workers’,	Financial	Times	(London,	27	February	1969),	p.	1.	288	‘Law	Report	4	March,	Queen’s	Bench	Division:	Are	Ford	Agreements	Legally	Binding?’,	The	Times	(London,	5	March	1969),	p.	16.	289	London,	National	Archives,	PREM	13/3553,	Untitled	memo	beginning	‘Fords	issued	a	High	Court	Writ’,	[n.d.].	290	‘Law	Report	5	March,	Queen’s	Bench	Division:	Ford	Seek	Revolution	in	Industrial	Relations,	Union	Counsel	Says’,	The	Times	(London,	6	March	1969),	p.	7;	‘Law	Report	6	March,	Queen’s	Bench	Division,	Collective	Agreements	Not	Enforceable	in	Law’,	The	Times	(London,	7	March	1969),	p.	8.	
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indicated	the	expanding	gulf	between	a	social-democratic	administration	and	workers	willing	to	take	industrial	direct	action	to	defend	their	own	interests.	Three	weeks	into	the	strike,	Harold	Wilson	conferred	with	Barbara	Castle	and	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	Roy	Jenkins	in	the	Prime	Minister’s	office	at	the	House	of	Commons.	While	Wilson	considered	the	policy	implications	of	renegotiating	a	new	productivity	deal,	without	penalty	clauses,	Jenkins’s	voiced	opposition	to	any	outcome	that	could	‘clearly	be	seen	as	a	victory	for	the	unions’.	More	significantly,	Castle	took	personal	credit	for	having	‘worked	out	a	formula	which	the	management	would	be	putting	to	the	unions	later	that	evening’.	This	included	a	twenty-five	pound	holiday	bonus,	ten	pounds	of	which	would	be	‘at	risk	for	workers	who	participated	in	unconstitutional	action’.291	A	senior	minister	drafted	the	details	of	the	Ford	contract.	The	following	day	union	leaders	accepted	this	proposal	at	a	meeting	in	the	Ministry	of	Labour,	the	two	champions	of	workers’	control	Jones	and	Scanlon	among	them.	Mass	meetings	then	took	place	at	all	but	one	of	the	company’s	plants.	While	‘many	strong	reservations	were	voiced	about	the	peace	formula’,292	specifically	the	penalty	clauses,	the	majority	of	workers	voted	to	accept	the	deal,	however	reluctantly.	By	then,	four	weeks	of	strike	action	had	caused	the	loss	of	an	estimated	£40,000,000	worth	of	production,	half	of	which	was	for	export.	Disruption	to	the	supply	of	components	made	in	Britain	had	also	severely	affected	Ford’s	production	across	Europe,	with	lay-offs	in	Belgium	and	the	loss	of	output	in	Germany.	A	week	later	Barbara	Castle	suggested	to	Harold	Wilson	and	Roy	Jenkins	‘that,	following	the	Ford	strike,	she	thought	the	psychological	atmosphere	was	right	for	a	short	bill	to	implement	some	of	the	provisions	in	the	White	Paper’.	The	Prime																																									 																					291	London,	National	Archives,	PREM	13/3553,	‘Confidential:	Note	of	a	Meeting	in	the	House	of	Commons’,	17	March	1969.	292	John	Elliott,	‘Almost	Complete	Return	at	Ford	Likely	To-Day’,	Financial	
Times	(London,	8	March	1969),	p.	1.	
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Minister	went	further	to	speculate	about	legislation	‘taking	a	leaf	out	of	Ford’s	book’.	Why	not	tackle	unofficial	action	through	conditional	holiday	and	lay-off	payment	schemes?	Even	for	Castle,	imposing	the	Ford	model	so	exactly	across	the	whole	of	British	industry	seemed	impractical,	as	she	spelled	out	to	him	in	writing.293	In	any	case,	In	Place	of	Strife	quickly	ran	into	difficulties.	When	the	policy	came	before	the	Labour	Party’s	National	Executive	later	that	month,	Home	Secretary	James	Callaghan	joined	‘union	rebels’	in	voting	down	the	proposals,	without	resigning	his	cabinet	position.	The	Prime	Minister	and	First	Secretary	were	soon	forced	to	shelve	their	planned	industrial	relations	legislation.294	While	setting	the	scene	for	this	government	failure	and	tarnishing	the	left-wing	credentials	of	union	leaders,	the	strike	also	received	external	support	from	new	sources.	Later	that	year	Ken	Weller,	a	prominent	member	of	Solidarity	and	former	shop	steward	at	Ford,	explained	what	form	this	took	in	an	article	for	the	group’s	eponymous	journal.	Weller	described	‘the	unconditional	help	given	to	the	strikers	by	large	number	of	students,	in	the	field	of	typing,	duplicating,	and	producing	a	steady	stream	of	posters	and	leaflets’.295	External	militants	intervened	in	this	dispute	to	an	extent	and	in	ways	not	seen	previously.	The	origins	of	much	of	this	activity	went	back	almost	a	year	earlier,	when	social	unrest	was	still	erupting	across	the	Channel.	At	the	time	a	socialist	theatre	company	CAST	(Cartoon	Archetypical	Slogan	Theatre)	called	a	meeting	at	the	Unity	Theatre	in	north	London,	a	venue	linked	to	the	Communist	Party.	The	organisers																																									 																					293	London,	National	Archives,	PREM13/2725,	Untitled	Confidential	note	from	Department	of	Employment	and	Productivity	to	the	Prime	Minister’s	Office,	25	March	1969;	‘Prime	Minister’s	Personal	Minute	no.	25/69’,	3	April	1969;	‘Prime	Minister’s	Personal	Minute	M32/6’,	14	April	1969;	and	Untitled	Minute	from	the	Minister	of	Employment	and	Productivity	to	the	Prime	Minister,	23	April.	294	Richard	Evans,	‘Callaghan	Stands	Firm’,	Financial	Times	(London,	28	March	1969),	p.	28.	295	Under	the	pseudonym	Mark	Fore,	‘Ford:	The	Settlement’,	Solidarity:	For	
Workers’	Power,	5.9	(1969),	1–6.	
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set	out	to	bridge	‘a	gap	between	the	left	and	cultural	work’,	responding	to	both	‘a	dissatisfaction	with	the	straight	left	[...]	and	a	dissatisfaction	with	the	counter	cultural’	as	the	painter	John	Hoyland	explained	afterwards.296	A	number	of	related	projects	emerged	from	this	event.		One	of	these	was	a	screen-printing	project	the	Poster	Workshop,	which	went	on	to	provide	a	particularly	practical	form	of	support	during	the	Ford	strike.	Launched	the	previous	summer,	this	collective	operated	out	of	a	dingy	basement	in	north	London.	Indicating	a	major	source	of	inspiration,	the	premises	were	flyposted	with	artwork	by	the	Atelier	populaire,	the	Parisian	agitprop	collective	responsible	for	many	of	the	most	iconic	images	from	May	1968.	A	website	recently	created	by	former	Poster-Workshop	members	specifically	mentioned	the	Ford	strike,	while	explaining	how	they	worked	with	other	groups:	We	could	if	necessary	respond	very	rapidly	to	a	request	for	posters.	The	most	extreme	case	was	probably	for	a	strike	at	Fords,	Dagenham.	The	vote	to	strike	was	taken	at	a	meeting	at	10	p.m.,	and	the	shop	stewards	rang	through	to	the	landline	of	the	local	pub,	where	we	were	waiting	for	their	call.	(No	mobile	telephones	in	those	days.)	They	needed	posters	to	put	out	around	the	factory	in	time	for	the	6	a.m.	morning	shift.	We	worked	through	the	night	designing,	printing,	and	finally	drying	the	posters	with	a	hairdryer,	before	driving	out	to	Dagenham	before	dawn,	in	time	to	hand	them	over	to	the	shop	stewards.297	Before	their	defeat	in	the	early	1960s,	the	Dagenham	shop	stewards	would	have	printed	their	own	material,	but	no	longer	had	the	means	to	do	so.	Instead	of	turning	
																																								 																					296	Cited	in	Catherine	Itzin,	Stages	in	the	Revolution:	Political	Theatre	in	
Britain	since	1968	(London:	Methuen,	1980),	p.	39.	297	‘The	Poster	Workshop:	About	Us’,	The	Poster	Workshop,	2018	<http://www.posterworkshop.co.uk/aboutus.html>	[accessed	19	September	2018]	(sic);	see	also	Sam	Lord	and	others,	Poster	Workshop,	1968-71	(London:	Four	Corners,	2018).	
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to	the	unions	for	support,	they	now	accepted	assistance	from	a	source	outside	the	mainstream	of	the	labour	movement.		During	the	strike	the	AgitProp	Street	Players,	a	theatre	troupe	that	emerged	from	the	same	meeting,	wrote	and	performed	a	new	piece	in	Dagenham	Stuff	your	
Penal	up	your	Bonus.	Acknowledging	the	aesthetic	limitations	of	this	intervention,	some	of	those	involved	later	singled	out	the	title	as	a	creative	highlight.	That	said,	they	also	recalled	the	act	of	turning	up	to	perform	in	spite	of	inclement	weather	as	a	simple	gesture	of	solidarity	that	was	well	received.	Chris	Rawlence,	a	founding	member	of	Agitprop,	also	drew	a	contrast	with	the	sort	of	reception	more	conventional	interventions	from	the	far	left	might	have	expected	at	an	industrial	dispute:	‘They’re	going	to	take	advantage	of	us	and	stuff	a	leaflet	down	our	throats	or	get	us	to	join	something.’298	At	the	very	least,	this	alternative	approach	overcame	such	justifiable	scepticism.	Shortly	after	the	dispute	Agitprop	Information	began	to	publish	a	newsletter	
Red	Notes	from	a	squat	on	Gower	Street	in	Bloomsbury,	London’s	main	university	district.	With	the	Hot	Autumn	erupting	in	the	meantime,	the	adoption	of	the	same	title	as	the	Italian	workerist	journal	Quaderni	rossi	cannot	have	been	a	mere	coincidence.	An	article	in	the	first	issue	discussed	how	to	achieve	greater	political	unity	between	workers	and	students	with	reference	to	a	single	case	study:		One	very	practical	means	of	permanent	assistance	has	been	initiated	by	the	Ford	workers	at	Dagenham.	Faced	by	increasing	need	to	know	exactly	what	their	bosses	are	up	to	they	contacted	Agitprop	and	asked	us	to	find	some	students	who	were	willing	to	work	as	a	research	group.’299	
																																								 																					298	Itzin,	p.	43.	299	‘Student	Worker	Unity’,	Red	Notes	(London,	December	1969),	p.	4.	The	subsequent	publisher	of	the	same	name	was	not	directly	related.	
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Whatever	came	of	this,	which	remains	unclear,	the	claim	that	Ford	workers	initiated	this	exchange	indicated	that	interest	in	developing	such	a	relationship	went	both	ways.		Dagenham	Convenor	Sid	Harraway	certainly	suggested	as	much	when	he	addressed	the	next	Conference	of	the	Institute	for	Workers	Control.	‘I	would	also	pay	tribute’,	he	told	his	fellow	delegates,	‘to	the	students	who	participated	in	picket	activities	and	the	like’.	300	Harraway	then	recounted	an	incident	when	extra	pickets	helped	prevent	a	delivery	of	fuel,	claiming	that	this	helped	keep	the	temperatures	inside	the	plant	below	a	minimum-operating	threshold.	Whatever	bearing	such	incidents	had	on	the	dispute’s	outcome,	or	not,	that	he	felt	the	need	to	make	such	a	public	statement	at	this	forum	was	revealing	in	itself.	Clearly,	Harraway	believed	it	to	be	worthwhile	to	maintain	a	good	relationship	with	these	elements	at	the	time.	Apart	from	the	well-established	critique	of	Solidarity,	such	activity	generally	subordinated	itself	to	the	rank-and-file	trade-union	leaders,	it	seems.	During	the	strike	itself,	however,	the	newsletter	of	The	Black	Ram	signaled	a	possible	shift	to	come:	‘If	in	the	Ford	strike	the	union	repeats	its	1967	sellout	of	the	workers,’	one	article	warned,	Ford	‘Langley	and	other	such	plants	will	be	in	the	same	position	as	Dodge	–	workers	against	both	management	and	unions.’301	The	same	issue	reported	the	activities	of	the	League	of	Revolutionary	Black	Workers	in	Detroit,	where	just	such	a	break	with	the	major	automobile	union	was	taking	place.	
The	Black	Ram’s	coverage	of	Ford	was	fleeting.	However,	its	editor	Selma	James	bridged	a	gap	between	C.	L.	R.	James,	her	husband	whose	politics	influenced	subsequent	autonomist	tendencies,	and	the	emergence	of	autonomist	feminism,	which	she	helped	develop.	As	well	as	questioning	the	role	of	the	unions	and	not	just	officials,	The	Black	Ram	also	drew	attention	to	the	racial	composition	of	the																																									 																					300	Sid	Harraway,	‘Fords	and	After’,	Bulletin	of	the	Institute	for	Worker’	
Control,	1.3,	43–45	(p.	44).	301	‘Editorial:	Master	Ford’s	Unwipped	Slaves’,	The	Black	Ram	([n.p],	15	March	1969),	pp.	1–2	(p.	2).	
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company’s	workforce	for	the	first	time.	According	to	the	article,	an	increasingly	racialised	division	of	labour	at	Ford	saw	the	expansion	of	a	Black	workforce	that	was	more	distant	from	the	union	than	their	white	counterparts.	As	also	occurred	more	generally	in	Britain,	racism	became	a	more	visible	issue	and	Black	workers	played	a	more	prominent	part	at	Ford	over	the	course	of	the	next	decade.	The	following	year	saw	another	external	intervention	on	Merseyside,	which	emerged	from	broadly	the	same	milieu	as	those	of	1969.	During	the	1970	Ford	pay	negotiations,	which	did	not	result	in	industrial	action,	activists	on	Merseyside	began	work	on	a	new	local	paper	Big	Flame.	Over	the	course	of	the	following	decade,	this	name	would	become	closely	connected	with	unrest	at	the	firm,	first	as	a	publishing	collective	and	then	as	a	political	organisation.	One	of	the	founders	Martin	Yarnit	explained	its	origins	in	interview.302	Before	Big	Flame,	Yarnit	helped	to	organise	a	sit-in	occupation	at	the	University	of	Keele	in	1968	and	completed	a	masters	at	Reading.	He	then	returned	to	Wallasey,	just	across	the	Mersey	from	Liverpool	at	some	point	in	the	summer	or	autumn	of	1969:	I	met	up	with	a	couple	of	people	at	that	stage.	One	of	them	was	a	Trotskyist,	a	local	Birkenhead	working-class	guy	who	had	got	involved	in	Trotskyist	politics,	and	the	other	was	a	very	different	person.	He	came	from	an	upper-class	background,	had	been	in	Paris	in	1968,	and	had	been	involved	in	the	Poster	Workshop.	The	three	of	us	sat	down	together	in	a	pub	in	Birkenhead	one	night	and	we	said:	‘We	need	to	do	something.	We	need	to	bring	poster	art	and	newspapers	to	the	working-class	movement	in	Liverpool.’	
																																								 																					302	What	follows	in	this	section	draws	upon	my	previous	work	in	Eoin	O’Cearnaigh,	‘Big	Flame:	An	Attempt	to	Ignite	Revolutionary	Class	Struggle	in	Britain	1970-1984’	(unpublished	Master’s	Dissertation,	Goldsmiths,	University	of	London,	2013).	
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We	looked	around,	and	we	found	other	people	with	similar	ideas.303	As	the	underground	and	alternative	press	burgeoned,	Big	Flame	began	as	a	Merseyside	newspaper,	broadly	located	on	the	far	left	but	without	any	party	affiliations.	It	aimed	to	address	a	working-class	readership	in	a	city	with	a	rich	history	of	social	struggle.	Inspiration	for	the	title	came	from	‘The	Big	Flame’,	a	television	play	written	by	Jim	Allen	and	directed	by	Ken	Loach.	BBC	One	first	broadcast	this	programme	earlier	that	year	as	an	episode	in	the	Wednesday	Play	drama	series.	Shot	in	black	and	white,	this	was	a	work	of	social	realism,	a	genre	more	widely	adopted	by	directors	of	the	British	New	Wave.	The	plot	depicted	a	fictional	wildcat	strike	on	the	Liverpool	docks	at	a	time	when	the	sector	was,	in	fact,	undergoing	a	combination	of	labour	unrest,	technological	change	and	state	intervention.	At	one	point	in	the	story	the	protagonist	Jack	Regan,	a	docker	and	shop	steward,	addressed	one	of	his	mates:	When	them	early	morning	risers	were	spouting	socialism,	I	was	too	busy	down	in	the	ship	fighting	for	peanuts—not	anymore.	Now	I	want	to	see	the	big	flame	Danny.	I	want	to	see	one	big	solid	mass	of	us	that	will	point	the	finger	at	those	raiders	and	say:	‘You	failed	in	your	management	of	society,	so	pack	your	bags,	think	yourself	lucky	and	go’.304	The	television	play	concluded	with	an	open	ending,	suggesting	a	nondeterministic	view	of	history	that	emphasised	the	role	of	human	agency.	With	the	possibility	of	general	strike	looming	in	the	background,	the	forces	of	the	state	prepared	to	suppress	industrial	action	on	the	docks.	Those	who	appropriated	the	name	Big	
Flame	afterwards	shared	the	playwright	and	director’s	commitment	to	a	
																																								 																					303	Martin	Yarnit,	Interview,	2016.	304	Ken	Loach,	‘The	Big	Flame’,	The	Wednesday	Play	(BBC	One,	1969)	<http://www.youtube.com/movie/the-big-flame>	[accessed	26	May	2013].	
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revolutionary	politics	that	emphasised	the	role	of	direct	action	by	the	broad	mass	of	workers	in	achieving	social	change.	Within	a	year	of	the	initial	broadcast	of	this	drama,	the	first	issue	of	the	paper	
Big	Flame	came	out	on	26	February	1970.	It	carried	the	strap-line	'merseyside’s	rank	and	file	paper'	and	was	priced	at	sixpence.	A	front-page	article	set	the	tone,	announcing	that:	'If	you	live	on	Merseyside	and	spend	your	life	being	pushed	around	this	is	the	paper	for	you'.305	Another	headline	informed	readers	that	‘Fords	&	Parity’	would	be	covered	in	the	next	issue.306	From	the	outset,	the	intention	to	provide	a	shop-floor	perspective	of	industrial	disputes	was	made	clear.	This	included	a	focus	on	the	local	automobile	sector	in	general	and	the	Ford	Halewood	plant	in	particular.	When	the	promised	piece	came	out	in	the	next	issue,	it	praised	the	trade-union	strategy	in	the	recent	contract	negotiations,	which	resulted	in	a	flat-rate	pay	rise	of	four	pound	per	week.	True,	this	fell	well	short	of	the	original	demand	for	an	increase	of	ten	pounds.	Shop	stewards	had	also	recommended	rejecting	the	offer,	but	only	workers	at	a	plant	in	Swansea	and	some	sections	at	Halewood	held	out	for	more	by	taking	unofficial	action.	Yet,	Big	Flame	still	framed	this	as	a	success,	reporting	it	as	a	‘well	organised	campaign	designed	to	inform	and	involve	all	workers	and	shop	stewards’.307	The	new	make-up	of	the	FNJNC	was	seen	as	an	important	improvement.	After	last	year’s	debacle,	representation	on	the	committee	had	finally	been	extended	from	union	officials	to	also	include	convenors.	The	voting	system	also	began	to	reflect	the	number	of	members	different	unions	had	at	the	firm,	as	well	as	the	geographic	distribution	of	the	workforce.	
																																								 																					305	‘Big	Flame...’,	Big	Flame:	Merseyside’s	Rank	and	File	Paper	(Liverpool,	26	February	1970),	1	edition,	p.	1	(sic).	306	‘Next	Issue:	Fords	&	Parity’,	Big	Flame:	Merseyside’s	Rank	and	File	Paper,	26	February	1970,	1	edition,	p.	1	(sic).	307	‘Facts	about	Ford	the	Press	Did	Not	Tell:	Ford	Parity	Campaign’,	Big	
Flame:	Merseyside’s	Rank	and	File	Paper	(Liverpool,	April	1970),	p.	4.	
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In	the	following	month’s	issue	one	of	the	Halewood	convenors	Eddie	Roberts	welcomed	the	arrival	of	the	paper,	writing	that	‘we	hope	[...]	Big	Flame	is	here	to	stay’.	Although	he	singled	out	the	publishers’	success	at	so	far	avoiding	the	sectarian	divisions	of	the	left,	he	went	on	to	warn	against	any	‘external	body	trying	to	dictate	the	affairs	of	the	organised	workers	in	the	factories’.308	To	begin	with	Big	
Flame	aligned	itself	closely	with	the	more	militant	elements	among	the	Halewood	shop	stewards,	including	senior	figures	such	as	Roberts.	The	collective	that	published	the	paper	managed	to	avoid	such	sectarian	splits,	which	characterised	so	much	of	far-left	politics,	long	enough	to	begin	bringing	out	the	paper.	As	well	as	individuals	with	no	party	affiliations,	the	paper	involved	members	of	various	organisations:	the	Communist	Party	of	Great	Britain	(CPGB),	International	Socialist	(IS)	and	the	Communist	Federation	of	Britain	(CFB).309	Predictably	enough,	fractures	soon	appeared	in	this	coalition,	however.	A	report	in	the	paper	of	a	readers’	meeting	at	the	Swan	Hotel	on	15	March	openly	explained	that	those	in	attendance	were	divided	between	a	number	who	believed	
Big	Flame	should	go	on	as	it	is	and	others	who	felt	that	it	should	go	beyond	reporting	to	political	analysis	and	the	taking	of	principled	stances'.310	Years	later	a	Big	Flame	pamphlet	would	describe	how	'under	pressure	for	clear	politics	the	working	alliance	came	apart	at	the	seams,	despite	still	selling	thousands	of	copies'.311	Within	a	month	of	Labour’s	general	election	defeat,	the	seventh	and	final	issue	came	out	that	July,	just	five	months	after	its	launch.	
																																								 																					308	Eddie	Roberts,	‘Big	Flame’s	Success	Depends	on	You’,	Big	Flame	(Liverpool,	April	1970),	pp.	1	&	4.	309	 archivearchie	(sic),	'The	Beginning:	Episodes	in	Big	Flame	History	No.	1',	Big	Flame	1970-84.	<http://bigflameuk.wordpress.com/2009/04/29/episodes-in-big-flame-history-no1/>	(25	May	2013).	310	 'Meeting'	Big	Flame:	merseyside's	rank	and	file	newspaper,	3	(April	1970),	p.	3.	311	 Big	Flame,	An	Introduction	to	Big	Flame:	Our	Politics,	History,	
Structures	and	Publications	(Liverpool:	Big	Flame,	[1978]).	
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Nothing	appears	to	have	filtered	through	from	Italy’s	Hot	Autumn,	which	continued	to	smoulder	at	the	time.	That	said,	traces	of	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	could	be	detected	in	this	first	incarnation	of	the	Big	Flame	paper	though.	One	issue	featured	a	front-page	photograph	of	a	worker	tearing	up	his	union	card	during	a	strike	at	Pilkington.	This	dispute,	a	major	focus	of	the	paper,	saw	workers	at	the	glass	manufactures,	which	supplied	Ford,	attempt	to	set	up	a	breakaway	union.312	The	next	page	also	featured	a	favourable	review	of	the	Solidarity	pamphlet	GMWU-Scab	Union	and	displayed	artwork	from	the	Poster	Workshop.313	
	
Chapter	Conclusion	
As	the	post-war	settlement	fell	into	crisis	in	the	late	1960s	British	state	policy	became	increasingly	enmeshed	with	industrial	relations	at	the	Ford	Motor	Company	(Limited).	The	sewing	machinists’	strike	persuaded	Barbara	Castle	of	the	need	to	legislate	against	unofficial	action,	while	the	1969	Ford	national	pay	strike	set	the	scene	for	this	policy’s	demise.	The	divisions	this	caused	then	contributed	to	the	party’s	general	election	defeat	in	June	1970.	They	also	caused	the	system	of	trade-union	mediation	to	come	under	increasing	strain.	Exemplifying	this,	Jones	and	Scanlon	opposed	their	allies	in	government	on	the	principle	of	the	matter,	while	alienating	union	members	by	compromising	over	the	issue	in	practice	at	Ford.	Meanwhile,	Solidarity	continued	to	give	the	clearest	expression	of	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy,	being	joined	briefly	by	The	Black	Ram.	A	broader	current	of	open	Marxism	also	emerged	from	1968,	which	inspired	by	events	in																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 				<http://bigflameuk.files.wordpress.com/2009/05/intro78-all.pdf>	(24	april	2013).	312	‘St.	Helens	Strike	Busters	Move	In’,	Big	Flame:	Merseyside’s	Rank	and	File	
Paper	(Liverpool,	May	1970),	p.	1.	313	‘Poster	Workshop’,	Big	Flame:	Merseyside’s	Rank	and	File	Paper	(Liverpool,	May	1970),	p.	2;	‘Read	GMWU—Scab	Union’,	Big	Flame:	Merseyside’s	Rank	and	File	
Paper	(Liverpool,	May	1970),	p.	2.	For	a	visual	history	of	the	Atelier	populaire,	see	
Beauty	Is	in	the	Street:	A	Visual	Record	of	the	May	’68	Paris	Uprising,	ed.	by	Johan	Kugelberg	and	Vermès	Philippe	(London:	Four	Corners,	2011).	
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France	and	Italy	adopted	new	cultural	and	political	practices	and	began	to	intervene	at	Ford.		 	
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3.	Tories	Must	not	Win	Where	Labour	Failed,	1970	to	1974314	
During	Edward	Heath’s	first	year	as	Prime	Minister,	Ford	workers	went	on	strike	over	pay	in	the	longest	dispute	in	the	British	subsidiary’s	history.	They	stayed	out	for	nine	weeks	from	29	January	until	5	April	1971.	During	this	dispute	the	Industrial	Relations	Bill	passed	through	Parliament,	adding	to	the	political	significance	of	the	strike.	While	presented	as	yet	another	response	to	the	Donovan	Commission,	this	legislation	threatened	harsher	legal	sanctions	for	unofficial	action	than	the	previous	proposals	of	the	former	Labour	government.	Coinciding	with	a	public-sector	pay	dispute	in	the	Post	Office,	the	nine-week	strike	represented	the	first	challenge	by	private-sector	workers	to	the	new	Conservative	administration’s	incomes	policy.	The	‘second	Battle	of	Britain’,	as	the	Director	General	of	the	Confederation	of	British	Industry	(CBI)	dubbed	these	events	at	the	time,	pitted	two	groups	of	workers	against	the	British	state	and	corporate	capital	as	represented	by	the	third	largest	US	multinational	company.315	When	union	officials	and	management	arranged	a	settlement	behind	the	backs	of	the	workers,	many	remained	hostile	to	the	deal,	unofficial	action	continuing	afterwards	at	plants	in	Swansea	and	Halewood.	The	wider	dynamics	of	the	period	played	out	at	Ford	with	industrial	unrest	at	the	firm	an	integral	part	of	this	process.	This	chapter	situates	the	strike	and	the	disputes	that	followed	at	Ford	under	the	Heath	administration	in	relation	to	the	development	of	a	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	in	Britain.	Groups	like	Solidarity	and	Big	Flame	only	had	a	marginal	position	in	relation	to	the	company’s	workforce,	as	well	as	the	wider	working-class	struggle	of	the	period.	Yet,	this	should	not	belie	the	relevance	of	their																																									 																					314	This	slogan	appeared	on	a	placard	at	a	demonstration	against	the	Industrial	Relations	Bill	filmed	in	Fighting	the	Bill	(Platform	Films	&	Video,	1970).	315	John	Elliott,	‘“Stand	Firm	against	High	Wage	Claims,”	CBI	Chief	Urges’,	
Financial	Times	(London,	23	January	1971),	p.	1;	‘Fortune	500:	A	Database	of	50	Years	of	Fortune’s	List	of	America’s	Largest	Corporations’,	Fortune	<http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full/1971/>	[accessed	12	September	2018].	
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analysis	to	what	took	place.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	1971	strike,	a	particularly	acute	situation	developed	at	the	centre	of	organised	labour	at	Ford,	reflecting	a	wider	crisis	of	political	representation	both	in	industry	and	society	at	large.	This	left	the	shop	stewards	increasingly	cut	off	from	workers’	struggles	on	the	shop	floor,	which	increasingly	erupted	into	violence.	As	we	shall	see,	such	unrest	involved	the	use	of	tactics	advocated	beforehand	by	Big	Flame	and	Solidarity.	The	two	groups	also	aimed	to	provide	car	workers	with	the	means	to	communicate	unmediated	by	the	trade	unions,	both	at	the	institutional	level	of	full-time	officials	and	even	in	terms	of	the	formal	leadership	of	the	shop	stewards.	Such	an	approach	clearly	chimed	with	a	mood	of	militancy	among	significant	sections	of	workers	inside	the	factory,	which	both	groups	documented	in	detail.	This	provided	a	perspective	from	below	not	recorded	in	other	sources.	The	current	chapter	begins	with	an	account	of	the	1971	national	pay	strike	at	Ford.	An	examination	of	the	relationship	between	labour	unrest	at	the	company	and	the	development	of	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	in	Britain	during	this	period	then	follows.	The	final	main	section	returns	to	industrial	conflict	inside	the	firm	to	focus	on	the	period	between	this	dispute	and	the	Heath	administration’s	defeat	in	the	first	of	two	general	elections	in	1974.		
The	Second	Battle	of	Britain,	1970	to	1971	
In	November	1970	with	the	Ford	pay	contract	up	for	renegotiation	the	following	spring,	Socialist	Worker’s	Sabby	Sagall	co-wrote	a	piece	with	Tom	Langan	on	the	situation	at	the	company.	Langan	was	an	Amalgamated	Union	of	Engineering	Workers	(AUEW)	shop	steward,	who	worked	at	Dagenham.	This	article	linked	the	demand	at	Ford	for	‘parity’	with	the	highest	pay	rates	in	the	automobile	sector	to	a	transition	in	the	rest	of	the	British	automobile	sector	away	from	piecework	and	towards	measured	day	work.	Such	a	payment	system,	which	went	back	to	the	early	
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days	at	Ford,	increasingly	became	a	model	for	the	British	automobile	industry	as	a	whole.	Not	only	did	this	highlight	income	inequality	between	car	workers,	it	also	raised	the	question	of	whether	workers	or	employers	would	benefit	from	the	resolution	of	this	disparity.	Ford’s	role	as	a	model	employer	also	continued	to	extend	beyond	the	sector	across	British	industry	in	general	as	it	still	provided	a	template	for	public	policy.	Limiting	cost-push	pressure	on	inflation	by	controlling	wage	increases	remained	a	key	public	policy	tool,	whichever	of	the	two	main	parties	was	in	government.	In	the	article	Langan	cautioned	his	workmates	against	having	unrealistic	expectations	of	trade-union	officials.	‘The	“left”	leaders	cannot	be	relied	upon	to	give	a	consistent	lead’,	he	warned.	‘They	will	act	militantly	only	to	the	extent	that	the	rank	and	file	takes	a	strong	initiative.’316	The	role	Hugh	Scanlon,	AUEW	President,	and	Jack	Jones,	Transport	and	General	Workers	Union	(TGWU)	General	Secretary,	had	played	in	negotiating	a	deal	that	introduced	penalty	clauses	to	Ford’s	1969	contract	already	gave	grounds	for	such	scepticism.	While	the	extent	of	these	concessions	had	been	more	limited	than	what	would	follow,	they	highlighted	the	hazard	of	relying	on	Jones	and	Scanlon’s	commitment	to	shop-floor	democracy.	Later	that	month	Moss	Evans,	TGWU	National	Secretary	(Automotive)	and	Chairman	of	the	union	side	of	the	Ford	National	Joint	Negotiating	Committee	(FNJNC),	formally	submitted	a	wage	claim.	This	included	a	demand	for	parity	‘with	the	best	standard	secured	in	the	British	motor	industry’.	To	clarify	what	he	meant	by	this,	Evans	drew	a	comparison	with	pay	rates	at	specific	other	firms:	‘your	employees’,	he	told	management	negotiators,	‘are	paid	around	6s.	to	8s.	an	hour	less’	than	at	Chrysler	and	British	Leyland.317	A	detailed	technical	analysis	of	Ford’s	commercial	position,	produced	by	the	TGWU	research	department	in	collaboration																																									 																					316	Langam	[sic]	Tom	and	Sabby	Sagall,	‘New	Pay	Battle	Looms	at	Ford’,	
Socialist	Worker	(London,	7	November	1970),	p.	5.	317	Moss	Evans,	The	Ford	Wage	Claim	(London:	Transport	&	General	Workers	Union,	1970),	pp.	5	&	14.	
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with	Ruskin	College’s	trade	union	research	unit,	supported	the	case	that	the	company	could	afford	to	meet	this	demand.	The	Financial	Times	labour	editor	called	the	claim	‘comprehensive,	well	researched	and,	on	the	face	of	it,	impressive’.318	Such	an	approach	clearly	met	with	approval	from	some	quarters,	but	it	received	a	cooler	reception	from	others.	According	to	a	Big	Flame	pamphlet,	the	document	reduced	the	dispute	to	‘a	squabble	between	two	sets	of	accountants	over	the	heads	of	the	workers	involved’.319	Doing	so	overlooked	how	pay	and	profit	related	to	day-to-day	disputes	between	workforce	and	management	over	production	issues,	such	as	manning	levels	and	the	speed	of	the	assembly	line.	As	negotiations	proceeded,	management	called	into	question	the	figures	from	the	unions’	wage	claim,	claiming	labour	costs	at	Ford	were	actually	the	highest	in	the	British	automobile	industry.320	The	data	used	to	make	this	case	aggregated	staff	pay,	including	senior	management	salaries,	with	the	wages	of	the	hourly	paid	workforce.	The	figures	also	concealed	any	relationship	between	overall	wages	and	varying	rates	of	overtime	and	shift-work	patterns	at	different	firms,	as	well	as	differences	in	productivity	and	the	impact	of	lay	offs	across	the	sector.	Two	days	after	the	claim	was	formally	submitted,	the	annual	Ford	Shop	Stewards	Conference	took	place	in	Coventry.	Delegates	passed	a	resolution	agreeing	to	support	the	demand	for	parity	and	to	oppose	the	Industrial	Relations	Bill	with	a	one-day	strike	on	8	December	1970.321	This	coincided	with	a	national	demonstration	to	oppose	the	legislation.	The	campaign	was	organised	by	the	Liaison	Committee	for	the	Defence	of	the	Trade	Unions	(LCDTU),	a	Communist	led																																									 																					318	John	Elliott,	‘Car	Workers’	Pay:	Looking	to	Ford	to	Step	on	the	Brake’,	
Financial	Times	(London,	7	January	1971),	p.	14.	319	Big	Flame	Ford	Group,	p.	27.	320	‘No	Suicide	Pact	Warning’,	Ford	Bulletin:	For	Ford	Employees	(Dagenham,	30	November1970),	section	1.	321	Peter	Cartwright,	‘Ford	Stewards	Call	for	Walk	Out	on	December	8’,	
Financial	Times	(London,	30	November	1970),	p.	38.	
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initiative	initially	established	to	oppose	the	previous	Labour	government’s	trade	union	policies.	As	well	as	linking	the	claim	for	parity	to	opposition	to	the	government’s	industrial	strategy,	this	resolution	signalled	the	militant	mood	of	rank-and-file	organised	labour	at	the	firm,	with	over	eighty	per	cent	of	the	two	hundred	delegates	voting	in	favour	of	industrial	action.	Negotiations	officially	opened	when	the	full	FNJNC	met	at	the	company’s	Regent	Street	offices	in	London	on	Friday	29	January	1971.	At	the	meeting	Bob	Ramsey,	labour	relations	director,	dismissed	the	wage	claim	as	an	invitation	‘to	commit	commercial	suicide’,	instead	offering	an	increase	of	two	pound	per	week.	This	left	‘a	gap	of	£12-£16	to	be	closed’	between	the	firm’s	proposal	and	the	demand	for	parity.322	When	convenors	became	aware	of	the	situation	during	an	adjournment	in	the	talks,	they	called	a	strike	for	the	following	Monday.	Before	the	meeting	had	even	ended,	however,	shop-floor	workers	seized	the	initiative.	Spontaneous	walkouts	occurred	at	Halewood,	Swansea	and	the	Dagenham	Knock	Down	Plant	(where	vehicles	were	prepared	as	kits	for	reassembly	abroad).	Crucially,	the	strike	began	with	shop-floor	workers	taking	unofficial	action	spontaneously	without	following	a	lead	from	union	representatives	at	any	level.	This	sequence	of	events	had	much	wider	implications	because	the	Industrial	Relations	Bill,	which	aimed	to	prevent	just	such	‘unconstitutional’	action,	was	not	yet	enacted.	Had	it	been	in	force	already,	Ford	stewards	could	have	faced	legal	liability	‘despite	the	fact	that	they	were	democratically	elected—and	despite	the	fact	that	there	was	a	clear	revulsion	against	the	offer	made	by	management’—as	Jack	Jones	explained	on	the	record	at	the	time.323	With	support	growing	for	the	campaign	to	‘Kill	the	Bill’,	the	dispute	came	to	represent	the	threat	legislation	
																																								 																					322	Michael	Hand,	‘Ford	Faces	All-Out	Strike	as	Union	Rejects	£2	Offer’,	
Financial	Times	(London,	30	January	1971),	p.	1.	323	David	Wilson,	‘Bill	Would	Make	Ford	Conveners	Liable’,	Financial	Times	(London,	8	February	1971),	p.	1.	
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posed	to	shop-floor	worker’s	ability	to	take	unofficial	action	in	future	and	the	defiance	with	which	this	challenge	met.	Despite	all	the	unions	involved	making	the	dispute	official	within	a	week,	supporters	of	the	government’s	attempt	to	shift	the	balance	of	forces	at	work	also	sought	to	make	political	capital	of	the	strike.	Ford	management	claimed	that	‘convenors	took	the	law	into	their	own	hands	and	brought	everyone	out	on	unconstitutional	strike’.324	This	overlooked	how	shop-floor	workers	walked	out	from	plants	across	the	country	three	days	before	union	representatives	had	even	called	for	industrial	action	to	begin.	The	weekend	after	the	strike	became	official	the	company	took	out	full-page	newspaper	advertisements,	listing	‘6	facts’	that	supposedly	undermined	the	case	for	parity.	Having	written	directly	to	individual	workers	in	previous	disputes,	Management	explained	the	need	to	use	this	means	of	communication,	‘in	view	of	the	cessation	of	postal	services’,	with	reference	to	the	other	major	strike	then	taking	place.325	Such	an	approach	clearly	aimed	to	sway	public	opinion	too.	Meanwhile,	the	FNJNC	next	met	at	the	company’s	request	on	19	February.	At	these	talks	Ramsey	offered	to	raise	the	minimum	pay	increase	from	£2	to	£2.50	a	week.	This	was	to	be	paid	for	without	any	further	funds	being	made	available,	however,	by	abandoning	a	proposed	service	increment.	Unsurprisingly,	union	negotiators	rejected	a	‘final	offer’	that	would	have	left	most	of	their	members	worse	off	than	management’s	original	proposal.	Later	that	day	Ford	convenors	voted	unanimously	to	continue	the	strike.326	
																																								 																					324	Ford	Motor	Company	Ltd.,	‘To	Ford	Employees	Now	on	Strike:	5	More	Facts	You	Ought	to	Know’,	Daily	Mirror	(London,	17	February	1971),	p.	15.	325	‘To	Ford	Employees	Now	on	Strike:	6	Facts	You	Ought	to	Know’,	Daily	
Mirror	(London,	9	February	1971),	p.	6.	326	Roy	Rogers,	‘Exports	Warning	as	Fords	Pay	Talks	Break	Down’,	Financial	
Times	(London,	20	February	1971),	p.	1;	‘Fords:	No	Increase	in	Pay	Offer’,	Morning	
Star	(London,	20	February	1971),	p.	1.	
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Negotiations	resumed	again	five	weeks	into	the	strike,	when	management	requested	that	the	FNJNC	meet	again	on	2	March.	Within	two	days	talks	broke	down,	when	the	union	side	rejected	another	offer	to	increase	wages	by	at	least	three	pound	and	twenty	pence	per	week.	While	Ramsey	warned	that	this	marked	‘the	start	of	the	decline	of	Ford	in	Britain’,	Moss	Evans	countered	that	the	proposal	was	‘well	below	what	the	company	can	afford	to	pay	and	what	our	members	expect’.327	The	FNJNC	would	not	meet	again	until	after	an	intervention	by	Jones	and	Scanlon	to	broker	a	backroom	deal.		Despite	criticisms	of	the	unions’	failure	to	encourage	wider	participation,	the	support	of	Ford	workers	for	the	strike	remained	solid.328	Mass	meetings	at	plants	across	the	country	consistently	voted	in	favour	of	industrial	action	on	thirteen	separate	occasions.	However	during	the	dispute,	the	BBC	broadcast	an	interview	with	two	women	who	claimed	to	speak	for	the	wives	of	most	Ford	workers	in	voicing	opposition	to	their	husbands’	actions.	Clearly,	the	loss	of	pay	during	industrial	action	disrupted	the	ability	of	households	to	meet	their	everyday	living	costs—something	such	women	would	generally	have	been	keenly	aware	of	given	their	role	within	the	household.	In	response,	a	group	of	‘Ford	wives’	from	Dagenham,	Tom	Langan’s	spouse	among	them,	invited	journalists	to	a	meeting	at	which	they	issued	a	strong	rebuttal.329	Seven	years	later	Ford	workers’	partners	would	organise	even	more	systematically,	beginning	before	the	outbreak	of	industrial	action,	to	rebuff	a	similar	attempt	to	disrupt	another	nine-week,	as	discussed	below	in	Chapter	Six.	
																																								 																					327	Mick	Costello,	‘Ford	Workers	Slam	Bosses	as	Talks	Fail’,	Morning	Star	(London,	5	March	1971),	p.	1;	Roy	Rogers,	‘Ford	Is	Facing	“a	Long	Strike”’,	Financial	
Times	(London,	5	March	1971),	p.	1.	328	Such	criticism	was	not	limited	to	the	likes	of	Big	Flame	and	Solidarity.	See	also	Mathews,	p.	116.	Matthews’s	‘Strike	Diary’	in	the	appendix,	pp.	205-08,	includes	a	chronology	of	all	the	mass	meetings	at	Ford.	329	‘Anti-Strike?	Not	on	Your	Life’,	Morning	Star	(London,	25	February	1971),	p.	1;	Mathews,	pp.	128–29.	
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The	recurrence	of	such	situations	called	attention	to	the	relationship	between	waged	labour	and	unpaid	housework,	revealing	how	industrial	production	is	integrally	linked	to	the	reproduction	of	workers	in	the	home.	During	the	strike	the	capacity	of	workers	to	withdraw	their	labour	was	sustained	in	part	by	their	entitlement	to	claim	social	security	payments	for	their	dependants,	if	not	themselves.	Such	claims	transferred	£450,000	of	the	cost	of	lost	earnings	from	the	households	affected	to	the	state.330	The	significance	of	this	situation	was	not	lost	on	the	government	at	the	time.	Before	the	end	of	the	dispute	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Social	Services	Sir	Keith	Joseph	introduced	new	legislation	to	reduce	the	eligibility	of	workers	to	make	such	claims	during	industrial	action.	On	29	March	he	made	a	statement	in	the	House	of	Commons	to	announce	publication	of	a	new	Social	Security	Bill.	Making	the	case	for	new	legislation,	Joseph	specifically	told	MPs	that	‘the	supplementary	benefit	payable	to	workers	at	Ford	now	engaged	in	a	trade	dispute	would	have	been	cut	to	something	like	two-thirds’,	indicating	the	strike’s	relevance	to	such	a	change.	In	response	to	questions	from	fellow	MPs,	he	also	described	the	measure	as	having	‘distinct	political	overtones’,	a	remarkably	candid	remark.331	Then	on	23	February	William	Batty	wrote	a	letter	to	The	Times,	warning	that	‘my	Company	last	week	decided	to	recommend	against	an	expenditure	of	almost	£30	million	for	a	new	expansion’	in	Britain.	Batty	explicitly	blamed	the	decision	against	investment	in	the	British	subsidiary	on	industrial	action.	He	went	on	to	assert	that	Ford	‘contributed	more	to	the	British	balance	of	payments	than	virtually	
																																								 																					330	Claimants	Union,	Claimants	Handbook	for	Strikers	([London]:	Claimants	Union,	1972),	p.	1.	331	House	of	Commons,	House	of	Commons	Debate	(Hansard),	Fifth	Series,	DCCCXIV	colls	1155-56.	
	 117	
any	other	organization’,	emphasising	the	impact	of	the	corporation’s	investment	decisions	on	the	wider	British	economy.332		Sid	Harraway	responded	on	behalf	of	the	shop	stewards,	pointing	out	that	the	decision	to	locate	the	new	plant	at	Bordeaux	in	France	had	been	announced	weeks	before	industrial	action	began.	Exposing	discrepancies	in	Batty’s	account	of	the	sequence	of	events	discredited	the	company’s	purported	rationale	for	this	decision.	Harraway	also	accused	Batty	of	inconsistency	in	simultaneously	representing	the	labour	of	Ford	workers	in	Britain	as	both	a	highly	productive	source	of	exports	and	a	poor	return	on	investment.333	Six	weeks	into	the	strike	Henry	Ford	II,	the	founder’s	grandson	and	now	chairman	of	the	corporation,	told	a	Tokyo	press	conference	‘we	will	be	thinking	very	hard	and	long	about	any	new	investment	(in	Britain)’,	reiterating	the	threats	made	by	the	British	subsidiary’s	managing	director.334	‘There	is	nothing	wrong	with	Ford	of	Britain,	but	with	the	country’,	he	declared	provocatively	on	his	arrival	at	London’s	Heathrow	airport	the	following	week,	adding	that	‘we	cannot	recommend	any	new	investment	in	a	country	so	dogged	with	labour	problems’.335	Senior	ministers	then	held	a	‘luncheon	to	join	with	Mr.	Heath	in	reassuring	Mr.	Ford	that	the	government	are	acting	resolutely	to	improve	industrial	relations	in	Britain’.336	The	American	business	leader	received	a	less	warm	reception	from	pickets	who	greeted	him	on	Whitehall	with	placards	bearing	hostile	slogans,	including	‘Go	
																																								 																					332	W.	B.	Batty,	‘Letters	to	the	Editor:	Effect	of	Strike	Action	on	Production	at	Ford’,	The	Times	(London,	23	February	1971),	p.	13.	333	Sid	Harraway,	‘Letters	to	the	Editor:	Effect	of	Strikes	on	Ford	Production:	Shop	Stewards’	Reply’,	The	Times	(London,	24	February	1971),	p.	13.	334	‘Henry	Ford:	“Hard	Look”	at	Future	U.K.	Expansion’,	Financial	Times	(London,	8	March	1971),	p.	29.	335	‘Henry	Ford	Blames	UK’,	Observer	(London,	14	March	1971),	p.	1.	336	‘Mr	Heath	and	Mr	Henry	Ford	to	Discuss	Future	of	the	Company’s	Operations’,	The	Times	(London,	11	March	1971),	p.	2.	
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Home	Yanks	and	Bring	Back	Parity	at	Ford’.337	Jack	Jones	took	a	more	conciliatory	approach	at	the	time,	asking	the	industrialist	for	a	meeting	to	resolve	the	dispute,	a	request	which	was	snubbed.	Ford	did,	however,	tone	down	his	rhetoric	in	a	statement	after	the	lunch,	accepting	that	management	shared	some	responsibility	for	the	state	of	labour	relations	and	expressing	a	commitment	to	ongoing	production	in	Britain.	Following	his	visit,	organised	labour	from	the	USA	also	became	publically	embroiled	in	the	dispute.	On	23	March	United	Automobile	Workers	(UAW)	President	Leonard	Woodcock	attended	the	International	Metalworkers’	Federation	(IMF)	World	Auto	Council	Conference	in	London.	Delegates	from	nineteen	countries	passed	a	resolution	at	this	event,	pledging	to	back	the	strike	financially.	Woodcock’s	own	statement	gave	a	clear	impression	that	whatever	practical	support	was	required	would	be	forthcoming:	‘The	federation	will	have	to	raise	financial	assistance	and	do	other	things	necessary,	if	Fords	show	evidence	of	breaking	that	strike	and	attempting	to	break	the	unions	involved.’338	He	then	joined	his	fellow	delegates	in	a	display	of	international	unity	on	the	Dagenham	picket	line	the	next	day,	a	gesture	reinforcing	the	previous	message	of	support.339	Apart	from	this	public	performance	of	solidarity,	however,	the	US	union	boss	played	another	role	behind	the	scenes	with	a	much	greater	bearing	on	the	strikes’	outcome.	On	the	same	day	as	the	IMF	conference,	Woodcock	joined	Jones	and	Scanlon	for	talks	with	the	Prime	Minister	and	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Employment.	Jones	later	recalled	this	as	a	cordial	occasion:	‘Heath	greeted	us	in	a	most	friendly	fashion	and	gave	us	a	courteous	hearing.’340	Following	this	meeting																																									 																					337	Mick	Costello,	‘Ford	Refuses	to	Meet	Jack	Jones’,	Morning	Star	(London,	16	March	1971),	p.	1.	338	Mick	Costello,	‘World	Unions	Pledge	Cash	to	Ford	Strike’,	Morning	Star	(London,	24	March	1971),	p.	1.	339	‘Visitors	Please	Ford	Pickets’,	Morning	Star	(London,	25	March	1971),	p.	3.	340	Jack	Jones,	Union	Man:	The	Autobiography	of	Jack	Jones	(London:	Collines,	1986),	p.	234.	
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The	Financial	Times	reported	that	‘Mr.	Carr	was	particularly	interested	in	Mr.	Woodcock’s	account	of	the	development	of	long-term	agreements	in	the	U.S.’341	Officially,	the	Ford	dispute	was	off	the	agenda	of	these	talks,	which	only	covered	industrial	policy	in	general	terms.	That	discussion	focused	of	the	merits	of	longer	US-style	pay	contracts	became	a	matter	of	public	record	though.	Afterwards	just	such	a	deal	occurred	at	Ford,	following	the	direct	intervention	of	the	two	British	union	officials	in	attendance.	To	bring	this	outcome	about,	the	government	and	TUC	leaders	helped	management	approach	Jones	and	Scanlon	directly	despite	ministers’	reluctance	to	become	visibly	involved	in	the	dispute.	The	Times	then	reported	‘speculation’	that	the	two	officials	would	intervene	in	the	strike.342	When	a	group	of	Liverpool	stewards	confronted	Jones	about	these	rumours	on	the	same	morning	the	article	came	out,	his	denial	was	emphatic:	‘I’m	not	involved	[...]	It’s	up	to	you	lads—you’re	running	the	strike.’343	Yet,	within	a	day	he	had	accepted	an	invitation	to	hold	secret	talks	with	senior	company	executives.	Bypassing	the	company’s	own	procedural	channels,	Ford	of	Europe	Chairman	Stanley	Gillen	and	Bob	Ramsey	then	made	a	new	offer	to	Jones	and	Scanlon.	While	this	fell	short	of	the	demand	for	parity,	the	company	improved	upon	the	previous	£2	offer	in	exchange	for	the	introduction	of	a	new	penalty	clause	and	an	agreement	to	put	the	decision	to	the	workforce	in	a	secret	ballot.	This	included	a	minimum	initial	pay	rise	of	£3.62	a	week	and	two	further	incremental	increases	over	the	term	of	a	two-year	contract.	The	union	leaders	then	presented	the	deal	to	a	‘hurriedly	called’	meeting	of	the	union	side	of	the	FNJNC	the	following	night.	Sid	Harraway,	as	reported	in	the	Financial	Times,	initially	described	the	outcome	as	‘a	victory	for	the																																									 																					341	Michael	Hand,	‘Demand	for	Curbs	on	International	Groups’,	Financial	
Times	(London,	24	March	1971),	p.	1.	342	Paul	Routledge,	‘Ford	Unions	to	Hold	Critical	Meeting’,	The	Times	(London,	25	March	1971),	p.	19.	343	Mathews,	p.	143.	
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broad	parity	movement’	despite	some	reservations.	While	the	tone	of	the	piece	was	generally	upbeat	about	the	deal,	it	reported	dissent	from	a	number	of	the	committee’s	recently	appointed	lay	members	who	had	apparently	abstained.344	The	Morning	Star	offered	a	less	sanguine	assessment	of	what	was	on	offer.	One	anonymous	steward	compared	accepting	the	penalty	clause	and	the	introduction	of	secret	ballots	to	‘accepting	the	Tory	anti-union	Bill	even	before	it	had	been	railroaded	through	parliament’.345	The	same	piece	suggested	that	most	convenors	on	the	FNJNC	had	opposed	the	settlement.	Clearly,	the	deal	encountered	strong	hostility	from	the	outset.	According	to	Mathews,	a	source	close	to	the	shop	stewards	at	Ford,	two	convenors	voted	against	the	deal,	two	others	were	not	even	notified	of	the	meeting	beforehand	and	two	officials	also	opposed	the	offer.	To	ensure	the	outcome	of	the	meeting,	he	described	Jones	and	Scanlon	using	strong-arm	tactics	at	odds	with	their	image	as	champions	of	workers’	control	within	the	unions.	Moreover,	some	members	of	the	FNJNC	later	claimed	to	have	only	been	informed	about	the	imposition	of	a	secret	ballot	after	they	had	already	agreed	to	recommend	acceptance	of	the	deal	to	the	workforce.346	While	still	opposing	legislative	change,	Jones	and	Scanlon’s	approach	set	out	to	show	‘restraint	in	the	use	of	strike	action	to	maintain	a	public	reputation	for	constitutionalism’,	according	to	labour	historian	Alistair	Reid.347	Perhaps	so,	but	the	tactics	used	to	achieve	this	end	undermined	the	credibility	of	the	two	union	leaders	and	the	Ford	shop	stewards	organisation,	which	had	backed	their	election	in	a	campaign	for	trade-union	democracy.	
																																								 																					344	Michael	Hand,	‘Ford	Ballot	on	16%	Two-Year	Package	Pay	Offer’,	Financial	
Times	(London,	1	April	1971),	p.	1.	345	Mick	Costello,	‘Fords	Offer	2-Year	Deal’,	Morning	Star	(London,	1	April	1971),	p.	1	(p.	2).	346	Mathews,	pp.	149–52.	347	Reid,	p.	301.	
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The	subsequent	ballot,	‘a	shabby	affair’	according	to	Body	Plant	Convenor	Jock	Macrae,	took	place	on	Monday	5	April.	This	reportedly	involved	numerous	irregularities.	Some	workers	claimed	to	have	received	multiple	voting	slips,	while	others	reported	not	receiving	one	at	all.	Aside	from	such	alleged	irregularities,	another	issue	also	had	a	crucial	bearing	on	the	outcome	of	this	process.	During	mass	meetings	at	plants	in	Halewood	and	Swansea	the	weekend	beforehand,	workers	had	decided	to	stay	out	on	strike	by	a	show	of	hands.	The	Morning	Star	quoted	one	Merseyside	steward’s	view	of	the	best	way	forward:	‘We	came	out	on	a	show	of	hands	and	we’ll	go	in	on	a	show	of	hands.’348	This	presented	a	major	dilemma	for	Ford	workers	who	opposed	the	deal,	whether	to	accept	the	process	and	vote	‘no’	or	to	instead	abstain	from	the	secret	ballot.	The	failure	of	shop	stewards	to	agree	a	common	strategy	proved	decisive.	The	final	result	came	in	at	16,471	in	favour	of	the	agreement	compared	to	only	6546	against,	but	only	about	half	of	the	workforce	even	voted.	Afterwards	Sid	Harraway	offered	a	muted	response:	‘I	will	be	back	at	work.	The	shop	stewards	accept	the	decision	of	the	ballot	although	I	personally	voted	against	accepting	the	offer.’349	While	distancing	himself	from	the	outcome	of	a	dubious	decision	making	process,	this	senior	convenor	made	clear	his	opposition	to	any	further	industrial	action.	Not	everyone	on	the	shop	floor	was	prepared	to	give	up	the	fight	so	quickly.	Work	resumed	in	Dagenham	soon	after	the	vote,	while	Moss	Evans	had	to	visit	Swansea	in	person	to	persuade	the	workforce	there	to	do	the	same.	This	facility	produced	rear	axels	for	Ford’s	entire	British	output	of	cars,	representing	a	potential	bottleneck	in	the	supply	chain,	as	did	the	Halewood	Transmission	Plant	where	all	gearbox	production	took	place.	Initially	at	least,	the	strike	carried	on																																									 																					348	‘Low	Ford	Poll	Accepts	Deal’,	Morning	Star	(London,	3	April	1971),	pp.	1	&	3.	 349	‘Two	Ford	Plants	Vote	to	Stay	Out’,	Morning	Star	(London,	5	April	1971),	p.	1;	although	there	are	some	small	discrepancies	with	the	results	reported	in	‘Ford:	How	They	Voted’,	Financial	Times	(London,	3	April	1971),	p.	15	these	still	broadly	support	this	analysis.	
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unofficially	after	the	ballot	at	these	two	locations.	The	Morning	Star	anticipated	that	this	could	lead	to	wider	company	lay-offs	the	following	week,	indicating	the	potential	for	such	unrest	to	quickly	cause	disruption.	However,	union	leaders	persuaded	both	plants	to	resume	production	before	this	happened.350	Just	as	it	began	with	spontaneous	walkouts,	the	longest	strike	at	Ford	in	Britain	ended	with	unofficial	action,	which	occurred	even	without	the	involvement	of	union	leaders	even	within	the	hierarchy	of	the	shop	stewards	organisation.		
None	of	Us	Were	Crying	When	Carr’s	House	Was	Bombed	
A	dramatic	sign	of	how	Britain	became	increasingly	polarised	under	Edward	Heath’s	Conservative	government	came	in	the	form	of	a	spate	of	bomb	and	arson	attacks	on	establishment	targets.	These	included	a	device	detonated	inside	the	St	James’s	Square	offices	of	the	Department	of	Employment	and	Productivity,	which	went	off	the	day	after	a	national	demonstration	against	the	Industrial	Relations	Bill.	Two	more	devices	exploded	at	the	home	of	Minister	of	Employment	Robert	Carr	on	12	January,	the	date	of	another	‘Kill	the	Bill’	demo.	A	series	of	communiqués	signed	‘The	Angry	Brigade’	claimed	responsibility	for	both	attacks	and	a	string	of	others.351	During	the	Ford	dispute	another	bomb	went	off	at	the	firm’s	accounts	office	at	Gants	Hill	in	the	early	hours	of	19	March,	the	morning	after	a	one-day	strike	by	more	than	a	million	engineering	workers.	An	Angry	Brigade	communiqué	claimed	responsibility	for	the	explosion,	ending	on	an	unambiguous	if	somewhat	melodramatic	note:	‘WE	BELIEVE	IN	THE	AUTONOMOUS	WORKING	CLASS.	WE	ARE	PART	OF	IT.	AND	WE	ARE	READY	TO	GIVE	OUR	LIVES	FOR	OUR	
																																								 																					350	‘All	but	Two	Ford	Plants	Start	Work’,	Morning	Star	(London,	6	April	1971),	p.	3.	 351	Stuart	Christie,	‘Chronology:	“The	Angry	Decade”	January	1966	to	December	1975’,	in	The	Angry	Brigade:	A	History	of	Britain’s	First	Urban	Guerilla	
Group,	by	Gordon	Carr,	PM	Press	edition	(Oakland,	CA:	PM	Press,	2010),	pp.	194–236	(pp.	218–24).	
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LIBERATION.’352	The	influence	of	the	Situationist	International	on	the	Angry	Brigade	has	been	widely	noted,	since	a	detective	in	the	case	made	the	link.	From	the	late	1950s	onwards	this	small	group	of	European	radicals	fused	avant-garde	art	practices	with	anti-authoritarian	Marxist	theory	to	develop	a	provocative	and	irreverent	style	of	intervention.	Whatever	tensions	there	were	between	workers’	self-organisation	and	tactics	involving	the	clandestine	use	of	explosives,	the	language	used	in	this	communiqué	indicated	the	Angry	Brigade’s	alignment	with	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy.	Following	the	strike,	another	explosion	rocked	the	home	of	Ford	Managing	Director	William	Batty,	with	a	further	blast	also	damaging	a	transformer	on	the	Dagenham	estate	the	day	after	the	former	shop	steward	John	Dillon	was	reinstated.	Glossing	over	industrial	unrest	at	Halewood,	Ford	News	filled	the	front	page	with	a	report	describing	the	attack	on	Batty’s	house	with	a	two-pound	gelignite	bomb.	This	recounted	how	a	woman	claimed	responsibility	on	behalf	of	the	Angry	Brigade	in	a	call	to	the	Press	Association.	Meanwhile,	another	communiqué	opened:	‘JOHN	DILLON’S	IN;	WE	WON	|	BATTY	AND	HIS	TRANSFORMER’S	OUT;	WE	WON	AGAIN’,	attempting	to	draw	a	link	between	industrial	action	and	such	interventions.353	John	Barker,	who	was	arrested	two	months	later	and	then	convicted	on	a	conspiracy	charge	in	relation	to	the	Angry	Brigade	campaign,	discussed	these	events	with	me	in	interview.	While	denying	any	personal	role	in	these	specific	actions,	Barker	previously	described	the	police	as	having	‘framed	a	guilty	man’	in	his	case.354	After	recounting	his	personal	trajectory	through	the	Claimants	Unions	
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and	Solidarity,	having	torn	up	his	Cambridge	final	exam	papers	in	protest	at	‘education	as	a	system	of	exclusion’,	he	turned	to	the	intervention	at	Ford:	The	group	I	was	convicted	of	being	a	part	of	actually,	in	this	strike,	put	a	bomb	in	the	generator	at	Ford’s	Dagenham.	You	know,	what	effect	this	had,	one	way	or	another...	It	probably	had	no	effect,	whatsoever,	but	the	attitude	from	the	people	involved—as	I	understand	it—was	that	it	was	more	a…	sort	of	cheering	up…	or	a	highlighting	of	Ford.	I	imagine	quite	a	lot	of	activists	in	Ford	were	really	pissed	off	about	it.	I	think	some	weren’t,	some	were.	And	as	I	am	sure	you	know,	car	workers	in	this	period—it	was	car	workers	and	miners—seemed	to	be	the	most	organised	and	powerful	trade	unionists.355	However	dramatic	their	campaign,	relating	the	Angry	Brigade	to	industrial	unrest	at	Ford	runs	the	risk	of	overstating	the	significance	of	this	aspect	of	the	history,	either	demonising	or	romanticising	those	involved	in	the	process.	Barker	reflected	back	on	his	role	at	the	time	with	ambivalence,	expressing	self-respect	for	his	willingness	to	take	a	stand	tempered	with	some	self-criticism	for	the	decisions	of	his	early	twenties.	Instead	of	celebrating	or	condemning	the	actions	of	the	past,	however,	he	emphasised	the	significance	that	automobile	workers	had	from	such	a	revolutionary	perspective	at	the	time.	He	also	stressed	the	need	to	contextualise	the	broader	social	unrest	of	this	period	in	relation	to	the	government’s	particularly	hostile	approach	towards	the	working	class.	Barker	summed	this	up	with	reference	to	Heath’s	depiction	as	‘Selsdon	Man’,	an	allusion	to	the	‘proto-neoliberal	programme’	of	the	Conservative	Party’s	1970	general	election	manifesto.	He	also	suggested	the	need	to	‘look	at	it	in	a	kind	of	reverse	way’,	situating	what	occurred	in	the	early	1970s	in	relation	to	what	followed.	The	US	abandonment	of	fixed	exchange	rates	and	the	introduction	of	internment	without	trial	in	Ireland	that	August,	the	month	of	his	own	arrest,																																									 																					355	John	Barker,	Interview,	2017.	
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signalled	a	wider	offensive	by	international	capital	and	the	British	state,	alike.	However,	such	‘indicators	don’t	become	actually	effective	until	the	IMF’	imposed	terms	on	Britain	for	the	bail	out	between	1975	and	1976.356	The	1971	strike	also	saw	the	first	intervention	at	Ford	Halewood	by	a	new	political	organisation,	which	emerged	from	the	recently	defunct	Big	Flame	newspaper	collective	and	readopted	the	same	name.	This	drew	together	militants	around	the	country	from	the	same	left-libertarian	milieu	as	the	Stoke	Newington	Eight,	the	defendants	in	the	main	trial	following	the	Angry	Brigade	campaign.	Members	of	the	new	group	and	those	on	trial	shared	a	common	background	in	the	Claimants	Union,	the	Women’s	Liberation	Movement	and	as	student	radicals	at	Cambridge	and	Essex,	in	particular.	Citing	‘political	differences’,	Big	Flame’s	solidarity	with	the	defendants	fell	short	of	support	for	the	actions	for	which	they	stood	trial.	A	successful	prosecution	was	seen	as	a	setback	for	the	wider	movement	though,	and	the	group	held	back	from	expressing	outrage:	‘none	of	us	were	crying	when	Carr’s	house	was	bombed’.	Political	difference	centred	on	a	question	of	tactics.	‘Until	the	actions	can	be	integrated	into	the	process	of	working	class	struggle’,	such	interventions	were	seen	as	provoking	‘repression	without	a	mass	reaction’.357	Instead,	Big	Flame	took	a	less	spectacular	approach.	Shortly	before	the	next	Ford	contract	negotiations	began,	the	group	started	distributing	leaflets	outside	the	company’s	Halewood	plants.	These	were	written	in	collaboration	with	contacts	already	established	among	the	workforce	through	the	former	newspaper.	The	
																																								 																					356	Ibid.	This	echoes	points	he	raised	previously	in	a	magazine	article,	republished	as	Barker,	‘Postscript:	Anarchy	in	the	UK:	The	Angry	Brigade	by	Tom	Vague,	AK	Press.	[A	Review]’,	p.	182.	In	this	piece	he	also	discussed	the	influence	of	Italian	workerism,	while	observing	how	little	material	was	available	in	English	before	his	arrest	in	1971.	357	‘Political	Violence’,	Big	Flame:	Merseysides	Socialist	Newspaper	(Liverpool,	June	1972),	p.	4.	
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earliest	example	of	such	a	leaflet	still	available	was	addressed	to	those	Halewood	workers	that	remained	strike	after	the	dispute	officially	ended.	This	opened	by	encouraging	them	to	continue	with	their	action.	The	text	also	emphasised	the	strategic	importance	of	the	Merseyside	plant	for	Ford’s	internal	supply	chain:	‘Fords	can’t	sell	cars	without	gearboxes,	and	we’re	not	making	them,	are	we?’	The	authors	went	on	to	ask	rhetorically	‘why	Jones	&	Scanlon	did	the	dirty’,	before	arguing	that	‘it’s	not	the	individuals,	it’s	the	whole	set-up	that	goes	wrong’.	Rather	than	a	specific	issue	with	the	personalities	involved,	the	problem	reflected	the	wider	social	function	of	trade-union	bureaucracy.	The	leaflet	went	on	to	set	out	Big	Flame’s	position:	‘We	don’t	claim	to	be	yet	another	political	leadership	because	we	believe	that	the	working	class	can	and	must	provide	its	own	leadership	inside	the	factories	and	the	community.’358	Such	an	approach	put	into	practice	the	sort	of	break	with	Leninist	vanguardist	politics	advocated	by	Mario	Tronti,	relegating	the	political	organisation	or	party	to	a	tactical	role	and	seeking	to	locate	strategic	leadership	within	the	working	class.	While	Tronti’s	most	relevant	writings	had	yet	to	be	translated	into	English,	a	collection	of	materials	from	and	about	the	Italian	workers’	movement	provided	the	content	of	the	first	Big	Flame	pamphlet	that	July.359	This	gave	a	glimpse	of	the	context,	development	and	aftermath	of	Italy’s	Hot	Autumn	(l’autunno	caldo)	in	1969,	when	a	series	of	industrial	pay-contract	negotiations	erupted	into	violent	social	unrest.	The	text	described	the	emergence	of	new	organisational	forms,	such	as	the	worker-student	base	committees	at	the	Fiat	Mirafiori	plant	in	Turin.	It	also	discussed	the	development	of	shop-floor	tactics,	such	as	‘the	snake’,	an	unruly	procession	that	spread	wildcat	strikes	throughout	the	factory.	Trade-union	mediation	came	under	criticism,	and	examples	were	provided	of	unmediated	forms																																									 																					358	Big	Flame,	‘Halewood	Carries	on	the	Fight’,	1971	<http://bigflameuk.wordpress.com/>	[accessed	17	September	2018].	359	Big	Flame,	Italy:	New	Tactics	and	Organisation	(Wallasey,	Cheshire:	Big	Flame,	1971).	
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of	shop-floor	struggle	from	physical	confrontations	with	management	to	acts	of	sabotage.	Without	going	into	much	theoretical	depth,	this	introduced	an	English	readership	to	Italian	workerism	(operaismo)	as	a	political	practice.	Most	of	this	piece	was	republished	again	later	that	year	in	Radical	America,	a	journal	linked	to	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS),	a	prominent	organisation	in	the	US	anti-Vietnam	War	movement.360	Solidarity	featured	a	review	of	the	pamphlet	that,	while	not	entirely	uncritical,	welcomed	the	first-hand	accounts	of	workers’	self-organisation	from	Italy.	Despite	Big	Flame’s	contribution	to	the	circulation	of	these	politics,	it	remains	unclear	how	widely	the	pamphlet	was	circulated	between	members	of	Ford’s	workforce,	or	what	impression	it	left	with	those	who	read	it.	All	the	same,	it	is	striking	that	after	1971	workers	at	the	firm	increasingly	adopted	tactics	advocated	in	the	text.	While	such	practices	cannot	necessarily	be	traced	back	to	this	source,	the	politics	articulated	in	it	were	clearly	more	in	synch	with	the	attitudes	of	militant	shop-floor	workers	than	the	labour	movement’s	official	leadership.	When	I	interviewed	Martin	Yarnit,	one	of	the	Big	Flame	newspaper’s	three	founders,	he	described	his	memories	of	this	period	as	‘incredibly	fragmented’.	Indeed,	he	felt	unable	to	give	any	account	of	Big	Flame’s	transition	from	a	broadly	left-wing	rank-and-file	newspaper	to	one	‘of	the	same	name	with	a	much	smaller	group	of	people	clustered	around	it	who	had	apparently	similar	politics’.	He	went	on,	however,	to	explain	clearly	how	their	rejection	of	the	Leninist	vanguardist	politics	set	them	apart	from	most	of	their	contemporaries	on	the	radical	left	in	Britain:	 We	didn’t	believe	in	a	coup	d’état	by	a	party	seizing	power	and	we	didn’t	believe	in	[...]	a	party	seizing	the	influence	and	the	support	of	the	working	class.	We	thought	we	had	to	build	from	the	bottom,	within	the	class.																																									 																					360	‘Italy:	New	Tactics	&	Organization’,	Radical	America,	5.5	(Sep.-Oct.),	3–38.	
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Alongside	feminist	theory	from	the	women’s	liberation	movement,	which	women	members	brought	to	the	group,	he	explained	how	the	Italian	workers’	movement	provided	a	major	theoretical	influence.	This	came	about	‘partly	through	Ed	Emery	and	his	documentation	about	the	struggles	of	the	Fiat	workers	at	Turin,	but	more	directly	[...]	via	Marcello	Dall’Aglio’.	Dall’Aglio	was	a	member	of	Lotta	Continua	(Continuous	Struggle),	an	organisation	on	the	Italian	extra-parliamentary	left,	who	had	moved	to	Liverpool	by	then.	According	to	Yarnit,	Big	Flame’s	approach	went	beyond	‘just	bringing	the	ideas	of	Operaismo	and	Autonomism’	to	an	English	audience:	‘it	was	also	a	way	of	looking	at	the	world	strategically’	he	explained.361	As	well	as	addressing	some	of	the	limitations	of	human	memory,	documentary	sources	support	his	recollections.		An	article	published	by	Big	Flame	in	1972	recorded	how	the	group	re-emerged	as	a	political	organisation	from	an	initial	intervention	to	leaflet	Ford	Halewood	during	the	1971	strike.	A	Ford	group	then	became	one	of	five	‘base	groups’,	subsequently	known	as	‘commissions’,	which	were	set	up	to	coordinate	the	new	organisation’s	activities.	While	acknowledging	that	most	of	those	who	initially	participated	in	the	group	did	not	work	for	Ford,	the	authors	claimed	that	‘workers	who	come,	whether	or	not	they	think	of	themselves	as	“Big	Flamers”,	have	final	control’,	an	indication	of	how	they	put	their	critique	of	Leninism	into	practice.362	Such	an	approach	favoured	organising	with	others	rather	than	recruiting	them	into	a	party	with	pretensions	to	constituting	the	intellectual	or	political	vanguard	of	the	class	struggle.	This	suggested	that	Big	Flame’s	uncontestably	marginality	in	terms	of	membership	numbers	belied	the	relevance	of	the	group’s	perspective	to	the	wider	situation.		Another	early	political	intervention	by	Big	Flame	took	place	on	the	Tower	Hill	housing	estate	in	Kirkby,	which	provided	overspill	accommodation	for																																									 																					361	Yarnit.	362	‘35hrs:	The	Struggle	in	Ford’,	Big	Flame	Bulletin,	3	(1972),	21–24.	
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Liverpool.	Despite	this	residential	neighbourhood’s	location	on	the	opposite	side	of	the	city	from	Halewood,	what	happened	there	had	a	closer	relationship	to	events	at	Ford	than	might	be	expected.	Tenants	began	to	organise	on	the	estate	within	the	context	of	widespread	opposition	to	rent	increases,	due	to	the	withdrawal	of	subsidies	for	council	houses	in	1972	under	the	Housing	Finance	Act.	While	a	national	campaign	saw	tenants	across	the	country	join	in	a	partial	rent	strike,	refusing	to	make	the	full	payments	in	line	with	the	increase,	a	local	action	group	in	Tower	Hill	went	further,	calling	a	full	rent	and	rate	strike.	This	turned	a	housing	estate	on	Merseyside	into	one	of	the	two	main	hubs	of	resistance	to	the	legislation,	alongside	Clay	Cross—a	Derbyshire	mining	town	where	Labour	councilors	ultimately	faced	bankruptcy	for	refusing	to	implement	the	policy.	Prior	to	the	start	of	this	campaign,	Big	Flame	advocated	a	militant	stance	in	opposition	to	the	Conservative	government’s	regressive	housing	policy.	When	the	group	relaunched	a	newspaper	in	July	1972,	a	front-page	article	in	the	first	issue	argued	that	'tenants	will	have	to	organise	and	fight’,	months	before	the	beginning	of	the	rent	strike	that	autumn.	The	same	piece	also	argued	that	success	would	require	mass	participation	rather	than	'a	committee	of	a	few	“dedicated	people”'.363	That	December,	shortly	after	the	rent	strike	began,	a	number	of	women	in	Tower	Hill	invited	female	members	of	Big	Flame	to	help	them	set	up	a	women's	group	there.	Two	years	later	the	first	issue	of	the	Big	Flame	Journal	featured	a	report	of	this	intervention,	published	after	the	fourteen-month	rent	strike	ended	in	defeat	for	the	tenants.	This	credited	the	action	group,	in	which	International	Socialist	(IS)	members	played	a	prominent	role,	for	how	well	they	ran	the	campaign,	however	unsuccessful	the	outcome.	While	the	authors	reflected	frankly	on	the	relatively	minor	part	they	had	played	in	these	events,	they	also	made	criticisms	of	the	rent																																									 																					363	‘“Sewage,	Rats	and	Rent	Rises”’,	Big	Flame:	Merseysides	Socialist	
Newspaper	(Liverpool,	June	1972),	p.	5.	
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strike	leadership.	Treating	childcare	as	an	individual	responsibility	not	relevant	to	the	campaign,	they	argued,	had	been	a	significant	mistake.	This	left	marginalised	mothers	on	the	estate,	who	were	more	readily	available	to	defend	it	during	the	day	than	others	who	worked	elsewhere.	Likewise,	the	failure	to	gain	industrial	support	for	the	rent	strike	lay,	for	them,	with	the	decision	to	liaise	with	the	Shop	Stewards	Committees	instead	of	leafleting	individual	workers	at	the	factory	gates.364	Brian	Ashton,	a	former	line	worker	in	the	Halewood	PTA	Plant	and	a	member	of	the	International	Socialists	(IS)	at	the	time,	described	to	me	more	recently	how	the	action	group’s	unsuccessful	industrial	strategy	played	out	at	Ford.	After	the	courts	began	to	impose	prison	sentences	on	participants	in	the	rent	strike,	housing	activist	and	Tower	Hill	resident	Tony	Boyle	approached	Ashton	at	a	picket	outside	Walton	Gaol.	At	the	time	Boyle	asked	him	to	help	establish	contact	with	the	unions	at	Ford,	so	as	to	discuss	implementing	a	decision	previously	reached	at	a	branch	meeting	to	take	industrial	action	in	such	circumstances.	Ashton	agreed	to	assist	Boyle	and	another	activist	to	covertly	enter	the	plant.	During	a	shift	change	the	two	followed	him	in	at	a	discreet	distance	and	he	led	them	to	the	union’s	offices.	They	then	met	the	available	senior	shop	stewards,	but	not	the	convenor	who	was	attending	an	FNJNC	meeting	at	the	time.	Later	that	day,	a	personnel	manager	confronted	Ashton	about	having	helped	these	unauthorised	visitors	access	company	premises,	a	sackable	offence	he	denied.	This	encounter	left	the	shop-floor	militant	in	no	doubt	as	to	who	had	exposed	him:	That	was	my	PhD.	That	is	when	any	illusion	I	had	in	the	union,	or	in	the	shop	stewards	went	[...]	Because	I	was	of	the	left,	I	had	to	be	done	in	and	they	used	that	opportunity.	But,	the	problem	was—in	order	to	get	me	sacked,	because	I’d	denied	it—the	only	people	who	could	prove	I’d	done	it	were	Tony	Boyle,	the	other	fellow	[from	Tower	Hill],	and																																									 																					364	‘We	Won’t	Pay:	Women’s	Struggle	on	Tower	Hill’,	Big	Flame	Journal,	1,	1974,	2–7.	
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the	four	fucking	union	guys.	[...]	It’d	blow	the	place	up,	so	nothing	happened	other	than	that.365	The	rent	striker’s	strategy	ended	in	failure.	Relying	on	shop	stewards	to	lead	industrial	workers	out	on	strike	in	support	of	a	social	struggle	based	outside	the	factory	ultimately	did	nothing	to	prevent	their	defeat.		While	earlier	precedents	existed	for	this	sort	of	social	rather	than	industrial	unrest,	such	as	the	1915	Glasgow	rent	strike,	the	Marxist	and	feminist	theory	that	informed	Big	Flame’s	politics	reframed	the	political	significance	of	such	struggles.	Mario	Tronti’s	social	factory	thesis	highlighted	the	welfare	state’s	role	in	the	most	recent	phase	of	capitalist	development,	which	was	then	sliding	into	crisis,	stabilising	social	relations	to	maintain	the	supply	of	labour	and	sustain	growth.	Tronti	represented	this	as	a	moment	of	real	subsumption,	a	term	Marx	used	to	distinguish	how	capital	had	historically	subsumed	prior	forms	of	labour	formally	through	the	wage	before	taking	direct	control	of	the	labour	process.	The	social	factory	thesis	suggested	that	the	boundaries	between	the	sphere	of	industrial	production	and	that	of	social	reproduction	were	becoming	increasingly	indistinct.	Feminists	from	the	same	political	tendency	as	Tronti,	such	as	Mariarosa	Dalla	Costa	and	Selma	James,	then	engaged	critically	with	this	analysis.	Their	work	underscored	the	role	of	women’s	unwaged	housework	in	the	social	reproduction	of	labour	power.366	To	some	extent,	these	perspectives	complemented	each	other.	Yet,	a	tension	also	remained	between	viewing	the	social	factory	as	a	relatively	recent	phase	of	capitalist	development	and	the	feminist	examination	of	the	relationship	between	social	reproduction	and	capitalist	development	in	greater	historical	depth.	As	well	as	drawing	a	link	between	Ford	Halewood	and	such	wider	social	struggles,	Brian	Ashton	also	described	how	the	situation	changed	following	the																																									 																					365	Ashton.	366	Mariarosa	Dalla	Costa,	Potere	femminile	esovversione	sociale:	con	<<Il	posto	
della	donna>>	di	Selma	James,	Interventi,	14,	3rd	edn	(Padova:	Marsilio,	1974);	Dalla	Costa	and	James.	
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departure	of	former	convenor	Eddie	Roberts,	who	was	generally	well	regarded	by	militant	workers.	Afterwards	a	clique	opposed	to	shop-floor	militancy	gained	key	leadership	positions	among	the	shop	stewards.	Opponents	dubbed	them	the	‘Heyton	Mafia’	after	Harold	Wilson’s	nearby	constituency,	the	Labour	Party	branch	to	which	many	of	them	belonged.	The	documentary	record	supports	the	view	that	the	shop	stewards’	organisation	at	Ford	became	increasingly	distant	from	the	firm’s	shop-floor	workers,	particularly	after	Jones	and	Scanlon’s	intervention	to	end	the	1971	strike.	To	some	extent,	this	reflected	a	specific	shift	in	the	company’s	labour	relations	strategy,	as	management	experimented	with	integrating	shop	stewards	into	formal	industrial-relations	apparatus.	More	generally,	it	showed	how	a	growing	structural	crisis	in	the	post-war	settlement	precipitated	a	breakdown	in	the	systems	of	union	mediation	it	relied	upon.	This	gave	greater	relevance	to	Big	Flame	and	Solidarity,	groups	which	viewed	trade	unionism	more	critically	than	more	orthodox	tendencies.	In	both	cases,	this	went	beyond	the	more	conventional	distinction	between	the	unofficial	leadership	of	the	shop	stewards	and	the	bureaucratic	role	of	full-time	officials,	taking	a	more	critical	view	of	trade	unionism	in	general.	The	two	groups	also	rejected	the	Leninist	shibboleth	of	an	external	vanguardist	party	bringing	revolutionary	class-consciousness	to	the	workers,	who	purportedly	needed	such	leadership	to	transcend	the	limitations	of	‘trade-union	consciousness’.	Whatever	their	differences,	both	organisations	shared	a	focus	on	industrial	unrest	outside	the	ambit	of	the	union,	which	proved	prescient	as	labour	relations	continued	to	deteriorate.	One	such	incident	‘blew	up’	in	May	1972	in	the	Dagenham	Knock	Down	plant	when	management	attempted	to	redeploy	twenty-five	workers	from	this	part	of	the	estate	to	the	PTA	plant.	When	they	refused	to	leave	their	workplace,	they	were	threatened	with	suspension	and,	so,	decided	to	occupy	the	canteen.	A	report	in	
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Solidarity	described	how	a	confrontation	that	initially	involved	just	a	few	workers	quickly	escalated,	as	management	tried	to	find	anyone	willing	to	accept	a	transfer:	‘This	continued	for	two	days,	until	there	were	several	hundred	men	occupying	the	canteen.	By	this	time	they	were	spilling	out	into	the	works	and	refusing	to	move.’367	Not	only	did	management	eventually	back	down,	but	eight	workers,	who	originally	accepted	the	move,	were	reinstated	in	their	previous	positions	afterwards.	While	recognising	this	incident	as	‘relatively	insignificant’,	the	author	of	the	article	saw	lessons	to	be	learned	from	how	participants	organised	collectively,	their	decision	to	remain	inside	the	factory	and	their	disregard	for	procedures.	The	absence	of	any	‘tightly-knit	group	of	militants	taking	charge	of	events	(albeit	with	the	best	of	intentions)’	also	met	with	their	approval.368	This	was	a	reference	to	what	Solidarity	saw	as	a	tendency	for	even	the	most	militant	shop	stewards	to	discourage	other	workers	from	actively	organising	industrial	action	for	themselves.	Against	this	backdrop	of	unrest	unmediated	by	trade	unionism	even	at	the	level	of	the	shop	stewards	organisation,	another	round	of	pay	negotiations	began.	In	anticipation	of	the	current	contract	coming	to	an	end	in	February	1973,	convenors	and	national	officials	drew	up	a	new	set	of	demands	that	autumn.	According	to	Big	Flame,	the	vaguely	worded	formula	arrived	at	by	the	trade	union	side	of	the	FNJNC	reflected	the	quality	of	leadership	that	could	be	expected	from	this	quarter	in	the	coming	campaign:		What	does	a	“shorter”	working	week,	or	a	“substantial”	pay	rise	or	an	“improved”	pension	scheme	mean?	Nothing—except	letting	the	negotiators	off	the	hook.	The	only	good	sign	is	that	the	convenors	have	said	they	don’t	want	another	two	year	contract.	Just	as	well.	This	one	has	been	a	disaster	for	the	workers.	
																																								 																					367	‘Fords:	News	from	the	Shop	Floor’,	Solidarity:	For	Workers’	Power,	6.10	(no	date),	13–15	(p.	14).	368	‘Fords:	News	from	the	Shop	Floor’,	p.	14.	
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Instead,	the	group	proposed	an	alternative	claim	of	fifteen-pound	pay	for	a	thirty-five-hour	week	and	entitlement	to	full	lay-off	pay.	Big	Flame	also	identified	‘increasing	need	for	a	national	rank	and	file	organisation,	independent	of	officials	and	convenors’.369	In	a	first	step	towards	this	goal,	members	distributed	an	open	letter,	which	they	had	drafted	with	sympathetic	Ford	workers,	outside	plants	in	Dagenham,	Leamington	and	Swansea,	as	well	as	Halewood.		
Incensed	Workers	Went	on	the	Rampage,	1971	to	1974	
In	the	aftermath	of	the	1971	strike	Ford	management	followed	the	by	now	familiar	routine	of	exploiting	the	end	of	a	large	national	dispute	as	an	opportunity	to	assert	authority	on	the	shop	floor.	This	time	events	came	to	a	head	in	Halewood	at	the	beginning	of	June.	Following	the	dispute	managers	cut	manning	levels	on	a	particular	team	in	the	Paint	Shop	from	eight	to	five.	Then	when	the	team	was	cut	again	to	four	men,	shop	steward	John	Dillon	called	an	informal	meeting,	reportedly	in	an	effort	to	defuse	the	situation,	but	the	remaining	workers	walked	out.	The	company	appeared	to	back	down	at	first	with	work	resuming	by	the	end	of	the	week.370	The	firm	sacked	Dillon	the	following	Monday,	however,	for	the	by	now	familiar	offence	of	holding	an	unauthorised	meeting	on	company	premises.	This	led	1300	of	his	workmates	to	walk	out	immediately	with	1500	others	on	the	night	shift	joining	them	the	following	day.	Despite	previous	assurances	that	Dillon	would	not	be	victimised,	managers	decided	to	take	this	step	at	a	secret	weekend	meeting	in	the	Adelphi	hotel,	which	was	then	leaked	to	shop	stewards.	Labour	Relations	Director	Bob	Ramsey	chaired	proceedings,	indicating	a	strategic	decision	by	senior	
																																								 																					369	‘Fraud	Contract’,	Big	Flame:	Merseysides	Socialist	Newspaper	(Liverpool,	September	1972),	p.	5.	370	‘Stalemate	at	Halewood’,	Solidarity:	For	Workers’	Power,	6.10,	1–2a.	
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management	to	attack	shop	stewards	on	Merseyside	as	previously	happened	in	Dagenham.371		In	response,	industrial	action	spread	to	the	Transmission	Plant	and	threatened	wider	disruption	to	production,	leading	management	to	enter	into	negotiations	with	trade-union	officials.	On	22	June	the	company	reinstated	Dillon,	but	redeployed	him	to	another	section	without	his	shop-steward	credentials.	A	headline	in	the	Morning	Star	declared	‘Workers	Hail	Victory’	in	celebration	of	this	outcome.372	By	contrast,	Big	Flame	saw	this	as	only	a	partial	victory,	since	a	‘position	of	strength	was	frittered	away	through	negotiations	and	the	union	compromised’	by	agreeing	to	the	conditions	imposed	on	Dillon’s	return	to	work.	This	marked	a	turning	point,	it	was	argued,	in	the	‘self-confidence,	militancy	and	popularity	of	the	Halewood	stewards’,	which	went	into	decline	afterwards.373	The	company	then	announced	planned	redeployments	at	Halewood	on	29	December	1972,	the	last	working	day	of	the	year.	The	timing	of	this	announcement	was	no	coincidence.	The	Heath	administration	introduced	a	new	incomes	policy	the	previous	month,	while	Ford’s	current	contract	was	due	to	expire	on	1	March	the	following	year.	This	gave	significant	political	weight	to	the	outcome	of	upcoming	pay	negotiations,	which	threatened	to	pose	a	major	challenge	to	phase	two	of	the	government’s	pay	freeze.	With	these	changes	in	manning	levels,	management	aimed	to	assert	authority	over	a	section	of	the	workforce	that	had	played	a	leading	role	in	the	most	recent	pay	struggles	at	the	firm.	Instead,	widespread	unrest	broke	out	at	Ford	Halewood.	The	company’s	attempt	to	implement	the	policy	began	the	following	Tuesday	with	seven	men	taken	off	a	section	of	the	trim	line,	increasing	the	intensity	of																																									 																					371	Jim	Arnison,	‘Bosses’	Secret	Talk	Led	to	Sack’,	Morning	Star	(London,	16	June	1971),	p.	3.	372	Jim	Arnison,	‘Ford	Stoppage	Ends,	Workers	Hail	Victory’,	Morning	Star	(London,	22	June	1971),	p.	3.	373	Big	Flame	Ford	Group,	pp.	8–9.	
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labour	for	those	left	behind.	In	response	to	what	effectively	amounted	to	a	speed	up	from	their	point	of	view,	the	remaining	workers	simply	allowed	cars	to	roll	off	the	line	unfinished.	Intervention	by	convenors	failed	to	resolve	the	situation,	so	managers	ordered	the	workers	to	go	home.	Instead,	they	held	a	sit	down	protest	inside	the	plant.	That	night	another	manning	issue	on	the	next	shift	in	the	Body	plant	provoked	a	separate	sit-in,	which	led	management	to	lay	off	a	third	group	of	workers.	The	response	of	those	who	were	laid-off	invited	international	comparison	in	a	Big	Flame	pamphlet:	‘They	quickly	organised	what	the	FIAT	workers	in	Turin	called	a	Snake’.374	This	description	seems	loaded	with	the	possibility	that	the	group’s	earlier	account	of	such	tactics	influenced	the	practice	of	those	who	initiated	this	action.	A	mobile	demonstration	inside	the	plant	closed	down	the	press	shop,	a	section	identified	by	the	authors	as	strategically	important	in	terms	of	potential	disruption	to	production	in	Dagenham	and	across	Ford’s	European	facilities.	The	next	day	the	dispute	spread	to	the	Engine	plant.	Then,	on	Friday	the	union	held	a	mass	meeting	in	Anfield	Stadium.	‘Amid	shouts	and	boos,	the	motion	was	narrowly	carried’,	but	this	result	seemed	skewed	to	some.375	The	entire	PTA	workforce	participated	in	the	vote,	although	the	dispute	only	affected	one	of	two	shifts	in	that	plant,	while	Body	Plant	workers	involved	in	industrial	action	were	given	no	say	in	the	matter.	With	another	round	of	pay	negotiations	on	the	horizon,	this	formed	part	of	a	wider	pattern	that	saw	senior	stewards	repeatedly	try	to	defer	worker’s	militancy	until	after	the	contract	had	expired.	A	commitment	to	‘constitutionalism’,	which	seemed	inconsistently	tolerant	of	sharp	practices	towards	union	democracy,	extended	down	from	the	national	leadership	to	senior	shop	stewards	at	Ford.	
																																								 																					374	Big	Flame	Ford	Group,	p.	16;	Big	Flame,	Italy,	p.	10.	375	Big	Flame	Ford	Group,	p.	17.	
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Three	days	later	the	union	side	of	the	FNJNC	rejected	an	initial	company	proposal	to	increase	pay	by	£2.40	per	week,	hundreds	of	Ford	stewards	voted	in	favour	of	an	all-out	strike	unless	management	improved	on	this	offer.	Later	that	day	more	shop	stewards	from	other	automobile	firms,	as	well	as	the	public	sector,	joined	them	to	back	a	LCDTU	campaign	against	the	Conservatives’	pay	freeze.	Meanwhile,	‘bound	by	the	constraints	of	the	Government’s	Phase	Two	pay	policy’,	management	reportedly	‘refused	to	go	beyond	the	£2.40	offer—the	maximum	permitted	under	the	£1	plus	4	per	cent	limit’.376	A	pay	dispute	at	Ford	looked	set	to	occupy	centre	stage	in	the	industrial	politics	of	Britain	yet	again.	In	practice,	this	proved	not	to	be	the	case	with	events	unfolding	in	a	convoluted	fashion.	Having	spent	months	damping	down	shop-floor	militancy,	convenors	went	through	the	motions	of	calling	for	an	all-out	strike.	A	union-backed	‘Guerrilla	Campaign’	of	unofficial	action	then	followed	at	plants	in	both	Dagenham	and	Halewood,	which	combined	one-day	strikes,	overtime	bans	and	a	work-to-rule.	Over	two	months	passed	before	a	deal	was	eventually	reached	that	was	little	different	from	what	was	originally	on	offer.377	Illustrating	this	shift	in	relations	between	shop	stewards	and	management,	a	front-page	article	in	Ford	News	carried	the	headline	‘Not	Them	and	Us—Just	Us’	that	summer.	This	piece	reported	effusively	on	a	company	sporting	event:	‘When	Halewood	shop	stewards	took	on	Ford	management	in	a	charity	football	match	last	Friday,	it	was	one	long	happy	giggle.’378	We	should,	perhaps,	avoid	too	credulous	a	reading	of	any	report	in	the	firm’s	newspaper,	since	such	an	internal	publication	served	as	a	means	of	corporate	communication	to	help	manage	employee	relations.	The	author	acknowledged	as	much	in	an	attempt	at	humour,	stressing	the	report’s																																									 																					376	Noel	Howell,	‘Ford	Shop	Stewards	Support	Call	for	All-Out	Strike’,	
Financial	Times	(London,	19	February	1973),	p.	1.	377	Big	Flame	Ford	Group,	pp.	29–42.	378	‘Not	Them	and	Us—Just	Us’,	Ford	News:	For	Ford	Employees	(Essex,	22	June	1973),	p.	1.	
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impartiality	on	this	occasion.	Intentionally	or	not,	this	suggested	such	a	disinterested	approach	was	atypical.	No	doubt,	even-handedness	came	more	easily	given	the	relative	insignificance	of	the	outcome	of	this	particular	confrontation,	a	conveniently	level	two-all	draw	all	the	same.	However	superficial	such	a	story	might	seem,	it	showed	management’s	desire	to	project	a	conciliatory	image	of	labour	relations,	and	the	willingness	of	enough	Halewood	shop	stewards	to	play	along	with	them	to	field	a	team.	Such	sportsmanlike	gestures	stood	at	odds	with	the	deteriorating	working	relations	on	the	factory	floor,	as	recorded	in	another	Big	Flame	leaflet	that	summer.	This	gave	a	very	different	view	of	working	relations	at	the	firm	to	the	piece	in	Ford	
News.	The	piece	began	by	subverting	the	company’s	current	recruitment	campaign	slogan,	responding	to	it	with	a	rhetorical	question:	‘Take	a	Ford	job!...	and	what	have	you	got?’379	Plundered	from	the	same	advertisement,	an	image	depicting	the	Fordist	archetype	of	a	white	suburban	family	accompanied	the	text	with	a	comic-strip	thought	bubble	emerging	from	the	father’s	head.	This	listed	the	negative	financial,	emotional	and	physiological	effects	of	working	for	the	firm,	before	concluding:	‘It’s	a	Fraud!’	The	leaflet	went	on	to	describe	the	firm’s	difficulties	recruiting	and	retaining	staff,	the	struggle	over	layoffs	and	the	ongoing	impact	of	work	on	life	beyond	the	factory,	before	ending	with	an	article	from	the	
Financial	Times.	This	reported	Ford’s	agreement	to	pay	Argentinian	hospitals	one	million	dollars	after	left-wing	guerrillas	shot	two	managers	in	an	attempted	kidnapping.	No	commentary	accompanied	this	excerpt,	leaving	readers	to	draw	their	own	conclusions.	Later	that	summer	serious	unrest	broke	out	again	at	Ford	Dagenham,	during	a	heat	wave	at	the	end	of	August	1973.	With	temperatures	particularly	hot	in	one																																									 																					379	London,	MayDay	Rooms,	East	London	Big	Flame	Collection,	Big	Flame,	‘Take	a	Ford	Job!’,	[c.	July	1973]	<	http://www.eastlondonbigflame.org.uk/files/Take%20a%20Ford%20Job!%20mid:late1973.pdf>	[accessed	26	September	2018].	
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section	of	the	paintshop,	managers	turned	down	a	request	to	temporarily	allow	extra	breaks.	In	response,	the	twenty-four	sprayers	who	worked	there	withdrew	their	labour.	Managers	then	attempted	to	lay	off	2400	of	their	workmates	in	the	Body	Plant	without	pay.380	The	timing	of	this	decision	just	before	midnight,	when	workers	who	had	just	come	on	shift	would	face	difficulties	finding	transport	home,	provoked	a	volatile	response.	A	local	newspaper	the	Barking	&	Dagenham	Advertiser	published	a	sensationalist	account	of	what	happened	next:	Hundreds	of	angry	Ford	workers	staged	a	midnight	“sit-in”	rebellion	after	being	told	they	would	be	laid	off	because	of	a	strike.	Management	officials	were	trapped	in	their	offices	as	rioting	workers	swept	along	the	corridors	smashing	windows	and	breaking	furniture.	Two	security	guards,	called	in	to	restore	order,	were	pushed	down	a	flight	of	stairs	as	the	incensed	workers	went	on	the	rampage.381	Perhaps,	this	version	of	events	should	be	taken	with	a	pinch	of	salt,	since	the	dramatic	attack	on	the	two	security	guards	received	no	mention	elsewhere.	The	way	in	which	management	made	light	of	events	did	not	ring	true	either	though.	One	company	spokesman	casually	dismissed	it	all	as	just	‘a	bit	of	skylarking’	with	a	nonchalance	that	defied	credibility.382	The	incident	was,	after	all,	sufficiently	serious	to	force	the	firm	to	concede	full	pay	to	the	entire	workforce	for	the	whole	shift.	Such	an	understated	response	clearly	aimed	to	avoid	the	situation	escalating	further.	The	Communist	Morning	Star,	which	remained	close	to	senior	shop	stewards	in	Dagenham,	made	no	mention	of	this	incident.	Instead	the	paper	reported	on	a	
																																								 																					380	Peter	Cartwright,	‘Talks	Today	on	Midland	Car	Strikes’,	Financial	Times	(London,	31	August	1973),	p.	31.	381	‘Rebels	Fight	Lay-Off	Threat:	Ford	Men	in	“Midnight	Riot”’,	Barking	&	
Dagenham	Advertiser	(Dagenham,	7	September	1973),	p.	1.	382	Ibid.	
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recent	speech	delivered	by	Henry	Ford	II	in	California.383	In	his	talk,	the	corporation’s	chairman	described	the	Dagenham	River	Plant	as	a	‘cesspool’,	before	claiming	that	the	women	working	there	had	threatened	strike	action	over	plans	to	move	them	to	a	new	facility.	A	strong	rebuttal	of	these	allegations	forced	an	embarrassing	denial	out	of	the	British	subsidiary’s	management.	Yet,	attention	focused	on	this	war	of	words,	instead	of	the	more	heated	confrontation	inside	the	factory,	demonstrating	how	distant	senior	shop	stewards	were	from	the	shop-floor	unrest.384	While	Body-Plant	Convenor	Jock	Macrae	announced	that	future	lay-offs	would	be	resisted,	the	union	leadership	at	Ford	generally	seemed	to	share	management’s	inclination	to	play	down	these	disturbances.	Such	understatement	stood	in	stark	contrast	to	Solidarity’s	assessment	of	the	situation.	By	this	account,	trouble	started	in	the	Body	Plant	when	a	‘West	Indian’	welder	Winston	Williams	was	dismissed	for	allegedly	threatening	to	assault	his	foreman.	A	stoppage	on	Williams’s	section	to	demand	his	reinstatement	then	led	management	to	announce	lay-offs	in	both	the	Body	and	PTA	plants	the	following	week.	The	next	day	chaos	broke	out	in	both	factories.	Managers	barricaded	themselves	into	their	offices;	windows,	vehicles	and	equipment	were	damaged;	and	‘protestors’	confronted	shop	stewards	who	tried	to	calm	them	down.	After	an	initial	mass	meeting	at	which	two	convenors	‘Macrae	and	Harraway	were	booed	and	catcalled’,	the	Shop	Stewards	Committee	only	regained	control	of	the	situation	by	persuading	workers	to	leave	the	factory	and	instead	picket	official	negotiations.385	This	reinforced	Solidarity’s	view	that	this	body	no	longer	
																																								 																					383	Compare	and	contrast	‘Henry	Ford	Has	Gotta	Say	Sorry’,	Morning	Star	(London,	30	August	1973),	p.	3;	and	Sid	Harraway,	‘Blabbermouth	Ford	Really	Should	Belt	Up!’,	Morning	Star	(London,	4	September	1973),	p.	4	;	with	‘Walkout	at	Ford	over	Pay	Guarantee’,	Morning	Star	(London,	1	September	1973),	p.	1;	and	‘Ford	Go	Back’,	Morning	Star	(London,	3	September	1973),	p.	3.	384	‘River	Plant	JWC’,	Ford	News	(Dagenham,	14	September	1973),	p.	1.	385	M.F.,	‘Rumpus	at	Ford’s’,	Solidarity:	For	Workers’	Power,	7.8,	5–8	(p.	5).	
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represented	rank-and-file	workers,	irrespective	of	the	militancy	of	individual	shop	stewards.	At	another	mass	meeting	in	the	PTA	Plant	that	September,	convenor	Brian	Elliott	‘didn’t	mention	the	Winston	William’s	sacking’	and	‘had	to	be	pressurised	from	the	floor	[...]	to	publicise	the	P.T.A.’s	demands	relating	to	layoffs’	to	workers	from	the	rest	of	the	Ford	Dagenham	estate.	All	the	same,	the	combination	of	an	overtime	ban	with	high	labour	turnover	in	the	PTA	restricted	management’s	ability	to	lay	off	assembly-line	workers.	This	section	of	the	workforce	tended	to	be	particularly	vulnerable	to	disruptions	in	production	elsewhere	in	the	supply	chain,	since	final	assembly	required	an	available	supply	of	all	the	different	components	needed	to	build	a	finished	car.	In	the	end,	industrial	action	proved	so	effective	that	union	full	timers	had	to	be	brought	in	to	persuade	workers	to	resume	production	on	22	November.	‘It	was	an	angry	meeting’,	according	to	a	report	republished	by	Red	Notes,	‘with	bottles	thrown	at	the	Union	officials	–	but	the	issue	was	lost...	for	the	time	being’.386	Having	tied	Ford’s	workforce	into	a	series	of	two-year	deals—which	imposed	penalties	without	delivering	parity—union	officials	undermined	their	members	in	the	disputes	that	inevitably	ensued	over	manning	levels	and	lay-offs	as	managers	attempted	to	reassert	their	authority.	Big	Flame	offered	a	practical	assessment	of	the	increasingly	polarised	dynamics	of	the	situation	inside	the	firm’s	car	plants:	A	pattern	is	developing	at	Ford	about	what	sort	of	issues	can	be	won	and	the	way	you	have	to	fight	to	win.	Disputes	which	‘go	through	procedure’	tend	to	end	in	compromise	and	defeat.	But	when	Ford	workers	have	taken	the	fight	into	their	own	hands	they	have	been	more	likely	to	win.387	
																																								 																					386	The	Little	Red	Blue	Book:	Fighting	the	Layoffs	at	Fords,	A	Red	Notes	Pamphlet	(London:	Red	Notes,	1978),	p.	2.	Ellipsis	in	the	original.	387	Big	Flame	Ford	Group,	p.	4.	
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Such	finding	were	hardly	surprising	given	the	group’s	political	perspective,	although	they	also	tallied	with	the	situation	on	the	ground.	Afterwards	Big	Flame	circulated	another	document	by	a	‘comrade	in	East	London’	providing	a	preliminary	analysis	of	working-class	struggle	in	Britain	from	
In	Place	of	Strife	to	the	demise	of	the	Heath	administration.	This	suggested	that	the	influence	of	the	recent	situation	in	Italy	on	the	industrial	politics	in	Britain	went	beyond	its	influence	on	their	own	perspective.	Ford	plants	began	to	experience	‘the	“guerrilla	strike”	or	“articulated	strike”	policies	learnt	by	the	unions	from	their	Italian	counterparts’,	who	had	become	so	adept	at	riding	the	tiger	of	industrial	unrest	after	the	Hot	Autumn.388	The	author	saw	such	techniques	as	allowing	the	union	to	maintain	control	over	shop-floor	unrest,	while	stifling	its	political	potential.	The	lack	of	a	major	political	challenge	to	phase	two	reflected	a	lack	of	preparation	and	organisation	among	the	working	class.	The	author	counterposed	the	demoralisation	caused	by	union	strategy	to	growing	anger	and	an	increasingly	sophisticated	awareness	of	this	situation	among	shop-floor	workers,	whatever	political	and	organisational	weaknesses	remained.	
	
Chapter	Conclusion	
Much	had	changed	since	Heath	came	to	power.	The	1971	Ford	national	pay	strike	was	one	of	the	most	politically	charged	industrial	disputes	to	confront	the	new	government.	While	Ford	workers	took	this	as	an	opportunity	to	challenge	government	industrial	policy,	officials	brokered	a	deal	that	imposed	secret	ballots	and	penalty	clauses	before	they	became	law.	The	failure	of	shop	stewards	to	prevent	this	outcome	further	widened	an	existing	gap	between	rank-and-file	union	representatives	and	the	wider	workforce.	This	breakdown	in	trade-union																																									 																					388	London,	MayDay	Rooms,	East	London	Big	Flame	Collection,	[Anon.],	‘The	Current	Crisis—Working	Class	Struggles	and	the	State	1969-1974’,	[n.d.].	
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mediation	at	all	levels	led	to	ineffective	pay	claims,	combined	with	growing	and	increasingly	volatile	shop-floor	unrest	over	issues	such	as	lay-offs,	manning	levels	and	the	pace	of	production.	The	situation	gave	greater	relevance	to	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy,	tendencies	that	had	foreseen	this	outcome.	Alongside	such	analysis,	publications	by	Big	Flame	and	Solidarity	gave	voice	to	those	directly	involved	in	these	actions,	serving	as	a	means	to	communicate	information	to	their	workmates	at	Ford	as	well	as	a	wider	readership.	Inspired	by	recent	events	in	Italy,	Big	Flame	took	this	as	an	opportunity	to	generalise	these	forms	of	struggle,	but	the	situation	at	Ford	left	it	to	other	groups	of	workers	to	challenge	the	government’s	pay	freeze.	By	the	beginning	of	1974	industrial	action	by	mineworkers	resulted	in	the	three-day	week,	a	Conservative	policy	ostensibly	introduced	to	conserve	electricity	by	placing	restrictions	on	commercial	energy	use.	Heath	then	called	a	snap	election	that	February,	famously	framed	as	a	vote	to	settle	the	question:	‘Who	governs	Britain?’	This	saw	the	Conservatives	loose	a	parliamentary	majority,	forcing	them	into	opposition.	Within	less	than	five	years,	a	Labour	government	and	then	a	Conservative	one	fell,	both	brought	down	by	workers	taking	industrial	action	over	incomes	policy	and	industrial	relations	legislation.	Yet,	the	crisis	that	such	measures	set	out	to	address,	both	in	terms	of	underlying	structural	issues	and	social	and	industrial	unrest,	remained	unresolved.		 	
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4.	To	Hell	with	the	Social	Contract,	1974	to	1978	
Following	the	first	of	two	1974	general	elections,	he	incoming	minority	Labour	government’s	attempt	to	resolve	the	ongoing	crisis	of	British	capitalism	took	a	left-wing	social	democratic	form.	In	return	for	concessions	in	other	fields	of	policy,	the	Trades	Union	Congress	(TUC)	leadership	agreed	to	help	implement	voluntary	pay	restraint.	Transport	and	General	Workers	Union	(TGWU)	General	Secretary	Jack	Jones	was	widely	credited	as	the	architect	of	this	policy,	which	became	known	as	the	Social	Contract.389	Jones,	the	leader	of	the	largest	union	both	in	the	country	and	at	Ford,	was	deeply	and	personally	invested	in	the	project.	While	the	issues	involved	went	beyond	individual	personalities,	he	came	to	embody	the	contradictions	between	the	role	of	trade	unions,	representing	the	interests	of	their	members	at	work,	and	their	political	ties	to	a	Labour	government.	At	Ford	this	situation	pushed	the	trade-union	mediation	of	industrial	relations	to	breaking	point.	Over	the	course	of	the	next	four	years	no	official	industrial	action	occurred	during	pay	negotiations.	Meanwhile,	shop-floor	unrest	became	so	disruptive	to	production	that	management	felt	the	need	to	take	the	unprecedented	step	of	increasing	pay	midway	through	a	contract.	The	situation	became	increasingly	volatile	and	spilled	over	into	violence	in	a	number	of	dramatic	incidents,	while	the	Labour	government	resorted	to	monetarist	austerity	policies	under	the	terms	of	an	IMF	bailout.	Against	this	backdrop,	Big	Flame	interventions	at	Ford	began	to	have	a	more	tangible	impact,	encouraging	workers	at	the	firm	to	adopt	practices	initiated	by	the	most	militant	sections	of	the	workforce.	Outside	the	factory,	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	also	influenced	wider	debates	at	the	intersection	of	the	labour	movement,	far-left	politics	and	academia.	Back	at	Ford,	two	new	workplace	groups	the	Ford	Workers	Group	(FWG)	and	Ford	Langley	Action	Committee	(FLAC)																																									 																					389	Reid,	p.	330.	
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put	these	politics	into	practice.	Unlike	Big	Flame,	both	organisations	were	made	up	of	Ford	workers	rather	than	external	militants.	Meanwhile,	the	firm’s	British	output	stagnated,	fluctuating	between	463,793	and	571,990	vehicles	per	year	between	1974	and	1977.	This	was	consistently	well	below	the	681,394	record	set	earlier	in	the	decade.	Over	the	same	period	the	British	subsidiary	reported	exceptional	growth	in	pre-tax	profits,	from	a	relatively	low	£8,700,000	in	1974	to	£263,000,000	in	1977.	This	was	more	than	four	times	greater	than	the	highest	figure	declared	previously.390	Even	allowing	for	inflation,	the	devaluation	of	sterling	and	the	notoriously	opaque	accountancy	practices	of	transnational	corporations,	these	figures	were	remarkable.	Lower	output	combined	with	record-breaking	profits	indicated	that	Ford	was	already	moving	towards	a	corporate	strategy	of	reinvesting	income	from	the	British	subsidiary	internationally,	rather	than	back	into	the	Ford	Motor	Company	(Limited).	Operations	continued	to	decline,	despite	Britain	joining	the	EEC.	By	1976	the	British	share	of	European	output	fell	to	twenty-eight	per	cent.	Although	another	subsidiary	became	operational	in	Spain	that	year,	German	output	continued	to	grow.391	Ford	still	retained	a	significant	position	in	the	British	economy	though,	as	a	key	employer,	a	major	exporter	and	a	potential	source	of	industrial	investment.	The	possibility	that	such	a	large	and	profitable	business	might	move	production	abroad	continued	to	have	profound	political	implications	too.	If	anything,	the	Ford	Motor	Corporation’s	strategy	took	on	greater	importance	for	British	policy	makers	the	further	the	subsidiary’s	operation	in	Britain	went	into	decline	relative	to	those	elsewhere	in	Europe.		
																																								 																					390	Tolliday,	‘Statistical	Appendix’,	II,	p.	141.	391	Tolliday,	‘Statistical	Appendix’,	II,	p.	144.	
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Friday	Night	is	Music	Night,	1974	to	1975	
Ten	days	before	the	general	election,	another	round	of	pay	negotiations	began	at	Ford	on	18	February	1974.	Management	opened	with	an	initial	offer	to	increase	the	basic	rate	of	pay	by	£2.60	per	week.	At	first	the	unions	rejected	this	proposal,	but	rather	than	responding	with	a	specific	claim	only	called	for	a	‘substantial’	wage	increase.	Afterwards	a	Big	Flame	leaflet	produced	in	London	derided	this	vague	demand	for	its	failure	to	‘commit	them	to	anything’,	leaving	workers	unable	to	hold	union	negotiators	to	account.392	Supporting	this	assessment,	at	the	time	the	
Financial	Times	reported	a	lack	of	any	serious	threat	of	industrial	unrest	despite	formal	union	opposition.	According	to	the	paper’s	labour	correspondent,	the	trade	unions	were	divided	on	a	point	of	strategy.	Should	they	aim	for	a	quick	settlement	before	the	election,	in	case	the	Conservatives	received	a	new	mandate	for	further	wage	restraint,	or	await	the	outcome	of	the	polls?393		In	the	event,	negotiations	carried	on	as	Labour	formed	a	minority	government.	By	the	time	Harold	Wilson	returned	as	Prime	Minister	on	4	March	1974,	mass	meetings	at	most	plants	had	already	rejected	the	offer.	The	same	day	union	negotiators	recommended	a	slightly	revised	deal,	which	made	no	improvement	on	the	£2.60	proposed	pay	increase.	It	was	only	at	this	point	that	a	narrative	began	to	emerge	in	the	press	that	portrayed	all	the	previous	meetings	as	poorly	attended.394	Accusing	union	leaders	of	committing	‘one	of	their	dirtiest	tricks	in	years’,	another	London	Big	Flame	leaflet	called	on	Ford	workers	to	‘Reject	the	Offer’.	The	
																																								 																					392	Personal	Collection,	Big	Flame	London	Ford	Group,	‘£2.60—A	Joke!!’,	21	February	1974.	393	Roy	Rogers,	‘Ford	Workers	Refuse	Pay	Offer’,	Financial	Times	(London,	19	February	1974),	p.	1.	394	Wyles	John,	‘Halewood	Men	Reject	Ford	Stage	3	Offer’,	Financial	Times	(London,	4	March	1974),	p.	29;	Roy	Rogers,	‘Ford	Unions	Back	Stage	3	Offer’,	
Financial	Times	(London,	5	March	1974),	p.	19	(p.	3);	‘Ford	Stage	3	Deal’,	Financial	
Times	(London,	12	March	1974),	p.	21.	
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text	went	on	to	list	possible	forms	of	industrial	action	short	of	a	strike:	a	policy	of	non-cooperation,	a	work	to	rule,	an	overtime	ban,	and	resistance	to	mobility	of	labour	or	to	any	future	lay-offs.	It	also	proposed	an	alternative	clear	demand	for	‘£10	plus,	and	a	guaranteed	week’s	pay,	work	or	no	work’,	without	any	productivity	deal.395	Framing	this	demand	in	terms	of	the	needs	of	workers,	as	distinct	from	those	of	capital,	marked	the	difference	between	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	and	the	conventional	trade	union	demands	of	an	official	wage	claim.	With	Big	Flame	too	marginal	for	such	analysis	to	have	much	impact	yet,	shop-floor	opposition	to	the	deal	remained	too	weak,	or	at	least	not	well	enough	organised,	to	influence	the	outcome.	On	15	March	union	negotiators	voted	to	accept	an	agreement	that	fell	within	the	pay	limits	set	by	the	previous	Heath	administration.396	Even	Big	Flame	gauged	that	there	was	no	mood	for	a	strike,	highlighting	the	limited	options	available.	With	high	inflation	driven	further	upwards	by	rising	oil	prices,	the	agreement	led	to	a	substantial	decrease	in	real	wages.	Afterwards	this	situation	would	highlight	the	limitations	of	relying	on	the	trade	unions	and	observing	official	procedures	in	terms	of	meeting	the	needs	of	workers,	fuelling	shop-floor	discontent.	The	start	of	the	new	contract	coincided	with	Labour	phasing	out	the	Three-Day	Week,	a	Conservative	policy	to	conserve	electricity	during	the	miners	strike.	This	measure	came	into	force	at	Ford	Halewood,	but	not	at	Dagenham.	Afterwards	a	Big	Flame	member	from	the	Merseyside	car	plant	described	the	effect	this	had	on	attitudes	among	the	workforce	towards	being	at	work.	The	shorter	working	week,	he	explained,	provoked	widespread	discussion	between	workers	about	how	long	they	spent	inside	the	factory.	In	particular,	night	shifts	on	a	Friday,																																									 																					395	London,	MayDay	Rooms,	East	London	Big	Flame	Collection,	[East]	London	Big	Flame	Ford	Group,	‘Reject	the	Offer’,	1974	<http://www.eastlondonbigflame.org.uk/files/Reject%20the%20Offer.pdf>	[accessed	11	April	2018].	396	Desmond	Quigley,	‘Ford	Unions	Accept	£16m.	Stage	Three	Deal’,	Financial	
Times	(London,	16	March	1974),	p.	17.	
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which	was	followed	by	a	return	to	the	day	shift	the	following	week,	significantly	shortened	the	length	of	the	weekend.	After	the	government	enforced	reduction	in	working	hours	came	to	an	end,	this	became	a	specific	source	of	resentment,	and	workers	on	some	sections	simply	began	to	skip	that	shift.	Taking	up	the	slogan	‘Friday	Night	is	Music	Night’,	Big	Flame	then	launched	a	campaign	encouraging	others	to	join	in	with	such	wildcat	action.	This	helped	put	pressure	on	shop	stewards	to	call	a	mass	meeting	at	which	a	resolution	was	passed	in	support	of	the	campaign.397	Not	only	did	Big	Flame’s	attempt	to	generalise	a	refusal	of	work,	which	originated	on	the	shop	floor	independently	of	the	unions,	put	Italian	workerist	politics	into	practice,	it	also	proved	effective.	Brian	Ashton,	who	still	worked	at	the	Halewood	PTA	Plant,	discussed	his	own	involvement	in	‘the	Friday	night	dispute’	with	me	in	interview.	In	doing	so,	he	referred	to	John	Bohanna,	a	militant	shop	steward	who	also	worked	for	Ford	on	Merseyside.	Ashton	recalled	Bohanna	describing	this	as	‘the	most	important	strike	in	the	time	he	worked	there,	in	his	thirty	years’,	before	adding	that	it	was	also	‘the	most	important	strike	in	my	seven	years’.398	Ashton	remembered	being	on	the	first	shift	assigned	to	work	on	a	Friday	night	after	full-time	work	resumed.	Workmates	on	his	section	discussed	their	frustration	at	the	resumption	of	a	longer	working	week,	while	those	on	another	section	known	as	the	High	Lines	took	action.	When	the	buzzer	sounded	they	downed	tools	spontaneously.	Initially,	senior	stewards	responded	with	hostility	to	industrial	action,	so	soon	after	a	new	contract	had	been	signed.	They	discouraged	workers	from	attending	an	initial	factory-gate	meeting,	accused	Big	Flame	of	orchestrating	events,	and	threatened	participants	with	the	withdrawal	of	union	support	if	management	took	disciplinary	action.	
																																								 																					397	Personal	Collection,	Big	Flame	London	Ford	Group,	‘More	Life	Less	Speed!’,	2	April	1974.		398	Ashton.	
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Nonetheless,	by	that	September	the	Financial	Times	reported	that	‘for	the	19th	Friday	night	in	succession,	4,000	workers	on	night	shift	in	the	paint,	trim	and	assembly	and	body	stamping	plants	did	not	turn	up’,	with	the	cost	to	the	company	estimated	at	£9,500,000.	Workers	in	the	Halewood	Press	Shop	then	took	unofficial	action	to	secure	‘“clean-up”	pay’.399	With	line	workers	already	receiving	such	a	supplement	in	recognition	of	the	time	they	spent	doing	so	before	and	after	every	shift,	their	co-workers	tried	to	get	in	on	the	act.	Likewise,	craftsmen	raised	an	unofficial	interim	wage	demand	in	an	effort	to	restore	pay	differentials.	Industrial	action	began	to	spread	to	Dagenham,	where	a	high	rate	of	labour	turnover	left	the	firm	particularly	vulnerable.	Yet	again,	a	series	of	informal	pay	claims	that	originated	on	the	shop	floor	threatened	to	spiral	out	of	control.	The	day	before	parliament	was	dissolved	for	the	second	general	election	that	year,	management	responded	with	a	statement	to	the	trade	union	side	of	the	Ford	National	Joint	Negotiating	Committee	(FNJNC).	Acknowledging	that	‘the	circumstances	in	which	it	negotiated	its	current	agreement	were	exceptional’,	the	company	proposed	a	new	contract	immediately,	even	though	the	current	one	was	not	due	to	expire	until	the	following	spring.	This	proposal	was,	however,	subject	to	an	immediate	‘return	to	normal	working	including	overtime’	and	a	discontinuation	of	‘the	extension	of	line	workers	preparation	and	clean	up	overtime’.400	That	management	felt	the	need	to	make	such	a	concession	indicated	the	effectiveness	of	wildcat	tactics,	while	highlighting	limitations	in	the	formal	labour	relations	apparatus.	Indeed,	the	‘Trade	Union	side	were	taken	by	surprise	by	the	Company’s	offer’	as	Moss	Evans,	their	chairman	on	the	FNJNC,	informed	TGWU	General	Secretary	Jack	Jones.	While	recognising	that	management’s	proposal	failed	to	address	the																																									 																					399	‘Ford	Halewood	Workers	to	Strike	over	Pay’,	Financial	Times	(London,	7	September	1974),	p.	15.	400	University	of	Warwick,	Modern	Records	Centre,	MSS.292E/213/617/1	‘Company	Statement	to	N.J.N.C.’	29	September	1974.	(sic)	
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issues	that	gave	rise	to	the	talks,	the	union	side	of	the	FNJNC	agreed	to	the	proposal.	Evans	ended	his	memo	by	stressing	that	trade-union	negotiators	were	not	responsible	for	the	situation:	‘I	cannot	do	more	than	emphasise	that	at	no	point	did	we	ask	the	company	to	negotiate	what	they	term	“a	new	contract”.	It	was	entirely	on	the	initiative	of	the	company	that	such	an	offer	was	made.’401	Far	from	being	a	welcome	outcome,	a	pay	rise	for	their	members	so	close	to	the	election	provided	a	source	of	embarrassment	for	union	leaders	committed	to	the	Social	Contract.	On	the	other	hand,	Big	Flame’s	tactic	of	trying	to	generalise	the	struggles	of	the	most	militant	sections	of	the	workforce	was	much	more	closely	in	synch	with	the	mood	on	the	shop	floor,	contributing	to	the	outcome.	Afterwards	the	Sunday	Telegraph	speculated	that	‘Ford	management’s	offer	could	help	re-establish	the	authority	of	the	unions’.	Backing	up	this	suggestion,	the	piece	cited	Dagenham	Body	Plant	Deputy	Convenor	Sid	Harraway	referring	to	proposal	as	‘a	“union	negotiator’s	dream”’.	To	show	the	extent	to	which	union	authority	was	currently	under	threat,	alongside	the	article	an	excerpt	appeared	from	a	Big	Flame	leaflet,	which	read:	‘As	the	Union	Caves	in	the	Fight	Begins’.	There	followed	a	somewhat	sensationalist	if	not	entirely	inaccurate	account	of	‘industrial	agitators’	engaging	in	‘political	warfare’.	Predictably	enough,	this	glossed	over	any	relationship	between	such	unrest	and	working	conditions,	or	company	and	government	policy.	While	several	far-left	organisations	were	mentioned	in	the	article,	focus	fell	primarily	on	Big	Flame	and	how	this	group’s	approach	differed	by	operating	outside	of	mainstream	rank-and-file	trade	unionism.	The	author	went	on	
																																								 																					401	University	of	Warwick,	Modern	Records	Centre,	MSS.292E/213/617/1	‘Company	Statement	to	N.J.N.C.’	‘Ford	Motor	Company’	memo	to	the	General	Secretary	from	the	National	Organiser	23	September	1974.	
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to	report	that	such	activity	had	already	come	to	the	attention	of	managers:	‘They	see	it’,	the	piece	concluded,	‘as	a	problem	for	the	unions’	though.402	The	company	tabled	a	two-year	deal,	which	included	an	immediate	wage	increase	of	between	£7.20	and	£9.40	a	week,	and	two	further	increases	both	worth	between	£2.70	and	£3.50,	a	pay	rise	of	almost	forty	per	cent.	Within	a	year	of	the	most	recent	pay	rise,	this	increased	wages	well	above	the	rate	of	inflation.	Moreover,	the	offer	included	a	‘threshold	arrangement’	to	automatically	increase	pay	should	the	retail	price	index	rise	by	more	than	thirty-six	per	cent.	In	spite	of	assurances	to	the	contrary	from	management	and	unions	alike,	this	clearly	posed	a	significant	challenge	to	the	Social	Contract.403		That	winter	Big	Flame	was	singled	out	in	Parliament	as	‘one	of	the	more	inflammatory	groups’	in	Britain.404	The	Conservative	Lord	Gisborough	made	these	remarks	in	a	speech,	which	referred	specifically	to	the	group’s	activity	at	Ford,	during	the	debate	of	a	motion	on	‘subversive	and	extremist	elements’	in	the	House	of	Lords.	The	same	session	heard	the	Communist	Party	and	other	left-wing	organisations	described	with	similar	hyperbole.	It	might	be	tempting	to	read	too	much	political	significance	to	Big	Flame	receiving	such	a	citation	in	Hansards.	More	than	anything,	the	general	tone	of	proceedings	revealed	the	level	of	hostility	towards	any	challenge	to	the	status	quo	from	elements	within	the	political	establishment.	That	said,	Big	Flame’s	range	of	influence	was	beginning	to	extend	beyond	Merseyside	during	this	period	with	the	creation	of	a	national	organisation	of	the	same	name.	Membership	would	always	remain	small,	even	by	the	meagre	standards	of	the	far	left	in	Britain,	although	to	some	extent	this	reflected	an																																									 																					402	McGavery	Paddy,	‘Shop-Floor	Power	Bid	at	Ford’s’,	The	Sunday	Telegraph	(London,	29	September	1974),	p.	17.	403	Roy	Rogers,	‘Ford	Offers	38	Per	Cent.	Two-Year	Pay	Deal’,	Financial	Times	(London,	4	October	1974),	p.	1.	404	Hansard	Parliamentary	Debates:	Lords,	Fifth	Series,	1974-75,	CCCLVII	cols	880-81.	
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emphasis	on	organising	horizontally	with	other	militants	rather	than	recruitment.	As	indicated	by	the	leaflets	mentioned	previously,	new	comrades	in	east	and	west	London,	as	well	as	Manchester	and	Birmingham,	joined	existing	members	on	in	Liverpool.	Initially	this	led	to	the	formation	of	a	loose	federation	linked	together	by	a	National	Co-ordination	Committee,	leaving	local	groups	with	a	high	degree	of	autonomy.	The	First	National	Conference	took	place	in	March	1975.	At	it	the	Big	Flame	Motor	Commission	reported	to	their	fellow	delegates	confidently:	‘We	have	better	contacts	and	organisation	round	the	country	between	the	plants	than	anyone,	including	the	unions,	with	the	exception	of	the	Ford	Motor	Co.'405	That	such	a	claim	seemed	at	all	credible	reflected	how	poorly	coordinated	the	shop	stewards	organisation	was	across	the	firm’s	factories,	never	mind	the	industrial	strategies	of	larger	political	organisation.	Before	the	conference	groups	from	Merseyside	and	East	London	also	circulated	two	separate	papers	entitled	What	is	a	Big	Flame	Group?	These	texts	presented	alternative	proposals	for	how	Big	Flame	should	organise.406	The	authors	of	both	pieces	approached	this	question	through	a	class	analysis	of	the	moment	of	crisis	in	which	they	were	written.	The	two	papers	articulated	a	shared	understanding	of	how	the	composition	of	the	working	class	had	been	transformed	through	the	expansion	of	deskilled	assembly-line	work,	highlighting	the	changing	role	of	migrant	labour	and	that	of	women	in	particular.	The	use	of	the	term	social	
factory,	which	was	coined	by	Mario	Tronti,	by	the	authors	of	both	documents	demonstrated	the	common	influence	of	Italian	workerism.	While	distancing	themselves	from	the	practice	of	contemporary	Leninism,	the	authors	also	framed																																									 																					405	Big	Flame	Motor	Commission,	The	Car	Industry	and	Big	Flame :	Motor	
Commission	Report	to	Big	Flame	National	Conference	([n.p.]:	Big	Flame,	1975),	p.	5.	406	Merseyside	Big	Flame,	‘What	Is	a	Big	Flame	Group?’,	1975	<https://bigflameuk.files.wordpress.com/2009/05/whatismbf-all.pdf>	[accessed	9	April	2018];	London,	MayDay	Rooms,	East	London	Big	Flame	Collection,	East	London	Big	Flame,	‘What	Is	a	Big	Flame	Group’,	1975	<https://bigflameuk.files.wordpress.com/2009/05/whatiselbf-all.pdf>	[accessed	9	April	2018].	
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their	proposals	in	relation	to	Lenin’s	writing	on	the	revolutionary	party	and	political	strategy	too.	All	of	this	demonstrated	how	a	shared	understanding	of	working-class	autonomy	informed	the	politics	behind	these	texts.	The	contribution	from	East	London	distinguished	between	three	distinct	aspects	of	workers'	autonomy:	'autonomy	from	capitalist	development	as	in	wage	drift	[...]	autonomy	from	capitalist	institutions	[...	and]	the	question	of	autonomy,	separate	organisations,	and	the	power	relations	within	the	class'.407	On	this	final	point	they	argued	that	recognising	such	differences	constituted	a	prerequisite	for	real	working	class	unity.	This	provided	a	rationale	for	supporting	autonomous	struggles	of	groups	such	as	women	and	Black	people	to	break	down	such	internal	hierarchies	within	the	working	class.	A	third	contribution	to	the	debate	from	Manchester	disputed	any	understanding	of	autonomy	that	went	beyond	the	need	for	workers	to	reject	productivity	deals	and	demand	wages	on	the	basis	of	their	own	needs.	The	authors	of	this	piece	went	so	far	as	to	dismiss	Mario	Tronti	as	'a	guru	of	the	ultra	left'.408	From	the	outset,	Big	Flame	encompassed	a	range	of	viewpoints	about	the	meaning	of	the	term	autonomy	itself,	with	some	disputing	whether	any	theoretical	insights	could	be	gained	from	one	of	the	most	prominent	figures	associated	with	Italian	workerism.	Despite	both	advocating	versions	of	a	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	informed	by	operaismo,	the	most	significant	divisions	proved	to	be	those	between	Liverpool	and	east	London.	Such	differences	centred	on	what	form	of	organisational	structure	to	adopt.	While	recognising	that	'Big	Flame	is	neither	[a]	revolutionary	party	nor	its	embryo',	members	from	Merseyside	proposed	the																																									 																					407London,	MayDay	Rooms,	East	London	Big	Flame	Collection,	East	London	Big	Flame,	‘What	Is	a	Big	Flame	Group’,	p.	3.	408	London,	Goldsmiths	University	of	London	Library	(Special	Collections),	Vic	Seidler	Box	1	[uncatalogued],	Pete,	Some	Questions	to	ELBF,	p.	4.	
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creation	of	a	centrally	organised	'interventionist	cadre	organisation'.409	From	the	perspective	of	East	London	Big	Flame	(ELBF),	such	an	approach	overlooked	how	recent	struggles	by	women	and	migrants	called	into	question	not	just	the	content	of	revolutionary	politics,	but	also	its	form.410	The	majority	of	conference	delegates	then	agreed	to	establish	a	national	organisation,	leading	ELBF	to	break	away.	At	the	exact	moment	that	this	tendency	was	beginning	to	have	some	effect	at	a	national	level,	the	conference	exposed	internal	divisions	within	what	remained	small	political	circles	by	any	standards.	Max	Farrar,	who	helped	set	up	a	Big	Flame	group	in	Leeds	shortly	afterwards,	subsequently	commented	on	these	events.	He	claimed	that	‘the	ideological	difference	between	ELBF	and	MBF	[Merseyside]	was	not	huge,	and	that	the	split	was	probably	as	much	to	do	with	personalities	[...]	as	to	do	with	ideologies’.411	That	might	well	have	been	the	case,	although	it	is	also	striking	that	the	split	reflected	the	influence	of	different	sections	of	the	Italian	extra-parliamentary	left.	Potere	Operaio	(Workers’	Power)	influenced	ELBF	politics	more	and	had	dissolved	into	the	wider	movement	by	then,	whereas	Lotta	Continua	(Continuous	Struggle)	provided	a	model	for	Liverpool	Big	Flame	and	retained	a	more	formal	organisational	structure.	While	the	ELBF	Ford	Group	became	inactive	within	a	year,	a	degree	of	continuity,	in	terms	of	political	orientation	and	some	individual	participation,	remained	afterwards	with	the	publishing	project	Red	Notes	and	the	Ford	Workers	Group	(FWG)	in	Dagenham.	Unlike	Big	Flame,	the	FWG	was	predominantly	made	up	of	Ford	workers	rather	than	external	militants	though.	This	could	be	seen	as																																									 																					409	Merseyside	Big	Flame,	pp.	9–10.	410	East	London	Big	Flame,	‘What	Is	a	Big	Flame	Group’,	1975,	p.	15	<https://bigflameuk.files.wordpress.com/2009/05/whatiselbf-all.pdf>	[accessed	9	April	2018].	411	See	his	comment	on	archivearchie,	‘Episodes	in	Big	Flame	History:	No	5.	1975	Debate	–	National	Organisation	and	Autonomy’,	2009	<https://bigflameuk.wordpress.com/2009/05/19/episodes-in-big-flame-history-no-5/>	[accessed	11	April	2018].	
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putting	into	practice	ELBF’s	position	about	new	organisational	forms	emerging	from	struggle.	Framing	this	as	a	straightforward	causal	relationship	between	ELBF	theory	and	FWG	practice,	however,	would	miss	the	point.	Despite	such	differences,	cooperation	afterwards	between	Big	Flame	and	the	Ford	Workers	Group	supported	the	broader	thrust	of	Farrar’s	argument	that	the	extent	of	such	differences	should	not	be	overstated.	Recent	historiography	has	framed	demands	for	greater	autonomy	by	workers	and	others,	such	as	women	and	Black	people,	as	an	aspect	of	the	emergence	of	‘popular	individualism’	in	1970s	Britain.	Some	former	Big	Flame	members	that	spoke	to	me	went	on	to	make	a	similar	assessment	of	the	‘decline	of	the	salience	of	class	identities’	associated	with	such	an	analysis.412	At	the	time	though,	they	still	conceived	of	such	phenomena	in	terms	of	class.	In	doing	so,	they	recognised	that	an	adequate	class	analysis	needed	to	focus	on	sexual	and	racial	divisions	both	within	the	waged	workforce	and	in	terms	of	the	role	of	unwaged	labour	in	reproducing	social	relations	more	generally.	While	Big	Flame	groups	thrashed	out	their	political	differences,	the	substantial	pay	rise	at	Ford	led	to	a	shift	in	the	balance	of	forces	between	management	and	workers,	which	was	documented	in	a	Solidarity	article.413	Beforehand,	high	labour	turnover	and	the	firm’s	inability	to	recruit	workers	fast	enough	to	fill	vacancies	had	given	greater	leverage	to	those	members	of	the	workforce	who	remained.	Afterwards,	an	influx	of	new	starters	made	it	possible	for	management	to	impose	mobility	of	labour	within	the	plant,	reducing	the	scope	of	workers	to	exercise	control	over	production.	The	author	of	the	piece	explicitly	applied	the	concept	of	the	refusal	of	work	in	his	analysis	of	the	situation.	Doing	so																																									 																					412	Emily	Robinson	and	others,	‘Telling	Stroies	about	Post-War	Britain:	Popular	Individualism	and	the	“Crisis”	of	the	1970s’,	20th	Century	British	History,	28.2	(2017),	268–304	(pp.	268	&	280);	Yarnit.	413	Ed	Zell,	‘The	Dagenham	“Occupation”’,	Solidarity:	For	Workers’	Power,	8.2	(1975),	8–6.	
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placed	strategic	emphasis	on	the	actions	of	ordinary	workers	from	the	organised	wildcat	strike	to	a	more	atomised	reluctance	to	take	up	or	remain	in	employment	with	the	firm.	This	then	suggested	the	basis	for	future	tactical	intervention.	Having	responded	to	such	a	situation	through	a	wage	increase,	predictably	enough,	management	set	out	to	increase	labour	productivity	and	impose	tighter	discipline.	This	met	with	resistance	at	different	plants	across	the	country.	For	instance,	that	April	eighteen	door	hangers	stopped	work	at	the	Dagenham	Body	Plant	in	a	manning	dispute,	when	eight	of	their	workmates	were	redeployed	to	a	labour	pool	with	eighty-five	others.	Then	managers	in	Swansea	suspended	a	number	of	lathe	operators	for	failing	to	increase	output.	In	response,	shop	stewards	led	a	sit-in	occupation	of	the	factory.	Both	incidents	stemmed	from	management	attempts	to	use	of	the	availability	of	surplus	workers,	retained	and	recruited	since	the	pay	rise,	to	increase	the	intensity	of	labour	for	some	sections	of	the	workforce,	while	leaving	others	idle.414	The	situation	in	Swansea	was	resolved	quickly,	but	in	the	meantime	shop	stewards	in	the	Dagenham	Body	Plant	attempted	to	replicate	the	tactics	used	there,	when	management	responded	to	the	door	hangers’	dispute	with	mass	lay-offs.	The	Dagenham	occupation	failed	to	gain	traction	though,	with	low	levels	of	participation	from	the	wider	workforce.	‘At	best’,	the	Financial	Times	reported	‘some	30	or	40	of	the	1,000	men	involved	in	the	dispute	were	inside	the	plant	yesterday	at	any	one	time,	picketing	the	padlocked	or	barricaded	gates’.	With	production	brought	to	a	halt,	shop	stewards	called	a	mass	meeting	to	shore	up	their	mandate	on	1	May	1975,	a	date	chosen	to	coincide	with	workers	having	to	come	on	site	to	collect	pay.415	 	
																																								 																					414	Lorelies	Olslager,	‘Ford	Factories	Hit	by	Protests’,	Financial	Times	(London,	24	April	1975),	p.	40.	415	Lorelies	Olslager,	‘Ford	Stewards	Seek	Mandate	over	“Occupation”	Claim’,	
Financial	Times	(London,	1	May	1975),	p.	15.	
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Despite	this	timing,	barely	anyone	attended	the	meeting,	as	was	reflected	in	a	vote	to	continue	with	the	occupation	being	lost	by	a	mere	thirty-nine	to	thirty-seven.	‘It	all	ended’,	as	Solidarity	noted	wryly,	‘with	a	bunch	of	disheartened	lefties	leaving	the	plant,	calling	each	other	“traitors”,	wailing	about	the	“lack	of	leadership”,	all	the	usual	stuff’.	On	the	other	hand,	the	article	described	the	workforce	as	having	‘a	healthy	distrust	of	anything	coming	from	the	convenors	and	the	shop	stewards	apparatus’,	while	also	feeling	‘isolated	and	unable	to	control	or	influence	what	was	going	on’.416	On	a	practical	note,	the	author	called	into	question	the	whole	rationale	for	organising	an	occupation,	particularly	before	alternative	tactics	had	been	exhausted.	With	the	unions’	ineffectual	role	in	recent	pay	negotiations	increasingly	undermining	their	credibility,	the	militant	stance	adopted	by	Body	Plant	shop	stewards	failed	to	mobilise	the	wider	workforce.	This	provided	yet	another	sign	of	the	growing	gap	between	shop-floor	workers	at	Ford	and	their	trade-union	representatives,	even	in	terms	of	the	lay	leadership	of	the	shop	stewards	organisation.	This	situation	would	only	deteriorate	further	the	following	year.		
The	Politics	of	How	Autoworkers	Fight	back	
In	January	1976	a	project	to	research	the	British	automobile	sector	came	out	of	the	Institute	For	Workers	Control	(IWC)	Conference.	This	exercise	was	explicitly	framed	as	a	‘workers’	enquiry’.417	Adopting	this	turn	of	phrase	strongly	signalled	the	influence	of	Italian	workerism,	although	the	researchers	did	not	spell	this	out	in	their	report.	While	the	term	workers’	inquiry	can	be	traced	back	to	a	survey	
																																								 																					416	Zell,	p.	5.	417	IWC	Motor	Group,	A	Workers’	Enquiry	into	the	Motor	Industry	(London:	CSE	Books,	1978);	see	also	‘Document:	A	Workers’	Enquiry	into	the	Motor	Industry:	The	Institute	for	Workers’	Control	Committee	of	Enquiry	into	the	Motor	Industry’,	Capital	and	Class:	Bulletin	of	the	Conference	of	Socialist	Economists,	1.1	(1977),	102–18.	
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prepared	by	Marx	for	La	Revue	socialiste	in	1880,	nothing	came	of	it	and	decades	past	without	the	expression	gaining	further	use.	It	only	re-entered	the	Marxist	lexicon	with	Romano	Alquati’s	co-research	study	of	the	Olivetti	typewriter	factory	in	the	early	1960s.418	The	content	of	this	report	showed	other	signs	of	the	influence	of	Italian	workerism:	a	focus	‘on	the	experience	of	production	line	workers’;	the	aim	to	provide	an	‘evaluation	of	the	impact	of	workers'	struggle’;	and	recognition	of	‘the	need	for	workers	to	develop	an	autonomy	in	ideas	and	action’.	Such	ideas	were	combined	in	a	somewhat	piecemeal	fashion	with	the	industrial	politics	of	the	IWC	and	enthusiasm	for	the	Lucas	Aerospace	shop	stewards’	alternative	plan.	The	authors	explained	that	their	work	was	informed	by	‘discussions	with	stewards,	convenors,	and	workers’,	although	it	was	perhaps	telling	that	the	workers	came	last	in	a	list	behind	their	union	representatives.	This	elided	the	distance	between	shop-floor	workers	and	the	lay	leadership	of	the	trade	union,	a	key	issue	at	the	time	that	the	report	overlooked.	That	said,	it	also	showed	how	operaismo	began	to	influence	the	analysis	of	sections	of	the	British	labour	movement	beyond	the	ranks	of	Big	Flame,	Solidarity	and	their	fellow	travellers.419	A	more	rigorous	engagement	with	Italian	workerism	took	place	that	spring,	when	the	Conference	of	Socialist	Economists	(CSE)	republished	Big	Flame’s	abridged	translation	of	Gambino’s	study	of	Ford	in	Britain.420	This	coincided	with	preparations	for	that	year’s	CSE	conference	as	explained	in	the	introduction	to	the	organisations	first	pamphlet,	which	came	out	later	that	year:	The	Conference	of	Socialist	Economists	has	encouraged	the	development	of	the	study	of	the	labour	process	through	local	groups,	“day	schools”,	and	work	projects	for	its	1976																																									 																					418	Haider	and	Mohandesi.	419	IWC	Motor	Group,	pp.	7–8	&	71.	420	Gambino,	‘Workers’	Struggles	and	the	Development	of	Ford	in	Britain	(Operai	e	Stato	1972)’.	
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annual	conference	(Coventry,	July	10,	11,	12),	which	has	been	entirely	given	over	to	the	labour	process	and	its	ramifications	[...]421	The	pamphlet,	itself,	consisted	of	five	articles,	three	of	which	comprised	of	translated	Italian	material	by	Raniero	Panzieri,	Sergio	Bologna	and	Mario	Tronti.	The	first	piece	by	Panzieri	provided	a	critical	reading	of	Capital,	and	by	extension	Leninist	politics	more	generally.	For	him,	too	much	emphasis	on	the	anarchy	of	circulation,	instead	of	class	antagonism	within	production,	marked	the	limits	of	Marx’s	magnum	opus	and	its	political	legacy.	The	Grundrisse,	Panzieri	speculated	tentatively,	might	offer	a	corrective	to	this	tendency.	Bologna’s	contribution	teased	out	the	historical	relationship	between	the	politics	of	German	council	communism	and	the	technical	composition	of	Labour	in	pre-war	Germany.	Tronti	provided	a	similar	analysis	of	labour	militancy	and	the	rise	of	US	industry.	Taken	together,	all	three	texts	contributed	to	the	development	of	a	particular	Marxist	approach	to	analysing	the	labour	process	that	placed	a	specific	emphasise	on	the	role	of	the	working	class	as	an	antagonistic	social	subject.	In	Britain,	such	material	informed	a	critical	response	to	Harry	Braverman’s	
Labor	and	Monopoly	Capital,	which	had	just	come	out	two	years	beforehand.	Whatever	insights	Braverman’s	account	provided	about	the	degradation	of	work,	his	analysis	was	explicitly	‘about	the	working	class	as	a	class	in	itself,	not	as	a	class	
for	itself’.422	As	he	openly	acknowledged,	this	left	out	any	consideration	of	working-class	subjectivity	or	agency.	The	Italian	texts	in	the	pamphlet	represented	a	tendency	within	Marxism	that	also	focused	on	the	labour	process,	while	in	contrast	with	Braverman	emphasising	the	role	to	working-class	struggle	as	a	driver	of	capitalist	development.	
																																								 																					421	G.	and	P.,	p.	2.	422	Braverman,	p.	27	(emphasis	in	the	original).	
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Paul	Thompson,	a	former	member	of	Big	Flame,	continues	to	focus	on	the	labour	process	as	a	sociologist	today.	He	has	credited	‘political	activity	with	shop	stewards	and	shopfloor	workers	in	the	motor	industry’	and	‘innovative	writings	on	the	changing	nature	of	work	and	class	derived	from	Italy	and	France’	with	informing	his	research.423	More	recently	he	also	drew	attention	to	two	‘interesting,	if	ultimately	unsatisfactory,	attempts	[...]	to	synthesise	an	understanding	of	the	various	strands	of	industrial	misbehavior’,	the	work	of	Pierre	DuBois	and	Geoff	Brown	from	the	late-1970s.424	In	fact,	DuBois	and	Brown	wrote	historical	accounts	of	industrial	sabotage.	Independently	from	one	another,	both	writers	adopted	broad	definitions	of	the	term	to	include	a	range	of	different	types	of	action	beyond	the	archetype	of	machine	breaking.	They	also	agreed	that,	having	become	marginalised	by	mid-twentieth-century	trade	unionism,	such	practices	showed	signs	of	becoming	increasingly	relevant	to	the	industrial	situation	at	the	time.	Brown	specifically	drew	upon	two	earlier	sociological	studies:	a	few	brief	references	to	sabotage	in	Beynon’s	Working	for	Ford,	and	a	piece	on	industrial	sabotage	by	Laurie	Taylor	and	Paul	Walton	from	the	early	1970s.	Taylor	and	Watson	proposed	a	categorisation	of	such	behaviour	based	on	the	subjective	intentions	of	those	who	engaged	in	it.	This	extended	from	simply	wanting	to	release	tension	and	alleviate	boredom,	through	challenging	the	pace	of	work,	to	attempting	to	exercise	greater	control	in	general.	They	opened	their	discussion	of	this	final	category	with	an	account	of	rioting	at	Fiat	Turin	in	1969.	The	section	ended	with	reference	to	a	criminal	prosecution	for	advocating	‘sabotage	as	a	legitimate	weapon	in	the	class	struggle	being	fought	inside	Ford	Dagenham’.	Their																																									 																					423	Paul	Thompson,	The	Nature	of	Work,	p.	ix.	424	Paul	Thompson,	‘All	Quiet	on	the	Workplace	Front?	A	Critque	of	Recent	Trends	in	British	Industrial	Sociology’,	Sociology,	29.4	(1995),	615–33	(p.	616);	Pierre	Dubois,	Le	sabotage	dans	l’industrie	(Paris:	Calmann-Lévy,	1976);	translated	as	Pierre	Dubois,	Sabotage	in	Industry,	trans.	by	Rosemary	Sheed,	Pelican	Originals	(Hamondsworth:	Penguin,	1979);	Geoff	Brown,	Sabotage:	A	Study	in	Industrial	
Conflict	(Nottingham:	Spokesman	Books,	1977).	
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analysis	concluded	with	a	prediction	that	‘productivity	agreements	which	tend	to	reduce	the	workers’	area	of	autonomy	within	the	factory’	would	make	the	phenomenon	even	more	prevalent.425	The	relationship	between	the	sociology	of	industrial	sabotage	and	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	went	back	further	through	their	sources.	The	incident	referred	to	at	Ford	involved	the	prosecution	in	1962	of	the	UK	distributor	of	publication	featuring	an	article	entitled	‘Sabotage—how	autoworkers	fight	back'.	This	provided	details	of	how	to	damage	an	assembly	line.	The	defendant,	reportedly,	posted	the	document	to	at	least	three	Ford	workers.	The	prosecutor	also	inferred	a	causal	link	between	the	dissemination	of	this	material	and	subsequent	damage	and	disruption	to	production	at	the	Dagenham	plant.	Pleading	not	guilty,	the	defendant	described	himself	as	‘the	London	representative	of	News	
and	Letters,	an	American	Marxist	publication’	edited	by	the	former	Detroit	auto-worker	Charles	Denby.	This	1970s	analysis	of	sabotage	linked	back	to	material	circulating	among	Ford	workers	in	Britain	in	the	1960s	that	was	published	by	the	Black	Marxists	who	initiated	a	turn	towards	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	in	America	from	the	1940s	onwards.426	Moreover,	the	whole	incident	only	came	to	Taylor	and	Walton’s	attention	through	an	article	published	in	Solidarity.	This	piece	recorded	that	an	attempted	speed-up	in	the	Dagenham	foundry	on	the	day	of	the	trial	resulted	in	a	deliberate	reduction	of	output.	Rather	than	suggesting	a	direct	connection	between	these	two	events,	or	any	involvement	of	Solidarity	in	either	of	them,	the	author	claimed	that	this	demonstrated	how	such	disruptive	activity	was	‘an	integral	part	of	their	
																																								 																					425	Laurie	Taylor	and	Paul	Walton,	‘Industrial	Sabotage:	Motives	and	Meanings’,	in	Images	of	Deviance,	ed.	by	Stanley	Cohen	(Harmondsworth:	Penguin,	1971),	pp.	219–45	(pp.	238	&	243).	426	‘Sabotage	Method	in	Pamphlet’,	The	Times	(London,	24	January	1962),	p.	6.	
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working	lives’	for	many	workers.427	According	to	Solidarity,	the	failure	of	Leninists	to	grasp	the	significance	of	such	examples	of	workers’	self-activity	reflected	bureaucratic	tendencies	inherent	in	these	politics.	Having	drawn	directly	on	this	material	as	well	as	Taylor	and	Watson’s	work,	Brown	concluded	by	focusing	on	the	current	situation	in	the	late-1970s	British	automobile	sector.	Sabotage,	he	claimed,	was	‘much	more	common	in	Fords	than	in	other	car	plants’,	a	situation	he	linked	to	the	faster	pace	of	work	and	the	lack	of	alternative	means	for	workers	to	exercise	job	control	under	measured	day	work.428	He	then	referred	to	interviews	with	former	Halewood	workers,	recorded	in	September	1974.	By	their	account,	spontaneous	acts	of	sabotage	occurred	routinely,	for	instance	when	two	workers	‘slashed	every	seat	of	27	or	28	cars	with	razor	blades	and	squirted	brake	fluid	on	the	paint	work’.429	Another	example	of	sabotage	saw	police	cars	on	the	assembly	line	being	singled	out:	‘Milk	bottles,	often	with	some	milk	left	in	them,	just	fitted	into	the	small	space	behind	the	dash	panel.’	From	the	distribution	of	the	News	and	Letters	pamphlet	in	1962	onwards,	two	elements	recurred	repeatedly	in	these	accounts.	A	critical	perspective	on	Leninist	politics	informed	by	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	and	references	to	the	actions	of	Ford	workers	flowed	through	the	course	of	this	reassessment	of	industrial	sabotage.	Much	of	my	own	research	broadly	supports	this	viewpoint.	Alan	Hayling	recounted	a	particularly	dramatic	and	coordinated	incident	to	me	in	interview.	In	1975	Hayling,	a	Cambridge	graduate	and	member	of	Big	Flame,	began	working	at	Ford	Langley,	intending	to	covertly	shoot	a	film	with	the	Newsreel	Collective.	Due	to	a	combination	of	financial	and	logistical	circumstances,	the	project	was	never	completed,	but	he	decided	to	continue	working	at	the	plant	anyway.																																									 																					427	John	Lane,	‘Who	Sabots?’,	Solidarity:	For	Workers’	Power,	2.1	(1962),	15–18	(p.	16).	428	Geoff	Brown,	p.	369.	(Sic).	429	Geoff	Brown,	p.	372.	
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An	exceptionally	hot	summer	the	following	year	resulted	in	mounting	tension	on	the	shop	floor.	This	began	with	workers	demanding	refreshment	breaks.	When	management	refused	these,	workers	simply	began	to	take	them	without	authorisation.	This	had	a	negligible	cost	to	the	company,	since	the	line	speed	was	increased	to	maintain	output.	Yet,	management	still	escalated	the	situation	by	docking	workers’	attendance	bonuses.	Spontaneous	acts	of	sabotage	then	became	increasingly	frequent	with	one	or	another	of	the	lines	broken	every	few	days	to	provide	a	brief	respite	from	the	heat	and	to	vent	frustration.	As	time	went	on	such	action	became	increasingly	coordinated,	with	a	shop-floor	consensus	emerging	that	any	administrative	errors	in	the	sequence	of	cabs	should	be	overlooked.	Normally,	such	mistakes	were	reported	voluntarily,	since	doing	so	interrupted	production,	providing	everyone	with	a	brief	break	while	repairs	were	carried	out.	Now,	output	fell	out	of	sequence	with	customer	orders,	producing	vehicles	that	could	not	be	readily	sold.	In	the	worst	cases,	left-hand	drive	cabs	ended	up	on	right-hand	drive	chassis,	making	the	finished	trucks	undriveable.	Management	still	continued	to	refuse	any	concessions	over	the	docked	wages	though.	Finally,	the	matter	reached	a	climax	in	an	incident,	which	linked	the	dispute	over	pay	to	an	ongoing	safety	issue.	Workers	had	previously	raised	concerns	with	management	about	the	allocation	of	a	particularly	demanding	task	fitting	cabs	onto	their	chassis	to	a	young	workmate	who	was	physically	unfit	for	such	and	arduous	task.	Alan	Hayling	gave	a	vivid	account	of	what	happened	next:	‘Everybody	was	warned	that	at	some	point	when	he	was	struggling	we	wouldn’t	stop	and	wait	for	him	[...]	The	truck	would	go	up	in	the	air,	and	it	would	travel	around	destroying	everything:	all	the	air	lines;	all	the	tools;	there	were	lots	of	storage	areas;	and	that’s	exactly	what	happened.	And	of	course,	when	it	went	back	it	tore	through	all	of	the	completed	cabs.	So,	it	must	have	done,	probably,	
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two	or	three	million	pounds	worth	of	damage.	But,	there	was	nothing	that	they	could	say,	because	they’d	been	warned	that	this	might	happen.	[...]	They	took	no	notice	and	then	it	happened.	We	just	let	it	happen.’430	Afterwards	management	withdrew	all	the	contested	pay	deductions.	Not	only	was	industrial	sabotage	an	everyday	aspect	of	working	life,	it	sometimes	proved	to	be	an	effective	tool	for	collective	direct	action.	The	breakdown	of	trade-union	mediation	at	the	time	made	it	all	the	more	likely	that	workers	would	resort	to	such	unmediated	forms	of	direct	action.	Brian	Ashton	described	a	similar	situation	at	Halewood.	To	relieve	the	pace	of	production,	workers	would	routinely	throw	components	away,	so	they	could	take	a	break	while	waiting	for	stock	to	be	replenished.	The	theft	of	car	radios	became	so	prevalent	that	they	could	only	be	installed	under	the	surveillance	of	a	security	man	and	immediately	before	hauliers	took	responsibility	for	the	vehicles.	Another	example	involved	an	individual	worker	refusing	to	apply	the	solvent	used	to	install	car	windows	after	management	failed	to	address	his	health	concerns	about	the	safety	of	working	with	the	chemicals.431	Other	former	militants	at	Ford	were	keen	to	distance	themselves	from	these	activities	though.	This	might	have	been	due	to	concerns	not	to	give	credence	to	the	right-wing	image	of	car	workers	as	wreckers,	as	well	as	scepticism	about	the	political	relevance	of	such	activity,	which	was	often	atomised	and	unfocused.	While	these	concerns	highlight	the	hazard	of	romanticising	such	activity,	the	everyday	occurrence	of	sabotage	reflected	how	estranged	workers	were	from	deskilled	and	monotonous	assembly-line	work.	Moreover,	such	actions	also	took	on	an	organised	and	politically	motivated	character	on	occasion,	as	Hayling’s	account	made	clear.			
																																								 																					430	Alan	Hayling,	2014.	431	Ashton.	
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The	Union	Leadership	Cannot	Carry	the	Day,	1976	to	1978	
During	the	1976	IMF	crisis	Treasury	projections	of	a	budget	deficit,	which	proved	wildly	accurate,	precipitated	a	run	on	the	pound	that	took	sterling	to	its	lowest	price	against	the	dollar	to	date.	Monetarist	austerity	policies,	which	the	Labour	government	adopted	as	a	condition	of	accepting	a	bailout	loan,	severely	undermined	the	terms	of	the	Social	Contract.432	‘At	this	precise	moment	the	struggle	of	Ford	Dagenham	workers	burst	on	to	the	scene’,	as	a	Red	Notes	pamphlet	described	dramatically.433	This	almost	suggested	that	the	intense	shop-floor	unrest,	which	coincided	with	the	intervention	of	the	IMF,	came	about	as	a	direct	response	to	attacks	on	sterling	by	currency	speculators.	An	overly	literal	reading	of	this	might	defy	credibility.	Such	rhetoric,	however,	highlighted	how	the	government	increasingly	came	under	attack	on	two	fronts,	as	it	struggled	to	meet	the	expectations	of	big	business,	while	confronted	by	irreconcilable	demands	from	workers.	Moreover,	one	of	the	most	violent	moments	of	unrest	in	the	British	subsidiary’s	history	occurred	on	exactly	the	same	day	that	the	pound	suffered	record	losses	against	the	dollar.	On	Tuesday	28	September	a	riot	on	the	nightshift	in	the	Dagenham	Body	Plant	erupted	out	of	a	minor	dispute	after	twelve	workers	walked	out	over	manning	levels.	Management	responded	by	laying	off	one-thousand	of	their	workmates.	‘Rioting	car	workers	went	on	a	rampage	of	destruction’	the	Daily	Mirror	reported.	An	angry	mob	damaged	vehicles,	smashed	windows	and	set	fires	alight	inside	the	plant.	When	police	arrived	they	met	with	‘a	hail	of	missiles’	before	workers	locked	the	gates	and	turned	fire	hoses	on	the	authorities.434	
																																								 																					432	Thorpe,	II,	p.	143.	433	The	Little	Red	Blue	Book,	p.	7.	434	Patrick	Long,	Stuart	Greig,	and	Palmer	Jill,	‘Rioters	Smash	up	Ford	Plant’,	
Daily	Mirror	(London,	29	September	1976),	p.	1.	
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Within	two	months	of	this	explosive	incident,	Big	Flame	held	its	second	National	Conference	at	which	debate	focused	on	the	best	approach	to	intervening	in	the	crisis.	Delegates	adopted	a	strategy	referred	to	as	‘the	project’,	which	reaffirmed	the	group’s	mass	working-class	political	orientation.	Afterwards	a	draft	manifesto	discussed	the	formation	of	‘a	new	organisation	forged	inside	the	struggle	and	the	experiences	of	vanguard	elements	of	the	working	class’,	indicating	what	the	approach	entailed.	Such	an	approach	was	counterposed	to	the	strategies	of	two	Trotskyist	groups.	The	Socialist	Workers	Party	was	seen	as	treating	‘the	movement	only	as	an	appendix	to	the	party’,	while	the	International	Marxist	Group’s	attempt	at	a	‘regroupment	of	vanguard	organisations	on	the	revolutionary	left’	was	seen	as	too	divorced	from	‘the	masses	and	their	struggle’.	435	Instead	of	either	of	these	strategies,	Big	Flame	aimed	to	build	an	autonomist	politics	orientated	towards	the	working	class.		In	more	general	terms,	‘the	project’	failed	in	its	objective	of	promoting	the	formation	of	an	organisation	capable	of	major	political	interventions	from	this	standpoint.	Such	an	outcome	was	hardly	surprising,	since	Big	Flame’s	membership	by	all	accounts	never	exceeded	more	than	a	few	hundred	people.	That	said,	the	
Draft	Manifesto	set	out	the	perspective	that	informed	their	intervention	at	Ford,	which	had	a	much	more	tangible	impact	with	wider	ramifications.	This	approach	was	informed	by	an	analysis	of	changes	to	the	‘composition	of	the	working	class’,	since	the	technical	recomposition	of	labour	achieved	by	the	introduction	of	the	Fordist	assembly	line.	This	included	an	analysis	of	sectional,	racial	and	sexual	divisions	within	the	working	class.	Industrial	production	was	situated	in	relation	to	the	role	of	housework	in	the	social	reproduction	of	labour	
																																								 																					435	Big	Flame,	Towards	a	New	Revolutionary	Socialist	Organisation:	A	Draft	
Manifesto	for	Discussion	(Liverpool:	Big	Flame,	1977),	p.	viii.	
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power.436	Since	‘there	can	only	be	effective	unity	when	all	sectors	of	the	class	are	strong	enough	to	see	that	their	own	demands	are	taken	up’,	autonomous	struggles	for	Black	and	Women’s	liberation	were	also	seen	as	of	political	significance.437	The	same	month	as	the	second	Big	Flame	Conference,	the	group’s	much	larger	Italian	‘sister	organisation’	Lotta	Continua	also	held	a	congress	in	Rimini.	This	saw	the	organisation	undergo	a	crisis	in	which	internal	criticisms	from	women	members	played	a	central	part.	It	resulted	in	the	dissolution	of	the	organisation.	That	March	Bologna	became	the	scene	of	major	violent	unrest	after	police	shot	dead	Lotta	Continua	militant	Francesco	Lorusso,	a	key	moment	in	the	political	shift	from	operaismo	to	autonomia.438	As	well	as	more	diffuse	ways	of	organising,	this	transition	saw	broader	social	issues	associated	with	the	women’s	movement	and	youth	culture	gain	greater	prominence	without	entirely	displacing	industrial	politics.	Big	Flame’s	publication	of	the	Draft	Manifesto	coincided	with	this	moment	of	social	upheaval	in	Italy.	In	many	ways,	the	intensity	of	the	situation	and	the	prominence	of	these	politics	in	Italy	underscored	Big	Flame’s	marginality	within	a	relatively	stable	political	context	in	Britain.	That	said,	Big	Flame	managed	to	address	the	challenges	raised	by	the	demand	for	women’s	autonomy	in	particular	without	facing	such	an	internal	crisis.	In	some	senses,	the	way	in	which	this	mixed-gender	group	in	Britain	developed	a	broader	understanding	of	autonomy	within	the	working	class	prefigured	developments	in	Italy.	While	gender	politics	raised	issues	for	Big	Flame	from	the	early	1970s	onwards,	women	managed	to	articulate	feminist	politics	inside	the	group	without	feeling	a	need	to	break	away,	unlike	their	Italian	sisters	or	others	on	the	left	in	Britain.439																																										 																					436	Big	Flame,	Towards	a	New	Revolutionary	Socialist	Organisation:	A	Draft	
Manifesto	for	Discussion,	pp.	3–7.	437	Ibid.	438	Red	Notes,	Italy,	1977-8:	Living	with	an	Earthquake,	pp.	17–35	&	81–96.	439	See,	for	instance,	‘We	Won’t	Pay:	Women’s	Struggle	on	Tower	Hill’.	
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Another	aspect	of	Big	Flame’s	politics	shifted	around	the	same	period.	By	spring	1977	the	group’s	hard-line	position	on	shop	stewards	had	already	begun	to	shift.	Marcello	Dall’Aglio	clarified	the	group’s	current	stance	in	a	letter	on	behalf	of	the	National	Secretariat	in	response	to	a	query	from	a	comrade	who	was	not	a	member.	While	referring	to	trade	unions	as	‘the	organisational	expression	of	the	reformist	side	of	the	working	class’,	Dall’Aglio	explained	that	Big	Flame	members	were	not	barred	from	standing	as	shop	stewards.	In	fact,	he	made	clear	that	some	already	did	so.	He	went	on	to	describe	how	‘our	approach	to	the	unions	is	a	tactical	one’	based	on	their	credibility	with	workers	in	any	specific	situation.	The	group’s	position	continued	to	emphasise	the	need	to	develop	alternative	forms	of	organisation	that	promoted	working-class	autonomy.440	As	the	revolutionary	optimism	of	the	early	1970s	wore	off	though,	Big	Flame	combined	such	aims	with	a	more	practical	attitude	towards	engagement	with	the	unionism.	Back	at	Ford,	the	Shop	Stewards	Committee	in	the	Dagenham	PTA	Plant	showed	signs	of	increased	militancy	with	a	policy	to	resist	unpaid	lay-offs.	Such	a	stance	reflected	how	the	assembly	plant	workforce,	which	epitomised	the	mass	worker	from	Big	Flame’s	perspective,	was	also	the	most	susceptible	to	lay-offs.	Since	the	final	assembly	of	an	automobile	required	all	the	component	parts	to	be	available,	this	stage	of	production	was	the	most	vulnerable	to	disruption.	The	struggle	over	unpaid	lay-offs	came	to	a	head	in	Dagenham	in	June	1977.	The	incident	began	with	the	suspension	of	a	single	worker	on	the	door-line	section	of	the	Body	Plant,	Olatunji	‘Bill’	Taylor	by	his	supervisor,	the	precise	details	of	which	remain	unclear.	This	soon	led	to	widespread	unrest.	Three	days	later	the	Ford	Workers	Group	issued	a	leaflet,	claiming	that	Taylor	‘had	a	sore	arm	and	
																																								 																					440	Salford,	Working	Class	Movement	Library,	uncatalogued,	‘Big	Flame	Internal	Bulletin’,	May	1977.	
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asked	to	be	moved,	temporarily,	to	a	lighter	job’.441	The	Evening	Standard	presented	the	incident	somewhat	differently:	Trouble	flared	after	a	worker	operating	a	machine	for	three	years	was	told	he	was	doing	it	wrongly	and	was	ordered	to	change.	He	refused	and	was	suspended	for	three	days.442	Whatever	exactly	took	place,	his	suspension	resulted	in	workmates	on	the	same	section	walking	out	in	solidarity	with	Taylor.	Management	then	responded	by	laying	2500	workers	off	from	the	PTA	Plant	and	1500	others	from	the	Body	Plant	later	that	day.	This	triggered	the	policy	adopted	by	assembly-plant	shop	stewards	the	previous	month	to	resist	any	further	unpaid	lay-offs.		Management	laid-off	the	entire	workforce	of	the	Body	Plant	one	week	into	the	dispute.	In	response,	‘workers	barricaded	themselves	in	the	plant	and	occupied	the	canteen	as	a	headquarters’.	The	Morning	Star	reported	that	workers	‘dug	seven	mock	graves	outside	the	foundry—six	for	named	supervisors	and	one	for	management’	in	a	provocative	display	of	propaganda.443	A	more	detailed	account	in	The	Little	Red	Blue	Book	gave	the	piece	a	more	nuanced	meaning	than	a	simple	threat	of	violence	towards	management.	The	graves	also	included	a	tomb	of	the	‘Unknown	Ford	Worker’,	as	well	as	those	of	union	officials	Mick	Murphy	and	Johnny	Davies.	Completing	the	scene,	a	gallows	replete	with	hangman’s	noose	carried	the	message	‘Ford	Disciplinary	Procedure—Stage	6’—a	joke	not	lost	on	those	familiar	with	the	five	stages	of	the	actual	process.	This	unapologetically	partisan	account	ended	on	a	note	of	bravado	by	warning	that	‘next	time	[...]	the	gallows	will	be	for	real’.	This	did	not	gloss	over	the	anger	and	militancy	that	this	display	was	clearly	intended	to	convey.	It	made	clear,	however,	that	those	behind	the	stunt	placed	responsibility	for	the	violence	of	the	situation																																									 																					441	Reproduced	in	The	Little	Red	Blue	Book,	p.	28.	442	Norman	Leith,	‘22,000	Face	Total	Ford	Shut-Down’,	Evening	Standard	(London,	17	June	1977),	p.	1	(p.	1).	443	‘Pickets	on	Patrol	at	Dagenham’,	Morning	Star	(London,	21	July	1977),	p.	3.	
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with	management	and	directed	their	hostility	towards	trade-union	officials	too,	not	to	mention	the	humour	of	the	piece.444	By	21	July	disruption	had	spread	to	Southampton	and	Langley,	bringing	the	total	number	of	workers	laid	off	to	16,000.	The	next	day	the	Financial	Times	reported	that	‘a	picket	line	of	fork-lift	trucks	and	barrels	again	prevented	supplies	from	entering	some	gates	of	the	plant’	With	industrial	action	still	ongoing	the	following	month,	management	and	officials	called	a	mass	meeting,	so	that	the	unions	could	recommend	a	return	to	work	on	terms	that	had	been	rejected	just	a	few	days	earlier.	‘“Go	Back”	plea	at	Ford	Plant’	announced	a	front-page	headline	in	the	Morning	Star,	suggesting	Communist	Party	support	for	this	attempt	to	end	the	strike.	The	author	of	the	piece	took	seriously	an	undertaking	by	officials	to	bring	the	issue	up	again	when	contract	negotiations	began	that	July.	He	made	no	mention	of	PTA	Convenor	Brian	Elliott’s	opposition	to	such	a	policy	though,	nor	to	the	opinions	of	the	striking	workers	on	his	section.445	Meanwhile,	the	PTA	Shop	Stewards	Committee	circulated	a	written	statement,	calling	on	assembly	plant	workers	to	reject	the	offer	and	continue	with	industrial	action.	‘Dagenham	trade	union	officials,	in	liaison	with	the	company’,	it	announced,	‘have	done	everything	they	can	over	the	past	two	weeks	to	demoralise	us	and	drive	us	back	to	work’.446	It	went	on	to	describe	how	officials	had	excluded	any	PTA	shop	stewards	from	attending	talks	about	the	dispute	held	with	union	representatives	from	other	plants.	Even	Elliott	had,	allegedly,	been	banned	from	addressing	the	meeting	because	of	his	refusal	to	support	the	settlement.	The	following	day,	the	Morning	Star	reported	that	‘officials	were	unable	to	present	a	13-point	peace	formula	to	an	angry	mass	meeting	of	the	assembly	plant	
																																								 																					444	The	Little	Red	Blue	Book,	p.	43.	445	Brewster,	Charlie,	‘“Go	Back”	Plea	at	Ford	Plant’,	Morning	Star	(London,	28	June	1977),	p.	1.	446	Reproduced	in	The	Little	Red	Blue	Book,	pp.	32–33.	
	 171	
yesterday’,	indicating	that	such	strong-arm	tactics	back	fired.447	According	to	the	
Financial	Times,	the	gathering	‘broke	up	when	shop	stewards	ejected	full	time	union	officials’	from	the	meeting	and	the	deal	was	rejected.448	More	details	came	out	afterwards	in	an	article	published	in	the	first	issue	of	
Fraud	News,	a	paper	initially	published	jointly	by	the	Ford	Workers	Group	and	a	new	shop	floor	organisation	the	Ford	Langley	Action	Committee	(FLAC).	This	piece	described	the	torrent	of	abuse	that	met	TGWU	official	Fred	‘Blake	the	snake’	when	he	tried	to	address	the	meeting.	PTA	workers	then	took	over	the	platform:	The	mike	was	then	in	the	control	of	the	workers.	Not	just	the	convenors	or	the	stewards,	but	the	workers	too!	A	very	rare	event	for	Ford	Dagenham.449	Blake	retreated	to	a	company	office,	and	management	cut	the	electricity	supply	to	the	public	address	system.	A	shop	steward	then	produced	a	megaphone	before	the	power	was	restored	and	the	meeting	resumed.	The	FWG	took	this	as	a	lesson	in	the	sort	of	tactics	needed	to	maintain	‘democratic	control’	of	such	decision-making	process.	Later	that	month	five	workers	from	Langley	gave	an	interview	to	The	
Leveller.	This	described	to	the	left-wing	magazine’s	readership	how	the	dispute	led	to	the	formation	of	the	Ford	Langley	Action	Committee	emerged.	FLAC	began	as	an	‘initiative	of	Big	Flame	militants’,	they	explained,	before	qualifying	this	remark	with	a	caveat,	‘but	they	now	see	it	as	taking	over	from	Big	Flame’	within	the	plant.	They	also	referred	to	FLAC	as	‘the	local	part’	of	the	Ford	Workers	Group.450	The	piece	went	on	to	discuss	how	assembly-line	workers	constituted	half	of	the	plant’s	total	
																																								 																					447	‘Angry	Ford’s	Workers	Stay	Out’,	Morning	Star	(London,	29	June	1979),	p.	1.	 448	David	Churchill,	‘Decision	To-Day	on	Ford	Peace	Bid’,	Financial	Times	(London,	30	June	1977),	p.	15.	449	‘We	Are	Not	Casual	Labour’,	Fraud	News	(London,	October	1977),	p.	4.	450	John	Carnegie,	‘Voices	from	the	Shopfloor’,	The	Leveller,	8,	1977,	28–29.	
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workforce,	but	remained	underrepresented	on	the	Shop	Stewards	Committee	with	its	twenty	other	members	easily	able	to	out-vote	their	eight	representatives.	During	the	dispute	in	Dagenham,	management	in	Langley	announced	lay-offs	‘at	half-an-hours	notice	without	pay’	for	assembly	lines	workers.451	Members	of	the	workforce	then	decided	at	a	mass	meeting	to	picket	the	plant.	The	plant	convenor	and	most	of	the	shop	stewards,	however,	opposed	this	move.	Despite	their	opposition,	industrial	action	initially	had	some	impact	with	haulage	drivers	refusing	to	break	the	picket.	Without	union	support	the	picket	quickly	collapsed	though,	leaving	just	thirty	workers	to	hold	out	with	only	two	stewards	among	them.	These	militants	then	went	on	to	set	up	FLAC.	Meanwhile	with	the	strike	still	ongoing	back	in	Dagenham,	another	mass	meeting	took	place	on	Thursday	30	June,	just	two	days	after	PTA	workers	last	voted	to	continue	industrial	action.	This	time	union	officials	recommended	a	new	agreement	including	revised	procedures	that	would	have	given	assembly-plant	workers	a	further	twenty-four	hours	notice	in	case	of	any	future	lay-offs.	Management	still	made	no	concessions	over	lay-off	pay	though.	According	to	a	
Morning	Star	report	of	a	‘sometimes	bitter	meeting’,	PTA	Convenor	Brian	Elliot	acknowledged	that	‘the	final	vote	was	clear’,	despite	expressing	his	personal	opposition	to	the	outcome.452	The	Financial	Times	gave	a	very	different	account	of	proceedings,	suggesting	that	the	CPGB	newspaper’s	version	of	events	downplayed	how	deeply	divisions	still	ran.	This	piece	cited	Elliot	as	saying	‘that	while	he	would	abide	by	the	decision,	there	would	be	“an	investigation	into	the	vote”’.453	The	PTA	convenor	went	on	to	allege	that	as	many	as	one	third	of	those	who	had	taken	part	in	the	vote	actually																																									 																					451	Ibid.	452	‘Ford	Workers	Yes	to	Lay-Off	Plan’,	Morning	Star	(London,	1	July	1977),	p.	3.	 453	Alan	Pike,	‘Assembly	Plant	Men	at	Ford	to	Go	Back’,	Financial	Times	(London,	1	July	1977),	p.	15.	
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worked	in	other	plants,	calling	into	question	the	legitimacy	of	the	entire	process.	Work	still	resumed	after	nineteen	days	of	industrial	action,	which	had	cost	Ford	an	estimated	18,000	vehicles	worth	£47,000,000	in	lost	production.	The	account	in	the	Financial	Times	was	remarkably	consistent	with	the	Ford	Workers	Group’s	version	of	events.	This	accused	management	of	packing	the	meeting	with	‘scabs	from	other	plants’	and	claimed	that	‘half	of	our	workers	were	not	notified’	of	its	occurrence.454	Despite	this	setback,	the	FWG	assessment	of	the	situation	in	the	PTA	Plant	still	remained	positive	on	the	whole.	The	level	of	self-organisation	and	self-confidence	among	workers	compared	favourably	with	that	at	any	time	since	the	1962	defeat	of	the	Dagenham	shop	stewards,	while	increased	notice	of	lay-offs	represented	a	shift	in	the	balance	of	power	in	their	favour.	Afterwards	the	British	state	became	further	embroiled	in	industrial	relations	at	Ford	through	the	firm’s	‘Erika’	Programme,	a	project	to	replace	the	small	family	car	the	Escort	with	a	new	model.	Within	a	month	of	the	strike	the	Private	Secretary	to	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Industry	wrote	to	his	opposite	number	from	10	Downing	Street,	briefing	the	Prime	Minister	on	Ford’s	plans.	This	held	out	the	possibility	of	more	than	£500,000,000	worth	of	industrial	investment,	addressing	a	key	government	economic	target.	The	future	of	9500	existing	jobs	and	2500	new	ones	were	at	stake.	Senior	executives	at	a	corporate	multinational	level	considered	locating	another	plant	at	two	possible	sites	in	Britain,	one	in	the	North	East	of	England	and	the	other	in	South	Wales.	These	two	locations	fell	within	Special	Development	Areas,	a	category	covering	regions	where	industrial	investment	attracted	financial	support	from	both	central	and	local	government.	This	meant	
																																								 																					454	Reproduced	in	The	Little	Red	Blue	Book,	p.	36.	
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that	public-sector	grants	worth	£150,000,000	promised	to	cover	almost	a	third	of	the	company’s	total	investment	costs.455	Despite	such	incentives,	the	decision	to	choose	either	of	these	locations	was	not	a	foregone	conclusion,	a	point	the	senior	civil	servant	emphasised	in	his	letter:	As	we	all	recognise	however,	there	are	other	problems	which	Ford	will	have	to	assess	on	a	hard-headed	business	basis,	particularly	continuity	of	supply,	and	on	this	the	recent	strike	in	Dagenham	cannot	have	helped	our	case.	Indeed,	in	the	judgment	of	the	Chairman	of	Ford	UK,	the	chances	of	the	project	being	located	here	are	less	than	50:50.	However,	the	Secretary	of	State	has	written	to	Ford	reminding	them	of	the	importance	which	the	Government	attach	to	the	location	of	this	programme	and	offering	further	discussion	before	any	final	decision	is	reached.456	Concern	to	secure	this	investment	drew	Ministers	further	into	the	micro-politics	of	shop-floor	conflict	at	Ford.	National	pay	negotiations	at	the	firm	also	became	the	cause	for	greater	political	concern.	When	the	contract	expired	that	October,	it	provided	an	initial	test	of	phase	two	of	the	government’s	incomes	policy.	Beforehand,	the	unions	submitted	a	‘very	moderate	claim’,	an	achievement	with	which	Big	Flame	credited	Communist	Deputy	Convenor	of	the	Dagenham	Body	Plant	Sid	Harraway.	No	doubt,	this	reflected	the	CPGB’s	ambivalence	towards	the	Social	Contract.	Harraway	originally	proposed	to	the	Ford	Convenors	Committee	a	ten-point	claim	including	a	fifteen	per	cent	pay	rise,	which	then	went	before	the	Shop	Stewards	Conference	in	Coventry	that	April.	While	this	threatened	to	breach	the	government’s	ten	per	cent	threshold,	it	still	left	the	living	standards	of	Ford	workers	severely	eroded	by	inflation.	Such	a	stance	shielded	the	Labour	government	from	the	political	fallout	of																																									 																					455	London,	National	Archives,	PREM	16/1702,	Letter	from	M.	J.	Mitchell	to	Nigel	Wicks	Esq,	11	July	1977.			456	Ibid.	
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more	vigorous	opposition	to	pay	restraint.	An	amendment	tabled	by	shop	stewards	at	the	conference,	‘calling	for	a	£20	and	a	35	hour	week’,	encountered	procedural	obstruction,	preventing	it	from	being	put	to	a	vote	by	delegates.457	At	the	only	mass	meeting	called	anywhere	to	consider	the	claim,	another	Communist	the	Chairman	of	the	Langley	Shop	Stewards	Committee	ruled	out	of	order	a	resolution	in	support	of	these	demands.	When	official	negotiations	opened	that	September	the	company	responded	with	an	initial	offer	of	between	8.5	and	10.5	per	cent.	This	received	a	‘cautious	response’	from	Moss	Evans,	the	incoming	TGWU	General	Secretary	and	chairman	of	the	union	side	of	the	FNJNC,	who	reserved	further	comment	until	after	consulting	senior	stewards.458	Eventually,	a	deal	was	reached	without	any	industrial	action,	which	fell	just	outside	the	government	limits,	but	avoided	any	serious	political	fall	out.459	Then	in	the	New	Year	government	ministers	became	preoccupied	by	unofficial	action	at	Halewood.	Industrial	unrest	stemmed	from	an	attempt	by	management	to	impose	changes	to	production	in	the	Press	Shop	the	previous	autumn.	Beforehand	workers	on	this	section	rotated	between	tasks	every	hour,	a	concession	made	to	alleviate	the	monotony	of	constantly	repeating	the	same	activity	all	day	on	every	shift.	The	time	lost	as	a	result	of	workers	moving	between	different	tasks,	however,	represented	a	cost	for	Ford.	As	Managing	Director	Terrence	Beckett	described	to	Secretary	of	State	for	Industry	Eric	Varley,	the	company	also	associated	this	practice	with	poorer	quality	output	than	that	of	other	European	Ford	plants.	Beckett	warned	the	minister	that	the	loss	of	14,000	vehicles	worth	of	production	to	industrial	action	gave																																									 																					457	‘Ford:	Through	the	Pay	Guide-Lines’,	Big	Flame:	Paper	of	the	Revolutionary	
Socialist	Organisation	Big	Flame	(Liverpool,	November	1977),	p.	3.	458	Pike,	Alan,	‘Ford	Keeps	to	10%	Offer	as	Vital	Pay	Talks	Start’,	Financial	
Times	(London,	17	September	1977),	p.	24.	459	‘Settlements	since	August	1’,	Financial	Times	(London,	8	November	1977),	p.	18.	
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ammunition	to	opponents	of	the	‘Erika’	programme,	jeopardising	future	investment	in	Britain.	Varley	then	informed	the	TGWU	General	Secretary	of	the	situation.	‘Ford	have	already	been	in	touch	with	Moss	Evans’,	he	told	colleagues	in	cabinet	afterwards,	‘and	they	have	formed	the	impression	that	this	is	a	case	where	the	union	leadership	cannot	carry	the	day	with	their	membership’,	warning	them	that	trade-union	officials	were	unlikely	to	resolve	the	situation.460		
Chapter	Conclusion	
The	Social	Contract	set	out	to	resolve	an	ongoing	crisis	by	further	integrating	the	trade	unions	into	the	political	system	for	regulating	British	capitalism.	This	further	exacerbated	the	break	down	in	trade	union	mediation	of	industrial	relations	in	general	and	at	Ford	in	particular.	Against	this	backdrop,	Big	Flame’s	intervention	began	to	have	a	tangible	effect	with	the	‘Friday	Night	is	Music	Night’	campaign.	Such	a	tactical	approach,	which	sought	to	generalise	the	shop-floor	refusal	of	work	by	more	militant	sections	of	the	workforce,	put	Italian	workerist	theory	into	practice.	At	the	same	time	Operaismo	began	to	have	some	wider	theoretical	influence	on	the	far-left	in	Britain,	too.	It	informed	the	labour	process	debate,	highlighting	how	technological	development	came	about	in	response	to	workers’	struggle.	The	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	also	shaped	contemporary	studies	of	industrial	sabotage	and	a	co-research	project	on	the	British	automobile	sector.	Meanwhile,	the	situation	at	Ford	remained	unresolved	and	unmediated	shop-floor	unrest	became	increasingly	intense	after	the	IMF	crisis.	Workplace	groups	with	autonomist	politics	then	emerged	at	Dagenham	and	Langley,	which	were	
																																								 																					460	London,	National	Archives,	PREM	16/1702,	Letter	from	Eric	Varley	to	Albert	Booth,	3	February	1978.	
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coordinated	within	Ford’s	workforce.	Along	with	Big	Flame,	they	would	take	the	initiative	the	following	year.		 	
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5.	One	in	the	Eye	for	Sunny	Jim,	1978	
I	believe	it	is	crucial	that	the	plan	we	develop	is	one	which	
our	employes	[sic]	can	be	persuaded	to	accept.	The	certain	
alternative	of	a	prolonged	dispute	would	have	a	devastating	
effect	on	the	short	and	long	term	future	of	Ford	of	Britain	
and	its	contribution	to	the	British	economy.461		 	 	 	 	 H.	A.	Poling,	Chairman	Ford	of	Europe		
I	note	the	pessimism	of	your	letter	but	I	hope	that	it	does	not	
mean	that	you	intend	to	concede	claims	only	because	they	
are	going	to	be	pressed	with	determination.	I	cannot	agree	
that	the	difficulties	that	must	result	from	operating	within	
the	guidelines	will	be	more	serious	than	giving	way,	
although	I	recognise	that	standing	firm	may	have	serious	
short-term	adverse	consequences.462	James	Callaghan,	Prime	Minister		The	1978	Ford	national	pay	strike,	while	not	quite	the	longest	in	the	firm’s	history,	had	more	profound	political	ramifications	than	any	previous	dispute	in	the	British	subsidiary’s	history.	The	company	generally	played	the	role	of	a	reluctant	third	party	throughout	this	dispute,	as	we	shall	see	in	this	chapter.	Instead,	a	precarious	Labour	administration	confronted	workers	at	the	firm,	whose	living	standards	came	under	attack	through	a	combination	of	rising	prices	and	government	imposed	wage	restraint.	Meanwhile,	high	labour	turnover	and	recruitment	issues	at	the	firm	explained	management’s	reluctance	to	support	such	a	macroeconomic	strategy.	This	breakdown	underscored	the	growing	division	between	the	interests	of	the	
																																								 																					461	London,	National	Archives,	T377/311	‘Pay	of	Staff	in	the	Motor	Car	Industry	Pay	Policy	1978-79	Ford	Motor	Company’,	Letter	from	H.	A.	Poling	to	the	Prime	Minister,	7	September	1978.	462	London,	National	Archives,	T377/311	‘Pay	of	Staff	in	the	Motor	Car	Industry	Pay	Policy	1978-79	Ford	Motor	Company’,	Letter	from	the	Prime	Minister	to	H.	A.	Poling,	13	September	1978.	
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multinational	corporation	and	those	of	the	British	state,	which	had	been	closely	aligned	throughout	the	post-war	era.	The	extent	to	which	worker	self-organised	independently	of	the	trade	unions	during	this	dispute	also	set	it	apart	from	previous	national	pay	strikes	at	Ford.	Conflict	between	the	shop	stewards	and	trade	union	officials,	who	rarely	if	ever	supported	the	company’s	workforce	in	such	conflicts,	ran	through	the	history	of	labour	relations	at	the	firm.	Increasingly	effective	interventions	informed	by	autonomist	politics	followed	on	from	the	practice	of	documenting	and	disseminating	accounts	of	shop-floor	unrest,	which	went	back	to	the	formation	of	the	libertarian	socialist	group	Solidarity	in	1960.	Such	an	approach	was	informed	by	a	critique	of	rank-and-file	trade	unionism	and	a	focus	on	unmediated	forms	of	struggle	by	shop	floor	workers.	While	spontaneous	industrial	actions	occurred	during	previous	national	strikes,	the	extent	to	which	workers	organised	autonomously	of	the	unions	in	this	dispute	was	unprecedented	at	Ford’s	British	subsidiary.	The	dispute	also	had	more	profound	historical	significance	that	linked	it	to	a	wider	moment	of	transition,	the	final	turning	point	in	the	protracted	crisis	of	the	long	1970s.			
Send	your	Steward	to	Coventry,	the	Background	
Six	months	before	the	current	contract	was	due	to	expire	at	the	end	of	October	1978,	shop-floor	militants	from	plants	across	the	country	launched	a	campaign	of	their	own	for	the	upcoming	round	of	pay	negotiations.	This	began	with	a	‘group	of	ordinary	workers	from	several	Ford	plants’,	as	they	described	themselves	to	their	workmates	afterwards,	calling	a	meeting	in	London	on	29	April	1978.463	Before	
																																								 																					463	Personal	Collection,	[Ford	Workers	Combine],	‘Send	Your	Steward	to	Coventry’	[1978].	’Note	the	difference	between	how	Combine	members	described	themselves	at	the	time	as	a	‘group	of	ordinary	workers’	and	their	subsequent	representation	as	’an	independent	shop	stewards’	movement’	in	the	account	of	the	
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formal	pay	negotiations	had	even	begun,	these	members	of	the	workforce	took	the	initiative	away	from	management	and	the	unions—senior	lay	representatives	and	full-time	officials	alike—for	the	first	time	in	the	subsidiary’s	history.	This	marked	the	beginning	of	a	new	national	organisation	the	Ford	Workers	Combine	(FWC).	The	Combine	outlasted	this	specific	pay	round	and	went	on	to	play	a	part	in	industrial	unrest	at	the	firm	for	years	to	come.	Its	members	even	attempted	to	mount	a	transnational	response	to	a	corporation	that	had	increasingly	integrated	operations	across	Europe,	since	the	late	1960s.	The	Combine	began	by	calling	for	‘a	simpler,	more	unified	claim—one	that	is	worth	fighting	for’—in	contrast	with	the	14-point	‘shopping	list’	submitted	by	the	unions	the	previous	year.	Instead,	the	group	proposed	three	clear	demands:	a	twenty-pound	pay	rise,	a	five-hour	reduction	to	the	working	week,	and	a	contract	with	‘no	strings’	(i.e.	no	productivity	deals,	penalty	clauses	or	changes	to	manning	levels).	From	the	outset	the	FWC	displayed	an	ambivalent	attitude	towards	trade	unionism.	‘We	are’,	the	first	Combine	leaflet	declared,	‘all	active	Union	members—and	we	don’t	set	ourselves	up	as	an	alternative	to	the	Union—	but	we	do	believe	in	controlling	our	own	claim.’464	While	firmly	situating	themselves	within	the	trade-union	movement,	FWC	members	also	asserted	their	autonomy	as	workers	from	the	unions.	This	went	beyond	rhetoric	and	was	put	into	practice	by	operating	outside	the	structural	boundaries	of	trade	unionism,	including	the	increasingly	formalised	systems	of	lay	representation.		From	the	outset	the	Combine	provided	a	vehicle	for	‘ordinary’	Ford	workers,	many	of	the	more	militant	stewards	among	them,	to	organise	collectively.	Yet,	it	also	came	about	as	a	result	of	a	deliberate	political	intervention.	Combine	Secretary	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 				Winter	of	Discontent	most	attentive	to	their	role	in	these	events.	Tara	Martin	López,	The	Winter	of	Discontent:	Myth,	Memory,	and	History,	Studies	in	Labour	History,	4	(Liverpool:	Liverpool	University	Press,	2014),	p.	73.	464	Ibid.	
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Alan	Hayling	explained	as	much	in	an	article	he	wrote,	under	the	alias	Jack	Brown,	for	a	pamphlet	issued	by	Big	Flame,	a	group	of	which	he	was	a	member:	The	Organisation	[i.e.	the	Combine]	didn’t	come	out	of	the	blue.	Its	first	meeting	was	called	by	three	workers	groups	which	already	had	a	long	history:	The	Ford	Langley	Action	Committee	[FLAC],	the	Ford	Dagenham	Workers’	Group	[FWG]	and	the	Ford	Halewood	Big	Flame	Group.465	Hayling	worked	at	Langley,	a	truck	plant	situated	to	the	west	of	London,	linking	FLAC,	a	workers’	group	at	that	factory,	to	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy.	The	other	two	groups	the	Ford	Workers	Group	in	Dagenham	and	Liverpool	Big	Flame	clearly	shared	similar	connections.	On	the	other	hand,	the	Combine	would	have	a	much	broader	political	make-up	with	‘members	of	the	SWP,	Big	Flame,	the	IMG,	Militant,	a	small	Marxist-Leninist	group	and	dissident	members	of	the	CP’	organising	collectively	in	a	‘non-sectarian	atmosphere’	alongside	workers	with	no	such	party	political	affiliations.466	Big	Flame	played	a	key	role	in	initiating	the	Combine	as	a	means	for	Ford	workers	to	self-organise.	Crucially,	such	a	tactical	intervention	left	strategic	control	on	the	shop	floor.	By	then	the	group’s	role	extended	beyond	Halewood,	where	it	organised	continuously	from	the	early	1970s	onwards,	as	indicated	by	Big	Flame	member	Alan	Hayling’s	position	as	National	Secretary	of	the	Combine,	while	working	in	Slough.	The	situation	in	Dagenham	was	more	complicated,	since	the	East	London	Big	Flame	(ELBF)	was	no	longer	affiliated	to	the	organisation	nationally	and	the	ELBF	Ford	Group	was	no	longer	active.	The	FWG	still	shared	broadly	similar	politics,	though,	as	well	as	the	ongoing	involvement	of	individuals,	perhaps	most	notably	the	external	militant	and	Red	Notes	publisher	Ed	Emery.	
																																								 																					465	Jack	Brown	and	Big	Flame	Industrial	Commission,	‘The	Ford	Workers	Group	(Combine):	How	One	Rank	and	File	Group	Played	a	Major	Role	in	the	Struggle’,	in	Organising	to	Win:	A	Political	Manual	about	How	to	Stop	Losing	
Struggles	at	Work	(Liverpool:	Big	Flame,	1981),	p.	30	(emphasis	in	the	original).	466	Ibid.	
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A	report	by	the	Big	Flame	Industrial	Commission	to	the	organisation’s	third	national	conference	that	May	set	out	plans	for	workplace	organising	that	drew	on	‘ideas	about	mass	work’,	which	constituted	for	Big	Flame	members	a	‘key	area	of	difference’	between	their	own	perspective	and	that	of	‘other	political	tendencies	on	the	revolutionary	left’.	In	practice,	the	Industrial	Commission	aimed	to	establish	‘a	genuine	rank	and	file	movement	(small	r,	small	f)	which	goes	beyond	the	limitations	of	trade	unionism,	and	which	also	goes	beyond	the	economism	and	the	party	domination	of	the	SWP	“Rank	and	File	Movement”’.467	For	those	who	initiated	the	Combine,	it	represented	an	attempt	to	overcome	contradictions	within	contemporary	Leninism,	although	participation	by	members	of	various	Leninist	organisations	was	also	required	for	the	project	to	succeed.	In	contrast	with	the	external	vanguard	party	that	purported	to	bring	revolutionary	consciousness	to	the	masses,	the	aim	was	to	establish	a	new	organisational	form	that	situated	leadership	within	the	working	class	itself.	In	spite	of	the	involvement	of	ex-students	turned	industrial	militants,	such	as	Hayling	and	Emery,	this	put	into	practice	a	critique	of	the	idea	of	intellectuals	as	an	external	source	of	political	leadership	for	working-class	struggle.	Despite	the	relative	marginality	of	autonomist	politics	on	the	far-left	in	Britain	and	limited	success	in	generalising	such	practices,	they	played	a	central	role	in	how	the	strike	played	out.	This	outcome	then	set	the	terms	for	a	series	of	disputes	with	much	wider	political	ramifications	in	what	proved	to	be	a	pivotal	historical	moment,	a	conjuncture	to	which	we	will	return.	The	Combine’s	shop-floor	campaign	got	into	gear	even	before	the	manual	trade	unions	at	Ford	decided	the	official	wage	claim.	That	May	convenors	from	all	the	firm’s	plants	met	to	draft	a	set	of	demands.	Instead	of	reporting	on	the	outcome																																									 																					467	‘Big	Flame	Conference’,	Big	Flame:	Paper	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialist	
Organisation	Big	Flame	(Liverpool,	May	1978),	pp.	6–7	(p.	7),	(emphasis	in	the	original).	
	 183	
of	this	meeting,	the	next	day’s	issue	of	the	Communist	daily	paper	the	Morning	Star	announced	the	circulation	of	an	anti-nuclear	petition	in	the	Body	Plant,	a	remarkably	anodyne	story	to	cover	in	the	circumstances.468	Presumably,	this	reflected	what	the	authors	of	one	unofficial	party	history	termed	‘the	ambiguity	of	Communists	to	the	Social	Contract’.	Support	for	allies	on	the	Broad	Left	who	were	committed	to	the	policy,	most	notably	Jones	and	Scanlon,	tempered	the	party’s	formal	opposition.469	Alternative	accounts	of	the	meeting	left	unclear	exactly	what	took	place.	A	report	in	Big	Flame	that	June	depicted	the	committee’s	proposals	as	so	vague	it	left	negotiators	plenty	of	scope	to	compromise	on	the	key	issues.	According	to	the	author	of	this	piece,	‘convenors	haven’t	specified	any	amount	of	money	in	their	version	of	the	claim’,	a	position	concealed	‘behind	an	extensive	shopping	list	including	holiday	pay,	sick	pay,	time	allowance’,	precisely	the	outcome	the	Combine	aimed	to	avoid.470	The	FWC’s	first	leaflet,	which	came	out	between	this	meeting	and	a	national	shop-stewards	conference	on	4	June,	put	the	matter	in	a	more	favourable	light.	‘As	a	result	of	national	shop	floor	pressure’,	it	announced,	‘the	national	Convenor’s	Committee,	meeting	in	London	on	Friday	May	19th,	agreed	to	support	the	2	main	points—£20	rise,	and	5	hours	off	the	week	with	no	loss	of	pay’.471	In	the	next	issue	of	Big	Flame	Alan	Hayling	went	into	greater	detail,	describing	how	‘several	leading	stewards	and	convenors	who	want[ed]	to	avoid	a	fight	with	the	Labour	Government	and	the	TUC	at	all	costs	[...]	particularly	in	an	election	year’	left	the	committee	divided.	According	to	his	account,	an	agreement	to	‘support	the	
																																								 																					468	‘Neutron	Bomb	Petition	at	Fords’,	Morning	Star	(London,	20	May	1978),	p.	5.		 469	James	Eaden	and	David	Renton,	The	Communist	Party	of	Great	Britain	since	
1920	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave,	2002),	p.	163.	470	‘Ford	Workers	Combine’,	Big	Flame:	Paper	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialist	
Organisation	Big	Flame	(Liverpool,	June	1978),	p.	3.	471	‘Send	your	Steward	to	Coventry!’.	
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claim	for	£20	and	5	hours	off	the	week’	was	only	passed	with	a	majority	of	a	single	vote	13	to	12.472		Steve	Hart,	a	Ford	worker	who	went	on	to	become	a	union	official,	subsequently	emphasised	his	own	role	in	mediating	between	the	unions	and	the	shop-floor	militants:	I	argued	at	the	Ford	Workers	Group	[...]	that	as	it	was	an	ambitious	claim	from	the	official	unions	it	would	be	sensible	for	the	FWG	and	the	official	unions	to	align	their	demands—rather	than	counterposing	one	against	the	other.	And	I	think	that	worked	very	well—all	pulling	in	the	same	direction.473	Hart’s	recollections	certainly	suggested	that	the	Combine	already	represented	a	force	to	be	reckoned	with,	even	before	the	official	pay	claim	had	been	made.	Why	else	would	the	alignment	of	their	position	have	mattered?	His	account,	however,	glossed	over	how	gradual	and	limited	reconciliation	proved	to	be	in	practice.		The	first	leaflet	that	the	Combine	issued	certainly	suggested	that	differences	still	remained	between	union	representatives	and	the	wider	workforce	after	the	convenors	meeting.	A	headline	slogan	called	on	readers	to	‘Send	your	Steward	to	Coventry!’	This	turn	of	phrase	summed	up	the	Combine’s	ambivalence	towards	trade	unionism,	meriting	further	consideration	even	at	the	risk	of	dissecting	a	joke	to	death.	Literally,	workers	were	encouraged	to	ensure	the	attendance	of	delegates	at	the	National	Shop	Stewards	Conference	in	Coventry.	The	choice	of	wording	also	contained	an	idiomatic	threat	though,	however	jocular	in	tone,	to	ostracise	any	delegates	who	failed	to	support	the	Combine’s	position.	While	still	recognising	the	need	to	operate	within	the	institutional	framework	of	the	unions,	the	shop-floor																																									 																					472	Jack	Brown,	‘Ford	Pay	Claim—A	Turning	Point	for	the	Working	Class’,	Big	
Flame:	Paper	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialist	Organisation	Big	Flame	(Liverpool,	July	1978),	p.	11.	473	Cited	in	Cohen,	Notoriously	Militant:	The	Story	of	a	Union	Branch,	p.	127.	While	this	suggested	to	Cohen	that	'a	relatively	strong	stand	by	the	officials	may	have	been	influenced	by	the	rank	and	file	Ford	Workers	Combine	Committee’,	she	makes	no	further	mention	of	the	Combine’s	existence	before	1984.	
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campaign	asserted	independence	not	just	from	union	officials	but	also	from	the	formal	leadership	of	the	shop	stewards.		The	week	before	the	Coventry	conference,	14,000	copies	of	the	leaflet	were	distributed	at	Ford	plants	across	the	country.	At	the	meeting	some	convenors	tried	unsuccessfully	to	prevent	the	text	from	being	circulated.	While	also	accepting	the	inclusion	of	six	other	demands	with	the	claim,	delegates	voted	to	support	the	call	for	a	twenty-pound	pay	rise	and	a	five-hour	reduction	to	the	working	week.	So	far	as	different	positions	were	reconciled	and	open	conflict	avoided,	convenors	clearly	responded	to	pressure	from	below	by	backing	a	more	ambitious	claim.	Afterwards	a	report	in	Socialist	Worker	warned	that	this	still	left	plenty	of	scope	for	negotiators	to	‘wheel	and	deal	from	one	fringe	benefit	to	another,	instead	of	keeping	central	the	question	of	pay’,	the	very	situation	the	Combine	aimed	to	avoid.474	Throughout	the	dispute	this	group	continued	to	raise	the	original	three	demands,	disregarding	other	aspects	of	the	official	claim	as	a	distraction,	as	we	shall	see.	Meanwhile,	the	Combine	continued	to	produce	and	distribute	other	campaign	resources,	leading	up	to	the	negotiations.	Brian	Ashton,	by	then	an	external	militant	living	in	East	London	having	resigned	from	Halewood	the	previous	year,	later	described	in	interview	how	the	wider	workforce	received	this	material:	 At	this	point	the	Combine	were	producing	badges	[...]	‘£10	on	the	Pay,	An	hour	off	the	Day’.	And,	the	feeling	within	the	Combine,	certainly	in	Dagenham	and	maybe	Langley	in	West	London,	was	it’s	not	gonna	happen;	there’s	not	gonna	be	a	dispute.	Then	guys	started	selling	the	badges.	[...]	Guys	were	grabbing	them.	[...]	There	was	obviously	something	there	going	on	that	people	hadn’t	picked	up	on,	but	once	
																																								 																					474	Martin	Jones,	‘Ford:	Keep	Your	Eye	on	That	£250m	Profit’,	Socialist	Worker	(London,	10	July	1978),	p.	14.	
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people	started	taking	the	badge	and	wearing	it,	you	sort	of	knew	that	it	was	gonna	blow.475	Ashton	went	on	to	describe	visiting	a	local	Women’s	Co-operative	to	screen-print	T-shirts	with	the	subverted	‘Fraud’	logo.	He	recalled	an	initial	run	of	a	few	hundred	being	sold	for	£5	each.	Such	resources	spread	the	Combine’s	message	and	helped	raise	funds.	More	importantly,	they	helped	their	other	workmates	show	support	for	the	demands.		The	week	after	the	Coventry	conference	the	Combine	held	another	national	meeting	at	the	General	Picton	pub	in	Islington,	north	London.	Beforehand,	organisers	invited	‘Ford	workers	and	their	wives/husbands	or	girlfriends/boyfriends’	to	come	along.476	As	we	have	already	seen,	the	involvement	of	women	in	industrial	action,	both	as	employees	and	as	housewives,	was	nothing	new	at	the	firm.	For	the	predominantly	female	partners	of	Ford’s	overwhelmingly	male	workforce	to	receive	such	an	open	invitation	to	participate	as	equals	in	such	a	collective	decision-making	process	was	unprecedented	though.	The	Combine	continued	to	advocate	such	an	inclusive	approach	to	organising	throughout	the	strike	itself	and	for	years	afterwards.	Race	relations	had	an	important	bearing	on	the	situation	at	Ford	too.	By	then	the	Imperial	Typewriters	strike	and	Grunwick	dispute,	which	was	still	ongoing,	had	seen	migrant	workers	take	action	that	met	with	hostility	from	some	white	co-workers	and	inconsistent	support	from	the	wider	labour	movement.	Meanwhile,	outside	the	factory	Black	and	Asian	youth	led	resistance	to	a	spate	of	racist	attacks	and	murders,	which	the	government’s	contradictory	policies	on	immigration	and	race	relations	helped	to	fuel.	Against	this	backdrop,	Black	socialists	and	labour	activists	developed	an	autonomous	liberation	politics	of	their	own.	A	broad	
																																								 																					475	Ashton.	476	‘About	the	Ford	(UK)	Workers	Combine’,	Big	Flame	(Liverpool,	July	1978),	p.	11.	
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political	conception	of	what	it	meant	to	be	Black	informed	the	movement	at	the	time	instead	of	any	narrower	culturally	determined	definition.477	Two	days	after	the	Coventry	Conference	the	racialised	division	of	labour	at	Ford	came	to	the	fore,	when	a	section	of	the	workforce	not	known	for	their	militancy	took	industrial	action.	This	began	when	management	decided	to	reinstate	a	Black	production	worker,	following	disciplinary	procedures	for	having	allegedly	punched	a	foreman	who	docked	two	hours’	pay	from	him.	Hundreds	of	foremen	in	the	Dagenham	Body	and	PTA	Plants	then	went	on	strike.	The	Daily	Mail	referred	to	the	incident	as	having	‘racial	overtones’.	Depicting	such	workplace	violence	as	commonplace,	an	anonymous	paint	sprayer	told	the	paper	that	‘90	per	cent	of	the	trouble	involved	coloured	[sic]	workers’	who	could	purportedly	no	longer	be	sacked	because	of	the	Race	Relations	Act.	In	the	same	piece	an	unnamed	maintenance	engineer	described	Black-on-White	violence	as	an	everyday	occurrence.	‘Most	of	us	get	along	with	the	coloureds	[sic]’,	the	interviewee	added,	dismissing	any	suggestion	of	prejudice	on	his	part,	before	betraying	his	underlying	prejudice	with	the	qualifying	remark,	‘but	there’s	always	a	few	troublemakers’.478	While	drawing	attention	to	racial	divisions	between	Ford	employees,	the	foremen’s	strike	did	not	go	according	to	plan.	Confronted	with	the	prospect	of	being	laid-off,	production	workers	decided	at	shop-floor	meetings	to	carry	on	with	their	work	unsupervised.	An	account	of	what	happened	next,	as	recounted	by	a	shop	steward,	appeared	in	Socialist	Worker:	‘We	controlled	the	line	and	we	got	quality	cars.	The	quality	was	the	best	for	years.	We	produced	what	we	wanted	to	produce.’	In	the	same	piece	another	steward	described	attempting	to	persuade	
																																								 																					477	A.	Sivanandan,	‘From	Resistance	to	Rebellion:	Asian	and	Afro-Caribbean	Struggles	in	Britain’,	Race	&	Class,	XXIII.2/3	(1981),	111–52.	478	Michael	Edwards,	‘Foremen	Walk	Out	in	Fear’,	Daily	Mail	(London,	7	June	1978),	pp.	1–2.	
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workers	on	his	section	to	exceed	their	hourly	target	of	fifteen	cars	and	produce	eighteen	instead.479	Others,	shop	stewards	among	them,	displayed	less	zeal	for	such	productivism.	In	the	next	issue	of	the	paper	Gordon	Davie	emphasised	the	need	to	keep	focus	on	the	underlying	reason	for	their	actions.	‘A	pity	some	stewards	see	themselves	as	substitute	foremen’,	Davie	noted	wryly	before	spelling	out	the	point.	‘We	worked’,	he	explained,	‘to	stop	the	foremen’s	strike	putting	pressure	(by	loosing	production)	on	the	company	to	sack	a	worker’,480	an	aim	which	had	been	achieved.	This	highlighted	different	attitudes	towards	work	on	the	shop	floor	at	Ford.	Let	us	consider	them	for	a	moment	before	returning	to	the	issue	of	race.	While	
Socialist	Worker	served	as	a	forum	for	discussions	between	militants	at	Ford,	it	also	reflected	the	perspective	of	the	party	that	produced	it.	At	the	time	the	SWP’s	rank-and-file	industrial	strategy,	as	well	as	the	‘Right	to	Work’	campaign,	were	modelled	on	Communist-led	campaigns	that	primarily	involved	organising	skilled	workers	before	the	Second	World	War.	By	contrast,	Big	Flame	and	others	influenced	by	operaismo,	for	instance	in	the	Claimants	Union	(CU),	took	a	different	view.	Perceiving	that	‘the	struggle	around	unemployment	is	much	more	than	the	struggle	for	the	“right	to	work”’,	they	contended	that	there	was	a	contradiction	between	the	‘struggle	for	a	society	freed	from	wage	slavery’	and	raising	a	political	demand	for	work.481	While	the	contribution	of	Davie,	an	SWP	member,	showed	that	such	differences	should	not	be	overstated,	an	autonomist	perspective	would	have	been	more	alert	to	the	Stakhanovism	of	the	other	two	shop	stewards,	particularly	given	their	union	roles.																																									 																					479	‘Ford:	So	Who	Needs	Foremen?’,	Socialist	Worker,	17	June	1978,	p.	16.	480	Gordon	Davie,	‘Letters,	Ford:	An	Upside-Down	Road	to	Victory?’,	Socialist	
Worker	(London,	24	June	1978),	p.	6.	481	‘Unemployment:	Right	to	Live’,	Big	Flame:	Paper	of	the	Revolutionary	
Socialist	Organisation	Big	Flame	(Liverpool,	May	1978),	p.	4.	
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At	any	rate,	both	letters	also	cast	new	light	on	the	race-relations	situation	depicted	in	the	Daily	Mail,	a	newspaper	that	had	not	changed	hands	since	the	infamous	1934	headline	‘Hurrah	for	the	Blackshirts!’482	There	were	clearly	multiple	connections	between	the	multi-ethnic	workforce	at	Ford	and	the	incendiary	anti-immigrant	politics	erupting	across	East	London.	That	spring	Victoria	Park	hosted	the	first	Rock	against	Racism	Carnival	against	the	Nazis.	As	well	as	responding	to	a	racist	tirade	by	the	musician	Eric	Clapton,	this	event	also	voiced	opposition	to	a	wave	of	racist	street	violence	instigated	by	the	National	Front.	That	May	shop	stewards	in	the	Dagenham	Engine	Plant,	reportedly,	purchased	500	Anti	Nazi	League	badges,	reselling	more	than	half	of	them	to	workers	on	a	single	shift.	The	Body	Plant	Shop	Stewards	Committee	also	affiliated	to	the	campaign.483	More	importantly,	the	following	month	thousands	of	Asian	workers	in	East	London	went	on	strike	in	response	to	a	series	of	racist	murders,	picketing	police	stations	in	protest	at	the	authorities’	lack	of	response	to	such	attacks.	‘Many	of	the	Asian	and	Black	workers	stayed	away	from	work’	at	Ford,	Dagenham	shop	steward	Shuel	Uddin	told	Socialist	Worker,	adding	that	‘[i]t	was	good	to	see	white	workers	coming	out	as	well	and	many	more	supporting	our	action’.484	When	another	incident	at	Ford	led	the	Evening	News	to	print	the	sensationalist	headline	‘60	Asians	Mob	Foreman’,	Big	Flame	responded	that	such	actions	‘express[ed]	the	anger	of	Black	workers	who	experience[d]	constant	harassment’.	Illustrating	the	point	with	reference	to	how	prevalent	racist	graffiti	was	within	the	PTA	Plant,	the	piece	went	on	to	explain	that	those	who	confronted	the	foreman	suspected	him	of	involvement	in	an	assault	on	one	of	their	workmates.485																																									 																					482	Viscount	Rothermere,	‘Hurrah	for	the	Blackshirts!’,	Daily	Mail,	15	January	1934,	p.	10.	483	‘The	Red	Arrow—That’s	the	New	Model	at	Ford’,	Socialist	Worker	(London,	27	May	1978),	p.	5.	484	Rahim	Ali,	Shuel	Uddin,	and	Dave	Albury,	‘Birth	of	Our	Power’,	Socialist	
Worker	(London,	22	July	1978),	p.	1.	485	‘Rolling	Back	Racism’,	Big	Flame	(Liverpool,	August	1978),	p.	12.	
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Acknowledging	racial	conflict	within	the	workforce	should	not	obscure	the	anti-racist	solidarity	shown	by	some	white	workers	or	the	class	dynamics	also	at	play.	All	the	same,	an	adequate	class	analysis	also	needs	to	address	how	the	division	of	labour	was	racialised	at	Ford	in	Britain.	Beginning	with	a	distinct	section	of	Irish	workers	in	the	Foundry	from	the	1930s	onwards,	migrant	labour	at	Ford	followed	broader	trends	of	post-war	immigration	from	the	Caribbean	and	South	Asia,	traces	of	which	we	have	seen	in	previous	chapters.	Following	this	quasi-technical	recomposition	of	labour,	members	of	these	groups	went	on	to	play	an	increasingly	prominent	part	in	industrial	unrest	throughout	the	1970s.	By	the	late	1970s	this	resulted	in	a	moment	of	political	recomposition	of	the	working	class,	both	at	Ford	and	in	Britain	more	generally.		Recognising	the	significance	of	how	race	and	gender	contributed	to	the	context	of	the	1978	strike	should	not	detract	from	the	class	dynamics	at	play.	As	negotiations	drew	closer,	Workers’	Action,	a	Ford	bulletin	published	by	a	small	Trotskyist	organisation,	leaked	extracts	of	an	internal	company	report	on	industrial	relations.	This	listed	management’s	recent	achievements:	the	dismissal	of	militant	stewards	with	no	disruption;	closure	of	the	River	Plant	Press	Shop	with	union	support;	and	restrictions	imposed	on	the	rights	of	workers	to	representation	in	disciplinary	cases.	The	document	also	outlined	future	plans	to	control	militant	stewards	and	resist	demands	for	lay-off	pay.	Apart	from	exposing	a	cynical	approach	to	industrial	relations,	this	leak	made	clear	managers’	confidence	in	their	ability	to	dictate	terms	to	the	unions	effectively.486	Writing	pseudonymously	in	Big	Flame	that	July,	Alan	Hayling	examined	the	position	in	which	this	situation	left	the	company’s	workforce.	Over	the	past	three	years,	the	firm’s	profits	multiplied	by	three-thousand	per	cent	while	the	real	income	of	workers	had	fallen	by	twenty-nine	per	cent.	Meanwhile,	‘newly	knighted																																									 																					486	‘Workers’	Action:	Revealed—Ford’s	Secret	of	Success’	in	Personal	Papers.	
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Chairman	of	Ford	Britain’	Sir	Terence	Beckett’s	received	a	pay	rise	of	eighty	per	cent	the	previous	year,	as	against	fifteen	per	cent	awarded	to	the	hourly	paid	workforce.	Describing	the	Social	Contract	as	a	source	of	power	and	status	for	union	officials,	which	only	delivered	workers	falling	living	standards,	he	went	on	to	speculate	about	the	political	implications	of	winning	a	pay	claim	that	met	their	demands:	 If	we	win	it‘ll	be	the	end	of	the	Social	Contract.	It	will	mean	that	one	of	the	major	obstacles	to	working	class	struggle	will	have	been	swept	away.	It’ll	mean	that	all	sections	of	the	working	class	will	have	a	little	more	space	to	struggle	against	lousy	pay,	unemployment,	harder	work	and	the	cuts	in	public	spending.	It	could	be	a	turning	point	but	we’ll	need	a	great	deal	of	support—to	even	begin	the	fight.487	With	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	it	is	hard	not	to	see	a	naive	optimism	in	this	assessment,	since	the	defeat	of	the	Social	Contract	turned	out	to	be	a	Pyrrhic	victory.	But	we	should	also	see	this	source	for	what	it	is:	not	a	dispassionate	work	of	analysis,	but	a	politically	engaged	piece	of	propaganda	requiring	a	certain	Gramscian	optimism	of	the	will.	In	any	case,	Hayling	gave	a	clear	assessment	of	the	leverage	available	to	Ford	workers,	as	well	as	another	reminder	of	why	they	felt	the	need	to	exercise	such	power.	A	review	appeared	alongside	his	article	of	The	Worker	Photographer,	a	new	journal	in	the	form	of	a	double-sided	A2	broadsheet	published	by	the	photographer	Terry	Dennett.	Inspired	by	1930s	Communist	agitprop,	the	first	issue	carried	the	title	‘Fighting	Fords	Layoffs’	and	featured	a	poster	on	one	side	composed	of	photographs	of	industrial	action	in	Dagenham	over	recent	years.488	The	accompanying	text	described	how	the	Ford	Workers	Group	curated	a	slide	show	exhibition	of	the	images,	many	of	which	were	their	own	photographs.	The	Little	Red																																									 																					487	Jack	Brown,	‘Ford	Pay	Claim—A	Turning	Point	for	the	Working	Class’.	488	Terry	Dennett,	‘Fighting	Fords	Layoffs’,	The	Worker	Photographer,	1,	1978,	n.p.	
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Blue	Book,	a	Red	Notes	pamphlet	published	the	same	year,	reviewed	the	same	period	of	struggle.	Just	before	the	1978	strike	Counter	Information	Services,	an	anonymous	group	of	non-aligned	radical	journalists,	also	published	an	‘Anti-Report’	on	Ford.489	The	impact	these	documents	had	at	the	time	is	difficult	to	assess,	but	they	at	least	showed	how	the	Combine	drew	external	support	from	a	number	of	sources	capable	of	producing	sharp	and	engaging	material.	Aside	from	yet	another	dry	and	technocratic	wage	claim,	the	lack	of	any	comparable	resources	from	the	trade	unions	was	striking.		As	the	start	of	pay	negotiations	drew	closer,	a	widening	gulf	between	the	company	and	the	government	became	increasingly	apparent.	On	13	July	Ford	Director	of	Employee	Relations	Bob	Ramsay	called	J.	G.	Littler,	the	Deputy	Secretary	responsible	for	counter	inflation	policy	at	the	Treasury.	Ramsay	spoke	to	Littler	in	anticipation	of	the	release	of	a	white	paper	announcing	phase	four	of	the	government’s	incomes	policy.	The	company	director	asked	the	senior	civil	servant	if	the	new	approach	would	be	‘broadly	similar	to	that	of	this	year,	only	worse’,	a	rhetorical	question	signalling	Ford	management’s	views.	In	response,	Littler	suggested	that	he	perhaps	meant	to	say	‘better—or	more	ambitious’—an	equally	pointed	reply.490	Before	formal	negotiations	even	began,	strain	began	to	show	between	the	government’s	wage	restraint	policy	and	the	company’s	need	to	recruit	and	retain	workers.		
Join	the	Action	Now,	the	Strike	
Official	negotiations	began	at	a	Ford	National	Joint	Negotiating	Committee	(FNJNC)	meeting	in	London	on	21	September,	with	a	lobby	of	Ford	workers	organised	by	
																																								 																					489	Counter	Information	Services,	The	Ford	Motor	Company,	Anti	Report,	20	(London:	Counter	Information	Services,	1978).	490	London,	National	Archives,	T377/311,	J.	G.	Littler,	‘Confidential	Note	for	the	Record’,	13	July	1978,	p.1.	
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the	Combine	greeting	committee	members	outside	the	venue.	Management	opened	the	talks	with	an	offer	to	increase	the	basic	rate	of	pay	by	five	per	cent,	consistent	with	government	policy.	Any	additional	increases,	they	proposed,	should	be	achieved	through	a	productivity	deal.	While	expressing	disappointment	with	the	offer,	the	initial	response	of	TGWU	National	Organiser	and	Chairman	of	the	FNJNC	union	side	Ron	Todd	was	‘to	persuade	his	colleagues	to	keep	talking	to	the	company’,	effectively	accepting	the	proposal	as	the	basis	for	a	deal.491	The	most	militant	shop	stewards,	however,	saw	no	point	in	negotiating	further,	so	long	as	the	company	remained	committed	to	the	limits	imposed	by	phase	four.	Meanwhile,	many	workers	took	matters	into	their	own	hands	with	spontaneous	walkouts	from	Southampton	and	the	Body	Plant	in	Halewood	within	hours	of	the	meeting.	The	strike	was	on.	Later	that	day	the	Combine	issued	a	leaflet	in	Langley.	‘Let’s	Join	the	Action	Now’,	it	urged	their	workmates,	informing	them	of	how	workers	in	Halewood	and	Southampton	responded	to	the	offer.	Text	added	to	the	back	of	the	leaflet	overnight	provided	further	updates.	‘Stop	Press:	Langley	Night	Shift	Goes	Home’,	it	announced	to	those	who	started	their	shift	the	next	morning.	The	text	went	on	to	describe	how	a	mass	meeting	on	one	section	decided	to	walk	out	immediately,	while	two	others	deferred	action	until	convenors	reported	back	to	them.492		To	prepare	for	mass	meetings	scheduled	at	most	plants	on	Monday	25	September,	the	Combine	then	produced	another	leaflet	headed	‘All	out	Today!”.	This	summarised	recent	developments,	reiterated	the	three	demands	and	discussed	possible	tactics,	such	as	the	use	of	flying	pickets,	while	calling	on	workmates	to	stand	firm:	
																																								 																					491	Alan	Pike,	‘Ford	Workers	Walk	out	after	5%	Pay	Offer	Is	Made’,	Financial	
Times	(London,	22	September	1978),	p.	1.	492	Personal	Collection,	Ford	(UK)	Workers’	Combine	(Langley	Branch),	‘The	Offer:	Let’s	Join	the	Action	Now’,	[21-22/09/78].	
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‘The	unions	were	forced	to	take	action	by	the	Mass	walkouts.	[...]	The	strike	is	on.	[...]	Some	Union	negotiators	are	already	telling	the	Press	that	they	will	accept	a	“Productivity	Deal”.	[...]	We	won’t	accept	it.	[...]	Don’t	just	leave	it	to	someone	else.	[...]	[L]et’s	get	it	ORGANISED!493	By	the	end	of	the	day,	most	of	Ford’s	hourly	paid	workforce	was	on	strike,	bringing	the	firm’s	operations	to	a	standstill	before	the	remaining	plants	voted	to	join	them	the	next	day.494	Afterwards	Ford	of	Europe	Chairman	H.	A.	‘Red’	Poling	wrote	to	the	Prime	Minister	concerning	‘the	dangerous	and	unprecedented	industrial	situation’	faced	by	the	firm.	In	his	letter	Polling	raised	with	Callaghan	the	unions’	decision	to	withdraw	from	talks	until	management	agreed	to	negotiate	‘in	a	free	collective	bargaining	situation’,	unrestricted	by	phase	four.	‘The	issue’,	he	observed	caustically,	‘becomes	one	of	principle	between	the	Government	and	Trade	Union	movement’.495	Polling	reiterated	that,	instead	of	excessive	wage	demands,	labour	shortages	represented	management’s	main	concern	with	the	firm	finding	it	increasingly	difficult	to	recruit	and	retain	workers.	That	Friday	the	Combine	organised	a	flying	picket	of	the	port	of	Harwich,	securing	the	agreement	of	road	haulage	drivers	not	to	handle	goods	for	Ford.	Dockers,	rail	workers	and	seamen	across	the	country	took	similar	action	in	solidarity	with	the	strike.	The	same	day	the	FWC	organised	a	lobby	of	a	meeting	of	the	FNJNC	union	side.	Ford	News	reported	that	a	proposal	to	start	‘informal	talks’	with	the	Company	to	negotiate	a	productivity	deal	was	narrowly	defeated	by	
																																								 																					493	Personal	Collection,	Ford	(UK)	Workers	Combine	‘All	out	Today!’	[25	September	1978].	494	Alan	Pike,	‘Shutdown	at	Ford	Almost	Complete	as	More	Join	Strike’,	
Financial	Times	(London,	26	September),	p.	1.	495	London,	National	Archives,	PREM	16/1708,	Letter	from	H.	A.	Poling	to	the	Prime	Minister,	25	September	1978.	The	role	that	labour	shortages	played	in	the	breakdown	in	alignment	between	the	‘national	interest’	and	that	of	Ford	supported	the	view	that	a	strategy	of	refusal	constituted	a	significant	aspect	of	class	struggle,	which	drove	capitalist	development	in	this	period.	
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twenty-one	votes	to	twenty-four,	the	motion	mainly	finding	support	from	full-time	officials.496		The	following	Monday	Beckett,	Ford	of	Britain	managing	Director,	updated	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	on	developments,	following	the	outcome	of	the	union	negotiator’s	meeting.	Afterwards	Ron	Todd	called	Beckett	to	inform	him	of	the	union	decision	not	to	resume	talks.	Beckett	still	managed	to	persuade	Todd	to	meet	him	privately	though.	‘I	should	add’,	the	Ford	Managing	Director	emphasised	to	Healey,	‘that	the	union	were	most	concerned	that	this	informal	exchange	be	kept	confidential	as	it	took	place	without	the	authority	of	the	trade	union	side	of	the	NJNC.’497	This	led	nowhere,	but	Todd’s	agreement	to	an	unauthorised	meeting	and	lack	of	candour	about	it	afterwards	suggested	just	how	committed	the	union	official	was	to	the	claim,	despite	his	inability	to	side	step	the	FNJNC	as	was	done	in	1971.	Ministers	soon	had	further	concerns	to	worry	about.	At	the	beginning	of	October	delegates	at	the	Labour	Party	Conference	dealt	the	government	a	‘massive	defeat’	on	wage	restraint,	voting	‘by	a	majority	of	more	than	two	to	one’	against	the	incomes	policy.	Despite	this	setback,	ministers	reportedly	remained	defiant,	reflecting	the	lack	of	available	alternatives	they	saw.498	Meanwhile,	the	Ford	Dagenham	shop	stewards	strike	committee	called	a	‘Day	of	Action’	on	Wednesday	11	October	to	demand	‘free	collective	bargaining,	a	35	hr	week,	higher	wages	and	rejection	of	5%	limit’.499	On	the	day	Ford	workers	marched	from	Tower	Hill	in	East	London	to	Central	Hall	in	Westminster,	where	speakers	including	Ron	Todd	and	Jo	Richardson	MP	addressed	their	rally.	
																																								 																					496	‘Ford	UK	Paralysed’,	Ford	Strike	News	(London,	5	October	1978),	2	edition,	p.	1.	 497	London,	National	Archives,	T377/312,	Letter	from	Sir	Terrence	Beckett	to	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer,	2	October	1978.	498	Richard	Evans,	‘Cabinet	Likely	to	Defy	Pay	Vote’,	Financial	Times	(London,	3	October	1978),	p.	1.	499	London,	TUC	Library,	HD	9710.6,	Ford	Shop	Stewards	Strike	Committee	Invites	all	Workers	to	Support	a	Day	of	Action.	
	 196	
Later	that	week	the	Combine	recorded	a	single	to	raise	money	for	the	strike	fund	and	boost	the	morale	of	their	workmates.	On	the	A-side	'The	Ford	Strike	Song'	repurposed	the	music	and	some	of	the	original	lyrics	to	''I	Feel	Like	I'm	Fixin'	to	Die	Rag'	by	Country	Joe	and	the	Fish,	an	anthem	of	the	anti-Vietnam	War	movement.	A	choir	of	Ford	workers	belted	out	the	chorus:	And	it's	one,	two,	three,	what	are	we	fighting	for?	You	can	stuff	your	five	per	cent,	'Cause	that	won't	pay	the	rent,	And	it's	five,	six,	seven,	picketing	the	factory	gates,	Its	one	in	the	eye	for	Sonny	Jim,	Whoopee!	We're	gonna	win.500	This	defiant	refrain	emphasised	the	political	character	of	the	strike,	depicting	it	as	a	direct	attack	on	James	Callaghan's	fragile	administration.	While	this	song	harked	back	to	the	Woodstock	music	festival	almost	a	decade	earlier,	the	B-side	had	a	more	contemporary	quality.	It	opened	with	a	sound	recording	of	the	Day	of	Action	demonstration,	providing	an	introduction	to	'Johnny	Strika',	a	track	on	which	the	influence	of	punk	could	be	heard	clearly.	This	lyrical	content	of	song	also	struck	a	different	note:	They	call	me	Johnny,	Johnny,	Johnny	Strika	But	I’m	no	radical	man,	I’m	an	“A”-Shift,	Day-Shift,	Ordinary	Harry,	From	Motor	City	Dagenham,501	The	defiant	militancy	of	the	previous	track	gave	way	to	indignation	at	the	depiction	by	the	right-wing	press	of	car	workers	as	wreckers,	who	welcomed	any	excuse	to	disrupt	production.	This	obscured	the	working	conditions	that	lay	behind	unrest	in	the	sector.																																									 																					500	OHC	and	the	Gappers,	Ford	Strike	Song,	1978.	A	handwritten	note	identifying	OHC	as	Ed	Emery	was	deposited	with	a	copy	of	this	recording	held	in	London,	British	Library,	1SE0104157	'Ford	Workers	on	Strike’.	Emery	also	edited	the	Red	Notes	pamphlets	and	translated	many	relevant	texts	from	Italian,	lending	credibility	to	an	interpretation	of	the	lyrics	that	emphasises	the	political	content	of	workers	industrial	struggles.	501	George	Chriba,	Johnny	Strika,	1978.	
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Later	that	month	Alex	Gungi,	a	Black	worker	at	Ford	Langley	who	was	active	in	the	Combine,	contributed	the	main	text	for	Why	Black	People	should	Support	the	
Ford	Strike,	a	Black	Socialist	Alliance	(BSA)	pamphlet.	Ambalavaner	Sivanandan,	director	of	the	Institute	of	Race	Relations,	later	recalled	how	the	BSA	provided	a	national	body	for	Afro-Caribbean,	African	and	Asian	workers	who	broke	away	from	a	left	that	‘did	not	speak	to	the	Black	experience’	at	the	time.502	In	the	circumstances,	BSA	support	provided	another	indication	of	how	atypical	the	Combine	was	of	the	mainstream	labour	movement	at	the	time.	In	the	pamphlet	Gungi	estimated	that	‘West	Indians	and	Asians’	made	up	around	half	of	Ford’s	workforce,	before	describing	how	the	division	of	labour	within	the	plant	fell	along	the	lines	of	race.	He	went	on	to	explain	how	after	the	1971	strike	when	‘people	created	a	stink’,	management	appointed	four	new	Black	foremen	and	a	single	Black	general	foreman,	but	then	made	no	further	promotions	of	Black	workers	in	the	intervening	years.	Gungi	also	noted	that	‘black	shop	stewards	don’t	tend	to	be	senior	shop	stewards’,	pointing	out	the	racial	hierarchies	also	reproduced	within	the	unions.503	That	the	BSA	called	on	Black	people	to	support	and	make	donations	to	the	Combine,	in	which	Black	and	white	workers	organised	together,	indicated	the	positive	role	this	group	played	in	challenging	such	racial	divisions.	The	same	publication	included	a	short	piece	‘taken	from	comments	made	by	Alex	Gungi’s	wife	Julie’.	Her	contribution	began	by	confronting	the	reader	with	how	men,	including	those	at	Ford,	who	felt	‘hung	up	and	strung	up’	by	work	frequently	took	out	their	frustrations	violently	at	home.	Having	raised	such	a	potentially	divisive	issue,	she	went	on	to	assert	women’s	support	for	the	strike,	which,	she	stressed,	was	also	in	their	own	interest.	Yet,	she	criticised	the	failure	of	many	men																																									 																					502	Sivanandan,	p.	143.	503	Alex	Gungi	and	Julie	Gungi,	Why	Black	People	Should	Support	the	Ford	
Strike	(London:	Black	Socialist	Alliance,	1978),	pp.	3–4.	
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to	‘discuss	[the	dispute]	with	their	wives’,	while	acknowledging	that	she	too	had	found	it	a	challenge	to	communicate	with	others	in	her	position.	Rather	than	shying	away	from	the	subject,	the	potential	for	domestic	relationships	to	constitute	a	potential	point	of	weakness	in	the	strike	was	confronted	directly.	Others	opposed	to	the	strike	sought	to	exploit	this	possibility	too.	On	Wednesday	18	October	Southern	Television	broadcast	an	appeal	by	two	Ford	workers’	wives.	They	invited	other	women	to	attend	an	event	in	Southampton	that	Saturday	to	call	for	a	return	to	work.504	This	met	with	a	robust	response	of	a	group	of	women	whose	partners	worked	in	Dagenham,	Langley	and	Southampton	as	described	in	the	next	issue	of	Ford	Strike	News:	We	marched	to	the	meeting—there	were	6	[...]	“ladies”	surrounded	by	T.V.	cameras.	Our	numbers	grew	to	nearly	200	and	the	argument	started—we	won	the	arguments,	the	meeting,	the	day—and	we	don’t	think	[the	organiser]	will	dare	raise	her	voice	again!505	A	photograph	accompanied	the	piece	showing	a	group,	mainly	made	up	of	women,	carrying	placards	with	slogans	such	as	‘Don’t	Scab	on	your	Husband’.	A	woman	in	a	
Fraud	t-shirt	stood	in	the	foreground,	her	mouth	open	and	her	index	finger	pointing	forward	as	she	addressed	someone	behind	the	camera.	‘The	Ford	Wives	Strike	Support	Group’,	which	shared	a	contact	address	with	the	Combine,	raised	an	assertive	female	voice	in	support	of	the	strike.	No	doubt,	the	FWC’s	active	encouragement	of	women’s	participation	from	the	outset	ensured	such	a	prompt	and	forceful	response.	Two	other	pieces	addressed	to	women	whose	partners	were	on	strike	appeared	on	the	same	page	of	the	strike	newsletter.	The	first	of	these	argued	that,	as	‘the	ones	that	have	to	make	ends	meet	on	a	wage	packet	that’s	been	CUT	BY	
																																								 																					504	‘Fords	International’,	Morning	Star	(London,	20	October	1978),	pp.	1	&	3.	505	‘Southampton:	Ford	Wives’	Support	Group	Says:	We	Won	the	Day!’,	Ford	
Strike	News,	[26	October	1978],	No.	5,	p.	2.	
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28%’,	they	had	a	direct	interest	in	supporting	the	strike.	An	account	of	housework,	which	included	dealing	with	‘husbands	being	worn	out	and	bad	tempered	[...]	because	of	the	lousy	shifts	and	long	hours’,	expressed	the	issues	raised	by	an	autonomist	feminist	analysis	of	social	reproduction	in	everyday	language.506	It	also	made	the	case	that	the	issue	of	low	pay	gave	those	women	who	earned	a	wage	of	their	own	another	reason	to	support	an	assault	on	the	five-per-cent	limit,	which	posed	an	obstacle	to	resolving	the	gender	pay	gap.	The	third	article	discussed	entitlement	to	social	security	payments	and	strategies	for	claiming	them.	Specifically,	it	referred	to	the	situation	in	Langley	of	some	single	strikers	(i.e.	those	with	no	dependents	who	would	not	generally	be	entitled	to	claim	anything	on	their	own	behalf).	A	few	of	them,	it	announced,	managed	to	‘win	social	security	money—because	of	strong	pressure	from	the	social	security	sub	committee	of	the	strike	committee’—a	situation	compared	favourably	with	that	at	Dagenham	and	Halewood.507	The	Claimants	Union,	reportedly,	supported	striking	Ford	workers	and	encouraged	them	to	make	demands	for	social	security	payments	collectively.	An	announcement	in	the	same	piece	informed	readers	of	an	opportunity	to	meet	with	CU	activists	at	Leys	Hall	in	Dagenham	later	that	day.	As	was	previously	the	case	in	the	1971	strike,	social	security	claims	by	striking	workers	became	a	point	of	contention	during	this	dispute.	The	week	after	the	initial	walkout	the	Department	of	Health	and	Social	Security	(DHSS)	called	Ron	Todd’s	Personal	Assistant	at	the	TGWU,	proposing	to	set	up	liaison	facilities	to	address	any	issues	that	arose.	While	the	same	proposal	was	also	put	to	the	AUEW,	neither	organisation	responded	to	the	offer.508	The	official	response	of	the	unions																																									 																					506	‘Why	We’re	Backing	Our	Men	in	the	Strike’,	Ford	Strike	News	(London,	26	October	1978),	No.	5.	507	‘SS’,	Ford	Strike	News	(London,	[26	October	1978]),	No.	5,	p.	2.	508	London,	National	Archives,	AST36/1346	Trade	Disputes	Ford	1978,	‘Memo:	Ford	Strike’,	27	September	1978;	‘The	Ford	Strike’	[No	Date].	
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representing	Ford’s	workforce	to	the	issue	of	social	security	payments	remained	muted	throughout	the	strike.	Later	that	week,	even	before	any	of	the	unions	involved	made	the	strike	official,	the	Civil	and	Public	Services	Association	(CPSA),	the	main	body	representing	civil	servants,	pledged	support	for	the	industrial	action.509	What	this	meant	in	practice	remained	unclear	at	first,	as	one	DHSS	official	observed	to	the	Minister	for	Social	Security’s	Private	Secretary.	The	situation	still	caused	sufficient	concern	in	Whitehall,	to	merit	ongoing	monitoring,	including	the	collation	of	material	issued	by	an	East	London	CPSA	branch,	the	FWC	and	the	Claimants	Union.	The	DHSS	administered	social	security	applications	arising	from	the	strike	differently	across	the	country.	In	regions	covering	some	plants,	such	as	Halewood	and	Langley,	strikers	attended	interviews	at	special	centres	temporarily	established	to	meet	the	extra	volume	of	claims.	Elsewhere,	most	notably	in	Dagenham,	applications	were	dealt	with	remotely	by	post	and	telephone.510	This	inconsistency	led	to	the	clearest	instance	of	CPSA	members	putting	their	union’s	support	for	the	strike	into	practice.	A	number	of	single	strikers	managed	to	secure	some	payments	with	the	support	of	shop	stewards	in	Langley,	while	the	Claimants	Union	linked	up	with	workers	in	Dagenham	before	the	end	of	October.511	Then	the	FWC	and	an	East	London	branch	of	the	CPSA	jointly	lobbied	the	regional	headquarters	of	the	DHSS	on	3	November.	Together,	they	issued	a	leaflet	to	demand	that	strikers	in	Dagenham	also	have	access	to	a	strike	centre	for	claiming	benefits,	ending	with	a	reminder	to	the	public	sector	workers	who	received	a	copy	as	they	entered	the	building:	‘Remember	the	CPSA	supports	the	Ford	workers	as	part	of	our	own	pay																																									 																					509	Christopher	Thomas,	‘Ford	Strikers	Say	They	Will	Not	Bargain	While	5%	Curb	Stands’,	The	Times	(London,	30	September	1978),	p.	17.	510	London,	National	Archives,	AST36/1346	Trade	Disputes	Ford	1978,	‘Ford	Strike:	Regional	Arrangements’,	[c.	3	October	1978].	511	‘SS’.	
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campaign,	the	least	that	we	can	do	is	see	that	they	receive	their	full	legal	entitlement’.512	Ford	Workers	began	to	forge	an	unlikely	alliance	between	s	Union	activists	and	DHSS	employees.	After	all,	CU	literature	generally	depicted	‘SS’	staff	as	little	Hitlers	complete	with	toothbrush	moustaches	and	military	uniform.	Later	that	day	the	Minister	for	Social	Security’s	Private	Secretary	received	another	briefing	from	a	colleague	on	‘elements	of	the	CPSA	who	are	in	close	touch	with	local	Claimants	Unions	and	Ford	shops	stewards’.	Anticipating	the	‘Ford	workers,	Claimants	Unions	and	other	activists	who	would	make	interviewing	difficult	by	creating	arguments	and	tensions’,	the	author	counselled	Ministers	against	meeting	their	demand.513	This	senior	civil	servant	identified	the	Ford	workers	behind	this	action	as	shop	stewards,	which	may	well	have	been	the	case	in	practice.	Afterwards	the	Combine	criticised	the	Dagenham	Strike	Committee,	a	body	of	senior	stewards	and	convenors	set	up	to	coordinate	the	strike,	for	a	failure	of	leadership	on	the	issue.	
Ford	Strike	News	reported	that	‘workers	took	matters	into	their	own	hands	and	occupied	the	East	Ham	Social	Security	Office	for	two	hours’	on	9	November	‘in	support	of	the	right	of	one	of	them	to	work	there’,	collective	action	as	practiced	by	the	Claimants	Union.514	The	piece	ended	with	an	invitation	for	workers	to	meet	in	the	PTA	Plant’s	car	park	to	take	part	in	other	similar	actions.	Stewards	or	not,	those	involved	organised	such	actions	independently	of	the	union,	both	in	terms	of	officials	and	the	leading	lay	representatives.	Over	the	course	of	the	strike	more	than	a	quarter	of	those	involved	successfully	claimed	a	total	of	£1,270,657	in	supplementary	benefits	for	their	dependants.	By	contrast,	at	most	fourteen	single	strikers	made	successful	claims																																									 																					512	London,	National	Archives,	AST36/1346,	Ford	Group	(Combine)	and	Waltham	Forest	CPSA	(DHSS),	‘Why	We	Are	Here’,	3	November	1978.	513	London,	National	Archives,	AST36/1346,	Letter	from	N	Hanson	to	Mr	Magee	dated	3	November	1978.	514	‘Dagenham	Social	Security	Scandal’,	Ford	Strike	News	(London,	16	November	1978),	8	edition,	p.	2.	
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for	their	own	urgent	needs	worth	a	mere	£254.515	As	happened	before	in	1971,	social	security	payments	generally	reduced	pressure	to	resume	work	for	those	whose	wages	also	supported	other	household	members.	Moreover,	the	attention	senior	civil	servants	paid	to	these	interventions	also	suggested	that	they	had	a	wider	impact,	beyond	their	financial	effect.	The	political	coalition	that	members	of	Ford’s	workforce	began	to	develop	with	public	sector	workers	and	activists	from	the	Claimants	Union	certainly	raised	concerns	in	Whitehall	at	the	time.	Likewise,	any	concessions	achieved	through	collective	action	also	served	as	propaganda	for	the	self-organised	approach	advocated	by	the	Combine	and	the	CU	alike.	Formal	negotiations	resumed	four	weeks	into	the	strike	after	Reg	Birch	wrote	to	Sir	Terence	Beckett	on	Thursday	19	October,	urging	him	‘to	discover	a	way	through	what	can	only	be	described	as	a	ghastly	mess’.516	The	Combine	condemned	this	approach,	arguing	that	the	press	widely	interpreted	it	as	a	sign	of	weakness	‘ON	OUR	SIDE’.	The	following	Monday	Beckett	held	further	secret	talks	with	Birch,	Ron	Todd	and	another	official	Doug	Cornwall.	When	this	came	out	at	a	meeting	of	the	union	side	of	the	FNJNC	that	Wednesday,	other	union	representatives	made	‘strong	criticisms	of	Reg	Birch’s	decision	to	approach	the	company	without	[...]	authority’.517	Shop	stewards	from	Dagenham	also	responded	with	a	resolution	that	any	further	meetings	with	management	should	be	attended	by	the	full	FNJNC.	Meanwhile,	the	Combine	organised	a	mass	lobby	of	the	talks	when	they	resumed	at	Ford’s	West	London	offices	in	Moscow	Place	that	Friday.	These	continued	until	the	following	Tuesday	evening	when	negotiators	agreed	to	put	a	proposed	deal	to	the	workforce.	Management	presented	this	as	‘the	
																																								 																					515	London,	National	Archives,	AST	36/1346	Trade	Disputes	Ford	1978,	‘Ford	Strike’	[No	Date].	516	Alan	Pike,	‘Ford	Union	Chief	Calls	for	More	Negotiations’,	Financial	Times	(London,	20	October	1978),	p.	1.	517	‘We’ve	Never	Been	in	a	Stronger	Position’,	Ford	Strike	News,	[26	October	1978],	No.	5,	p.	1.	
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company’s	final	offer’,	predictably	enough.518	It	included	increasing	the	basic	rate	of	pay	by	at	least	£5.92,	a	percentage	increase	of	over	nine	per	cent.	This	was	supplemented	by	an	additional	‘attendance	allowance’,	which	could	be	withdrawn	for	breach	of	any	one	of	nine	criteria.	These	included	participation	in	industrial	action,	late	attendance,	disciplinary	issues	and	lay-offs	due	to	internal	disputes.	In	principle,	this	raised	wages	by	at	least	an	additional	£3.20,	amounting	to	a	total	pay	rise	of	over	fourteen	per	cent.	The	response	of	union	negotiators	to	the	deal	was	inconsistent.	While	claiming	to	have	rejected	the	offer,	they	agreed	that	the	matter	should	be	put	to	a	vote	of	the	workforce	at	mass	meetings	later	that	week.	Ron	Todd,	chairman	of	Union	side	of	the	FNJNC,	saw	the	inclusion	of	penalty	clauses	as	‘the	main	stumbling	block’,	distancing	himself	from	what	was	on	the	table.519	The	next	day	a	report	in	the	Morning	Star	celebrated	the	offer	as	‘shatter[ing]	the	government’s	5	per	cent	pay	limit	by	more	than	200	per	cent’.	While	this	exaggerated	the	point	by	overlooking	how	the	attendance	allowance	effectively	operated	as	a	productivity	deal,	the	assessment	of	the	offer’s	impact	on	government	policy	proved	accurate.	The	author	also	noted	that	‘it	may	well	not	satisfy	the	57,000	Ford	workers	now	in	the	sixth	week	of	the	strike’,	since	the	offer	made	no	concession	on	working	hours	and	it	still	fell	well	short	of	the	demand	for	twenty	pound	without	strings.520	By	contrast	a	front-page	headline	in	the	next	issue	of	Ford	Strike	News	unambiguously	called	on	workers	to	‘Reject	This	First	“Final	Offer”’,	making	the	Combine’s	position	clear.	A	photomontage	appeared	alongside	the	text,	depicting	a	man	dressed	in	a	suit	with	a	giant	carrot	in	his	arms,	an	image	culled	from	an																																									 																					518	Personal	Collection,	Ford	Motor	Company	Limited	‘Ford	Employee	Information’,	31	October	1978.	519	Philip	Bassett	and	Christian	Tyler,	‘Ford	14.9%	Pay	Offer	Rejected	by	Unions’,	Financial	Times	(London,	1	November	1978),	p.	1	(p.	9).	520	Charlie	Brewster,	‘Ford	Lifts	Offer	to	14.9	Per	Cent’,	Morning	Star	(London,	1	November	1978),	p.	1.	
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advertisement	for	executive	pensions.	In	its	original	context,	this	depicted	the	challenge	of	providing	senior	managers	with	financial	incentives	that	minimised	tax	liability.521		The	disparate	uses	of	this	image	exemplified	the	meaning	of	the	Situationist	terms	récuperation	and	détournement.	First	the	advertising	industry	recuperated	the	aesthetics	of	Dadaism	and	Surrealism,	co-opting	an	avant-garde	style	of	photomontage	to	market	financial	services.	This	advertisement	then	underwent	a	
détournement,	subverting	its	previous	use	for	radical	political	ends.	In	both	contexts	a	besuited	character	represented	senior	management.	A	pair	of	cartoon	eyes	with	an	evil	expression	and	a	mouthful	of	sharply	pointed	teeth	transformed	the	overgrown	root	vegetable	from	a	symbol	for	executive	benefits	into	‘the	carrot	that	bites	back’,	an	attack	on	workers	disguised	as	an	incentive	package.	Another	modification	saw	a	speech	bubble	emerge	from	the	manager’s	mouth.	‘They	are	bound	to	accept	this	at	a	mass	meeting’,	it	announced,	implicitly	voicing	the	Combine’s	challenge	to	their	workmates	to	defy	this	expectation.522	Mass	meetings	of	workers	at	every	Ford	plant	apart	from	Swansea	overwhelmingly	voted	against	accepting	the	deal.	The	same	day	Ford	announced	plans	to	lay-off	workers	from	a	German	plant	in	Saarlouis.	Transnational	integration	across	Europe	left	operations	elsewhere	increasingly	vulnerable	to	the	effects	of	industrial	action	in	Britain.523	Following	this	setback,	negotiations	resumed	again	on	20	November,	when	management	were	able	to	announce	that	union	negotiators	recommended	acceptance	of	an	offer.	This	deal	remained	essentially	the	same	as	the	one	rejected	by	workers	three	weeks	earlier,	with	no	further	cash	on	the	table.	The	only																																									 																					521	‘An	Incentive	to	All	Directors	Earning	over	£25,000’,	Financial	Times	(London,	28	September	1978),	section	Survey,	p.	15.	522	‘Reject	This	First	“Final	Offer”’,	Ford	Strike	News,	2	October	1978,	[No.	6]	edition,	p.	[1].	523	Philip	Bassett	and	Arthur	Smith,	‘Ford	Strikers	Reject	“Final”	Pay	Offer’,	
Financial	Times	(London,	4	November	1978),	p.	1.	
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concessions	management	made	were	to	bring	a	new	holiday	pay	scheme	forward	by	four	months	and	to	limit	the	conditions	for	attendance	payments,	which	were	also	rebranded	as	‘supplementary	payments’.524	Ron	Todd	described	the	deal	as	a	‘significant	improvement	in	the	previous	offer’,	a	claim	published	without	critical	comment	in	the	Morning	Star.	According	to	the	same	source,	trade	union	representatives	reached	agreement	by	a	majority	of	almost	3	to	1,	voting	33	to	12	in	favour	of	the	offer.525	Ford	Strike	News	tried	to	rebut	this	claim,	arguing	that	there	was	a	much	narrower	margin,	just	24	to	19,	with	the	vote	causing	divisions	between	union	officials	and	senior	stewards.	Singling	Todd	out	for	personal	criticism,	the	same	piece	noted	scathingly	the	similarity	between	the	deal,	which	now	met	with	his	approval,	and	the	one	he	described	as	a	‘recipe	for	disaster’	just	three	weeks	earlier.	The	bulletin	went	on	to	emphasise	the	wider	political	significance	of	the	dispute:	Fords	backed	by	the	Government	and	the	CBI	[Confederation	for	British	Industry]	have	been	stonewalling	for	the	last	3	weeks.	Faced	with	this	political	pressure	the	trade	union	leaders	have	lost	heart.	Our	strike	has	always	been	against	the	Government	and	pay	restraint,	and	yet	the	union	leaders	have	tried	to	prevent	other	workers	coming	out	alongside	us.526	Their	workmates	were	urged	to	reject	the	offer,	a	position	also	taken	by	shop	stewards	committees	from	plants	in	Halewood,	Langley	and	Croydon,	but	not	Dagenham.	When	mass	meetings	took	place	in	all	of	Ford’s	plants	except	Langley	on	22	November,	most	workers	decided	to	accept	the	offer,	bringing	the	strike	to	an	end.	
																																								 																					524	Personal	Collection,	Ford	Motor	Company	Limited,	Ford	Employee	
Information,	20	November	1978.	525	Charlie	Brewster,	‘Ford	Unions	Accept	17%’,	Morning	Star	(London,	21	November	1978),	p.	1.	526	Personal	Collection,	No	Surrender,	Ford	Strike	News,	No.	9	[c.	21	November	1978],	p.	1.	
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Despite	a	‘convincing	vote	for	a	return	to	work’,	the	Financial	Times	reported	‘criticism	at	mass	meetings	of	the	penalty	clauses	in	the	supplementary	payment	scheme’,	identifying	this	as	a	source	of	future	friction.527	The	dispute	cost	the	firm	an	estimated	117,000	vehicles	in	lost	production	worth	£450,000,000.	Its	resolution	dealt	a	major	blow	to	the	government’s	incomes	policy,	with	British	Oxygen	already	about	to	settle	another	strike	with	a	pay	offer	in	breach	of	the	5%	limits	and	more	to	follow.		
Make	the	Union	Serve	the	Interests	of	the	Workers,	the	Aftermath	
After	nine	weeks	the	strike	came	to	an	end,	having	lasted	almost	as	long	as	the	1971	pay	dispute.	While	the	vote	to	return	to	work	went	against	the	Combine’s	recommendation,	this	was	hardly	surprising	given	the	length	of	the	dispute	and	the	less	robust	stance	adopted	by	official	union	negotiators.	None	of	this	should	detract	from	the	role	these	shop-floor	militants	played	in	organising	industrial	action	from	the	outset.	While	they	did	not	achieve	everything	they	set	out	to,	the	government	incomes	policies	came	under	a	severe	attack,	encouraging	others	to	make	the	fatal	blow.	Afterwards	Members	of	the	Combine	met	again	to	debrief	in	Coventry	on	17	December.	Reports	from	plants	across	the	country	described	management’s	reluctance	to	provoke	conflict	since	the	return	to	work.	Minutes	of	the	meeting	recorded	the	prevailing	view	of	the	pay	dispute’s	outcome.	‘The	general	feeling	about	the	strike	was	that	it	was	no	victory	–	because	we	could	have	done	much	better	–	and	it	was	no	defeat,	because	we	smashed	through	the	5%.’	Expenditure	of	£1,300	was	accounted	for,	mainly	for	printing	and	distributing	Ford	Strike	News,	with	costs	covered	by	the	sale	of	t-shirts	and	badges,	and	donations.	The	meeting	
																																								 																					527	Alan	Pike,	‘Ford	Strikers	Back	Tomorrow	after	Accepting	17%	Deal’,	
Financial	Times	(London,	23	November	1978),	p.	1.	
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decided	to	form	‘a	mass	organisation	of	Ford	workers	and	their	wives	and	husbands’,	building	on	the	credibility	established	during	the	dispute.	Discussions	about	drafting	a	constitution	covered	a	range	of	issues:	unemployment	and	a	reduced	working	week,	the	need	for	action	and	whether	the	Combine	should	be	an	explicitly	socialist	organisation.	An	initial	decision	was	taken	to	exclude	racists,	while	‘a	long	discussion	on	whether	the	Constitution	should	include	a	point	about	sexism’	also	took	place.528	That	agreement	was	reached	so	quickly	to	take	such	a	firm	position	on	racism,	but	not	sexism,	reflected	the	composition	of	the	company’s	workforce,	which	while	ethnically	diverse	was	overwhelmingly	made	up	of	men.	For	the	Combine,	an	organisation	mainly	composed	of	semi-skilled	mass	workers—the	section	of	the	workforce	generally	accessible	to	Black	workers—opposing	racism	clearly	served	to	maintain	collective	unity.	On	the	other	hand,	issues	to	do	with	sexual	inequality	played	out	inside	workers’	households	as	much	as	they	did	within	the	factory.	Given	the	role	that	stereotypes	of	masculinity	played	in	the	wider	culture	of	the	car	industry,	the	amount	of	time	spent	discussing	the	issue	of	sexism	might	seem	more	remarkable	than	any	failure	to	reach	quick	agreement	on	how	to	address	the	issue.		A	draft	constitution	proposed	to	define	the	first	of	the	Combine’s	aims	and	objectives	as	‘[t]o	build	a	rank	and	file	organisation	to	develop	the	power,	organisation,	confidence	and	strength	of	Ford	workers	–	and	to	make	the	union	serve	the	interests	of	the	workers’.529	As	seen	already	in	the	first	FWC	leaflet,	the	implication	that	workers	needed	such	an	independent	organisation	to	ensure	the	unions	represented	their	interests	effectively	displayed	ambivalence	towards	trade	unionism.	The	text	went	on	to	suggest	that	members	should	be	‘strongly	encouraged	to	regularly	attend	union	branch	meetings’	and	tasked	Combine																																									 																						529	Personal	Collection,	[Alan	Hayling],	‘Draft	Constitution’,	[1978].	
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branches	with	developing	‘tactics	and	plans	within	local	union	branches	and	shop	stewards’	committees’.	Such	trade-union	activity	only	constituted	one	aspect	of	a	broader	strategy	for	how	to	‘organise	to	win’	within	the	firm.	Emphasis	was	also	placed	on	‘support	and	solidarity	[...]	for	any	group	of	workers	fighting	over	an	issue	with	which	the	“Combine”	agrees’.	All	this	signalled	the	continued	relevance	of	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy.	Yet	the	document’s	draft	status	also	suggested	a	lack	of	consensus	on	these	issues	among	industrial	militants,	whose	perspectives	reflected	the	sectarian	divisions	of	left-wing	politics	in	Britain.	This	posed	a	challenge	to	the	militants	as	recalled	in	interview	by	Rod	Finlayson,	an	active	Combine	member	from	its	inception	who	worked	in	the	Dagenham	Foundry	until	its	closure	when	he	moved	on	to	the	PTA	plant.	Finlayson	described	himself	as	‘a	Maoist-Stalinist	who	ended	up	a	Stalinist’,	words	spoken	with	a	broad	smile	but	without	a	trace	of	irony.	Instead,	his	expression	conveyed	a	sharp-witted	pleasure	in	taking	such	a	provocative	stance,	which	was	tempered	by	a	disarming	warmth	and	sincerity	in	his	commitment	to	fighting	social	injustice.	Given	Finlayson’s	political	trajectory,	his	recollections	of	how	the	Combine	dealt	with	Leninist	parties	were	all	the	more	striking:	At	one	point	I	brought	a	leading	bloke	from	the	organisation	I	was	in	and	then	somebody	else	brought	someone	from	SWP.	And	we	had	to	ban	[both	of]	them	because	all	they	did	was	create	splits.	And	you	can’t	have	workers’	unity	and	splits	at	the	same	time.530	For	the	Combine	to	organise	effectively,	it	had	to	engage	as	many	militants	at	Ford	as	was	practicable.	Alongside	those	with	no	party	political	affiliations	and	Labour	Party	members,	these	included	the	cadre	of	the	full	panoply	of	far-left	organisations	in	Britain.	More	often	than	not,	this	entailed	adherence	to	Leninist	politics	of	one	form	or	another	at	the	time.	To	overcome	the	sectarian	divisions	that	plagued	the	
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left,	however,	the	Combine	needed	to	organise	independently	from	such	outside	influences.	Finlayson	reiterated	the	point	with	reference	to	another	occasion	when	relations	deteriorated	with	the	SWP,	which	had	previously	printed	material	for	the	campaign.	He	recalled	how	the	Combine	then	turned	to	anarchist	printers.	Such	a	move	was	only	possible	because	of	the	non-sectarian	approach	of	those	who	initiated	the	Combine.	Given	the	tensions	between	Finlayson’s	professed	politics	and	such	practices,	it	seems	appropriate	to	give	him	the	last	word:	‘You	can	work	with	people	and	you	build	up	trust	and	you	build	up	solidarity	and	then	people	will	perhaps	consider	your	views,	or	perhaps	not’.531	Early	in	the	New	Year	Alan	Hayling	wrote	to	Jan	Cartier	of	the	Ford	Amsterdam	Workers’	Commission	to	thank	him	for	solidarity	shown	during	the	national	pay	strike.	Hayling	specifically	mentioned	how	information	sent	from	the	Netherlands	during	the	strike	gave	the	Combine	greater	credibility.	Likewise,	a	message	of	support	that	accompanied	a	donation	to	the	Langley	strike	fund	from	their	Dutch	workmates	made	reference	to	FWC	member	Alex	Gungi.	This	led	the	plant’s	Shop	Stewards	Committee	to	allocate	one	hundred	pounds	from	the	donation	to	the	Combine.	Hayling	then	went	on	to	discuss	the	possibility	of	an	international	meeting	of	the	firm’s	workforce:		I	think	a	Ford	Europe	conference	on	the	35	hour	week	would	be	a	great	idea.	At	least	it	would	put	our	Convenors	on	the	spot.	It	would	be	even	better	if	it	was	organised	in	such	a	way	as	to	get	rank	and	file	participation.	(eg	a	conference	in	which	a	factory	of	a	certain	size	would	send	its	convenor,	plus	a	specified	number	of	stewards,	and	a	specified	number	of	ordinary	rank	and	file	workers).	Of	course	the	call	for	this	conference	would	have	to	come	
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from	an	official	Ford	Trade	Union	organisation	in	one	country	or	another.	Any	thoughts	on	this???532	Cartier	and	Hayling	made	contact	due	to	the	Combine’s	role	in	the	strike	and	the	solidarity	shown	by	their	Dutch	workmates.	Within	two	months	the	two	men	began	to	hatch	plans	to	bring	together	shop-floor	worker	from	across	Ford’s	European	operations.		
Chapter	Conclusion	
In	preparation	for	the	1978	wage	claim	Big	Flame	and	others	from	a	broad	tendency	that	advocated	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	initiated	a	new	national	organisation	the	Ford	Workers	Group	(“The	Combine”).	While	many	of	those	involved	were	shop	stewards	holding	a	broader	range	of	political	views,	collectively	they	identified	themselves	as	ordinary	workers	and	organised	independently	of	both	the	unions	and	any	political	parties.	The	Combine	then	ran	an	unprecedented	shop-floor	campaign	inside	both	the	factory	and	the	unions,	which	began	before	negotiations	started	and	carried	on	after	the	final	vote	to	resume	work.	The	strike	was	a	watershed	moment	for	relations	between	the	company	and	the	British	state	too.	Over	the	previous	decade,	whichever	of	the	two	main	parties	was	in	government,	the	agenda	of	the	state	and	Ford	management	generally	aligned	over	how	to	manage	the	crisis	in	the	post-war	settlement.	As	the	company’s	need	to	recruit	labour	came	into	conflict	with	the	Social	Contract	this	consensus	broke	down.	The	terms	under	which	British	social	democracy	and	Ford’s	subsidiary	had	thrived	symbiotically	no	longer	applied.		 	
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6.	There	is	No	Alternative,	1979	to	1990	
It	goes	without	saying	that	Margaret	Thatcher’s	election	as	Prime	Minister	marked	a	major	turning	point	for	the	country,	just	as	the	1978	Ford	national	pay	strike	had	done	for	the	subsidiary	six	months	earlier.	In	Britain	the	origins	of	this	transition	can	be	traced	back	through	the	IMF	crisis	to	the	radical	free-market	policy	proposals	of	the	Conservative	1970	general	election	manifesto.	Internationally,	American	abandonment	of	the	Bretton	Woods	system	under	Richard	Nixon	and	the	role	of	the	Chicago	Boys	in	developing	monetarist	economic	policies	for	the	Chilean	Junta	also	set	the	scene	for	such	a	shift.	Yet,	Thatcher’s	rise	to	power	and	the	election	of	her	ally	Ronald	Reagan	the	following	year	represented	a	fundamental	shift	in	how	the	capitalist	state	responded	to	a	systemic	crisis	that	had	by	then	been	ongoing	for	well	over	a	decade.	In	this	new	climate	and	with	Ford’s	operations	in	Britain	going	further	into	decline,	unrest	at	the	firm	would	never	again	have	the	same	political	impact.	The	1978	strike	saw	imports	of	Ford	cars	exceed	exports	for	the	first	time	since	domestic	production	began.	This	marked	the	beginning	of	a	trend.	The	size	of	the	workforce	peaked	the	following	year.	Having	been	extolled	for	years	as	the	country’s	main	exporter,	the	firm	became	the	source	of	a	net	loss	to	the	balance	of	trade	worth	£164,000,000	in	1980.	The	British	share	of	European	output	also	continued	to	fall.	While	Ford	Werke	in	Germany	consolidated	its	position	as	the	largest	operation	in	Europe,	output	in	Spain	started	to	match	that	in	Britain	by	1984.	In	the	circumstances,	the	British	subsidiary	reported	remarkably	strong	profits	throughout	the	1980s,	even	exceeding	previous	records	on	two	occasions.533	This	combination	of	rising	profits	with	declining	production	signalled	a	shift	in	corporate	policy	away	from	reinvesting	earnings	back	into	British	manufacturing	facilities.																																									 																					533	Tolliday,	‘Statistical	Appendix’,	II,	pp.	141–47.	
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A	drive	to	restructure	the	process	of	production	inside	the	factory	accompanied	such	changes	to	the	corporation’s	trans-European	structure.	Following	the	1979	visit	of	Ford	of	Europe	Vice-President	Manufacturing	Bill	Hayden	to	Japan,	management	made	a	series	of	attempts	to	remodel	operations	based	on	Japanese	management	techniques.534	Implementation	of	such	an	approach	would	remain	a	point	of	contention	with	members	of	the	workforce	for	years	to	come.	Nevertheless,	Ford,	the	company	that	had	become	eponymous	with	the	paradigm	for	mid-twentieth-century	manufacturing,	began	to	look	for	an	alternative	model.	This	came	about	amid	an	ongoing	international	structural	crisis	in	an	automobile	sector	with	excess	capacity.	Operations	across	Europe	felt	the	effect	of	this	particularly	acutely,	since	investment	had	been	concentrated	there	since	the	Second	World	War.535	Both	economically	and	symbolically,	the	sector	became	increasingly	displaced	from	its	central	position.	The	automobile	industry	in	Britain	and	its	workforce	were	further	undermined	by	the	specific	deindustrialisation	policies	adopted	by	the	new	Conservative	administration.	These	accelerated	a	general	secular	trend	towards	lower	employment,	if	not	output,	in	manufacturing	across	the	developed	world	from	the	1950s	onwards.	Amplifying	this	tendency,	British	industry	also	underwent	a	relative	decline	throughout	the	long	twentieth	century	from	a	pervious	hegemonic	position	within	the	world	economy.	While	situating	developments	within	this	context,	the	economic	and	social	historian	Jim	Tomlinson	underscored	the	abrupt	nature	of	this	transition:	‘De-industrialization	reached	a	crescendo	in	1979-82,	when	a	grossly	overvalued	exchange	rate	rendered	large	swathes	of	British	industry	
																																								 																					534	Tolliday,	‘The	Decline	of	Ford’,	II,	pp.	99–101.	535	Beverly	J.	Silver,	Force	of	Labor:	Workers’	Movements	and	Globalization	
since	1870,	Cambridge	Studies	in	Comparative	Politics	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003),	pp.	49–54	&	171.	
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uncompetitive,	and	industrial	output	fell	by	20	per	cent.’536	Both	the	extent	and	pace	of	change	were	exceptional	by	comparison	with	other	developed	countries.	Tomlinson	analysis	serves	to	undermine	‘declinist	narratives’	of	twentieth-century	British	history	in	general,	not	just	those	depicting	this	specific	moment	as	one	of	economic	renewal.	What	is	absent	from	his	otherwise	compelling	structural	analysis,	however,	is	a	sense	that	this	process	had	any	connection	to	the	industrial	and	social	unrest	of	the	previous	decade.	Tomlinson’s	reluctance	to	rely	on	‘contemporary,	highly	politicized	and	polemical	discourses’	highlights	some	of	the	challenges	entailed	in	engaging	critically	with	such	sources.	While	such	concerns	should	not	be	dismissed	lightly,	exactly	this	question	of	the	relationship	between	workers’	agency	and	structural	change	that	was	then	ongoing	preoccupied	those	advocating	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	at	the	time.	In	1979	Red	Notes,	which	was	linked	to	Ford	through	the	activities	of	its	publisher	Ed	Emery	as	am	external	militant	in	Dagenham,	brought	out	Working	
Class	Autonomy	and	the	Crisis.	This	document	was	published	in	support	of	the	April	7	Defence	Committee,	an	international	solidarity	campaign	for	Italian	political	prisoners	arrested	in	a	wave	of	repression	in	the	wake	of	the	Moro	affair.	At	the	time	this	text	represented	the	most	significant	collection	of	material	translated	into	English	from	the	Italian	movement	to	date.	The	editorial	selection	draws	out	a	chain	of	continuity	between	contemporary	autonomist	Marxism	and	earlier	Italian	workerism.	The	opening	articles	introduced	English	readers	to	two	key	texts	from	operaismo	written	by	Mario	Tronti	in	the	mid-1960s.	In	the	first	of	these	‘Lenin	in	England’,	Tronti	emphasised	the	role	of	working-class	struggle	as	a	driver	of	capitalist	development.																																									 																					536	Jim	Tomlinson,	‘De-Industrialization	Not	Decline:	A	New	Meta-Narrative	for	Post-War	British	History’,	Twentieth	Century	British	History,	27.1	(2016),	76–99	(p.	87).	For	an	overview	of	worldwide	capitalist	development	over	the	longue	
durée,	see	also	Giovanni	Arrighi,	The	Long	Twentieth	Century:	Money,	Power	and	the	
Origins	of	Our	Times	(London:	Verso,	1994).	
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In	the	other	‘The	Strategy	of	Refusal’,	he	identified	the	refusal	of	work	as	a	politically	strategic	moment	in	which	workers	took	action	for	themselves,	relegating	the	party	to	a	tactical	role.537	These	texts	are	indeed	‘highly	politicized	and	polemical	in	tone’,	providing	a	perspective	that	is	far	from	detached	in	its	analysis.	The	same	goes	for	the	other	material	translated,	which	originally	came	out	in	Italian	after	these	two	texts,	including	several	pieces	by	a	prominent	figure	among	the	defendants	Antonio	Negri.	In	the	first	of	these	Negri	linked	the	shift	in	public	policy	away	from	social	democratic	reform	towards	restructuring	to	a	change	of	state-form	from	the	‘state-as-planner’	to	the	‘state-as-enterprise’,	a	transition	he	identified	as	early	as	1973.538	An	interview	with	Negri,	an	extract	of	which	was	also	included,	Dall’operaio	Massa	All’Operaio	Sociale	(translated	as	‘Notes	on	the	“Social”	Worker’),	suggested	another	transition	with	the	recomposition	of	labour	away	from	the	mass	worker	towards	a	more	diffuse	form	of	working-class	subjectivity.539	Given	the	strategic	implications	of	such	analysis	in	terms	for	the	relative	insignificance	of	future	unrest	in	the	automobile	sector,	it	is	perhaps	to	the	credit	of	those	involved	that	they	did	not	abandon	this	terrain	altogether.	Yet,	agitating	and	organisational	activity	at	Ford	informed	by	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	declined	dramatically	over	the	course	of	the	1980s,	reflecting	the	underlying	changes	in	social	conditions	that	such	analysis	set	out	to	address.	While	Ford	
																																								 																					537	Tronti,	‘Lenin	in	England’;	Tronti,	‘Lenin	in	Inghilterra’;	Tronti,	‘The	Strategy	of	Refusal’;	Tronti,	Operai	e	capitale,	pp.	234–52.	538	Negri,	‘Reformism	and	Restructuration’.	The	original	was	published	as	the	first	appendix	to	Negri,	Antonio,	‘Partito	operaio	contro	il	lavoro’,	in	Crisi	e	
organizzazione	operaia,	by	Sergio	Bologna,	Paolo	Carpignano,	and	Antonio	Negri,	I	fatti	e	le	idee	Saggi	e	Biografie,	279	(Milano:	Feltrinelli,	1974),	pp.	99–193	(pp.	161–65).	 539	Antonio	Negri,	‘Note	on	the	“Social”	Worker’,	in	Working	Class	Autonomy	
and	the	Crisis,	ed.	by	Red	Notes,	trans.	by	Red	Notes	[Ed	Emery]	(London:	Red	Notes,	1979),	pp.	37–38;	Antonio	Negri,	Dall’operaio	massa	all’operaio	social:	
Intervista	sull’operaismo,	ed.	by	Paolo	Pozzi	and	Roberta	Tommasini	(Milano:	Multhipla,	1979).	
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workers	continued	to	organise	at	work	afterwards,	both	the	efficacy	and	broader	political	significance	of	such	activity	diminished.	In	response	to	a	cycle	of	heightened	social	and	industrial	unrest,	a	radical	transformation	at	the	level	of	the	state	ushered	in	the	restructuring	of	the	British	motor	industry,	the	same	situation	Negri	grappled	with	in	Italy.	Just	as	shop-floor	militants	at	Ford	began	attempts	to	organise	transnationally	across	Europe,	the	political	and	industrial	landscape	became	much	less	favourable.	The	rest	of	this	chapter	charts	this	process	across	three	main	sections.	The	first	examines	the	situation	in	British	Ford	plants	during	Margaret	Thatcher’s	first	term	as	Prime	Minister	between	1979	and	1983.	The	second	charts	developments	at	a	European	level,	examining	the	history	of	the	European	Ford	Workers	Combine	(EFWC).	The	third	section	returns	to	the	situation	in	Britain	during	Thatcher’s	second	and	brief	third	terms	as	Prime	Minister,	ending	in	1990.	
	
After	Japan,	1979	to	1983	
Within	two	weeks	of	the	1979	general	election,	‘the	Ford	Workers	Group	(“The	Combine”)’	held	a	national	meeting	on	19	May	1979.	This	was	the	second	such	gathering	since	the	previous	year’s	strike.	By	then	the	Combine	drew	support	from	ten	plants	across	the	country.	The	agenda	covered	the	challenge	of	how	to	mount	‘a	sustained	campaign	on	the	issues	facing	us—pay,	the	35-hour	week,	victimisation,	racism,	automation	and	redundancies’.	‘Don’t	leave	it	to	someone	else—or	nothing	will	change’—they	urged	their	workmates	afterwards,	encouraging	them	to	get	involved	if	they	shared	the	group’s	aims:	‘More	money	and	less	work	[|]	Forcing	the	union	to	fight	for	the	interests	of	its	members	[|]	Against	racism	and	discrimination	against	women’.540																																									 																					540	‘Combine	National	Meeting’,	Fraud	News	(London,	July	1979),	p.	5.	
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The	piece	then	ended	by	providing	contact	details	for	the	Combine	in	a	flat	on	a	South-London	council	estate	and	at	another	address	on	Whitechapel,	Liverpool.	The	following	month	another	issue	of	Fraud	News	came	out.	Articles	covered	a	wide	range	of	topics,	such	as	the	police	killing	of	Blair	Peach	at	an	anti-racism	demonstration,	reports	from	plants	across	the	country,	industrial	action	by	Danish	workmates	and	a	hunger	strike	at	Ford	Spain.	The	main	focus	fell	on	that	year’s	pay	claim	though.	The	Combine	proposed	a	clear	set	of	demands:	a	twenty-five	per	cent	pay	increase,	bringing	the	minimum	basic	rate	to	one	hundred	pound	a	week;	index	linking	of	wages	to	inflation;	a	thirty-five-hour	working	week;	and	the	abolition	of	pay	supplements	and	other	penalty	clauses.	Following	the	Combine’s	effective	intervention	at	the	previous	Coventry	Shop	Stewards	Conference,	however,	union	leaders	planned	to	cancel	it	this	year.	This	raised	concerns	about	how	to	exert	shop-floor	power	over	negotiations.	The	exclusion	of	any	shop-floor	involvement	in	pay	negotiations	by	union	officials	would	continue	throughout	the	1980s.541	Another	piece	in	the	same	issue	explored	the	implications	for	car	workers	of	the	rapid	fall	in	the	cost	of	microprocessors.	One	early	indication	of	the	impact	of	such	technology	on	the	automobile	industry	came	from	Italy,	where	Fiat	led	the	European	car	industry	in	terms	of	the	introduction	of	robotics.	That	year	a	trial	of	new	robots	also	began	at	Halewood.	Fraud	News	argued	that	this	situation	required	a	specific	response:	‘What	needs	to	be	challenged	is	not	technology,	but	the	control	over	technology	by	managements	committed	to	profit-making	at	our	expense.’542	A	new	phase	in	automation	suggested	another	phase	in	the	technical	recomposition	of	labour	as	occurred	with	the	introduction	of	the	assembly	line	six	decades	earlier.	The	potential	to	increase	productivity	threatened	widespread	redundancies,	given	the	current	capacity	of	the	European	automobile	sector.	
																																								 																					541	‘It’s	Got	to	Be	£100!’,	Fraud	News	(London,	July	1979),	p.	1.	542	‘The	Chips	That	Bite	Back’,	Fraud	News	(London,	July	1979),	p.	3.	
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This	situation	coincided	with	the	Ford	executive	Bill	Hayden’s	visit	to	Japan,	which	marked	the	beginning	of	management	attempts	to	restructure	European	operations	modelled	on	the	Japanese	car	industry.	First	the	After	Japan	programme	and	then	the	Employee	Involvement	programme	both	emphasised	the	rigid	labour	discipline	and	the	more	flexible	working	practices	associated	with	Japanese	management	techniques.543	This	restructuring	also	entailed	a	transition	towards	just-in-time	supply	chain	management,	facilitated	by	new	computer	technology.	That	July	Alan	Hayling	and	Ed	Emery	hosted	another	national	meeting	of	the	Combine	in	Epping	Forrest,	an	area	of	ancient	woodland	situated	along	the	north	east	fringe	of	Greater	London.544	While	such	a	sylvan	setting	might	seem	an	incongruous	location	for	industrial	militants	to	strategise	how	best	to	organise	in	an	increasingly	high-tech	workplace,	the	agenda	covered	more	familiar	territory.	The	talks	covered	finance,	Fraud	News,	plant	reports,	and	the	upcoming	pay	claim.	While	a	draft	constitution	was	also	circulated	beforehand,	discussion	never	reached	this	final	item	on	the	agenda.	This	suggested	that	tackling	more	practical	issues	took	priority	over	trying	to	agree	on	a	formal	structure,	which	perhaps	risked	highlighting	internal	disagreements.	In	any	case,	the	text	indicated	some	of	the	different	views	within	the	Combine.	This	was	a	composite	of	two	earlier	proposals	from	the	previous	national	meeting,	one	by	Hayling	and	another	by	someone	only	identified	by	his	first	name	Jim.	The	new	version	of	the	text	differed	significantly	from	Hayling’s	original.	It	defined	the	Combine	as	‘an	organisation	of	rank	and	file	trade	unionists’,	rather	than	workers	whose	trade-union	status	only	came	up	previously	to	refute	any	suggestion	otherwise.	Rather	than	asserting	their	independence	from	the	unions	as	a	group	of	‘ordinary	workers’,	the	Combine’s	role	became	that	of	‘building	a	fighting																																									 																					543	Tolliday,	‘The	Decline	of	Ford’,	II,	pp.	99–101.	544	Personal	collection,	‘[Agenda	of	the]	Ford	Workers	Group	(“The	Combine”)’,	23	July	1979.	
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stewards	movement’,	albeit	one	that	‘fully	involves	the	rank	and	file	in	all	union	activities’.545	To	some	extent,	this	offered	a	realistic	assessment	of	the	available	alternatives,	but	such	a	rhetorical	shift	reflected	the	political	makeup	of	the	Combine	too.	As	on	the	British	left	in	general,	Big	Flame’s	purely	tactical	commitment	to	trade	unionism	represented	a	marginal	point	of	view	at	one	end	of	a	political	spectrum.	Even	on	the	far	left,	the	orthodox	Leninist	distinction	between	the	reformist	economic	role	of	trade	unions	and	the	revolutionary	political	role	of	the	party	prevailed.	Other	signs	still	remained	of	an	autonomist	outlook	with	the	Combine	described	as	a	‘socialist	organisation’,	but	one	‘not	allied	to	any	particular	party	or	group’.	Likewise,	the	commitment	of	members	to	take	action	took	priority	over	their	identification	with	socialist	politics.	Membership	rights	also	still	extended	to	‘Ford	workers	and	their	wives/girlfriends	or	husbands/boyfriends’,	who	were	not	necessarily	union	members	in	their	own	rights.546	Most	importantly,	the	Combine	continued	to	organise	independently	of	both	union	officials	and	the	formal	leadership	of	senior	shop	stewards	and	convenors.	Before	the	union	had	submitted	that	year’s	pay	claim,	a	Combine	leaflet	produced	in	Langley	challenged	union	leaders	for	refusing	to	allow	any	shop-floor	involvement	in	the	formulation	of	demands.	‘They	don’t	want	a	repeat	of	last	year’,	the	authors	noted	caustically,	‘when	there	was	a	real	shop	floor	campaign	with	thousands	of	badges	and	leaflets’.	Readers	were	urged	to	hold	union	representatives	to	a	motion	that	had	been	passed	by	the	branch,	resolving	that	any	final	decision	on	the	claim	should	be	made	at	mass	meetings.	The	text	went	on	to	
																																								 																					545	Ibid;	Personal	Collection,	[Alan	Hayling],	‘Draft	Constitution’,	[1978].	546	Ibid.	
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argue	that	‘we	want	–	more	money,	index	linked	wages,	shorter	hours,	more	holidays,	better	pension’,	five	clear	priorities.547	Significantly,	the	official	claim	raised	exactly	the	same	points	in	precisely	the	same	order	when	it	came	out.	It	also	included	an	ambitious	demand	for	a	thirty-pound	increase	in	the	basic	rate	of	weekly	pay.	The	conciseness	of	this	document,	which	only	took	up	a	single	sheet	of	A4	paper,	stood	in	marked	contrast	with	the	lengthy	pamphlets	issued	over	the	past	decade.	The	unions	framed	demands	in	terms	of	workers	needs	instead	of	lengthy	technical	arguments	about	the	company’s	ability	to	pay.	On	paper	at	least,	the	Combine’s	impact	was	clear	to	see.548	This	left	little	choice	but	to	acknowledge	the	claim	as	‘a	good	one’	in	terms	of	its	content.	Concerns	remained	about	the	union	decision	to	cancel	the	Shop	Stewards	Conference	though,	which	was	rightly	seen	as	a	sign	of	hostility	towards	any	shop-floor	involvement	in	negotiations.	Both	management	and	the	press	had	access	to	the	claim	before	it	was	made	available	to	union	members.	This	raised	doubts	that	the	militant	posture	adopted	by	union	leaders	in	fact	served	to	deflect	attention	from	their	real	attitude	towards	industrial	action,	by	deliberately	calling	a	strike	without	building	rank-and-file	support.	‘Don’t	Decide	before	Yuletide’,	the	Combine’s	slogan,	instead	urged	workers	to	avoid	either	accepting	a	deal	or	embarking	on	a	long	strike	until	after	the	New	Year.	As	well	as	calling	for	a	mass	lobby	of	the	talks,	a	variety	of	other	tactics	were	suggested:	‘work	to	rule,	overtime	ban,	taking	Friday	nights	out	and	generally	relaxing’.549	
																																								 																					547	Personal	Collection,	[Ford	Workers	Combine],	‘Wage	Claim	Latest’,	[September	1979].	548	Personal	Collection,	Ron	Todd	and	Jack	Whyman	on	behalf	of	the	Ford	National	Joint	Negotiation	Committee	(Trade	Union	Side),	‘Ford	Claim—What	We	Want	and	What	Ford	Needs’,	[1979].	549	‘How	to	Win	the	1979	Wage	Claim:	Don’t	Settle	before	Xmas’,	Fraud	News:	
Bulletin	of	the	Ford	Workers	Group	“The	Combine”,	[November	1979],	p.1.	
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Management	then	tabled	an	offer	that	was	purportedly	‘the	largest	cash	increase	in	wage	rates	ever	offered	in	response	to	the	Unions’	annual	wage	claim’,	raising	basic	weekly	pay	by	a	minimum	of	£11.25.550	While	negotiations	took	place	without	government	imposed	wage	restraints	for	the	first	time	in	recent	years,	such	a	grandiose	claim	did	not	reveal	the	full	picture.	In	fact,	the	offer	failed	to	keep	up	with	an	exceptionally	high	rate	of	inflation	even	by	the	standards	of	the	1970s,	reaching	seventeen	per	cent	in	Thatcher’s	first	year	in	office.	Yet,	the	approach	adopted	by	union	negotiators	combined	with	the	mood	on	the	shop	floor	led	to	this	offer’s	acceptance	without	industrial	action.	The	first	major	strike	to	confront	the	Thatcher	administration	instead	took	place	in	the	steel	industry,	although	this	dispute	saw	secondary	action	take	place	at	Ford.	This	began	when	the	Dagenham	Engine	Plant	Convenor	decided	to	‘black’	all	steel	for	three	days.	Doing	so	threatened	major	disruption	at	the	car	firm,	before	TGWU	officials	ordered	an	end	to	the	action.	Two	months	later	the	union	executive	reversed	this	position,	instructing	members	to	‘positively	observe	all	steel	pickets’.	Steelworkers	from	Warrington	then	sent	a	flying	picket	to	Dagenham,	which	the	Combine	supported	with	12,000	leaflets	calling	on	their	workmates	to	show	solidarity.	According	to	Big	Flame,	an	Iron	and	Steel	Trades	Confederation	(ISTC)	official	attended	the	scene	and	told	his	own	members	to	‘fuck	off’,	claiming	that	the	Ford	unions	had	the	matter	in	hand.	In	spite	of	this	obstructive	intervention,	the	unofficial	blockade	resumed	again	briefly	before	ISTC	replaced	it	with	a	purely	symbolic	‘token	picket’.551	Union	officials	actively	prevented	industrial	action	from	taking	full	effect	in	what	was	widely	seen	as	potentially	a	major	political	challenge	to	the	new	government.		
																																								 																					550	Personal	Collection,	Employee	Relations	Staff	of	the	Ford	Motor	Company	Limited,	Ford	Employee	Information,	16	November	1979.	551	‘Ford	Workers	Held	Back’,	Big	Flame:	Paper	of	the	Revolutionary	Socialist	
Organisation	Big	Flame	(London,	April	1980),	p.	3.	
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Meanwhile,	the	existing	leadership	of	the	Ford	shop	stewards	organisation	continued	to	encounter	pressure	from	below.	The	1980	Langley	TGWU	branch	elections	saw	‘a	battle	between	the	Ford	Workers	Group	(“The	Combine”)	and	self-proclaimed	“moderates”’,	who	had	dominated	the	plant’s	union	branch	for	more	than	a	decade.552	At	a	general	meeting	to	elect	new	representatives,	a	district	official	declared	the	result	of	a	show	of	hands	null	and	void,	putting	the	matter	to	a	secret	ballot	instead.	Proceedings	then	descended	into	chaos	with	furniture	smashed	and	people	physically	ejected	off	the	stage.	The	incident	only	came	to	a	conclusion	with	the	arrival	of	a	police	officer,	riding	a	bicycle	and	ringing	his	bell.	Such	an	ending	was	more	reminiscent	of	an	Ealing	Comedy	than	Finally	got	the	
News,	a	hard-hitting	documentary	about	the	struggle	of	Black	workers	in	the	Detroit	automobile	industry,	which	the	Combine	screened	at	a	fundraising	event.	Although	the	intensity	of	the	conflict	was	not	the	same,	both	situations	saw	workers	organising	independently	of	the	union	in	response	to	an	institutional	failure	to	represent	their	needs.553	The	following	year	Ford	workers	voted	‘overwhelmingly’	in	favour	of	another	pay	offer,	although	it	represented	‘a	big	cut	in	[...]	living	standards’,	failing	yet	again	to	keep	up	with	inflation.	Discussing	the	situation	in	Big	Flame	under	a	pseudonym,	Alan	Hayling	described	the	reluctance	of	most	workers	to	take	action	despite	efforts	to	persuade	them	otherwise.	This	stemmed,	the	Secretary	of	the	UK	Ford	Workers	Combine	suggested,	from	a	shared	sense	that	‘no	one	section	[of	the	workforce]	on	its	own	will	have	the	power	to	knock	out	this	government’,	emphasising	the	political	character	of	such	a	confrontation.	While	all	remained	quite	on	the	pay	front,	he	still	foresaw	a	‘hot	year	at	Ford’s’	ahead.	Indeed,	management	attempts	to	assert	authority	on	the	shop	floor,	using	‘efficiency																																									 																					552	Ford	Langley	Worker,	‘Fist	Fights	at	Langley’,	Big	Flame:	Paper	of	the	
Revolutionary	Socialist	Organisation	Big	Flame	(London,	February	1980),	p.	2.	553	Stewart	Bird,	Peter	Gessner,	and	Rene	Lichtman,	Finally	Got	the	News	(Icarus	Films,	1970).	
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clauses’	and	a	new	‘disciplinary	code’,	had	already	met	with	opposition	in	Halewood.554	Hayling’s	prediction	proved	well	founded.	With	the	introduction	of	new	technology	on	Merseyside,	management	attempted	to	impose	a	new	disciplinary	regime,	which	became	known	as	the	‘3rd	Riot	Act’	within	the	plant.	This	provoked	a	two-week	unofficial	strike,	which	forced	the	company	to	abandon	the	policy.	While	national	pay	disputes	were	avoided,	Ford	workers	continued	to	resist	restructuring	of	the	process	of	production	through	unofficial	action.555	That	year	saw	transport	workers	at	Ford	take	such	steps,	providing	another	indication	of	the	state	of	trade-union	representation	at	the	firm.	The	roots	of	this	dispute	dated	back	to	July	1980	when	five	regular	weekly	deliveries	of	parts	from	Genk	under	the	‘Cortina	Support	Programme’	came	to	an	end.	At	that	time	shop	stewards	followed	official	procedures	to	secure	an	agreement	from	management	that	any	future	deliveries	of	parts	from	the	Belgian	plant	would	be	allocated	to	Ford	employees.	When	such	work	resumed	the	following	January,	external	contractors	instead	delivered	the	parts.	This	provoked	a	picket,	which	a	panel	of	union	officials	and	convenors	initially	refused	to	support,	even	though	the	company	had	breached	the	terms	of	an	existing	agreement.556	In	response,	Ford	laid	off	thousands	of	other	workers	from	plants	across	the	country.	The	company	then	sent	a	letter	on	30	January	to	those	effected	that	emphasised	the	unofficial	status	of	the	dispute:	‘Management	and	the	Unions	are	doing	their	best	to	get	a	resumption	of	normal	work’.557	The	union	position	only	shifted	in	favour	of	industrial	action	after	the	picket	had	been	temporarily	lifted	to																																									 																					554	Jack	Brown,	‘Peace	at	Fords?’,	Big	Flame:	Paper	of	the	Revolutionary	
Socialist	Organisation	Big	Flame	(London,	February	1981),	p.	5.	555	Darlington,	pp.	203–4.	556	Personal	Collection,	Ford	Truck	Drivers,	‘The	Drivers’	Case’,	29	January	1981.	557	Personal	Collection,	Letter	to	Employees	from	Langley	Plant	Manager	P.	J.	Sissions,	30	January	1981.	
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allow	for	negotiations,	in	which	management	made	no	concessions.	Meanwhile,	the	Combine	encouraged	their	workmates	to	‘support	the	drivers’,	framing	the	issue	in	terms	of	the	need	to	defend	jobs	and	‘fight	unpaid	layoffs’.558		Even	after	an	agreement	acceptable	to	the	drivers	was	reached,	unofficial	action	still	carried	on	in	support	of	eight	employees	of	the	haulier	firm	Silcock	and	Collier,	who	faced	dismissal	for	refusing	to	cross	the	Ford	workers’	picket	line.	Attempts	to	break	the	strike	led	to	angry	confrontations,	which	saw	one	driver	arrested	for	the	alleged	possession	of	a	weapon,	although	the	charges	were	later	dropped.	Although	Ron	Todd	gave	a	television	interview	and	the	union	side	of	the	FNJNC	issuing	a	statement,	both	of	which	distanced	the	unions	from	the	dispute,	the	drivers	did	not	return	to	work	until	15	February.	As	a	result,	all	of	the	contractor’s	drivers	were	formally	reinstated.559	This	dispute	coincided	with	attempts	by	management	to	introduce	the	After	
Japan	programme.	This	aimed	at	cutting	costs	by	increasing	the	intensity	of	labour	and	making	greater	use	of	outside	suppliers,	such	as	the	Hauliers	Silcock	and	Collier.	To	avoid	drawing	too	facile	a	distinction	between	Fordist	vertical	integration	and	post-Fordist	outsourcing,	it	might	be	instructive	to	consider	the	history	of	the	body	works	at	Ford	at	this	juncture.	After	all,	it	was	first	outsourced	to	Briggs	following	the	move	to	Dagenham	before	being	brought	back	in	house.	Even	at	the	peak	of	Fordism,	production	always	included	externally	sourced	components,	which	were	sometimes	substituted	for	those	previously	produced	internally.	All	the	same,	the	introduction	of	outsourcing	had	not	previously	caused	unrest	at	the	subsidiary,	demonstrating	how	a	shift	in	company	strategy	now	met	with	opposition.	
																																								 																					558	Personal	Collection,	The	Ford	Workers	Group	“The	Combine”,	‘Fraud	News	Bulletin:	Support	the	Drivers	Fight	Unpaid	Layoffs!’,	[w/c	2	February	1981].	559	‘Lorry	Drivers	Show	the	Way:	Diary	of	the	Strike’,	The	Ford	Worker:	Voice	
of	the	Ford	(Dagenham)	Party	Committee	of	RCPB	(M-L)	(London).	
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At	first	the	1982	pay	negotiations	looked	set	to	lead	to	serious	industrial	action	with	preparations	made	for	an	official	strike	while	talks	were	still	ongoing.	Then	Ron	Todd	began	to	signal	willingness	to	make	concessions	on	pay	and	the	introduction	of	controversial	new	efficiency	measures,	in	return	for	an	improved	pension	and	the	earlier	introduction	of	a	small	reduction	in	working	hours.	Just	before	the	strike	was	scheduled	to	start,	union	executives	unilaterally	withdrew	official	support	for	industrial	action.	An	immediate	walkout	occurred	at	Halewood,	while	workers	voted	in	favour	of	an	unofficial	strike,	both	there	and	in	Swansea.	As	‘convenors	felt	bound	by	misguided	loyalty	to	the	officials	and	recommended	acceptance,	despite	their	own	opposition’,	the	outcome	of	meetings	at	other	plants	was	less	clear	cut.	Some	reports	disputed	the	accuracy	of	results	called	in	favour	of	accepting	the	offer	based	on	a	show	of	hands.	This	sparked	a	‘mini	riot	that	wrecked	the	union	office’	in	the	Dagenham	PTA,	leaving	one	senior	steward	hospitalised.560	Such	outbursts,	however,	had	no	effect	on	the	outcome	of	the	pay	settlement.	The	next	major	incident	at	Ford	only	came	about	after	the	announcement	of	a	redundancy	programme	to	cut	3,000	jobs	at	Halewood	in	January	1983.	Against	this	backdrop,	the	sacking	of	an	assembly	line	worker	Paul	Kelly	for	an	alleged	act	of	minor	vandalism	provoked	a	four-week	strike	in	the	PTA	Plant,	which	remained	unofficial	throughout	most	of	its	duration.	While	the	company’s	redundancy	programme	went	ahead	afterwards,	this	action	resulted	in	Kelly’s	reinstatement,	albeit	on	another	section.	Management	also	backed	down	on	an	attempt	to	introduce	new	working	practices	to	the	Body	Plant,	which	began	during	this	dispute.561	Unofficial	action	still	proved	more	effective	at	defending	working																																									 																					560	A	Steward	at	Ford	Langley,	‘Sold	out	Also	at	Ford’,	Big	Flame:	Paper	of	the	
Revolutionary	Socialist	Organisation	Big	Flame,	February	1982,	p.	4.	Presumably,	Alan	Halying	wrote	this	report.	561	Darlington,	pp.	211–12;	Brian	Groom	and	Diana	Smith,	‘Ford	May	Abandon	Portugal	Plant	Plan’,	Financial	Times	(London,	23	March	2018),	p.	1;	John	
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conditions	and	resisting	the	victimisation	of	trade	union	representatives	than	relying	on	official	procedures.	With	such	redundancies	and	rising	unemployment	driven	by	government	policy,	which	effectively	accelerated	deindustrialisation,	a	‘People’s	March	for	Jobs’	made	its	way	that	month	from	Glasgow	towards	a	rally	in	London’s	Hyde	Park.	While	encouraging	attendance	at	this	event,	the	Combine	took	the	opportunity	to	criticise	Ron	Todd,	who	chaired	the	TUC	committee	organising	the	event.	This	drew	a	contrast	between	Todd’s	rhetorical	stance	that	‘not	one	more	job	should	disappear’	and	his	involvement	in	the	‘Japanisation	of	Halewood’.	In	particular,	his	suggestion	that	the	unions	should	make	concessions	on	the	issue	of	redundancies	in	exchange	for	a	one-off	‘interim	payment’	prompted	a	call	for	his	resignation.	Instead,	the	FWC	highlighted	the	recent	militancy	of	workers	on	Merseyside,	as	well	as	a	strike	in	defence	of	jobs	at	Ford	Genk	in	Belgium.562	This	gathering	took	place	just	four	days	before	Thatcher	was	scheduled	to	go	to	the	country.	While	warning	that,	‘whoever	wins	the	Election,	the	bosses	will	still	be	in	control’,	even	the	Combine	held	out	hope	that	high	attendance	might	help	swing	the	result.563	Turnout	proved	to	be	disappointing	though,	foreshadowing	the	outcome	of	the	vote.	The	easing	of	the	recession,	which	characterised	most	of	Thatcher’s	first	term	as	Prime	Minister,	and	military	success	in	the	Falklands	left	industrial	relations	eclipsed	in	a	British	general	election	for	the	first	time	in	well	over	a	decade.		
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 				Lloyd,	‘Ford	and	Unions	to	See	Acas	over	Halewood	Strike’,	Financial	Times	(London,	31	March	1983),	p.	9.	562	Personal	Collection,	Ford	Workers	Group	(“The	Combine”),	‘Fighting	Mass	Unemployment’,	26	May	1983.	563	Ibid.	
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Fighting	the	International	Sweating	System,	1979	to	1985	
While	shop-floor	resistance	to	the	restructuring	of	production	remained	effective	to	some	extent,	as	we	have	just	seen,	management	and	union	officials	maintained	a	firm	grip	over	pay	negotiations	at	Ford	in	Britain.	The	Combine’s	attempt	to	overcome	this	impasse	would	entail	unprecedented	trans-European	cooperation	between	Ford	workers.	Such	a	strategy	came	about	in	response	to	a	growing	awareness	of	the	limitations	of	workers	organising	at	a	national	and	plant	level,	given	the	transnational	reach	of	the	firm’s	strategic	operations.	The	origins	of	what	would	become	known	as	the	European	Ford	Workers	Combine	(EFWC)	dated	back	to	the	1978	national	pay	strike.	At	that	time,	strikers	in	Langley	received	financial	support	from	workmates	in	the	Netherlands.	This	led	to	correspondence	between	Jan	Cartier,	Secretary	of	the	Ford	Amsterdam	Shop	Stewards	Committee,	and	Alan	Hayling.	Their	discussion	explored	the	possibility	of	organising	‘a	Ford	Europe	conference	on	the	35-hour	week’,	with	Hayling	proposing	the	inclusion	of	shop-floor	workers	among	the	delegates.564	Communication	between	union	representatives	from	different	European	subsidiaries	had	already	taken	place	well	before	Hayling	and	Cartier	made	contact	with	each	other.	For	instance,	British	convenors	met	in	Ostend	with	counterparts	from	Germany	and	the	Belgian	plant	in	Genk,	which	operated	as	part	of	Ford	Werke,	from	as	early	as	December	1969.	Subsequently	British	and	German	trade	unionists	repeatedly,	if	irregularly,	held	further	discussions	under	the	auspices	of	the	International	Metalworkers’	Federation	(IMF).	This	has	led	the	historian	Sheila	Cohen	to	speculate	that	the	Ostend	meeting	‘could	be	seen	as	the	first	stage	in	setting	up	a	permanent	European	Ford	Combine	Committee’.565	However	plausible	
																																								 																					564	Personal	Collection,	Letter	from	Alan	Hayling	to	Jan	Cartier,	12	January	1979,	p.	3.	565	Cohen,	Notoriously	Militant:	The	Story	of	a	Union	Branch,	p.	97.	For	a	detailed	history	of	relations	between	German	and	British	unions	at	Ford,	see	
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such	conjecture	might	seem,	this	was	not	in	fact	the	case.	On	the	contrary,	the	IMF	and	the	German	union	federation	IG	Metall	posed	the	main	obstacles	to	an	ambitious	attempt	to	organise	across	Ford	of	Europe’s	entire	workforce.	Such	contact	actually	began	between	the	Combine	in	Britain	and	rank-and-file	militants	from	Ford	of	Europe’s	periphery.	As	we	saw	at	the	end	of	last	chapter,	the	first	proposal	for	a	meeting	came	from	Cartier	in	Amsterdam,	where	a	truck	plant	faced	the	threat	of	closure.	Then	shop	stewards	from	Denmark	played	an	important	early	role.	Since	the	closure	of	a	Danish	assembly	plant	in	the	1960s,	the	small	subsidiary	they	worked	for	served	as	a	sales-and-servicing	operation.566	During	a	pay	claim	in	spring	1979,	three	shop	stewards	ran	a	campaign	that	called	on	their	workmates	to	‘Fight	the	International	Sweating	System’,	evoking	the	memory	of	events	in	Britain	the	previous	year:		‘Remember	the	English	Ford	Workers.	Their	solidarity	broke	Ford	and	the	government’s	antisocial	incomes	policy.’567		Their	industrial	action	took	the	form	of	a	‘go-slow’,	which	succeeded	in	securing	a	pay	increase	of	twenty	per	cent.	At	the	time	workmates	in	Britain	showed	solidarity	by	deliberately	sending	the	wrong	parts	to	a	warehouse	in	Denmark.	With	such	support	suggesting	the	possibility	of	greater	European	co-ordination,	the	Danish	stewards	then	invited	workmates	from	across	Europe	to	a	three-day	international	conference	afterwards.	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 				Thomas	Fetzer,	Paradoxes	of	Internationalization:	British	and	German	Trade	Unions	
at	Ford	and	General	Motors	1967-2000,	Critical	Labour	Movement	Studies	(Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	2012),	pp.	160–87.	566	Peter	Sørensen	and	others,	‘Ford	Denmark	and	the	Scandinavian	Market:	From	Regional	Export	Base	to	Periphery’,	in	Ford,	1903-2033:	The	European	History,	ed.	by	Hubert	Bonin,	Yannick	Lung,	and	Steven	Tolliday,	2	vols	(Paris:	Éditions	PLAGE,	2003),	II,	267–319	(p.	299).	567	Personal	Collection,	Fællesklubben	Fords	Informationsudvalg	‘Bekæmp	Internationalt	Løntrykkeri:	Ford	Motor	Company’,	[1979].	The	original	reads:	‘Husk	de	Engelske	Ford-arbejdere.	Deres	sammenhold	knækkede	både	Ford	og	regeringens	asociale	indkomstpolitik.’	
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Reporting	on	proceedings,	the	left-wing	Socialistisk	Dagblad	interviewed	Alan	Hayling,	by	then	a	shop	steward	at	Langley.	The	interview	concluded	with	his	assessment	of	the	situation:	This	is	about	militant	workers	on	the	shop	floor,	workers	who	have	learned	through	struggle	of	the	need	to	also	stand	together	internationally	because	when	capital	is	international,	as	is	the	case	with	Ford,	we	must	be	able	to	fight	against	it	internationally,	too.	Otherwise,	they	only	play	one	country's	workers	off	against	another,	and	then	we	are	back	where	we	started.568	At	the	gathering	in	Copenhagen,	militants	from	Denmark,	Spain,	Germany,	the	Netherlands	and	Britain	launched	the	‘Ford	Workers	Ring’,	as	it	was	initially	known.	To	coordinate	activities,	an	international	secretariat	was	also	established	with	Hayling	among	the	members	appointed	to	this	committee.		Those	present	also	passed	resolutions:	launching	‘an	independent	campaign’	on	the	35-hour	week;	opposing	racism	and	the	exploitation	of	migrant	labour;	and	proposing	internationally	coordinated	action	for	a	common	European	employment	agreement.569	The	first	resolution	to	be	discussed	pledged	solidarity	in	the	‘fight	for	the	reduction	in	working	hours	and	the	reinstatement	of	all	sacked	workers’	at	Ford	Almussafes,	which	was	then	sent	by	telegram	to	comrades	working	in	Valencia.	This	gesture	came	about	in	response	to	intense	disturbances	at	the	Spanish	car	plant.	Industrial	action	erupted	there	amid	a	wider	upheaval	in	Spanish	workplaces	after	the	ratification	of	the	new	Spanish	constitution,	the	legalisation	of																																									 																					568	‘Et	fantastisk	initiativ	vore	danske	kammerater	har	taget’,	Socialistisk	
Dagblad	(København,	10	October	1979),	p.	5.	The	original	reads:	‘Der	er	tale	om	militante	arbejdere	på	gulvplan,	-	arbejdere	som	gennem	kamp	har	lært	nødvendigheden	af	at	stå	sammen	-	også	internationalt.	For	når	kapitalen	er	intenational	som	det	er	tilfældet	med	Ford	må	vi	arbejdere	også	bekæmpe	den	internationalt.	Ellers	spiller	de	bare	det	ene	lands	arbejdere	ud	mod	det	andet.	Og	så	er	vi	lige	vidt.’	569	Personal	Collection,	Ford	U.K.	Workers	Group	(The	Combine),	‘A	Combine	Notice:	European	Ford	Workers	Ring’	[c.	October	1979].	
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left-wing	parties	and	labour	organisations	and	the	first	free	union	elections	since	the	death	of	Franco.	Against	this	backdrop,	the	dispute	at	Ford	over	a	new	pay	contract	that	February	formed	part	of	wider	opposition	to	the	austerity	that	accompanied	Spain’s	transition	to	liberal	democracy.	It	resulted	in	a	government-imposed	settlement	and	the	sacking	of	thirteen	trade	unionists,	provoking	a	hunger	strike	that	held	out	for	more	than	two	weeks.570	On	the	second	day	of	the	Copenhagen	conference,	an	assembly	of	militant	Ford	workers	also	took	place	in	Valencia.	This	meeting	sent	a	report	back	to	their	workmates	in	Denmark.	Warning	that	the	company	has	‘declared	war	on	the	workers	for	refusing	to	accept	its	plans’,	this	painted	a	bleak	picture	of	the	situation	inside	the	Spanish	plant:	The	trade	unions	are	increasingly	weak	and	incapable.	They	are	not	functional;	they	cannot	bring	thirty	people	together.	CC.OO.	has	been	decapitated	and	the	latest	dismissals	have	exacerbated	the	situation.571	The	statement	was	signed	by	‘Movimiento	Comunista	(en	Ford)’	(MC),	a	Maoist	group	that	then	generally	organised	within	the	Communist	led	Comisiones	Obreras	(CC.OO.,	Workers’	Commissions)	union.	The	decision	in	this	case	to	instead	set	up	a	workers’	assembly	showed	a	degree	of	continuity	with	the	previous	practices	of	the	Organización	de	Izquierda	Comunista	(OIC,	Organisation	of	the	Communist	Left).	This	left	communist/workerist	group,	which	had	merged	into	MC	earlier	that	year,	had	had	a	relatively	significant	presence	at	the	plant	from	its	opening.572																																									 																					570	Robert	Graham,	‘Hunger	Strike	in	15th	Day	at	Spanish	Ford’,	Financial	
Times	(London,	19	April	1979),	p.	2.	571	Personal	Collection,	Movimiento	Comunista	(en	Ford)	‘Las	problemas	más	importante	que	en	la	lucha	tenemos	planteados’,	6	October	1979.	The	original	reads:	‘La	incapacidad	y	debilidad	de	las	secciones	sindicales	va	en	aumento.	No	funcionan,	son	incapaces	de	reunir	a	treinta	personas.	CC.OO.	está	dezcaberada	y	los	últimos	despidos	han	agudizado	más	la	situación.	The	Workers’	Commissions	(Comisiones	Obreras	(CC.OO.)),	the	Communist	led	union	federation,	was	the	largest	both	in	Spain	and	at	Ford	Almussafes	at	the	time.	572	Joel	Sans	Molas,	‘Militancia,	vida	y	revolución	en	los	años	70:	la	experiencia	de	la	Organización	de	Izquierda	Comunista	(OIC)’	(unpublished	
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This	was	not	the	only	organisation	from	the	Spanish	labour	movement	influenced	by	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	to	become	involved	in	the	Ring.	To	begin	with,	the	anarcho-syndicalist	Confederación	Nacional	del	Trabajo	(CNT)	also	had	contact	with	this	network	of	militants.	Writing	to	‘the	constituents	of	the	European	Ford	Workers	Ring’	on	behalf	of	the	CNT	in	May	1980,	M.	Angeles	and	A.	Martinez	queried	the	progress	of	a	draft	questionnaire	and	reported	on	developments	at	the	Spanish	plant.	They	decided	to	send	this	letter	directly	to	local	activists	though	with	an	oblique	explanation	that	‘things	are	not	going	well	between	us,	that	is	to	say	at	the	level	of	the	secretariat’,	suggesting	that	tensions	existed	between	them	and	others	involved.573	Both	the	CNT	and	MC	soon	became	marginalised	within	the	‘ring’.	Rather	than	political	differences	between	different	groups	of	militants,	this	probably	reflected	their	increasing	marginalisation	inside	the	Spanish	plant	due	to	increased	repression	and	a	normalisation	of	labour	relations	through	the	mainstream	union	federations.	However	short-lived	such	involvement	was,	it	demonstrated	that	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	influenced	sections	of	Ford’s	European	workforce	outside	Britain.	That	December	Jan	Cartier	invited	delegates	to	another	meeting	of	the	‘so-called	“Ford	Workers	Ring”’.	At	the	time	he	also	proposed	that	the	agenda	should	include	discussion	of	an	‘“Official”	Conference	of	Ford	Workers	[...]	organized	by	the	official	Trade	Union	organizations’.	Cartier	went	on	to	suggest	how	they	should	relate	to	the	trade	unions:	To	avoid	all	misunderstanding	we	want	again	[to]	make	clear	that	this	meeting	is	organized	by	the	shop-stewards																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 				Doctoral	Thesis,	Universitat	Autònoma	de	Barcelona,	2017),	p.	444	<https://ddd.uab.cat/pub/tesis/2017/hdl_10803_457365/jsm1de1.pdf>	[accessed	9	May	2018].	573	Personal	Collection,	Letter	from	M.	Angeles	and	A.	Martinez	to	the	constituents	of	the	European	Ford	Workers’	Ring,	12	May	1980.	The	original	reads:	‘a	nivel	de	Coordinadora	es	decir	de	relacion	con	vosotros	no	an-amos	muy	bien’.	
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committee	of	the	Ford	Amsterdam	plant.	D.I.A.S.	[Diensten	Internationale	Arbeiders	Samenwerking	(International	Workers	Cooperation	Services)]	will	give	organizational	support.	The	intention	of	the	meeting	is	to	interchange	information	and	strengthen	the	cooperation	between	shop	stewards	and	union	militants	from	the	different	European	Ford	Plants.	It	is	not	the	intention	to	form	an	alternative	to	the	existing	cooperation	between	the	“official”	European	Unions.	Of	Course	our	aim	is	to	get	an	as	broad	as	possible	representation	from	every	country.574	This	statement	might	well	have	reflected	Cartier’s	own	views	as	senior	shop	steward	accurately	enough.	That	he	felt	the	need	to	clarify	the	point	at	length	in	an	invitation	to	the	next	meeting,	however,	indicated	concern	that	such	informal	gatherings	of	Ford	workers	without	prior	trade-union	approval	might	be	viewed	differently.	It	also	reflected	a	tension	that	ran	through	the	history	of	the	EFWC	between	attempts	to	secure	official	support	for	European	co-ordination	of	rank-and-file	trade	unionists	at	Ford	and	a	more	independent	approach	to	organising	from	below.	As	demonstrated	by	the	situation	in	Spain,	this	entailed	bringing	together	workers	from	across	Europe	who	faced	different	political	contexts,	in	terms	of	how	labour	relations	were	mediated	in	each	specific	country.	While	it	was	necessary	to	confront	the	challenges	that	this	raised,	engaging	with	organisations	from	outside	the	traditional	confines	of	mainstream	trade	unionism	certainly	proved	more	straightforward.	Alongside	DIAS,	the	Counter	Information	Service	(CIS)	the	Trans	National	Institute	(TNI)	and	the	Centre	for	Alternative	Industrial	and	Technological	Systems	(CAITS)	all	provided	support	to	the	EFWC.		At	the	Amsterdam	meeting,	ten	lay	trade-union	representatives,	Cartier	among	them,	welcomed	participants	from	all	the	countries	represented	previously:																																									 																					574	Personal	Collection,	Letter	from	Jan	Cartier	to	‘Dear	friends’,	12	December	1979.	
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Alan	Hayling	from	England;	a	German	shop	steward	Rudolf	Bambach;	Magens	Hegelund	and	Erik	Schou,	two	of	their	previous	hosts	in	Denmark;	and	Ignacio	Ortega,	a	CC.OO.	delegate	from	Valencia.	Two	more	delegations	joined	them:	the	Confédération	générale	du	travail	(CGT)	secretary	and	another	representative	from	Ford	Blanquefort	in	Bordeaux;	and	two	members	of	União	Geral	de	Trabalhadores	(UGT)	from	the	Lisbon	works	council.575	Details	of	the	discussions	were	recorded	on	a	handwritten	note	among	Alan	Hayling’s	papers.	Among	other	things,	the	talks	addressed	the	challenge	of	making	such	events	official	when	certain	unions	‘do	not	want	their	membership	to	make	international	links’.	In	particular,	the	German,	Belgian	and	English	unions	were	identified	as	‘not	very	effective’	in	this	respect.	Likewise,	a	delegation	of	Portuguese	office	staff	reported	that	fears	of	‘communist	infiltration’	led	to	their	own	union	the	social	democrat	UGT’s	opposition	to	involvement.576	This	gave	an	early	indication	of	how	Cold	War	divisions	between	trade	unions	would	pose	an	obstacle	to	effective	transnational	cooperation	by	Ford	workers.	The	extent	of	such	divisions	was	apparent	at	the	IMF	Ford	World	Auto	Conference	in	Valencia	in	November	1980.	Delegations	reflected	the	make-up	of	the	IMF,	an	affiliate	to	the	International	Confederation	of	Free	Trade	Unions	(ICFTU),	an	anti-Communist	breakaway	from	the	World	Federation	of	Trade	Unions	(WFTU).	This	left	the	CC.OO.	and	CGT,	the	largest	unions	at	Ford	in	Spain	and	France	respectively,	unrepresented.	Local	rivals	even	had	a	veto	over	their	attendance	as	observers.	A	CC.OO.	report	to	the	rest	of	the	Combine	described	how	a	request	to	participate	met	the	condescending	response	‘[only]	if	they	were	good	boys’,	adding	that	‘CCOO	never	received	the	invitation	so	apparently	they	have	not																																									 																					575	Personal	Collection,	‘European	Ford	Workers	Combine	Annexe	I:	Introduction	by	Delegation	Members’,	January	1980.	576	Personal	Collection,	loose	sheet	number	16-17	beginning	‘6.	Continuation	of	the	work	of	the	Combine’	and	‘7.	How	can	we	get	official	international	meetings?’,	[1980],	p.	17.	
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been	“good	boys”’.577	Even	the	choice	of	location	represented	a	cynical	attempt	to	swing	union	elections	at	Ford	Almussafes	in	favour	of	the	UGT.	Instead	of	requesting	observer	status,	the	main	Ford	union	in	Portugal	the	Confederação	Geral	dos	Trabalhadores	Portugueses	(CGTP)	decided	to	send	delegates	to	an	EFWC	meeting,	where	they	could	at	least	participate	fully.	The	situation	was	less	problematic	for	Ford’s	northern	European	workforce,	since	all	the	relevant	unions	were	affiliated	to	the	IFTUC.	Apart	from	two	convenors,	however,	the	British	delegation	consisted	almost	entirely	of	full-time	officials,	with	craft	unions	also	overrepresented	relative	to	those	representing	workers	of	lower	skill	status.	Another	EFWC	meeting	then	took	place	in	Bordeaux	from	6	to	8	November	1981.	Alan	Hayling	set	out	how	to	make	the	case	for	an	official	delegation	from	Britain.	He	recommended	to	one	of	his	fellow	participants,	probably	a	senior	CGT	or	CC.OO.	delegate,	how	to	write	to	Danny	Connor,	Sid	Harraway	and	Steve	Hart.	While	the	first	two	were	Ford	convenors,	Hart	was	not	even	a	shop	steward,	but	he	was	a	member	of	the	CPGB	Central	Committee	working	at	Dagenham.	Hayling	specified	three	points	to	be	raised	in	the	letter:		(A)	that	the	majority	of	delegations	(Holland,	Denmark,	France,	Spain,	Portugal)	are	trade	union	representatives	and	that	it	would	be	better	if	that	were	also	true	for	England.	(B)	that	the	E.F.W.C.	is	not	dominated	by	the	‘ultra	left’—in	fact	there	are	many	members	of	Communist	Parties	involved	notably	from	France,	Spain,	Portugal	and	Holland.	(C)	that	you	are	writing	as	a	fellow	CP	member.578	Alongside	the	Cold	War	divisions	mentioned	already,	the	EFWC	also	had	to	overcome	the	suspicions	of	senior	Communists	at	Ford	Dagenham	towards	the																																									 																					577	University	of	Warwick,	Modern	Records	Centre,	923/7,	‘IMF	Ford	World	Auto	Council:	List	of	Particpants’	17-19	November	1980;	and	European	Ford	Workers	Committee,	‘Report	on	the	London	Meeting’	5-7	December	1980,	p.	14.	578	Personal	Collection,	handwritten	note	beginning	‘Please	write	to:—Danny	Connor,	Sid	Harraway,	Steve	Hart’	(emphasis	in	the	original).	
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Combine	in	Britain.	Such	an	appeal	to	the	involvement	of	Communist	Party	members	might	seem	incongruous	given	the	Trades	Union	Congress’s	(TUC)	affiliation	to	the	ICFTU.	Yet,	it	reflected	the	specific	role	of	Communist	politics	in	the	subsidiary’s	labour	history,	as	well	as	more	general	idiosyncrasies	of	British	trade	unionism.	After	the	Bordeaux	conference	Pierre	Norrito	wrote	to	DIAS	on	behalf	of	the	local	work’s	council.	Norrito	began	by	expressing	surprise	at	DIAS’s	plans	to	hold	another	planning	meeting	in	Paris	that	April,	indicating	that	the	CGT	would	be	reluctant	to	host	such	an	event.	He	went	on	to	draw	a	sharp	contrast	between	the	militants	from	England	and	Germany,	who	lacked	a	trade	union	mandate,	and	the	official	delegations	from	France,	Spain	and	Portugal.	Norrito	then	clarified	the	CGT’s	position	going	forward.	‘We	can	only	accept	“observers”	if	federations	refuse’	to	participate.	Recent	official	communications	between	the	CGT	and	other	union	meant	it	was	no	longer	appropriate	to	‘maintain	contact	with	groups	and	individuals	that	discredit	the	trade-union	movement	and	are	opposed	by	these	organisations	nationally	and	within	the	workplace’,	he	explained579	The	trade-union	strategy	of	the	French	Communist	Party,	which	focused	internationally	on	integrating	the	CGT	with	ICFTU	affiliates,	set	out	to	marginalise	shop-floor	militants	who	lacked	official	backing	from	participating	further	in	the	EFWC.	In	June	1982	representatives	of	the	main	unions	at	Ford	plants	in	southern	Europe,	all	of	which	shared	Communist	Party	links,	met	in	France	to	plan	another	international	conference	in	Valencia	that	October.	Taking	this	as	an	opportunity	to	legitimise	relations	with	northern	European	unions,	the	CGT	proposed	to	press	the	issue	of	limiting	attendance	to	official	delegations.	Mario	Caballero	of	the	CC.OO.																																									 																					579	Personal	Collection,	letter	from	Pierre	Norriot	to	the	DIAS	group,	[c.	April	1982.].	The	original	reads:	‘Ce	n’est	que	s’il	y	a	refus	de	certaines	fédérations	que	nous	pourrions	accepters	des	<<observateurs>>.	[...]	continuer	des	contacts	avec	des	groupes	ou	des	hommes	qui	discréditent	le	mouvement	syndical	et	sont	combattus	par	ces	mêmes	organisations	d’enterprises	et	nationales.’	
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instead	argued	that	the	potential	of	the	EFWC	should	be	assessed	on	its	ability	to	highlight	shared	demands	with	one-day	or	half-day	strikes	across	Europe.	The	CC.OO.	also	invited	the	UGT	to	co-host	this	event,	but	received	no	response.	Extending	such	an	invitation	to	participate	from	the	closed	shop	of	social	democratic	unions	in	Northern	Europe	to	members	of	rival	minority	unions	among	the	firm’s	local	workforce	brought	such	co-operation	too	close	to	home	for	the	CGT’s	liking.	With	all	of	this	left	unresolved,	the	French	union	intended	to	secure	agreement	at	the	conference	on	the	question	of	restricting	participation	to	official	trade-union	delegations	in	future.580	The	following	month	Gerry	Walsh,	a	line	worker	from	Dagenham	and	founding	member	of	the	Combine,	discussed	this	situation	with	Caballero	during	a	trip	to	Valencia.	At	the	time	he	expressed	the	Combine’s	objections	to	both	CGT	attempt	to	instrumentalise	the	Combine	for	its	own	strategic	goals	and	CC.OO.	advocacy	of	token	industrial	action.	Walsh	instead	suggested	the	need	‘to	organise	around	concrete	issues’,	such	as	plant	closures	and	the	transfer	of	work	between	subsidiaries,	and	to	organise	effective	international	solidarity	during	national	pay	disputes.	He	also	reported	back	to	comrades	in	Britain	that	there	had	been	‘a	marked	downturn	in	the	struggle’	at	the	Spanish	plant,	since	the	late	1970s.	Describing	the	CNT	as	‘a	spent	force’,	he	went	on	to	criticise	their	abstentionism	as	an	opportunist	position.	Walsh	also	noted	scornfully	that	such	a	stance	had	not	prevented	the	syndicalists	from	taking	court	action	against	a	rival	faction,	following	a	split	within	the	organisation.	While	the	CNT	by	now	dismissed	the	EFWC	as	no	more	than	a	Communist	front,	he	still	forwarded	their	current	address	details	to	DIAS	with	Caballero’s	recommendation	that	they	be	kept	informed	of	progress	with	the	EFWC.	During	a	visit	to	the	plant	Walsh	also	met	with	one	of	four	remaining																																									 																					580	Personal	Collection,	photocopy	of	a	letter	from	Gerry	[Walsh]	to	Bill,	21	July	1982.	
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‘autonomist’	shop	stewards.	While	sharing	‘politics	much	closer	to	[...]	the	U.K.	group’,	they	now	had	insufficient	cadres	within	the	plant	to	do	more	than	operate	as	a	militant	tendency	within	the	CC.OO.	Although	he	saw	Comisiones	Obreras	as	politically	to	the	right	of	the	FWC,	at	least	in	Caballero	the	union	had	a	secretary	at	Ford	who	shared	common	commitments.	The	conference	scheduled	for	Valencia	that	October	never	took	place.	The	following	month	Caballero	informed	Alan	Hayling	that	it	had	been	rescheduled	until	after	the	New	Year,	so	as	to	increase	the	likelihood	of	more	plants	sending	delegations.	Since	being	notified	of	this	postponement,	he	went	on	to	explain,	that	Bernie	Passingham	had	already	offered	his	support	as	the	Secretary	of	the	Convenors	at	Ford	from	all	the	plant	in	Britain.	Confirmation	was	also	received	directly	from	shop	stewards	in	Dagenham	and	Halewood,	as	well	as	from	Genk.	While	this	left	Caballero	fairly	upbeat	in	his	assessment	of	their	prospects	of	success,	he	also	raised	concerns	about	a	possible	boycott	organised	by	the	European	Metalworkers’	Federation	(EMF),	which	had	been	brought	to	his	attention	by	contacts	in	the	Spanish	UGT.581	The	following	April	Caballero	reported	progress	to	CC.OO.	members	at	the	Spanish	plant.	An	event	described	as	‘the	First	Conference	of	Ford	Europe	Union	Representatives’	was	scheduled	from	25	to	27	March.	Delegates	had	already	confirmed	attendance	from	twelve	English	plants,	Bordeaux,	Lisbon,	Genk	and	Copenhagen,	but	he	still	awaited	a	response	from	Ford	Werke	plants	in	Germany	and	Spanish	‘comrades’	from	the	UGT.582	Unions	from	across	most	of	Europe	began	to	engage	officially	in	a	process,	which	emerged	from	informal	contact	between	members	of	the	Combine,	rank-and-file	trade	unionists	from	the	periphery	of	Ford	of	Europe	and	a	handful	of	other	shop-floor	militants.																																									 																					581	Personal	Collection,	Letter	from	Mario	[Caballero]	to	Alan	[Hayling],	12	November	1982.	582	Mario	Caballero,	‘Editorial:	La	Conferencia	de	Ford	Europa’,	Informatin	
Laboral	CC.OO.	Sección	Sindical	de	Ford	Espańa,	1.8	(1983),	3–4.	
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Then	in	February	1984	the	TGWU	Centre	in	Eastbourne	hosted	the	European	Ford	Workers	Conference.	Bernie	Passingham	began	proceedings	by	welcoming	delegates	on	behalf	of	the	Ford	UK	National	Convenors	Committee.	TGWU	National	Organiser	Ron	Todd,	who	became	General	Secretary	later	that	year,	then	made	the	opening	address.	Official	delegations	came	from	five	other	European	countries,	as	well	as	Brazil,	although	German	involvement	still	remained	limited	to	unofficial	participants	now	relegated	to	the	status	of	observers.583	Financial	assistance	came	from	the	Greater	London	Council	(GLC)	and	Merseyside	County	Council	(MCC),	the	two	main	hubs	of	a	municipal	socialist	opposition	to	the	Conservative	government’s	political	offensive.	Organisational	support	also	came	from	the	CAITS.	This	research	unit	at	North	London	Polytechnic	emerged	from	the	Lucas	Aerospace	Combine’s	alternative	Corporate	Plan.	The	two	combines	took	distinct	approaches:	one	embarked	on	a	project	of	reimagining	socially	useful	production	in	an	effort	to	defend	jobs;	the	other	adopted	a	more	confrontational	approach	focused	on	pay,	hours	and	working	conditions.	The	Lucas	
Plan	came	out	of	a	specific	set	of	circumstances,	beginning	with	a	ministerial	proposal	by	Tony	Benn	to	shop	stewards	who	appealed	for	his	help	to	defend	jobs.	Such	an	approach	also	reflected	differences	between	more	specialised	branches	of	engineering	and	mass	production	though.	The	extent	of	workers’	estrangement	from	their	labour	on	the	assembly	line	at	Ford	pointed	in	a	much	more	antagonistic	direction,	making	the	inception	of	such	a	scheme	there	inconceivable.	The	role	CAITS	played	in	compiling	a	report	of	the	EFWC	showed	common	ground	between	the	two	approaches,	suggesting	the	need	to	keep	such	differences	in	perspective.	This	recorded	how	the	chairman,	Passingham	presumably,	contrasted	this	meeting	with	those	of	the	IMF,	referring	to	his	own	regular																																									 																					583	Centre	for	Alternative	Industrial	and	Technological	Systems	(CAITS),	
European	Ford	Workers	Conference	Report:	The	Future	of	Ford?	(London:	Centre	for	Alternative	Industrial	and	Technological	Systems	(CAITS),	1984).	
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attendance	at	these	gatherings	for	over	a	decade.	‘I	get	more	information,	more	inspiration’,	he	enthused,	‘from	meetings	of	this	character	than	I	do	in	the	IMF’.	He	went	on	to	confirm	the	federation’s	continued	refusal	to	engage	with	an	event	that	was	open	to	all	the	relevant	unions,	irrespective	of	their	political	links.	This	remained	the	case	despite	an	exchange	of	correspondence	and	telephone	conversations	with	IMF	General	Secretary	Herman	Rebhan,	who	personally	declined	an	invitation.	Having	fled	Poland	in	his	youth,	Rebhan	became	a	US	citizen	before	embarking	on	a	career	as	an	official	with	the	United	Automobile	Workers	(UAW).	By	his	own	account,	Eastern	European	origins,	a	background	in	‘Zionist	Social	Democratic’	politics	and	the	experience	of	organising	with	the	UAW	contributed	to	his	staunchly	anti-Communist	outlook.584	As	IMF	General	Secretary,	he	also	developed	particularly	close	connections	to	IG	Metall	in	Germany,	perhaps	the	most	centralised	and	certainly	the	most	well	integrated	union	in	the	European	automobile	sector.	Following	the	introduction	of	the	German	Codetermination	Act	(Mitbestimmungsgesetz)	of	1976,	legislation	codifying	the	participation	of	workers	in	the	boardroom,	Herman	Rebhan	even	became	vice	chairman	of	the	Ford	Werke	supervisory	council	(Aufsichtsrat).	While	any	individual’s	role	should	not	be	overstated,	Rebhan’s	personal	history	encapsulated	the	political	basis	of	IG	Metall	and	the	IMF’s	hostility	to	greater	coordination	between	Ford	of	Europe’s	fragmented	workforces.	A	telex	message	Rebhan	sent	from	Geneva	to	Don	Stallman,	United	Automobile	Workers	(UAW)	Director	of	Governmental	and	International	Affairs,	the	following	February	made	his	position	explicit.	This	message	addressed	a	query	
																																								 																					584	Interview	with	Herman	Rebhan,	The	Association	for	Diplomatic	Studies	and	Training	Foreign	Affairs	Oral	History	Project	Labor	Series,	1995,	p.	2	<https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Rebhan,%20Herman.toc.pdf>	[accessed	13	June	2018].	
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regarding	an	invitation	that	the	UAW	had	received	to	another	International	Ford	Workers	Conference	on	Merseyside	that	year.	Rebhan	spelled	out	his	stance:	FORD	MEETING	IN	LIVERPOOL	PRESENTS	IMF	WITH	CERTAIN	PROBLEMS.	[...]	ALTHOUGH	ENDORSED	BY	NATIONAL	TGWU	LEADERSHIP	IT	IS	BEING	ORGANIZED	BY	LEADING	COMMUNIST	SHOP	STEWARDS	INSIDE	FORD.	OTHER	FORD	UNIONS	IN	UNITED	KINGDOM	NOTABLY	AUEW	NOT	INVOLVED.	[...]	REPRESENTATIVES	FROM	COMMUNIST	UNIONS	IN	SPAIN,	FRANCE	AND	PORTUGAL	ARE	BEING	INVITED	AND	WILL	USE	OCCASION	TO	ATTACK	IMF	AFFILIATED	UNION	EVEN	WHEN	AS	IN	CASE	OF	MAJOR	FORD	PLANT	IN	VALENCIA	UGT	(IMF-AFFILIATED	HAS	MAJORITY	IN	PLANT.585	From	dissident	members	active	in	the	Combine	from	the	outset	to	senior	leaders	who	brought	with	them	the	conflicting	agenda	of	different	national	parties,	Communists	across	Europe	had	a	complex,	ambivalent	relationship	with	the	EFWC.	On	the	other	hand,	the	IMF’s	hostility	and	IG	Metall’s	refusal	to	participate	posed	far	more	consistent	obstacles	to	trans-European	coordination	between	Ford	workers.	Despite	such	attempts	to	obstruct	proceedings,	shop-floor	delegations	from	sixteen	countries	attended	the	Ford	World	Workers	Conference	in	Liverpool	over	three	days	between	15	and	17	March	1985.	Bernie	Passingham	chaired	the	meeting,	which	was	hosted	by	the	Ford	UK	National	Convenors	Committee.	Delegates	‘agreed	to	stop	the	company	raising	production	in	one	country	to	crush	industrial	action	in	another’.586	As	an	example	of	such	transnational	solidarity,	
																																								 																					585	Personal	Collection,	transcript	of	cable	from	Herman	Rebham	to	Don	Stillman,	5	February	1985.	586	‘Ford	Unions	in	Major	Solidarity	Boost’,	Morning	Star	(London,	18	March	1985),	p.	1.	See	also	‘Worldwide	Ford	Workers	Meet’,	Morning	Star	(London,	15	March	1985),	p.	5;	Ian	Hamilton-Frazer,	‘Ford	Workers	Agree	to	Worldwide	Mutual	Support’,	Financial	Times	(London,	18	March	1985),	p.	10.	
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Passingham	cited	the	refusal	of	workers	in	Britain	to	handle	South	African	parts	during	a	German	dispute	over	working	hours.	In	his	study	of	cross-border	co-operation	between	Ford	unions,	Thomas	Fetter	emphasised	the	ineffectiveness	of	such	attempts	before	the	introduction	of	European	Works	Councils	in	the	transition	towards	European	Union	integration.	He	also	argued	against	interpreting	such	activity	as	‘rooted	in	idealistic	notions	of	working-class	solidarity’,	suggesting	a	more	complex	situation	in	which	‘banal	nationalism’	remained	a	significant	political	motive.587	No	doubt,	this	reflected	aspects	of	trade	union	realpolitik	more	accurately	than	such	a	naive,	if	hypothetical,	class	analysis.	However,	Fetzer’s	institutional	approach,	an	almost	exclusive	focus	on	Anglo-German	relations	and	his	lack	of	attention	to	the	early-1980s	obscured	how	many	rank-and-file	trade	unionists	and	other	shop-floor	militants	framed	their	own	actions	precisely	in	terms	of	such	solidarity.	That	said,	the	EFWC	ultimately	had	a	very	limited	impact.	A	myriad	of	factors	affected	this	overdetermined	outcome.	Restructuring,	the	introduction	of	new	technology	and	excess	capacity	had	already	begun	to	shift	the	balance	of	power	away	from	European	automobile	workers	before	transnational	links	began	to	develop.	The	Cold	War	agenda	of	the	IMF	certainly	did	not	help	matters;	nor	did	those	Communist	trade	unionists	who	adopted	an	instrumentalist	approach	to	a	process	initiated	on	the	shop	floor.	Perhaps	most	importantly,	the	lack	of	involvement	of	IG	Metall,	which	represented	workers	at	what	had	become	Ford’s	main	European	subsidiary,	severely	hampered	the	whole	exercise.	In	some	sense,	however,	it	became	a	victim	of	its	own	success	with	official	recognition	moderating	the	agenda.	With	workers	increasingly	on	the	defensive,	shop-floor	involvement	in	discussions	between	European	workplace	representatives	posed	less	of	a	challenge	to	trade	union	officials.																																									 																					587	Fetzer,	p.	5.	Fetzer	explicitly	draws	this	distinction	between	trade	union	politics	and	of	labour	conflict	to	distinguish	his	work	from	that	of	Beverley	J.	Silver.	
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So	why	didn’t	we	Squeeze?	1983	to	1990	
By	the	beginning	of	Margaret	Thatcher’s	second	term	as	Prime	Minister,	few	signs	remained	at	Ford	of	an	organised	tendency	committed	to	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy.	Big	Flame	started	to	undergo	a	shift	in	orientation	away	from	Ford	before	beginning	to	unravel	as	a	national	organisation,	which	effectively	dissolved	in	1984.588	The	previous	year	Alan	Hayling	took	redundancy	from	Langley	to	work	with	the	Greater	London	Council’s	Popular	Planning	Unit.	Through	the	GLC,	however,	he	continued	to	support	EFWC	conferences	and	rank-and-file	union	activity	at	Ford.589	That	year	also	saw	the	longstanding	external	militant	Ed	Emery	embark	on	a	cultural	turn	of	sorts	with	Red	Notes	publishing	material	from	a	series	of	theatre	workshops	by	the	Italian	dramatists	Dario	Fo	and	Franco	Rame.590	Restructuring	drove	car	workers	on	to	the	defensive	and	began	to	displace	the	automobile	sector	from	a	central	position	in	the	British	economy.	In	these	circumstances,	political	practices	that	were	predicated	on	identifying	the	mass	worker	in	this	sector	as	a	hegemonic	antagonistic	social	subject	became	increasingly	untenable.		This	history	still	left	a	legacy	on	the	industrial	unrest	that	continued	to	feature	in	labour	relations	at	Ford,	as	already	seen	in	a	wider	European	context.	The	trade	union	activists	that	took	over	the	main	1107	branch	of	the	TGWU	at	Dagenham	in	1983	had	prior	experience	of	organising	with	the	Combine,	which	remained	active	as	a	means	of	organising	independently	of	formal	union	structures.	In	doing	so	they	built	upon	practices	previously	established	by	the	Combine:	overcoming	sectarian	divisions	on	the	left;	promoting	international	solidarity;	and																																									 																					588	archivearchie,	‘EPISODES	IN	BIG	FLAME	HISTORY:	No	30.	The	Last	Years’,	
Big	Flame	1970-1984	<https://bigflameuk.wordpress.com/2010/01/11/episodes-in-big-flame-history-no-30/>	[accessed	24	July	2018].	589	Hayling.	590	Dario	Fo	and	Franca	Rame,	Dario	Fo	and	Franca	Rame:	Theatre	Workshop	
at	Riverside	Studios,	London.	April	28th,	May	5th,	12th,	13th,	&	19th	1983	(London:	Red	Notes,	1983).		
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challenging	racial	and	sexual	discrimination.591	While	the	1107	branch	demonstrated	a	degree	of	continuity	in	workplace	organising	activity	at	Ford,	the	two	major	disputes	of	this	period	paint	a	very	different	picture.	The	first	of	these	took	place	over	the	closure	of	the	foundry	in	1984;	the	other	concerned	a	new	contract	introduced	in	1988.	Taken	together,	these	demonstrated	the	extent	of	shifts	in	the	balance	of	forces	both	at	Ford	and	across	the	rest	of	British	industry.	On	17	January	1984	Ford	announced	plans	to	close	the	Dagenham	foundry	the	following	April.	This	would	cost	2,000	jobs,	bringing	the	issue	of	unemployment	to	the	fore.	This	decision	came	about	despite	the	workforce	having	already	met	a	series	of	targets,	which	had	been	set	by	management	over	the	previous	four	years	as	part	of	a	rescue	package.	Speaking	on	behalf	of	negotiators,	Ron	Todd	appeared	willing	to	support	a	robust	response	at	first.	‘This	is	a	fight	over	the	total	manufacturing	capacity	of	Ford	of	Britain,	not	just	the	foundry.	We	are	going	to	involve	the	whole	of	the	workforce.’592	He	also	called	on	union	members	not	to	handle	any	imported	engine	components,	suggesting	the	likelihood	of	official	industrial	action.	The	following	day	the	FNJNC	went	further	and	decided	to	recommend	a	national	strike.	Foundry	workers	then	voted	overwhelmingly	in	favour	of	such	action	at	a	mass	meeting.	The	Combine	issued	‘a	call	to	action’	to	their	workmates	later	that	day.	Arguing	that	the	‘closure	of	the	Foundry	clearly	puts	all	our	jobs	at	risk’,	the	text	observed	that	Dagenham	was	on	course	to	become	a	mere	assembly	plant	with	the	subsidiary’s	workforce	cut	by	over	a	quarter	since	1979.593	It	also	noted	that	the	corporation	had	extracted	£1,000,000,000	of	profit	from	Britain	over	
																																								 																					591	Cohen,	Notoriously	Militant:	The	Story	of	a	Union	Branch,	pp.	133–84.	592	Brian	Groom,	‘Ford	Dagenham	Foundry	to	Close’,	Financial	Times	(London,	17	January	1984),	p.	1.	593	Personal	Collection,	Ford	Workers	Group	(“The	Combine),	‘Fraud	News	Dagenham	Leaflet’,	18	January	1984,	p.	2.	
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the	previous	six	years,	all	at	the	expense	of	the	sort	of	reinvestment	required	to	keep	operations	such	as	the	foundry	viable.	While	broadly	supportive	of	industrial	action,	a	broadsheet	published	by	the	Socialist	Workers	Party	raised	concerns	about	the	motivations	behind	the	apparently	tough	union	stance:	‘Understandably,	there	has	been	widespread	suspicion	of	union	officials’	motives.	It	is,	after	all,	election	time	in	the	TGWU.’	At	the	time	Ron	Todd	was	standing,	successfully	as	it	turned	out,	for	the	position	of	General	Secretary.	‘Union	leaders’,	the	piece	went	on	to	warn,	‘have	never	forgiven	the	rank	and	file	Ford	workers	for	taking	the	strike	in	1978	out	of	their	hands’.594	Then	in	an	unprecedented	step	at	Ford,	union	officials	representing	both	hourly	paid	workers	and	salaried	staff	wrote	jointly	to	management,	requesting	a	meeting	before	a	strike	was	scheduled	to	commence	on	13	February.	While	industrial	action	was	initially	deferred	after	management	agreed	to	further	talks,	the	newly	formed	Ford	Unions	Joint	Co-ordinating	Committee	(FUJCC)	appeared	at	first	committed	to	a	hard-line	stance.	‘The	strike’s	on’,	an	FUJCC	leaflet	announced,	urging	workers	to	delegate	the	committee	authority	to	call	industrial	action	if	management	refused	to	agree	to	the	withdrawal	of	the	foundry’s	closure	notice	and	to	provide	further	investment.595	While	adopting	such	tough	rhetoric,	the	FUJCC	excluded	even	the	most	senior	shop	stewards	and	convenors.	Its	membership	was	composed	exclusively	of	trade-union	officials.	Before	talks	began	these	full	timers	then	decided	to	continue	with	negotiations	whether	or	not	management	agreed	to	discuss	the	survival	of	the	foundry.	This	undermined	a	previous	position	taken	by	plant	convenors	that	talks	could	only	take	place	if	this	issue	remained	at	the	top	of	the	agenda.	Internal	debate	within	the	unions	on	the	issue	was	shut	down	at	a	Joint	Works	Committee	meeting.																																									 																					594	Personal	Collection,	Socialist	Workers	Party,	‘Stop	the	Foundry	Closure!’	[c.	February	1984].	595	Personal	Collection,	Ford	Unions	Joint	Co-ordinating	Committee,	‘The	Strike’s	On’	[February	1984].	
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‘The	smell	of	a	sell-out	is	high’,	Fraud	News	warned,	while	publicising	a	mass	lobby	of	the	22	February	talks	called	by	shop	stewards	from	the	Dagenham	PTA,	Engine	and	Body	Plants.596	At	this	meeting	a	company	presentation,	which	provided	an	overview	of	the	issues	effecting	investment	from	the	firm’s	perspective,	dominated	proceedings.	Union	negotiators	only	managed	to	raise	concerns	about	the	foundry	after	an	adjournment.	Then	Ford	of	Europe	Vice	President	of	Manufacturing	W.	J.	Hayden	set	out	management’s	position	bluntly:	‘The	decision	to	close	the	foundry	would	not	be	reversed	and	he	was	not	prepared	to	raise	false	hopes	among	the	foundry	employees’.597	The	meeting	then	came	to	a	close.	Afterwards	rumours	of	a	‘revolt’	by	Dagenham	Ford	workers	opposed	to	industrial	action	began	to	circulate	in	the	press,	although	the	only	evidence	in	support	of	such	claims	came	from	‘unofficial	reports’	of	a	recent	vote	against	a	strike.598	That	the	participants	in	the	ballot	were	foremen,	perhaps	the	section	of	staff	least	likely	to	show	solidarity	with	hourly-paid	workers,	received	no	mention	in	these	reports.	At	first	union	officials	continued	to	call	for	a	strike,	before	deciding	to	call	off	industrial	action	after	yet	more	talks	with	the	company.	While	claiming	that	he	now	‘believed	there	would	be	better	communication	between	management	and	unions’,	Ron	Todd	offered	no	explanation	for	such	new-found	optimism.599	In	the	end,	the	closure	of	the	foundry	went	ahead	without	any	effective	trade-union	opposition.	From	the	perspective	of	the	Combine,	this	highlighted	a	strategic	error	in	how	the	campaign	had	been	organised,	as	well	as	weaknesses	within	the	structures																																									 																					596	Personal	Collection,	Ford	Workers	Group	“The	Combine”,	‘Fraud	News	Dagenham	Bulletin’,	February	20	1984.	597	Personal	Collection,	Ford	Britain	Industrial	Relations,	‘Employee	Bulletin’	23	February	1984.	598	Brian	Groom,	‘Mixed	Support	for	Ford	Protest’,	Financial	Times	(London,	28	February	1984),	p.	10.	599	‘Some	Progress	in	Ford	Talks’,	Morning	Star,	7	March	1984,	p.	5.	
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and	official	leadership	of	the	trade	unions	at	Ford.	Anticipating	further	closures,	
Fraud	News	called	for	a	more	locally	lead	approach:	Do	it	the	miners’	way.	If	there	is	any	fight	in	any	plant	under	attack,	they	must	come	out	first,	and	then	the	rest	of	us	must	support	them	by	coming	out	ourselves.	Let	the	threatened	plants	have	confidence	that	we	will	join	them,	and	that	we,	all	united,	can	win.600	With	government	policy	driving	up	unemployment,	defending	jobs	became	a	major	point	of	contention.	Yet	instead	of	car	plants,	the	closure	of	coal	pits	provoked	this	politically	charged	confrontation	between	organised	labour	and	Thatcher’s	government.	While	union	officials	demonstrated	a	lack	of	leadership	at	Ford,	the	miners’	defensive	struggle	ultimately	ended	in	defeat.	If	such	an	outcome	was	not	necessarily	inevitable,	the	situation	stood	in	stark	contrast	with	previous	political	impact	of	less	protracted	industrial	action	by	miners	and	car	workers	alike.		Another	major	dispute	at	Ford	appeared	like	a	serious	possibility	three	years	later.	During	negotiations	of	the	1988	pay	contract,	Ford	workers	voted	to	take	industrial	action	in	a	secret	ballot	by	an	overwhelming	eighty-eight	per	cent.	With	an	official	strike	planned	to	start	the	following	day,	the	FNJNC	met	on	Sunday	31	January.	At	first	divisions	between	the	unions	averted	industrial	action.	These	arose	when	covert	negotiations	between	AEU	officials	and	the	company	became	exposed.	In	scenes	reminiscent	of	those	surrounding	the	opening	of	Halewood,	these	discussions	aimed	to	establish	a	single-union	agreement	for	a	new	plant	in	Dundee.	This	would	again	undermine	the	national	agreement	with	the	introduction	of	different	terms	and	conditions	at	the	new	facility.	With	representatives	of	the	workforce	divided	by	inter-union	rivalries,	negotiations	resulted	in	a	recommendation	to	accept	a	new	three-year	contract.	Though	this	improved	upon	the	company’s	original	offer	in	terms	of	pay,	contentious	proposals	to	change																																									 																					600	Personal	Collection,	Ford	Workers	Group	(“The	Combine”),	Fraud	News:	
Dagenham	Bulletin,	9	May	1984.	
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working	practices	remained	in	place.	That	week	workers	voted	to	reject	the	deal.	Then	3,000	of	them	walked	out	from	the	Dagenham	PTA	Plant	before	strike	action	went	nationwide	the	following	week.601	During	the	dispute	a	poster	appeared	on	the	picket	line,	bearing	the	Combine’s	subverted	Fraud	logo.	A	photograph	of	a	Black	worker,	holding	a	homemade	placard	that	read	‘No	Strings’	high	in	his	hands,	almost	filled	the	entire	sheet	of	paper.	This	image	drew	on	the	previous	history	of	workers’	struggle	at	Ford,	echoing	the	language	used	by	the	Combine	a	decade	earlier.	Previously	the	demand	had	always	been	raised	alongside	others	though,	representing	a	refusal	to	let	management	tie	pay	increases	and	other	concessions	to	changes	in	working	practices.	That	the	Combine	now	raised	it	on	its	own	pointed	to	how	the	power	dynamics	had	changed	in	favour	of	the	company.	The	poster	still	depicted	the	workforce	as	retaining	leverage	though,	a	point	that	the	only	text	aside	from	the	
Fraud	logo	expressed	explicitly:	‘We’ve	got	them	by	the	bollocks,	now	squeeze!’	This	begged	a	question	afterwards,	as	spelt	out	in	a	caption	to	a	photograph	of	the	poster	in	Fraud	News:	‘So	why	didn’t	we	squeeze?!’602	The	strike	certainly	made	its	impact	felt	across	Ford	of	Europe	more	rapidly	than	similar	disputes	had	done	previously.	Further	European	integration	and	the	move	towards	just-in-time	production	left	operations	elsewhere	in	Europe	more	vulnerable	to	disruption	in	the	production	of	components	at	Ford	plants	in	Britain.	With	stock	in	the	supply	chain	kept	to	a	minimum	under	this	system,	a	‘domino	effect’	began	to	hit	production	at	plants	in	Genk,	Saarlouis,	Amsterdam	and	Cork	within	a	day	or	two	of	industrial	action	breaking	out.603	As	well	as	the	threat	the	
																																								 																					601	Charles	Leadbeater,	‘Threat	of	National	Strike	at	Ford’,	Financial	Times	(London,	5	February	1988),	p.	1.	602	B.	P.,	‘We	Were,	We	Are,	We	Will	Ever	Be’,	Fraud	News	(Ilford,	Essex,	April	1988),	pp.	4–5.	603	Haig	Simonian,	‘Domino	Effect	Hits	West	German	Car	Plants’,	Financial	
Times	(London,	10	February	1988),	p.	12.	
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ongoing	restructuring	of	Ford	of	Europe	posed	to	the	workforce,	it	also	exposed	new	vulnerabilities	for	the	company	too.	Within	two	weeks	of	the	strike	starting,	officials	still	engaged	in	secret	talks	with	management,	where	they	agreed	another	deal.	This	covered	a	shorter	period	than	the	original	company	proposal,	running	for	two	years	instead	of	three,	and	left	‘changes	in	working	practices	subject	to	agreement’	with	the	unions.604	In	the	end,	workers	voted	by	more	than	two	to	one	in	favour	of	its	acceptance.	Out	of	twenty-one	British	Ford	plants,	only	the	Dagenham	PTA	workforce	voted	down	the	offer.	Communist	Party	member	and	FNJNC	Secretary	Jim	Arlie	described	the	settlement	as	having	‘forced	major	changes	from	the	company’,	representing	it	as	a	victory.	TGWU	General	Secretary	Ron	Todd	described	the	outcome	as	having	‘vindicated	his	trust	in	his	members’,	a	remark	that	revealed	where	he	felt	the	burden	of	trust	lay	between	trade-union	members	and	officials.605	In	contrast	to	such	congratulatory	statements,	the	final	issue	of	Fraud	News	offered	a	more	sombre	assessment,	while	tracing	industrial	action	back	to	unofficial	stoppages	and	mass	lobbies	of	the	negotiations	the	previous	year.	Union	leaders,	such	as	FNJNC	Deputy	Chairman	Derek	Horn	who	claimed	‘there	are	no	strings	at	all	attached	to	this	agreement’,	came	under	criticism	for	misrepresenting	the	final	offer	before	the	final	vote.606	While	winning	minor	concessions	on	the	implementation	of	this	process,	union	officials	abandoned	a	position	of	strength	without	a	fight	on	the	substantive	issue.	TGWU	official	Steve	Hart,	a	Eurocommunist	in	the	factional	splits	then	dividing	the	CPGB,	came	under	particularly	harsh	scrutiny.	As	well	as	obstructing																																									 																					604	‘Ford	Workers	Vote	to	Accept	Pay	Deal’,	Morning	Star	(London,	19	February	1988),	p.	12.	605	Ibid.		 606	Ford	Workers	Group	(‘The	Combine’),	‘We	Were	Conned.	We	Were	Robbed.	Now	We	Must	Fight	the	Strings!’,	Fraud	News	(Ilford,	Essex,	April	1988),	p.	1.	
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rank-and-file	involvement	in	the	strike,	Hart	stood	accused	of	failing	to	support	a	shop	steward	sacked	on	false	charges	from	the	Dagenham	Body	Plant	shortly	beforehand.	Publication	of	an	old	photograph	of	him	in	a	Combine	t-shirt	mocked	him	for	having	previously	presented	himself	as	more	sympathetic	to	the	shop-floor	militants.	While	supporting	a	left-wing	campaign	for	control	of	the	unions,	the	Combine	also	emphasised	the	need	for	their	workmates	to	take	collective	action	themselves	to	prevent	the	introduction	of	team	working,	temporary	labour,	quality	circles	and	the	like.	The	pay	claim	that	ran	between	1989	and	1990	told	a	similar	story.	In	response	to	an	offer	of	a	9.5	per	cent	pay	rise	with	a	further	increase	of	2.5	per	cent	above	inflation	the	following	year,	a	series	of	unofficial	strikes	broke	out	during	negotiations.	A	ballot	also	indicated	overwhelming	support	for	a	strike	with	eighty-one	per	cent	of	votes	cast	in	favour	of	industrial	action.	Such	signs	initially	suggested	the	possibility	of	a	major	confrontation.	Yet,	union	negotiators	then	avoided	official	action	by	re-balloting	the	membership.	While	some	unofficial	stoppages	took	place	afterwards,	these	involved	skilled	workers	defending	their	sectional	interests,	instead	of	involving	the	wider	workforce.	This	gave	yet	another	indication	of	the	shift	in	power	away	from	the	broad	mass	of	Ford	workers.607	Meanwhile,	widespread	social	unrest	outside	the	factory	put	the	significance	of	the	situation	at	Ford	into	perspective.	By	the	end	of	the	year	a	campaign	of	direct	action	against	the	poll	tax	led	to	the	resignation	of	Margaret	Thatcher	as	Prime	Minister.	This	conjuncture	lent	itself	to	analysis	in	terms	of	the	‘social	wage’,	since	this	policy	threatened	a	regressive	shift	in	the	burden	of	taxation	raised	to	pay	for	local	government	services.	While	the	outcome	of	industrial	unrest	at	the	carmakers	in	the	1980s	was	not	a	foregone	conclusion,	the	relative	impact	of	these	two																																									 																					607	‘Ford	and	Unions	to	Meet	Next	Week	on	Pay’,	Financial	Times	(London,	4	January	1990),	p.	7;	Michael	Smith	and	Michael	Cassell,	‘Ford	Faces	Disruption	Despite	Vote’,	Financial	Times	(London,	25	January	1990),	p.	1;	Cohen,	Notoriously	
Militant:	The	Story	of	a	Union	Branch,	pp.	159	&	163.	
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conflicts	was	striking.	The	analysis	of	autonomist	Marxists,	such	as	Negri,	who	view	this	as	a	period	of	transition	away	from	the	‘mass	worker’	as	hegemonic	social	subject	towards	more	socialised	forms	of	working-class	subjectivity,	can	only	be	understood	in	relation	to	this	conjuncture.	Autonomist	Marxist	theory	and	the	history	of	working-class	struggle	at	Ford	converged	with	more	global	political	and	economic	changes,	the	legacy	of	Thatcherism	and	Japanese	just-in-time	production.	
	
Chapter	Conclusion	
At	the	end	of	the	1980s,	Marco	Revelli,	a	founding	member	of	Lotta	Continua	and	a	former	contributor	to	the	workerist	periodical	Primo	Maggio,	concluded	his	account	of	work	at	Fiat	with	an	analysis	of	developments	there	in	the	1980s.608	Alongside	a	collection	of	Negri’s	work	published	the	previous	year,	this	was	one	of	the	last	works	from	the	Italian	movement	translated	by	Red	Note.609	In	it	Revelli	provided	a	detailed	account	of	changes	to	the	labour	process	situated	within	a	wider	historical	and	political	context.	In	doing	so,	he	framed	the	lack	of	effective	resistance	to	mass	layoffs,	which	saw	around	half	Fiat’s	workforce	effectively	dismissed,	in	terms	of	a	moment	of	working	class	decomposition.	His	analysis	drew	out	the	role	of	technology	in	the	‘liquidation	of	the	working	class	as	a	subjective	dimension	within	the	labour	process’,	undermining	the	Communist	myth	of	the	development	of	the	productive	forces	as	a	primarily	progressive	process.	The	situation	at	Ford	in	Britain	differed	from	that	in	Italy,	where	Fiat	led	the	way	in	terms	of	automating	European	car	production,	having	experienced	some	of	the	most	intense	industrial	conflict	seen	across	the	worldwide	automobile	sector.																																									 																					608	Marco	Revelli,	‘Capitolo	7’,	in	Lavorare	in	Fiat	(Milano:	Garzanti,	1989),	pp.	125–64.	609	Marco	Revelli,	‘[Draft	Translation:]	Power	Relations	at	FIAT’,	trans.	by	Red	Notes	[Ed	Emery]	(London,	1989);	Antonio	Negri,	Revolution	Retrieved:	Writing	on	
Marx,	Keynes,	Capitalist	Crisis	and	New	Social	Subjects	(1967-83),	trans.	by	Red	Notes	[Ed	Emery	and	John	Merrington]	(London:	Red	Notes,	1988).	
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Production	methods	at	the	British	subsidiary,	which	first	introduced	the	car	assembly	line	to	Europe,	were	much	less	developed.	While	still	advanced	by	the	standards	of	the	rest	of	the	British	sector,	these	now	lagged	behind	continental	rivals,	as	well	as	Ford	of	Europe	operations.	In	the	1980s	the	main	capitalist	innovation	in	Britain	occurred	at	the	level	of	the	state,	which	pursued	a	strategy	of	actively	driving	deindustrialisation	further	forward.	Yet,	Revelli’s	analysis	remained	relevant,	situating	the	pattern	of	international	development	in	relation	to	workers	struggle.	This	served	as	a	reminder	of	the	political	dynamics	connecting	the	industrial	unrest	of	the	long	1970s,	so	much	of	which	played	out	at	Ford,	with	the	Thatcherite	response	of	restructuring.		 	
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Conclusion	
The	production	of	Ford	cars	continued	in	Britain	throughout	the	1990s	and	into	the	early	years	of	the	twenty-first	century.	This	section	begins,	however,	by	revisiting	the	long	1970s,	so	as	to	highlight	the	broader	historical	relevance	of	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	and	industrial	unrest	at	the	corporation’s	British	subsidiary.	We	then	examine	a	more	recent	and	distinctly	post-Fordist	moment	of	industrial	action,	which	impacted	upon	an	outsourced	link	in	the	firm’s	supply	chain	and	saw	the	subverted	Fraud	logo	deployed	one	last	time.	Finally,	we	consider	the	relevance	of	this	history	to	a	number	of	issues	of	contemporary	concern	today.	The	first	of	these	is	a	current	vogue	for	accelerationist	ideas,	which	owe	something	of	a	debt	to	autonomist	political	theory.	Another	is	the	recent	resurgence	of	interest	in	workers	inquiry	as	both	a	research	methodology	and	tool	for	political	intervention.			
Workers’	Struggle	at	Ford	in	the	Long	1970s	
The	two	key	early	innovations	first	introduced	at	Ford,	the	automated	final	assembly	line	and	the	firm’s	high-wage	policy,	came	about	in	the	wake	of	major	international	syndicalist	disturbances.	Setting	the	pace	of	work	automatically	extended	beyond	Taylorism,	which	already	set	out	to	give	management	greater	control	over	production	through	the	appropriation	of	workers’	knowledge	and	individualised	incentives.	Higher	wages	aimed	to	buy	off	workers,	who	became	acutely	estranged	from	this	form	of	labour,	which	had	been	entirely	stripped	of	any	intrinsic	value.	Industrial	unrest	and	technological	development	then	intermeshed	throughout	the	history	of	this	twentieth-century	icon,	a	multinational	corporation	that	came	to	symbolise	modern	development.	This	dynamic	played	out	at	the	firm’s	British	subsidiary	as	well	as	in	America.	
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	Amid	the	crisis	and	social	unrest	of	the	interwar	period,	Ford	seemed	to	answer	to	the	prayers	of	British	industrialists.	Then	the	public	investment	required	for	the	development	of	Dagenham	foreshadowed	subsequent	developments.	To	make	this	vision	a	reality	required	state	intervention	on	an	altogether	different	scale	though.	Apart	from	under	the	conditions	of	a	wartime	command	economy,	the	firm	only	fully	realised	its	full	potential	as	an	integral	component	of	the	post-war	Fordist	system.	Meanwhile,	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	emerged	first	in	the	USA,	and	then	in	France	and	Italy,	as	an	articulation	of	the	perspective	of	those	brought	together	by	this	new	form	of	industry.	This	came	about	in	response	to	a	situation	in	which	production	in	purportedly	socialist	countries	increasingly	mirrored	working	conditions	in	developed	capitalist	countries.	Meanwhile,	social	planning	was	embraced	in	the	West—calling	into	question	how	different	these	two	social	models	really	where.	The	formation	of	the	libertarian	socialist	organisation	Solidarity	in	1960	provided	a	manifestation	of	this	tendency	in	Britain,	with	former	Ford	shop	steward	Ken	Weller	a	founding	member.	While	offering	a	unique	perspective	on	shop-floor	unrest	at	Ford,	Solidarity’s	perspective	followed	the	same	political	trajectory	as	Socialisme	ou	Barbarie	away	from	Marxist	class	analysis.	This	then	left	the	group	ill-equipped	to	interpret	the	period	of	crisis	that	began	in	the	late	1960s.	Meanwhile,	government	anti-inflation,	industrial	and	trade	policies	become	increasingly	aligned	with	the	interest	of	Ford.	The	1968	sewing	machinists	strike	saw	company	proposals	to	penalise	unofficial	action	turned	into	a	template	for	legislation	to	impose	similar	sanctions	across	the	entire	workforce	of	Britain.	A	national	pay	strike	at	Ford	the	following	year	then	suggested	an	opportunity	to	implement	such	a	policy.	This	backfired,	contributing	to	Labour’s	defeat	in	the	1970	general	election.	The	stance	taken	by	leading	trade	union	officials	also	highlighted	the	inherent	contradictions	of	the	situation.	Political	
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opposition	to	the	introduction	of	legislation	went	hand	in	hand	with	negotiating	an	agreement	at	Ford,	which	effectively	introduced	such	penalties.	Events	in	France	and	Italy	then	stimulated	interest	in	an	open	Marxist	politics,	equipped	with	the	theoretical	tools	to	analyse	such	a	situation	of	crisis.	From	1969	onwards,	external	interventions	at	Ford	initially	emerged	from	the	intersection	of	far-left	politics,	the	student	movement	and	counter	culture.	This	saw	the	launch	a	new	rank-and-file	newspaper	Big	Flame	on	Merseyside,	the	location	of	the	newer	of	Ford’s	two	main	car	plants.	Then	in	1970	the	Heath	administration	was	elected	on	a	manifesto	that,	while	foreshadowing	neoliberalism,	still	relied	on	the	existing	policy	toolkit	of	industrial	relations	legislation	and	incomes	policy.	This	time	there	was	to	be	less	carrot	and	more	stick	though.	As	the	Industrial	Relations	Bill	passed	through	parliament,	the	1971	Ford	national	pay	strike	posed	the	most	direct	challenge	to	the	introduction	of	this	legislation.	However,	Jack	Jones	and	Hugh	Scanlon,	the	leaders	of	the	two	main	unions	involved,	brokered	a	two-year	deal	behind	the	backs	of	the	strikers.	This	introduced	more	severe	penalty	clauses	and	a	requirement	to	hold	secret	ballots	before	official	industrial	action,	once	again	foreshadowing	government	legislation.	The	failure	of	senior	shop	stewards	to	effectively	oppose	this	settlement	exacerbated	divisions	between	rank-and-file	trade	union	leaders	and	increasingly	militant	groups	of	workers	on	the	shop	floor.	This	strike	also	saw	further	external	intervention.	The	Angry	Brigade	bombing	campaign	made	a	dramatic	impact	at	Ford,	which	was	framed	explicitly	in	terms	of	working-class	autonomy,	whatever	gaps	remained	between	theory	and	practice.	In	Liverpool	Big	Flame	developed	into	a	political	organisation	that	was	modelled	on	Lotta	Continua	(Continuous	Struggle),	the	largest	group	on	the	Italian	extra-parliamentary	left.	Taking	a	leaf	out	of	the	book	of	Italian	Workerism	(operaismo)	led	to	a	tactical	intervention	at	the	car	firm	that	aimed	to	generalise	
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strategies	adopted	by	the	most	militant	sections	of	shop-floor	workers.	Against	a	backdrop	of	rising	inflation	and	the	withdrawal	of	subsidies	for	social	housing,	women	members	of	Big	Flame	also	became	involved	in	housing	struggles	on	Merseyside.	This	experience	along	with	autonomist	and	feminist	theory	underscored	the	relationships	between	industrial	production	and	social	reproduction.	With	wage	rises	increasingly	eroded	by	inflation	and	social	unrest	extending	outside	the	factory,	the	limits	of	a	purely	industrial	strategy	became	increasingly	apparent.	Trade-union	mediation	still	continued	to	break	down	at	Ford,	though.	Shop-floor	unrest	escalated	over	lay-offs,	manning	levels	and	the	pace	of	production.	This	gave	greater	credibility	to	the	critiques	of	trade	unionism	made	by	Big	Flame	and	Solidarity,	groups	that	also	increasingly	provided	militant	shop-floor	workers	with	means	of	communication	between	different	plants	across	the	country.	Meanwhile,	union	officials	obstructed	industrial	action	over	pay	negotiations	at	Ford,	leaving	it	to	other	workers	to	challenge	the	Heath	administration’s	pay	freeze.	Industrial	unrest	still	brought	down	the	government	though.	As	labour	returned	to	power,	the	Social	Contract	brought	trade	union	leaders	even	more	closely	into	alignment	with	the	government.	In	the	wake	of	the	oil	shock,	their	joint	solution	to	the	ongoing	crisis	of	British	capitalism	entailed	imposing	deflationary	wage	settlements	on	workers,	a	real	terms	pay	cut.	This	pushed	the	system	of	trade-union	mediation	towards	breaking	point.	Shop-floor	unrest	at	Ford	reached	a	violent	peak	during	the	IMF	crisis.	The	Ford	Workers	Group	(FWG)	and	the	Ford	Langley	Action	Committee	(FLAC),	workplace	groups	that	put	autonomist	politics	into	practice,	then	emerged	at	Dagenham	and	Langley.	While	Big	Flame	played	a	key	part	in	initiating	this	
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development,	strategic	leadership	remained	in	the	hands	of	members	of	Ford’s	workforce.	This	network	of	external	militants	and	workplace	groups	then	initiated	a	new	national	organisation	the	Ford	Workers	Group	(“The	Combine”)	in	preparation	for	the	1978	wage	claim.	While	many	of	those	involved	were	shop	stewards	with	a	broad	range	of	political	perspectives,	collectively	they	identified	themselves	as	ordinary	workers	and	organised	independently	of	both	the	unions	and	any	external	political	organisations.	Before	negotiations	even	began,	the	Combine	ran	an	unprecedented	shop-floor	campaign	inside	the	factory	and	the	unions.	This	history	hinged	upon	the	1978	national	Ford	pay	strike.	No	previous	pay	dispute	had	seen	the	same	level	of	shop-floor	coordination	across	all	of	the	firm’s	plants.	At	the	same	time	the	company’s	interests	fell	fundamentally	out	of	alignment	with	those	of	the	British	government.	This	led	to	one	of	the	two	longest	strikes	in	the	history	of	Ford’s	local	subsidiary.	It	sparked	off	a	string	of	similar	disputes	in	what	became	known	as	the	Winter	of	Discontent.	The	election	of	Margaret	Thatcher’s	Conservative	administration	in	1979	brought	with	it	a	fundamental	shift	in	government	strategy.	This	entailed	abandoning	pay	restraint	to	instead	pursue	policies	that	actively	fostered	deindustrialisation.	Thatcher’s	one-sided	solution	to	the	crisis	of	the	long	1970s	marked	a	clear	break	with	previous	administrations.	Politically,	this	accelerated	a	process	of	working-class	decomposition,	complementing	a	technical	recomposition	of	labour	both	within	and	beyond	the	automobile	sector.	The	Combine	remained	an	effective	shop-floor	organisation,	but	fundamental	changes	in	public	policy	combined	with	European	corporate	restructuring	increasingly	pushed	workers	onto	the	defensive.	This	allowed	management	and	union	officials	to	stave	off	industrial	action	during	pay	negotiations	throughout	Thatcher’s	first	term	in	office.	That	said,	unofficial	action	enjoyed	some	success	in	
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resisting	the	introduction	of	new	Japanese-style	management	techniques,	and	shop-floor	anger	could	still	erupt	dramatically	at	times.	Ultimately,	it	was	left	to	other	groups	of	workers	to	take	major	industrial	action	of	national	political	significance	with	such	defensive	struggles	ending	in	defeat.	Ford’s	corporate	restructuring	plans	encountered	one	unorthodox	form	of	opposition,	which	originated	on	the	shop	floor.	The	European	Ford	Workers	Combine	(EFWC)	came	about	as	a	direct	result	of	contacts	established	through	the	Combine’s	role	in	the	1978	strike.	It	began	with	a	series	of	informal	discussions	between	shop	stewards	and	other	militants	from	Britain	and	other	subsidiaries	at	peripheral	to	Ford	of	Europe’s	main	operations.	Initially	this	network	included	autonomists	and	anarcho-syndicalists	from	Spain,	where	the	transition	to	liberal	democracy	witnessed	particularly	intense	industrial	unrest	at	Ford	Almussafes	in	Valencia.	The	EFWC	provided	a	hub	for	the	transnational	exchange	of	information	between	members,	but	attempts	at	more	coordinated	activity	proved	less	effective.	As	efforts	to	gain	official	union	support	brought	competing	agenda	to	the	fore,	momentum	dissipated	and	militancy	was	tempered	by	the	involvement	of	senior	trade	unionists.	Official	backing	for	a	series	of	transnational	labour	conferences	grew,	but	cold	war	politics	continued	to	prevent	the	German	union	IG	Metall	from	participating,	leaving	Ford’s	largest	single	European	workforce	outside	the	process.	During	the	1988	pay	negotiations,	a	walkout	at	Ford	Halewood	and	heated	confrontation	between	union	representatives	and	workers	suggested	the	possibility	of	another	major	confrontation.	However,	unofficial	action	quickly	fizzled	out.	Militant	shop	stewards	remained,	who	managed	to	challenge	racial	and	sexual	discrimination,	but	management	restructuring	and	redundancies	generally	went	ahead	unchecked	afterwards.	A	combination	of	Thatcherism	and	Japanese	management	techniques	resolved	a	decades-long	struggle,	which	had	pitted	Ford’s	workforce	against	the	company	and	the	British	state.	
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As	the	hinge	for	this	history,	the	1978	Ford	national	pay	strike	merits	some	further	attention.	The	part	that	the	Ford	Workers	Combine	played	in	this	dispute	broadly	supports	Colin	Hay’s	contention	that	the	Winter	of	Discontent	was	symptomatic	of	trade	union	weakness,	rather	than	strength.	After	the	trade	unions	as	institutions	supported	a	series	of	deflationary	pay	settlements	under	the	Social	Contract,	shop-floor	workers	gave	industrial	action	its	impetus,	acting	independently	even	of	the	shop	steward’s	leadership.	As	well	as	debunking	the	myth	of	this	as	a	‘crisis	of	an	overloaded	state	held	to	ransom	by	the	trade	unions’,	Hay	highlighted	the	constitutive	role	of	this	mythology	in	the	Thatcherite	project	to	transform	the	state.610	Emphasising	the	contingency	of	this	transition,	Hay	went	further	though	to	deny	that	the	crisis	arose	out	of	any	fundamental	contradictions	in	British	Keynesianism.	For	him,	Thatcher	and	her	allies	simply	exploited	issues	originating	out	of	the	Yom	Kippur	War.	All	of	this	suggested	that	the	trade-off	between	unemployment	and	inflation,	a	key	component	in	the	Keynesian	macroeconomic	toolkit,	was	temporarily	disrupted	by	an	exogenous	shock.	It	is	not	clear,	however,	that	the	Arab	Israeli	War	was	the	main	driving	factor	behind	the	rising	cost	of	energy.	Two	years	beforehand	the	US	State	Department	had	already	begun	to	not	just	predict	but	to	actively	advocate	in	favour	of	an	oil-price	increase.	Moreover,	America,	the	hegemonic	world	power,	shared	strong	strategic	ties	to	the	largest	OPEC	member	Saudi	Arabia.	As	an	oil	producer,	the	USA	potentially	gained	an	economic	advantage	over	other	industrial	rival,	among	them	Britain,	from	such	a	price	rise,	which	also	promised	to	stabilise	global	supply.	In	
																																								 																					610	Colin	Hay,	‘Chronicles	of	a	Death	Foretold:	The	Winter	of	Discontent	and	Construction	of	the	Crisis	of	British	Keynesianism’,	Parliamentary	Affairs,	63.3	(2010),	446–70	(p.	447);	Colin	Hay,	‘Narrating	Crisis:	The	Discursive	Construction	of	the	“Winter	of	Discontent”’,	Sociology,	30.2	(1996),	253–77	(p.	261).	
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any	case,	the	relationship	between	increasing	energy	costs	and	inflation	predated	the	war	and	were	not	located	exclusively	in	the	Middle	East.611	Well	aware	of	this,	the	Midnights	Notes	Collective,	a	group	of	autonomist	Marxists	in	America	with	links	to	comrades	in	Italy	and	Britain,	read	the	situation	differently.	Instead	of	emphasising	international	competition,	this	analysis	linked	the	Nixon	and	Ford	administrations’	attitude	towards	oil	prices	to	the	breakdown	in	union-mediated	productivity	bargaining	at	the	end	of	the	1960s.	Across	the	developed	world	wildcat	strikes,	such	as	those	at	Ford	in	Britain,	achieved	‘excessive’	wage	gains	that	were	only	wiped	out	by	inflation	linked	to	increased	energy	costs.	As	Midnight	Notes	observed,	this	situation	then	led	to	‘the	largest	financial	flows	in	the	world’	to	date,	which	funded	the	subsequent	restructuring	the	world	economy.612	With	western	oil	companies	reaping	the	benefits	alongside	OPEC	countries,	the	massive	accumulation	of	capital	across	the	energy	sector	fuelled	another	cycle	of	investment	in	automation,	computerisation	and	robotics.	Explaining	stagflation	primarily	as	an	exogenous	shock	caused	by	the	Middle	East	conflict	obscures	how	the	inflationary	policies	of	western	governments	responded	to	the	actions	of	workers	in	their	own	countries.	A	breakdown	in	the	mechanisms	for	mediating	industrial	relations	during	the	long	1970s	constituted	a	major	contradiction	for	the	Keynesian-Fordist	system.	While	the	political	and	economic	aspects	of	this	crisis	were	intrinsically	intermeshed	and	its	outcome	far	from	predetermined,	Thatcherism	provided	a	decisive	response,	however	opportunistic	and	one-sided,	to	this	situation.	If	Hay	rightly	emphasises	the	possibility	of	political	alternatives,	we	must	also	recognise	that	the	status	quo	did	not	represent	one	of	these.	
																																								 																					611	Oppenheim,	‘Why	Oil	Prices	Go	Up	(1)	The	Past:	We	Pushed	Them’,	
Foreign	Affairs,	25.Winter	1976,	24–57.	612	Midnight	Notes	Collective,	‘“Chapter	1.	Oil,	Guns	and	Money”’,	in	Midnight	
Oil:	Work,	Energy,	War	1973-1992	(Brooklyn,	NY:	Autonomedia,	1992),	pp.	6–7.	
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Framing	this	period	in	terms	of	class	composition	also	suggests	a	dynamic	relationship	between	the	technical	composition	of	labour	and	working-class	subjectivity.	Instead	of	relying	upon	some	notion	of	a	purportedly	traditional	working-class	collective	identity,	this	brings	to	the	fore	the	actual	content	of	class	conflict	as	an	historical	phenomenon,	with	class	understood	as	a	dynamic	relationship	rooted	in	the	production	of	commodities	and	the	reproduction	of	social	relations.	In	the	long	1970s	such	conflict	included	industrial	unrest,	both	at	Ford	and	in	workplaces	across	Britain,	as	well	as	wider	struggles	over	the	social	wage.	Questions	of	collectivism	versus	individualism	then	become	a	political	problem,	rather	than	a	purely	analytical	question.	Moreover,	the	apparent	decline	in	saliency	of	class	might	be	understood	as	a	phenomenon	bound	up	with	a	process	of	working-class	decomposition	in	which	this	period	ended.		
Ford	beyond	Fordism,	1988	to	2009	
Power	relations	at	Ford	shifted	decisively	in	favour	of	management	following	the	1988	pay	dispute.	If	a	successful	strike	a	decade	earlier	marked	a	turning	point,	the	situation	reached	a	nadir	from	a	shop-floor	perspective	by	the	time	Thatcher	left	office.	The	production	of	Ford	cars	in	Britain	carried	on	afterwards	for	a	time,	as	did	militant	rank-and-file	trade	unionism.	Such	activity	also	still	showed	some	signs	of	continuity	with	the	Combine’s	approach	to	organising,	notably	in	relation	to	tackling	sex	and	race	discrimination	at	work.		As	the	rigid	sexual	division	of	labour	at	Ford	started	to	break	down	in	the	1990s,	women	workers	became	increasingly	integrated	into	the	wider	workforce.	This	resulted	in	complaints	about	the	display	of	pornography	inside	the	Dagenham	Engine	Plant.	Management	and	the	trade	union	‘moderates’	who	dominated	the	Joint	Works	Committee	(JWC)	in	that	particular	plant	failed	to	take	the	issue	seriously	at	first.	It	took	an	intervention	by	Allan	Martin,	a	shop	steward	active	in	
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the	militant	1107	branch	of	the	Transport	and	General	Workers’	Union	(TGWU),	for	the	practice	to	be	eradicated.613	One	woman	who	worked	in	Dagenham	at	the	time	Janet	Marlow	later	recalled	the	branch’s	role	in	combatting	other	forms	of	sexual	harassment	too.	She	specifically	credited	shop	stewards	with	successfully	opposing	the	practice	of	hiring	strippers	for	retirement	celebrations	held	within	the	factory.	Likewise,	when	a	group	of	male	workers	forced	their	way	into	a	women’s	changing	room,	union	representatives	from	the	branch	pressed	for	their	dismissal.	While	such	solidarity	helped	foster	a	less	macho	workplace	culture,	Marlow	also	remembered	differences	between	1107	shop	stewards	and	women	members	of	the	branch.614	Not	without	justification,	these	union	representatives	tended	to	view	the	introduction	of	more	‘flexible’	working	practices	with	hostility.	Such	changes	put	downward	pressure	on	full-time	wages	and	threatened	to	remove	whatever	leverage	shop	stewards	still	retained	over	management.	At	the	same	time,	part-time	hours	suited	many	women	who	still	tended	to	carry	the	overwhelming	burden	of	housework,	such	as	childcare.	Solidarity	between	shop	stewards	and	their	women	workmates	ultimately	prevailed.	That	the	interests	of	the	two	groups	became	counterposed	to	one	another,	however,	still	emphasised	how	the	changing	composition	of	the	workforce	coincided	with	a	shift	in	the	balance	of	power	in	management’s	favour.	A	decade	earlier	the	Combine	had	fought	casualisation	and	campaigned	for	a	shorter	working	week,	while	confronting	thorny	issues	raised	by	gender	politics	much	more	confidently.	That	full-time	work	was	now	seen	as	something	that	had	to	be	defended	underscored	the	extent	of	change	in	the	power	dynamics.	This	weakening	in	the	position	of	the	workforce	can	be	framed	in	terms	of	a	political	decomposition	of	labour	brought	about	to	a	significant	extent	through	a	technical	recomposition	of	labour	in	response	to	industrial	unrest.																																									 																					613	Cohen,	Notoriously	Militant:	The	Story	of	a	Union	Branch,	pp.	165–68.	614	Ibid.	
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With	the	workforce	still	mainly	made	up	of	men,	but	extremely	diverse	in	its	ethnic	composition,	racism	remained	an	equally	if	not	more	important	issue.	When	a	Ford	advertising	campaign	saw	the	faces	of	Black	workers	whitewashed	out	of	the	original	photograph,	a	public	relations	debacle	ensued	for	the	firm.	Meanwhile,	unfair	recruitment	practices	resulted	in	union	lawyers	bringing	successful	claims	for	racial	discrimination	to	an	industrial	tribunal.	The	company	was	found	to	have	excluded	members	of	ethnic	minorities	from	well-paid	positions	as	drivers	and	to	have	only	publicised	certain	other	vacancies	in	parts	of	the	Dagenham	estate	where	white	workers	were	much	more	likely	to	see	them.615	The	plant	also	witnessed	serious	outbreaks	of	racist	violence.	In	response	to	a	series	of	attacks	on	Black	and	Asian	workers	on	the	Dagenham	estate,	eight	hundred	of	their	workmates	eventually	walked	out	from	the	PTA	plant	on	5	October	1999.	Senior	steward	Steve	Riley,	another	veteran	of	the	Combine,	demanded	an	investigation	by	the	Commission	for	Racial	Equality.	The	press	reported	the	activity	inside	the	Dagenham	estate	of	Combat	18,	a	group	of	violent	neo-Nazis	connected	to	the	British	National	Party	(BNP).616	Following	the	party’s	electoral	turn	that	year,	the	BNP	became	the	main	opposition	party	on	the	London	Borough	of	Barking	and	Dagenham	Council.	Fascist	politics	had	deep	local	roots	as	seen	in	Bob	Lovell’s	recollections	of	the	1930s.	This	situation	was	without	precedent	anywhere	in	Britain	though.617	Crucially,	it	occurred	in	the	aftermath	of	the	closure	of	the	PTA	plant,	the	main	bastion	of	the	most	militant	section	of	Ford’s	workforce.	Yet	again,	the	deteriorating	political	situation	was	linked	to	the	decomposition	of	labour	inside	the	factory.	
																																								 																					615	Rebecca	Fowler,	‘So	Who	Are	the	Ford	Racists’,	Daily	Mail	(London,	9	October	1999),	pp.	18–19.	616	Robert	Taylor,	‘Ford	Accused	of	Racism	as	Workers	Walk	Out’,	Financial	
Times	(London,	6	October	1999),	p.	1.	617	Lovell,	‘Fords—the	Victory	for	Union	Recognition’.	
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Eventually,	corporate	executives	decided	to	close	the	PTA	plant	despite	an	‘impressive	productivity	turnaround’,	which	saw	new	working	practices	introduced	both	at	Dagenham	and	Halewood.618	By	the	mid-1990s	this	left	both	facilities	relatively	competitive	by	the	standards	of	operations	elsewhere	in	Europe.	All	the	same,	the	assembly	of	Ford	cars	at	Halewood	came	to	an	end	in	2001,	when	a	new	model	the	Focus	replaced	the	Escort.	Operations	only	continued	afterwards	with	a	much	lower	output	of	Jaguar	and	subsequently	Land	Rover	vehicles,	luxury	brands	briefly	acquired	by	the	corporation	before	being	sold	on.	The	following	year	the	Dagenham	PTA	plant	closed,	bringing	just	over	ninety	years	of	Ford	car	production	in	Britain	to	an	end.	Overcapacity	across	European	markets	drove	corporate	decision-making.	Even	though	Halewood	was	by	then	more	efficient	than	Saarlouis,	Ford	maintained	production	at	the	German	subsidiary	as	it	had	capacity	to	absorb	lost	output	from	the	Merseyside	plant,	but	not	vice	versa.	Meanwhile,	British	monetary	policy,	which	saw	sterling	overvalued	before	being	forced	out	of	the	Exchange	Rate	Mechanism	in	September	1992,	contributed	to	the	decision	to	close	Dagenham.	The	volatility	of	the	pound	after	Black	Wednesday	initially	favoured	British	exports.	However,	its	price	increased	again	as	currency	convergence	across	the	Eurozone	created	greater	certainty	about	production	costs	between	member	states.	Conservative	government	policy	also	made	it	quicker	and	cheaper	to	implement	cuts	in	Britain	than	in	Germany,	‘the	downside	of	Britain’s	much-vaunted	labour	market	flexibility’	as	Tolliday	noted	acerbically.619	Workers’	struggle	might	not	have	been	the	immediate	cause	of	Ford	car	production	in	Britain	coming	to	an	end.	The	Conservative	government’s	decidedly	one-sided	solution	to	social	and	industrial	unrest	still	shaped	the	context	for	this	outcome	though.		
																																								 																					618	Tolliday,	‘The	Decline	of	Ford’,	II,	p.	105.	619	Tolliday,	‘The	Decline	of	Ford’,	II,	p.	108.	
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Eight	years	later	another	group	of	workers	involved	in	industrial	action	adopted	the	Fraud	logo	one	last	time,	providing	a	coda	to	the	history	of	unrest	at	Ford.	Two	decades	after	the	Combine’s	last	recorded	use	of	this	symbol,	the	company	logo	was	symbolically	stolen	once	again	in	support	of	a	campaign	of	industrial	direct	action.	This	occurred	after	the	announcement	of	the	closure	of	three	Visteon	plants,	which	had	been	formerly	owned	by	Ford,	with	the	loss	of	six-hundred	jobs.	In	response,	Workers	decided	to	occupy	the	factories.	The	roots	of	this	dispute	went	back	to	8	September	1997,	when	the	Ford	Motor	Corporation	announced	plans	to	restructure	its	international	components	division	into	a	new	company	Visteon.	While	this	began	as	a	wholly	owned	subsidiary,	the	choice	of	such	a	different	name	created	a	distinct	identity,	signalling	the	intention	from	the	outset	to	separate	this	aspect	of	the	business	from	the	rest	of	the	brand.	At	the	time	management	justified	this	move	in	terms	of	the	need	to	increase	sales	to	other	car	firms,	due	to	the	ongoing	consolidation	of	the	components	sector.	The	Financial	Times	reported	that	the	head	of	this	new	offshoot	Charles	Szuluk	'steered	clear	of	the	sensitive	issue	of	divestments'	though.	The	article	also	noted	that	‘outside	suppliers	tend	to	pay	workers	appreciably	less	than	the	leading	car	makers’.620	Following	recent	industrial	unrest	at	General	Motors	over	the	divestiture	of	its	components	division,	Ford	initially	took	a	gradual	approach,	but	the	direction	of	travel	was	clear.	Corporate	policy	first	began	to	‘treat	Visteon	as	an	outside	contractor’,	before	the	spin-off	was	formalised	with	a	share	issue	to	Ford	stockholders	three	years	later.	In	preparation	for	this	move,	the	parent	company	conducted	‘a	market-pricing	review’	with	the	subsidiary	to	adjust	the	rates	for	the	supply	of	various	components.	This	internal	report	made	clear	that	‘it	is	expected	that	Visteon	will	reduce	prices	to	Ford’,	leaving	little	room	for	doubt	where	the	costs	of																																									 																					620	Haig	Simonian,	‘Ford	Revamps	Parts	Division’,	Financial	Times	(London,	9	September	1997),	pp.	1	&	20.	
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outsourcing	would	fall.621	With	ninety	per	cent	of	sales	and	more	than	half	of	all	new	business	still	coming	from	the	parent	company,	the	idea	that	the	new	firm	represented	a	viable	independent	business	met	with	scepticism	in	the	financial	press	from	the	outset.	Within	less	than	a	decade	Visteon	put	British	operations	into	liquidation	on	31	March	2009,	announcing	the	closure	of	three	former	Ford	plants	at	Basildon	in	Essex,	Belfast	and	Enfield	in	North	London.622	Ex-Visteon	worker	Phil	Wilson	later	recalled	how	bluntly	a	consultant	from	KPMG	announced	the	news	to	the	workforce:	‘Visteon	UK	has	just	gone	into	administration—any	money	that	is	owed	to	you	you’ll	have	to	claim	off	the	government.’623	At	first	the	workforce	received	no	guarantees	that	outstanding	wages	would	even	be	paid,	never	mind	redundancy	pay	or	pensions.	In	response,	workers	spontaneously	occupied	the	plant	in	Belfast	later	that	night.	The	next	day	their	workmates	in	Enfield	followed	suit.	Others	in	Basildon	did	likewise,	although	this	third	occupation	came	to	an	abrupt	end	after	workers	‘trashed	the	site	offices’,	resulting	in	a	threat	of	criminal	prosecution.624	The	Belfast	and	Edmonton	plants	still	remained	in	occupation	though.	Meanwhile,	London	hosted	a	G20	summit.	Discussions	between	government	ministers	and	central	bankers	from	twenty	of	the	most	powerful	countries	focused	on	the	ongoing	global	financial	crisis,	a	situation	that	precipitated	Visteon’s	insolvency.	While	the	meeting	witnessed	popular	protest	and	police	violence,	which	left	a	bystander	Ian	Tomlinson	dead,	the	Enfield	occupation	attracted																																									 																					621	Tim	Burt,	‘Visteon	Strives	to	Achieve	Independence	from	Ford’,	Financial	
Times	(London,	17	April	2000),	p.	28.	622	London,	Bishopsgate	Institute,	Woodward	70,	‘Visteon	Workers:	Fighting	for	Pensions	Justice’.	623	Phil	Wilson,	‘We	Knew	We	Had	Nothing	to	Loose’,	Solidarity,	The	Trade	
Union	Magazine:	For	Independent,	Fighting	and	Democratic	Trade	Unionism,	Autumn	2009,	pp.	8–9	(p.	8).	624	Report	&	Reflections	on	the	2009	UK	Ford-Visteon	Dispute:	A	Post-Fordist	
Struggle	(London:	Past	Tense,	2009),	pp.	1–2.	
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external	support	too.	The	most	practical	solidarity	came	from	the	Haringey	Solidarity	Group	(HSG),	a	local	collective	based	in	the	neighbouring	borough,	which	originally	emerged	out	of	a	local	anti-poll	tax	group.	Only	one	other	person	remained	inside	the	plant	throughout	the	entire	occupation	alongside	former	members	of	the	workforce.	He	was	Alan	Woodward,	a	HSG	‘supporter,	though	not	a	member’,	as	he	described	himself.625	Woodward	helped	draft	the	one	written	statement	issued	throughout	the	occupation,	which	was	then	printed	by	HSG	member	Dave	Morris.	Other	members	of	the	group	picketed	Ford	dealers,	provided	legal	information,	provided	access	to	a	bank	account	to	process	donations	and	played	a	key	role	in	setting	up	the	Ford	Visteon	Workers	Support	Group.	Afterwards	one	of	those	involved	in	the	occupation	the	former	convenor	Phil	Wilson	drew	a	contrast	between	such	concrete	solidarity	and	the	response	received	from	union	officials:	I	remember	one	stage	when	we	had	an	official	come	down	to	the	picket	line	and	basically	saying	you’re	holding	out	here	for	something	you	may	never	receive,	painting	a	really	gloomy	picture	for	us.	That	was	one	of	our	lowest	points.	I	have	to	say	that	one	of	the	people	that	was	responsible	for	lifting	our	spirits	after	that	was	a	guy	called	Tony	from	Haringey	Solidarity	that	came	round	in	his	big	white	Transit	van	and	just	kept	all	our	spirits	up—so	that	just	showed	me	the	two	different	sides	where	you’ve	got	a	guy	down	the	road	that	lifted	our	spirits	and	someone	who	we	expected	to	lift	our	spirits	just	knocking	the	stuffing	out	of	us	really.626	Despite	occasional	bouts	of	militant	rhetoric,	Unite	officials	oscillated	in	practice	between	adopting	a	passive	stance,	which	was	perhaps	understandable	given	the																																									 																					625	Alan	Woodward,	Ford	Visteon	Enfield	Workers	Occupation:	An	Eyewitness	
Account	and	First	Thoughts	(London:	Gorter	Press,	2009),	p.	7.	626	Phil	Wilson,	p.	9.	
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legal	implications	of	any	involvement,	and	actively	attempting	to	end	the	occupation	before	the	dispute	had	been	resolved.	Wilson,	who	was	by	his	own	account	less	sceptical	of	the	union	than	many	of	his	workmates,	afterwards	singled	out	the	official	Steve	Hart	for	putting	them	under	pressure	to	end	industrial	action	before	a	final	settlement	had	been	reached.627	In	the	end	union	negotiations	resulted	in	a	settlement,	which	represented	at	least	a	partial	victory	for	the	occupation.	Visteon	workers	achieved	this	outcome	with	their	most	consistent	support	coming	from	a	group	with	broadly	autonomist/anarchist	politics,	while	Unite	trade-union	officials	played	a	much	more	ambiguous	role.	The	main	source	of	outside	solidarity	came	from	a	group	that	emerged	from	the	campaign	against	the	poll	tax.	This	could	be	framed	as	a	struggle	over	the	erosion	of	the	social	wage,	with	a	regressive	change	to	fiscal	policy	shifting	the	burden	of	payment	for	local	authority	services.	While	this	situation	demonstrated	that	militant	industrial	action	could	still	achieve	results	well	after	the	end	of	the	long	1970s,	situating	these	events	in	a	longer	view	puts	their	scale	and	wider	political	impact	into	perspective	too.	However	effective	the	Visteon	workers’	actions	proved	to	be,	nobody	could	ascribe	to	them	the	same	vanguard	role	as	car	workers	had	for	proponents	of	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	in	the	long	1970s.	This	is	not	to	belittle	the	Visteon	occupation,	but	rather	to	suggest	that	the	notion	of	an	internal	vanguard	might	have	served	its	purpose	by	then	in	politically	displacing	the	external	vanguard	party.	Moreover,	seeking	out	a	new	hegemonic	antagonistic	social	subject	seems	unlikely	to	provide	any	shortcuts	to	the	problem	involved	in	industrial	organising	today.	What	contemporary	relevance	can	we	glean	from	this	history	then?		
																																								 																					627	Woodward,	pp.	15–16.	
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Accelerationism	and	the	Politics	of	Working-Class	Autonomy	Today	
Political	ideas	owing	something	of	a	debt	to	autonomist	Marxism	have	gained	a	certain	currency	in	Britain	today.	The	journalist	and	commentator	Paul	Mason	made	as	much	clear	in	PostCapitalism:	A	Guide	to	Our	Future,	a	popular	work	of	political	economy	that	made	the	Sunday	Times	Bestsellers	List.	Mason	cited	Negri’s	interpretation	of	a	section	of	Marx’s	Grundrisse	the	‘Fragment	on	Machines’	as	providing	a	prophetic	vision	of	a	Postcapitalist	future.628	In	doing	so,	he	set	out	to	popularise	a	brand	of	technologically	utopianism	referred	to	as	left-accelerationism.	More	recently	the	founding	editor	of	Novara	Media	Aaron	Bastani	signalled	that	he	broadly	shared	the	same	position	with	the	title	of	his	book	
Fully	Automated	Luxury	Communism.	Along	with	an	unambiguously	enthusiastic	attitude	towards	technological	progress,	Bastani	evoked	‘the	right	to	luxury’,	a	demand	first	raised	in	Italy	by	autonomist	youth	associated	in	the	mid-1970s.629	Likewise,	a	provocative	and	widely	cited	manifesto	by	two	academics	Nick	Srniceck	and	Alex	Williams	recently	proposed,	‘a	fully	automated	economy’	as	the	first	of	three	emancipatory	demands	aimed	at	revitalising	left-wing	politics.	They	too	drew	upon	the	‘Fragment	on	Machines’,	while	situating	themselves	in	dialogue	with	autonomist	Marxists	and	those	influenced	by	this	tendency.	Srniceck	and	Williams	recognised	that	the	approach	they	advocated	entailed	taking	a	bit	of	a	gamble.	‘The	simple	wager	of	the	demand	for	full	automation	is	that	wealth	can	be	produced	in	non	capitalist	ways.’	In	fact,	the	punt	they	proposed	taking	went	further	though.630	Their	argument	rested	on	the	assumption	that	automation	
																																								 																					628	Paul	Mason,	PostCapitalism:	A	Guide	to	Our	Future	(London:	Allen	Lane,	2015),	pp.	133–38.	629	Aaron	Bastani,	Fully	Automated	Luxury	Communism:	A	Manifesto	(London:	Verso,	2019);	Maria	Elena	Cantilena	and	Marco	Grifo,	‘Da	Wounded	Knee	alla	Sapienza.	La	figura	dell’indiano	nel	movimento	del	1977:	comunicazione	transatlantica	e	ibridazione	culturale’,	Ácoma,	2017,	185–214	(p.	195).	630	Nick	Srnicek	and	Alex	Williams,	Inventing	the	Future:	Postcapitalism	and	a	
World	Without	Work	(London:	Verso,	2015),	pp.	109	&	218–19.	
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necessarily	results	in	such	an	outcome.	For	them,	a	breakdown	in	the	correlation	between	value	and	labour	time	promised	to	lead	to	an	irreconcilable	contradiction	between	productive	forces	and	capitalist	social	relations.	Marx	certainly	speculated	about	the	possibility	that	such	a	situation	could	arise	in	the	‘Fragment	on	Machines’.	Moreover,	the	emphasis	they	placed	on	this	text	set	Italian	workerists	and	autonomist	Marxists	apart	from	both	a	structuralist	reading	of	Capital	and	a	Marxist	humanist	focus	on	his	early	writings.	In	doing	so,	they	aimed	to	address	common	concerns	across	this	tendency,	such	as	the	need	to	develop	a	critical	analysis	of	the	changing	relationship	between	the	labour	process	and	wider	circuits	of	valorisation	and	social	reproduction.	Yet,	some	of	those	involved	in	autonomist	politics	at	the	time	went	on	afterwards	to	reflect	critically	upon	the	influence	this	text	had	had	on	them.	Notably,	George	Caffentzis	later	identified	what	he	saw	as	a	major	inconsistency	within	Marx’s	logic.	While	positing	a	tendency	towards	the	incommensurability	of	labour	time	and	value,	he	also	continued	to	explain	capitalist	crisis	in	terms	of	the	more	familiar	tendency	of	the	rate	of	profit	to	fall,	which	he	derived	from	the	labour	theory	of	value.	According	to	Caffentzis,	Marx	later	resolved	this	conceptual	contradiction,	which	they	both	saw	as	reflecting	a	real	systemic	contradiction	too,	through	the	‘rejection/inclusion	of	the	incommensurability	thesis’	in	his	subsequent	analysis	of	the	general	rate	of	profit.631	In	the	third	volume	of	Capital,	Marx	argued	that	the	relationship	between	labour	and	value	ultimately	functioned	across	the	economy	as	a	whole.632	Significantly,	this	suggested	a	relationship	between	the	development	of	highly	automated	industries	and	the	ongoing	emergence	of	other	new	sectors	of	the	economy	with	a	much	lower	levels	of	organic	composition.	
																																								 																					631	George	Caffentzis,	‘From	the	Grundrisse	to	Capital	and	Beyond:	Then	and	Now’,	Workplace:	A	Journal	for	Academic	Labor,	15,	2008,	59–74	(p.	64).	632	Chapter	Nine	of	Marx,	III,	pp.	254–72.	
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The	relevance	of	Caffentzis’s	argument	goes	beyond	mere	Marxology.	His	reading	of	Marx	informed	an	analysis	of	recent	structural	changes,	which	had	seen	the	expansion	of	labour-intensive	service	sector	work	alongside	the	rise	of	high	tech	sectors.	Crucially,	this	suggested	a	mechanism	by	which	the	capitalist	system	adapted	to	crises	linked	to	technological	expansion.	In	such	circumstances,	the	growing	‘techno-skepticism’	of	the	anti-capitalist	movement	since	the	late	1960s	represented	a	coherent	response	according	to	Caffentzis.633	Even	within	autonomist	Marxist	circles,	those	who	took	seriously	Marx’s	analysis	of	value	did	not	necessarily	share	the	conclusions	drawn	from	the	Grundrisse	by	today’s	left-accelerationists.	Revisiting	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	in	Britain	during	the	heyday	of	labour	unrest	at	Ford	might	help	clarify	relative	merits	of	Caffentzis’s	reading	of	Marx	compared	to	an	accelerationist	one.	While	it	was	left	to	an	American	publisher	to	translate	Negri’s	most	relevant	work	from	his	seminars	at	the	École	Normale	Supérieure,	Red	Notes	played	a	key	part	in	introducing	an	English	readership	to	much	of	his	writing,	which	clearly	influenced	subsequent	readings	of	the	Grundrisse.634	More	importantly,	another	generally	overlooked	source	Raniero	Panzieri’s	‘Surplus	Value	and	Planning:	Notes	on	the	Reading	of	“Capital”’	cast	light	on	the	origins	of	this	debate.	This	text	only	came	out	in	English	as	the	opening	article	of	the	first	pamphlet	of	the	Conference	of	Socialist	Economists’	(CSE),	which	as	we	have	seen	then	shared	links	to	Big	Flame	and	Red	Notes.	The	translator	of	this	text																																									 																					633	Caffentzis,	‘From	the	Grundrisse	to	Capital	and	Beyond:	Then	and	Now’,	p.	69.	 634	Antonio	Negri,	Marx	oltre	Marx:	Quaderno	di	lavoro	sui	Grundrisse,	Materiali	Marxisti,	442	(Milano:	Feltrinelli,	1979);	Antonio	Negri,	Marx	beyond	
Marx:	Lessons	on	the	Grundrisse,	ed.	by	Jim	Fleming,	trans.	by	Harry	Cleaver,	Michael	Ryan,	and	Maurizio	Viano	(South	Hadley,	MA:	Bergin	&	Garvey,	1984);	see	also,	for	instance,	‘Marx	beyond	Marx:	Working	Notes	on	the	Grundrisse’	in	Negri,	
Revolution	Retrieved:	Writing	on	Marx,	Keynes,	Capitalist	Crisis	and	New	Social	
Subjects	(1967-83),	pp.	155–76.	
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neglected	to	mention	that	the	Italian	original	served	as	the	introduction	to	the	first	Italian	translation	of	Marx’s	‘Frammento	sulle	macchinhe’.	In	the	piece,	Panzieri	criticised	Lenin	for	equating	state	planning	with	socialism	in	theory,	while	in	practice	replicating	capitalist	social	relations	in	production.	Panzieri	linked	this	to	a	broader	critique	of	orthodox	Marxism,	which	he	traced	back	to	an	ambiguity	in	Volume	One	of	Capital.	By	emphasising	the	contrast	between	factory	planning	and	the	anarchy	of	circulation,	Marx	suggested	that	this	tension	constituted	an	inherent	contradiction	intrinsic	to	capitalism,	rather	than	one	affecting	the	dynamics	of	a	particular	historic	phase	of	the	system’s	development.635	Panzieri	then	considered	the	possibility	that	the	Grundrisse	might	inform	an	alternative	to	the	failed	Leninist	model	of	transitioning	to	Communism	through	state	planning.	In	doing	so,	he	made	just	one	direct	reference	to	the	text	though:	Throughout	Marx	there	is,	if	anything,	a	theory	of	the	“unsustainability”	of	capitalism	at	its	highest	level	of	development	(see	the	final	part	of	the	fragment	from	the	
Grundrisse	published	below).	The	“superabundant”	productive	forces	then	enter	into	conflict	with	the	“restricted	base”	of	the	system	and	the	quantitative	measurement	of	labour	becomes	a	blatant	absurdity.	Yet,	this	perspective	immediately	refers	us	back	to	another	question.	The	development	of	capitalism	in	its	most	recent	form	demonstrates	the	capacity	of	the	system	to	self-limit,	to	reproduce	the	conditions	of	its	own	survival	through	conscious	interventions,	and	to	plan—alongside	the	development	of	the	capitalist	productive	forces—the	limits	
																																								 																					635	Karl	Marx,	‘Frammento	sulle	macchine’,	trans.	by	Renato	Solmi,	Quaderni	
rossi,	4,	1964,	288–300;	Mario	Tronti,	‘Chapter	18:	Italy’,	in	Karl	Marx’s	Grundrisse:	
Foundations	of	the	Critique	of	Political	Economy	150	Years	Later,	ed.	by	Marcello	Musto,	trans.	by	Arianna	Bove,	Frontiers	of	Political	Economy,	109	(London:	Routledge,	2008),	pp.	229–32.	
	 271	
of	such	development	(for	example	by	planning	the	level	of	unemployment).636	Panzieri	prefaced	the	‘Fragment	on	Machines’	by	warning	against	a	technologically	determinist	reading	of	Marx.	For	the	avoidance	of	doubt,	he	concluded	by	reiterating	the	point.	‘In	brief,	Marxist	thought	has	failed	to	grasp	the	fundamental	character	of	modern-day	capitalism,	which	lies	in	its	capacity	for	salvaging	the	fundamental	expression	of	the	law	of	surplus	value,	i.e.	planning,	both	at	the	level	of	the	factory	and	at	the	social	level.’637	Whatever	relevance	the	Grundrisse	retains	today,	raising	a	demand	for	full	automation	glosses	over	all	this.	The	historic	relationship	between	technological	development	and	industrial	unrest	at	Ford	points	to	another	issue	with	adopting	such	a	demand.	Instead	of	a	tactical	engagement	in	industrial	politics,	contesting	management’s	use	of	technology	while	recognising	the	strategic	agency	of	workers,	we’re	left	with	a	slogan	divorced	from	all	such	practical	concerns.	Fortunately	perhaps,	accelerationism	is	not	the	only	example	of	a	perspective	today	with	a	genealogical	relationship	with	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy.	Others	have	also	attempted	to	develop	political	practices	for	intervention	in	the																																									 																					636	My	own	translation	based	on	Raniero	Panzieri,	‘Surplus	Value	and	Planning:	Notes	on	the	Reading	of	“Capital”’,	in	The	Labour	Process	&	Class	
Strategies,	trans.	by	Julian	Bees,	CSE	Pamphlet,	1	(London:	Stage	1,	1976),	pp.	4–25	(pp.	20–21).	The	original	reads:	‘C’è	diffusamente,	semmai,	in	Marx,	(si	veda	la	parte	finale	del	frammento	dei	Grundrisse	pubblicato	qui	di	seguito)	una	teoria	della	<<insostenibilità>>	del	capitalismo	al	suo	massimo	livello	di	sviluppo,	allorché	le	forze	produttive	<<sovrabbondanti>>	entrano	in	conflitto	con	la	<<base	ristretta>>	del	sistema,	e	la	misurazione	quantitativa	del	lavoro	diventa	un	palese	assurdo.	Ma	questa	prospettiva	rinvia	immediatamente	a	un’altra	questione:	lo	sviluppo	del	capitalismo	nella	sua	forma	recente	dimonstra	la	capacità	del	sistema	ad	<<autolimitarsi>>,	a	riprodurre	con	interventi	consapevoli	le	condizioni	della	sua	sopravvivenza,	e	a	pianificare,	con	lo	sviluppo	capitalistico	delle	forze	produttive,	anche	i	limiti	di	questo	sviluppo	stesso	(ad	esempio,	con	la	pianificazione	di	una	quota	di	disoccupazione).’	Raniero	Panzieri,	‘Plusvalore	e	pianificazione:	Appunti	di	lettura	del	Capitale’,	Quaderni	rossi,	4,	1964,	256–87	(pp.	285–86).	637	Panzieri,	‘Surplus	Value	and	Planning’,	p.	21.	The	original	reads:	Accade	cosí	che	al	pensiero	marxista	sfugga,	in	generale,	la	caratteristica	fondamentale	dell’odierno	capitalismo,	che	è	nel	recupero	dell’espressione	fondamentale	della	legge	del	plusvalore,	il	piano,	dal	livello	di	fabbrica	al	livello	sociale.	Panzieri,	‘Plusvalore	e	pianificazione’,	p.	288.	
	 272	
workplace	informed	by	this	tendency.	For	instance,	the	Kolinko	collective	from	the	Rhine-Ruhr	region	of	Germany	began	a	call	centre	inquiry	in	1999.	This	reflected	disillusionment	with	the	summit	hopping	of	the	anti-globalisation	movement,	which	they	saw	as	irrelevant	to	the	everyday	lives	of	activist	themselves,	as	well	as	those	of	other	workers.	Such	an	approach	set	out	to	examine	‘the	concrete	conditions	of	exploitation	and	the	prospects	of	a	new	class	movement’,	explicitly	influenced	by	Socialisme	ou	Barbarie	and	Quaderni	rossi.638	Over	a	two-year	period	Kolinko	forged	a	number	of	transnational	connections	as	indicated	by	references	to	reports	in	Undercurrents,	an	English	publication	sharing	a	similar	perspective,	on	the	1999	British	Telecom	(BT)	strike.	This	dispute	was	widely	regarded	at	the	time	as	the	first	call-centre	strike	in	this	country.	Such	transnational	links	extended	beyond	an	exchange	of	information,	aiming	towards	a	collective	common	practice.	Activists	in	Brighton	adopted	the	name	Hotlines,	which	was	originally	used	by	their	German	comrades,	for	leaflets	that	they	produced	and	distributed	during	this	dispute.	While	demonstrating	a	degree	of	continuity	with	previous	workerist	politics,	Kolinko	ultimately	succeeded	more	in	confronting	other	activists	with	the	limitations	of	protesting	international	summits	than	in	establishing	an	effective	alternative	practice.639	More	recently	the	financial	crisis	of	2007	to	2008	and	its	ongoing	aftermath	focused	wider	attention	on	issues	of	economic	power,	the	world	of	work	and	class	relations.	The	online	magazine	Viewpoint,	which	emerged	from	the	Occupy	movement,	dedicated	an	entire	issue	to	the	theme	of	workers’	inquiry.	This	included	historical	material	from	and	analysis	of	Socialisme	ou	Barbarie,	Italian	
operaismo,	and	the	French	Maoist	practice	of	établissment,	which	entailed	an	industrial	turn	by	former-student	intellectuals	in	the	1970s.	These	pieces	appeared																																									 																					638	Kolinko,	Hotlines:	Call	Centre,	Inquiry,	Communism	(Duisburg:	Kolinko,	2002)	<https://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/kolinko/lebuk/e_lebuk.htm>	[accessed	5	September	2018].	639	Ibid.	
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alongside	other	material	with	a	more	contemporary	focus,	applying	the	methods	and	concepts	to	today’s	workplace.640		Such	engagement	displays	greater	continuity	than	accelerationism	with	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy,	both	in	terms	of	theory	and	practice.	Questions	remain	about	what	lessons	should	be	learned	from	autonomist	theory	about	the	relationship	between	the	world	of	work	and	wider	social	relations	though.	In	his	comprehensive	account	of	Italian	autonomist	Marxism,	Steve	Wright	concluded	that	one	of	this	tendency’s	main	weaknesses	consisted	in	a	propensity	to	develop	overarching	conceptual	categories.	According	to	Wright,	the	‘[m]ost	damaging	of	all’	was	the	operaio	sociale.	He	took	a	more	favourable	view	of	the	term	social	
factory,	which	‘alluded	to	a	significant	rethinking	of	class	composition’,	however.	Wright	also	offered	a	positive	assessment	of	the	shift	away	from	a	‘too-narrow	focus	on	[...]	the	immediate	process	of	production	[...]	to	examine	the	world	beyond	the	factory	walls’,	as	a	general	trajectory	within	workerism	and	autonomist	Marxism.641	Wright’s	analysis	highlights	the	limitations	of	any	politics	focusing	exclusively	on	the	labour	process	in	isolation	from	wider	circuits	of	valorisation	and	social	reproduction,	processes	involving	both	the	state	and	unwaged	labour.	However	welcome	a	recently	renewed	interest	in	workplace	organising	may	be,	distilling	down	the	lessons	of	Italian	workerism	into	a	mere	workplace	inquiry	would	be	mistaken.	To	do	so	would	be	particularly	ironic	today,	when	so	much	work	clearly	lies	well	beyond	the	factory	gates	of	half	a	century	ago.	When	making	deliveries	in	the	gig	economy,	for	instance,	the	boundary	between	the	site	of	production	and	the	wider	social	field	has	become	increasingly	erased.																																									 																					640	‘Workers’	Inquiry’,	Viewpoint	Magazine,	3,	2013	<https://viewpointmag.com/2013/09/30/issue-3-workers-inquiry/>	[accessed	14	March	2016].	641	Steve	Wright,	Storming	Heaven:	Class	Composition	and	Struggle	in	Italian	
Autonomist	Marxism	(London:	Pluto	Press,	2002),	pp.	224–25.	
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The	history	of	how	the	politics	of	working-class	autonomy	intersected	with	labour	unrest	at	Ford	in	Britain	also	highlights	how	too	narrow	a	focus	on	the	inquiry	as	a	method	could	obscure	what	else	has	emerged	from	this	tendency.	True,	aspects	of	such	a	method	run	throughout	this	history,	from	leaflets	co-written	by	external	militants	and	members	of	the	workforce	to	the	exchange	of	information	within	the	EFWC.	Yet,	almost	none	of	this	was	framed	as	a	workers’	inquiry	as	such.	Moreover,	the	distinction	drawn	between	strategy	and	tactics,	the	mode	of	analysis	in	terms	of	class	composition	and	the	practical	approach	to	organising	all	have	broader	social	relevance	too.							
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